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THE LONDON CONFERENCE.

From the Saturday Review, May 11. | who might be able and willing to prosecute a doubtful claim. It was in virtue of the contract with the GRAND DUKE that France acquired an interest in the subjectmatter, but Prussia was fully justified in regarding the occupation of Luxemburg as a German or European question, lying wholly beyond the competence of the local ruler. If the fortress was considered a necessary safeguard against a French invasion of Germany, it was absurd to transfer it to the possible invader. On the other hand, the Prussian garrison offered no menace to France which might not have been as reasonably apprehended or resented at any time during the last two-and-fifty years. The military importance of the position is probably exaggerated in conventional language for diplomatic porposes. CARNOT, indeed, is said to have asserted that Luxemburg was, after Gibraltar, the most formidable fortress in Europe; but modern experience, in America and elsewhere, has shown that strong places may be extempo

THE task of the London Conference was virtually accomplished when Lord STANLEY consented to guarantee the neutrality of Luxemburg. From the first there had evidently been little risk of failure, inasmuch as both the ligitants and the assessors were deeply interested in a successful result. The latest precedent of a similar meeting was happily in all respects inapplicable. In the middle of the Danish war, and in view of the inevitable defeat of the weaker party, the English Government made a desperate attempt to terminate hostilities by inducing the belligerents to meet with the neutral Powers in conference. Unfortunately, Prussia, then servilely followed by Austria, had determined on completing the conquest of Schleswig; nor were all the arbitrators sincere in their desire for peace. The Emperor of the FRENCH had been irritated by the refusal of Eng-rized during war; and, when Luxemburg is land either to go to war on behalf of Po- demolished, there is nothing to prevent the land, or to concur in his proposal of a Prussian Government from doubling the European Congress; and consequently, defences and armament of Trèves. The throughout the Danish war, he affected to real security both of Germany and of regard the successes of Germany rather as France consists in the unlimited resources a check to England than as a menace to of either Power, and in the certainty that himself. The Plenipotentiaries at the pres- permanent conquests on either side would ent Conference have had the easier duty of be impossible. The hope of recovering saving the honour of two Governments Alsace or Lorraine has for several generawhich would otherwise have engaged in an tions ceased to inspire the most sanguine unprofitable duel. In strict justice, it might of German patriots; and though French have been sufficient to reject the unfounded ambition has been more recently undepretentions of France, which had no ground ceived, the disillusion has extended rapidly for interfering with the Prussian occupa- in the course of the present dispute. Less tion of Luxemburg; but a decision in favour than a year has passed since the negotiation of one party would certainly not have ter- for the Saarbruck coal-fields, and the stranminated the quarrel. Diplomatic tribunals ger demand for a rectification of the fronare rather mediators than judges; and. tier. The discovery that even the purchase luckily, the King of HOLLAND contributed of a German principality is impracticable to the settlement of the dispute a colourably will not fail to be remembered. Jegal claim on the fortress of Luxemburg. Since France required some concession As long as he was, in his ducal capacity, a as a pretext for withdrawing an untenable German prince, the presence of a Prussian claim, it was obviously necessary that garrison in a Federal fortress was perfectly Prussia also should get something, or compatible with his sovereign rights; but seem to get something. There is inthe violent dissolution of the Confederacy, deed every reason to believe that the followed by the exclusion of Luxemburg strong man of Germany, fully armed, will, from the new North-German League, tech- without the aid of any Conference, hencenically converted the mixed right of the forth keep his house in peace; but as he is GRAND DUKE into absolute dominion. Not requested to unfasten one joint of his harthinking it expedient to demand the evacu- ness, he naturally asks his friendly advisers ation of the fortress, and feeling some un- to provide him with an equivalent security. easiness at the possible demands of Prussia The neutralization of Luxemburg may poson his more important possessions, the King sibly be equivalent to a fortified town, as of HOLLAND proposed to transfer Luxem- long as it is respected in time of war; but burg, with all its appendages, to an owner garrisons and batteries protect themselves,

