not to recede by declaring his pretensions | the Emperor's personal staff. He is, say reasonable. Why should not our moral the gossips, to command himself, with Genforce, if exerted only to secure peace, be applied to the plaintiff as well as the defendant? Interference of this kind simply increases the chance of war, by irritating the stubbornness of Prussia and the sensitiveness of Napoleon to repulse. Prussia is not likely to yield the more because officious friends think she might as well yield, or France because those same friends formally declare that she has reason on her side. The situation is as grave as it is possible for it to be before troops are actually in movement. If we may believe statements which, though not absolutely official, have all the appearance of truth, Napoleon has addressed demand to Berlin, the Powers have endorsed that demand, and Berlin has declined civilly and quietly to accede. What remains for Napoleon except to prepare himself to support his demand by arms, or to retreat, acknowledging himself defeated? He may do the latter, of course, but if he does he will take a course at varianee at once with his policy, his present position, and his recent acts. His policy is to compensate France for the strictness of his internal regime by extending her influence abroad, and retreating, after a formal challenge, will not extend her influence. His present position is that of a man whose reputation for political sagacity and nerve begins to wane, and would, under one more failure, disappear. Retreat would unmistakably admit one more failure. His acts are those of a man who sees that war is at hand, and silently prepares for the battle. The first reserves, 60,000 men, have been called out "for drill" for the 1st of May. All officers, non-commissioned officers, and men on furlough have been ordered to present themselves at their posts on the same date. The fleet, it is stated, has been quietly made ready for active service. Horses for the Artillery the last thing a government buys, they are so costly, and in peace so useless are being purchased everywhere. Orders for shoes and socks have been widely distributed, and all the soldiers in the Army directed to present themselves to the surgeons, that men unfit for campaigning may be weeded out. The semi-official papers are instructed to say that the situation grows worse, and the chief among them, the Constitutionnel, talks of "unjust provocation" addressed to France, and rumours as to conmands in the campaign begin to circulate in the Army, rumours which point to the organization of FOURTH SERIES. LIVING AGE. VOL. V. eral Montauban, ablest of the "Mamelukes," as chief of his central staff. All these things may be done, no doubt, expensive as many of them are, in order to impress the Prussian Court with the idea that the Emperor is in earnest, but then they may also be done with a view to immediate war, and the latter is the more probable explanation. The Emperor knows perfectly well that to address visible menaces to a new power is to make it almost impossible for that power to give way, and no menace could be more visible than preparations such as the Belgian, German, and even French journals report. The Emperor, we fear, is preparing for war, and if he is, he will strike soon, and strike hard, lest his adversaries, whose impatience is becoming feverish, and whose commerce is paralyzed by the suspense, should gain the advantage of time. The suggestion that he must first raise a loan is a mistake. The French Treasury can get money enough for the wants of a few days without difficulty, and to ask for a loan in advance is to invite a discussion upon the propriety of the war. The cannon. once heard, the Chamber will vote anything without discussion or opposition, and with the French system of open loans the emergency will not greatly affect the price. It is strange to observe, as the crisis draws near, or seems to draw near, how slight is the bias of English feeling to one or other side. Our interests not being directly involved, the public judgment is unclouded, and it holds itself in suspense, to be decided in the main by the course of events. Of sympathy with either side there is little or none. There is no moral question involved, and no tangible result except the loss of treasure and lives. On the moral side neither Power is much in the right or much in the wrong, neither attracts the sympathy which flows naturally to the weaker, neither offends English feeling by hectoring or apparent desire for war. On the other hand, there is no result probable, scarcely any possible, which Englishmen strongly desire, as they desired, for example, the liberation of Italy. If France wins completely, she will have the Rhine, and Germany will be broken up, and neither of those results will be acceptable to this country. If Germany_wins completely she will overthrow the Bonaparte throne, and may compel Holland to enter the Confederation, consequences which most Englishmen regard as decided 138. ly undesirable. If France wins a little, she | an invading army cannot but carry with it From The Economist, 27th April. THE PECULIAR DANGER OF THE THREAT. ignominy; so that, if France and Germany ENED WAR. THERE has been in all our recent wars a certain remarkable economy of the terrible weapon used, which has in a great measure limited their mischief, and utilized at the least possible sacrifice their beneficial results. Even the Crimean war, vast as was the expenditure involved, was, probably, one of the most efficient and economical of all wars, in proportion, that is, to the immense scale of the object attempted a serious check to Russia, and a deliberate exhaustion of her offensive resources. The devastation it caused was limited locally to a short campaign on the Danube, and an unimportant corner of the Russian empire, and though vast regions were drained of men and supplies to sustain the contest in that corner, a vast sacrifice of life and wealth was inseparable from the object in view - we do not say how far it was a wise object-of striking physically a disabling blow at the ambition of Russia. The war ceased the moment Russia found that that object had been attained by making certain moderate, and, as was thought at the time in England, quite too small concessions; nor did it bring the wide-spread misery which - really go to war for the supremacy, we do And, if France and Germany really go to PECULIAR DANGER OF THE THREATENED WAR. would stimulate the victor into the hope of final victory. Every defeat would sting the vanquished into new and more brilliant efforts. Nor is it conceivable that between two conterminous countries with so long a boundary line, and a boundary line almost every section of which has changed masters in former wars, the war could be isolated, as it was in the case of Russia, to any one unhappy spot in which it could be fought out like a desperate duel to its conclusion. Such an isolation is not geographically possible in the case of a war between France and Germany. It would involve a sacrifice of half the best chances of war to attempt it on either side, and if either side were willing so to concentrate the horrors of the fight, it would be impossible to secure the assent of the other to so artificial an arrangement. A war between France and Germany, nominally for Luxembourg, means, then, something quite different from anything we have known of late years, a war between great military Powers, of, probably, nearly equal resources, - a war for a symbol of supremacy, not for any substantial end which even the defeated Power could afford to admit as a concession fair to make, a war of jealousy, not a war of patriotism, - a war to measure power between great nations, neither of whose real power can be guaged in a month, or even in a year. We fear, therefore, that if this war should break out