while parchment limitations of the rights of are seconded by the French iron-masters, war tend to become inoperative as soon as who object to competition with the ore of they are applicable. If a French army wished Luxemburg. Diplomatists will look rather to pass through Luxemburg on its way to to the political consequences of commercial Rhenish Prussia, it would probably be found amalgamation than to the material interests that some breach of engagement on the of the province. If a little army of French part of the enemy justified a disregard of Custom-house officers separated Luxemburg pledges of neutrality. The Great Powers from Germany, the Duchy might almost as were therefore desired to prove the sin- well be a department of France; and excerity of their love of peace by making perience has shown that the Customs-Union themselves responsible for the neutrality of which Prussia has long directed has a tenLuxemburg; and, by the acceptance of the dency to produce political approximation. proposal, Germany has obtained a perfect It is difficult to understand Count BISverbal security against the dangers which MARK's motive for having left Luxemburg, are supposed to arise from the demolition of after last year's war. ontside the new Conthe fortress. The Prussian demand was federation and the Zollverein. He may reasonable; although the English Plenipo- probably be still indifferent to a commercial tentiaries were at first naturally unwilling union with the Duchy, but he will certainto undertake new Continental liabilities. ly oppose a corresponding pretension on the Lord STANLEY is a consistent advocate of part of France. non-interference, but he properly regarded With the happy close of the deliberations the case of Luxemburg as exceptional. To of the Conference, charges and recriminaa certain extent, the guarantee will be only tions will cease to disturb timid minds. renewed, or continued; for the territory of German journalists complained that the the King of the NETHERLANDS was guar- armaments of France were proceeding, anteed by the Great Powers in 1814, and while Prussia had not yet summoned a solall existing securities were expressly main- dier to his colours, or bought an additional tained at the final arrangement between horse. It is possible that the statement may Belgium and Holland in 1839. It is true have had some foundation in fact, although that the evacuation of the fortress will ren- it was probably exaggerated; but though the der the obligation more onerous, as well as numbers of the French army may have more necessary, especially as the proposed been increased, the Government, even if it pledge will be given to Prussia, rather than had wished to deceive an enemy, would not to Belgium or Holland; but, on a balance have wantonly encouraged the hopes of its of inconveniences, Lord STANLEY has de- subjects for the purpose of aggravating their termined to remove the only remaining ob- subsequent disappointment. The Emperor stacle to a settlement of the principal dis- NAPOLEON has ascertained, by his recent pute. The neutrality of Luxemburg is experiment, the entire change which has henceforth guaranteed by the six Great passed over the minds of the present generPowers, including Italy, which owes to Eng- ation. The great body of Frenchmen reland the formal recognition of its well-gard the speeches of M. THIERS and the earned rank in Europe. The Conference inflammatory essays of M. DE GIRARDIN as has apparently not undertaken to determine antiquarian relics of obsolete opinion. The the commercial position of the neutralized keen susceptibility of the nation to any territory. It is evident that Luxemburg stain on its honour retains its former delicacannot, like a French province before the cy, but the great body of politicians decline Revolution, establish a fiscal system of its to regard the partial realization of German own, or allow its produce to be taxed as unity as an affront to France. In the pressoon as it passes the frontier. It is equally ent instance, as in many others, popular impossible that it should trade freely with cant serves as an index to the public opinboth its powerful neighbours, as the French ion which it echoes and travesties. The and German Customs systems reciprocally working-men who have been taught by exclude one another. Unless the province is to be deprived of all hope of prosperity, it must be enclosed within one of the two commercial frontiers. The inhabitants, having hitherto traded chiefly with Germany, would prefer unrestricted intercourse with the States of the Zollverein to any advantage which could be derived from free access to French markets; and their wishes

habitual adulation to assume the airs of a representative aristocracy publish platitudes in favour of peace with their German brethren, which are at least more innocent than demands for the aggrandizement of France. That French democracy, reflecting on its own qualities, should select a love of peace as its favourite virtue, is a whimsical proot of the blindness which attends corporate as

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well as individual vanity. Not many years | promise is without danger, because "if all have passed since democratic writers, in- the Powers act together resistance would cluding MICHELET and VICTOR HUGO, be out of the question, while, on the other held up moderate Governments to the con- hand, any repudiation by one Power of its tempt of patriots, because they neglected to obligations would necessarily absolve the othresume the boundaries of the Republic and ers." If the acceptor does not pay the enthe Empire. As a German poet said with dorser ceases to be liable, a novel doctrine, more truth than melody, the greedy ravens which proclaimed in big type in the City were always croaking themselves hoarse article of the first commercial journal in the about the Rhine, which his countrymen, for world, will, we doubt not, carry much comtheir part, absolutely refused to surrender. fort to the souls of bankrupts, speculators, It is one of the advantages of democracy and rogues generally. If Lord Stanley has that conversion operates simultaneously on agreed to guarantee Luxemburg with any masses, and that deserted creeds are in- such arrière pensée, he has simply agreed to a stantly forgotten. Twenty years of victory fraud which, of all forms of political fraud, had persuaded the French people that it we should have thought most alien to his was their mission to propagate civilization political character. His forte is surely juby conquest. Half a century of peace had dicious directness, not diplomatic subtlety, scarcely untaught them the disastrous lesson; and till he himself avows it we refuse to bebut the rise of Italy, and more especially of lieve that he is playing a game of which Germany, seems to have convinced French- Lord Palmerston would have been ashamed. men of the present day that other nations He did at least try to keep his pledge to also have rights, and that peace is better Denmark. The need of the guarantee can than war. The Germans, having for cen- only arise when Luxemburg has been occuturies found themselves the victims of pied by one of the Powers, and if that ocFrench ambition, were excusably suspicious, cupation of itself annuls the pledge, what and jealous of making the first concession; is the use of giving it? It is merely a but the intelligent opinion of Europe was farce, a pledge to do that which, while unanimously opposed to an unnecessary con- pledging ourselves, we acknowledge that test, and in smoothing away the difficulties we never intend to do - a grandiloquent which impeded a friendly arrangement, the assertion that we will be responsible for the Conference has enjoyed the great advan- bill if the acceptor pays it. Even the Times tage of swimming with the stream. seems to feel this is a little disreputable, for after using this argument it argues that the pledge after all is a little one, because we already guarantee Holland. As a matter of fact, that statement is a trick, for we do not directly guarantee Holland against the great Powers, but only against Belgiuma very different thing; but suppose we do, as Lord Stanley on Thursday seemed to asWHAT is an endorsement on the back of sume, what is that to the point? The guara bill? Is it a promise to pay if the other antee for Holland, on the Times' own showparties to the transaction do not, or only in ing, is as unreal as any other. Nobody but case they do? We should have thought a great power can attack Holland, and the that a simple question enough in commer- moment a great power breaks its obligation cial ethics, but that the Times has chosen ours ceases, and we may skulk away conthis week to assume the second answer. It tented, like a hound who has stolen a bone declares that man is responsible for his and escaped the expected whip. We are signature unless the acceptor has paid the not liable, because the contingency we bill, and so rendered the signature unneces- promised to provide against has occurred. sary. The Prussian Government has been asked to evacuate the fortress of Luxemburg as a concession to the sensitive dignity of France, and has agreed, it is reported, upon the condition that Europe shall guarantee its neutrality. In plainer words, each of the Five Powers is to pledge itself in writing to declare war upon any Power which may attempt to seize this military position. Thereupon, the Times declares that such a

From the Spectator, May 11.

LORD STANLEY AND THE LUXEMBURG
QUESTION.

If you bit that little boy again," says Fifth Form, "I shall thrash you," and the bully desists. By and by, plucking up his courage, he hits the little boy, and Fifth Form walks off, consoling himself as he goes by muttering that if "people will not keep their agreements he is not bound to keep his."

We looked to Lord Stanley to pursue a manlier diplomacy than this, and must, till

LORD STANLEY AND THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION.

he confesses the contrary, believe that he intends the guarantee, if he gives it, to be a reality, a promise to resist the use of Luxemburg by France against Germany. That is the common sense of the pledge, that is why it is asked, that is why it is conceded. And in this view, we believe, no more dangerous pledge could be made by Great Britain. It is nonsense to compare it with our guarantee of Belgium. We should fight for Belgium anyhow, and the guarantee makes no practical difference, except to give the advocates of war a new and unanswerable argument. But without the guarantee we should not dream of fighting for Luxemburg. Moreover, no power will attack Belgium merely as an incident in a campaign; but Luxemburg is very likely indeed to be incidentally occupied. It is just the place a French General, wanting to sever railway communications along the Rhine, would declare himself compelled to take, and then Prussia would be able to demand our alliance against France. We do not want to fight France. Except a war with America, no calamity could be so detrimental to us, to Europe, and to civilization, so ruinous to commerce, so fatal to progress, so meaningless in result. What have we to get from France? Yet if the guarantee does not mean that we are liable to a risk of this demand, to a sudden war with our nearest neighbour, or a confession of cowardice before the world, what does it mean? If we are to allow France to take Luxemburg, what does Prussia gain in exchange for her fortress? Just this, that if it is very convenient to us to defend Luxemburg, we shall have legal locus standi when we say we intend to do it. What is the value of that to Prussia of her right to ask an acquaintance to commence a grand Chancery suit for her own advantage and his detriment ?

But we shall be told the guarantee is essential to preserve the honour of Prussia, and so to maintain peace. It is a bit of high comedy, like an English duel, but one which it is necessary for the political grandees to go through with. There is a certain amount of truth in that suggestion, but then the question arises why England, which of all Powers manages high comedy worst, should be compelled to play her part. How is it her interest? The Times, which cares about nothing but the price of Consols, always assumes that peace is the grand interest of this country, and that might be true, were the peace real. But it may very well be doubted whether the condition of armed preparation now maintained all over Eu

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rope is not worse than war, whether it does not exhaust the nations more, more deeply imperil the profits upon trade. At all events, it is clear that there is a future price at which even peace may be dear. If France and Prussia equally accept our mediation, and find no new cause of quarrel in some detail, and rest content without trying their relative strength about Luxemburg, then we shall have purchased a postponement of a war which we can keep out of, at the price of a future war into which, if we are decently honest and straightforward, we must perforce enter. We buy an escape from the annoyance of giving evidence in a Chancery suit at the price of a Chancery suit to which we shall be principal parties. That is at least exceedingly bad economy, as Lord Stanley out of office would probably be the first to see.

It would be rather a grotesque finale for the negotiations if we found ourselves burdened with a guarantee without obtaining the compensatory peace. Of course, as England assents to the sine qua non, war can, if France and Prussia are equally willing, be easily postponed, but are they willing? The Foreign Office thinks so apparently, but the British Foreign Office has always shown itself the most credulous of detective establishments, and the broad facts do not bear out that theory. It is almost certain, as certain as anything carefully concealed by officials can be, that France is arming fast, and that Berlin is taking either real or affected umbrage at these armaments, the reality and the affectation being about equally dangerous. It is argued, of course, in France that the collection of the camp at Châlons two months earlier than usual, the enlargement of that camp, the completion of the works at Metz, the incessant manufacture of cartridges. the increase in the effectives, and above all, the calling out of the reserves, are all precautionary measures; but they have been taken on a scale and at a cost which Sovereigns do not sanction unless they see very serious dangers ahead, and they are continuing now, when, to believe the newspapers and the funds, the reign of peace has been solidly re-established. Why is the Emperor embarrassing his exchequer, if he feels so certain that the Conference is sure to give him a great diplomatic victory, for the evacuation of Luxemburg is a victory for him? and why does Count von Bismarck pass the word to demi-official journals to complain of armaments which, as he knows, cannot be made the subject of official remonstrance? France will not take orders as to the extent of her

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armaments from any power in the world, as long as he has been in Parliament an al

least of all from the one which has so recently excited her jealousy, and with which she is in such open diplomatic conflict. It is not like Count von Bismarck to publish statements so wounding to the amour propre of an adversary merely because they are wounding, with no intention of following them up, and no motive in calling the attention of the people behind him. The clouds are very thick still, and though they seem to be breaking, perhaps we may say are breaking, the barometer is still far from baving risen to "set fair." Despite the meeting of Conference, the acceptance of a basis, the neutralization of the Duchy, which does not involve the grand point at issue, and the optimist tone of the British official world, the grand security for peace is still that if Napoleon fights he knows he must succeed, and that in a war between equals success is never certain.

One word more. If the Conference succeeds in maintaining peace one fact will be established of far greater importance than any possible solution of the Luxemburg question. The European tribunal dissolved by the Crimean war will have been re-established, to the immense benefit of mankind. There is no longer a power on the Continent which can do as it likes, without consulting anybody, but many Powers so equal and so bound together that they must perforce prefer the régime of law to the régime of force. The fate of Belgium and Holland, for example, is no longer dependent upon Napoleon's fiat, or that of Denmark upon the policy of Berlin. The Powers are jealous again, and with reason, and every accession of territory, however small, every intrigue, however secret, will be watched with anxious care, and, if needful, arrested by the Council of Five, which alone has the strength to maintain the European peace and an interest in doing so. When France arms to obtain a bit of outlying land and cannot obtain it, Europe is safe from the aggression of any less potent State.

From the Economist, May 11.

LORD STANLEY'S ENGLISH GUARANTEE.

LORD STANLEY admitted on Thursday night that he has engaged on behalf of England to give the guarantee of the neutrality of Luxembourg demanded by Prussia from the great Powers. It seems to be Lord Stanley's happy fortune, after representing

most extreme form of the principle of nonintervention, to come out as the direct heir to Lord Palmerston's policy in both extorting satisfaction for real injuries from weak but presumptuous nations, and in multiplying those vague and dangerous engagements of the English Crown, which we have more than once had to regret bitterly in the past. We not only do not blame, we heartily approve of, Lord Stanley's policy in the case of the dispute with Spain concerning the Queen Victoria. It was not a pleasant thing for England, who took so humble a part in the great European dispute of 1864, to have to take so high-handed a line with Spain in 1866. Parcere superbis, debellere subjectos, has been rather too much the English motto under Lord Palmerston's foreign policy. But that is not Lord Stanley's fault, and no Minister in his place could have done otherwise than he did in our little misunderstanding with Spain. But it will be, we think, his fault and greatly to his discredit if he completes, as he intimates that he intends to complete, this hitherto merely accidental resemblance, by launching England into new and large engagements, the true bearing of which on our own national interests, if ever we are called upon to fulfil them, no one can foresee; and the high probability that we shall some day be called upon to fulfil them, every one can even now foresee. Indeed, as far as we can understand, the only apology which is made for the policy of giving an English guarantee to the neutrality of Luxembourg, is, that while it staves off the war for the present, it does not much enlarge the extent of our engagements for the future. Now, the fact is quite the reverse. If we take these new engagements, honestly and with the sincere purpose of keeping them to the best of our ability, they do enlarge indefinitely, most dangerously, our liabilities for the future. If we take them in the strong hope, and with a halfformed resolve, that some way shall be found to relieve us of these engagements if ever they become troublesome, then we are guilty of one of the most dishonourable acts of which any nation could be guilty. Two great nations relying on our guarantee, and asserting that they would not rely on any thing less, that we will assist in protecting the neutrality of Luxembourg from violation in case of any great European quarrel, retire from the threatening position they had just assumed. Each of them believes that we are now bound to prevent a very advantageous position from falling into the hands of its adversary; that if it should ever be

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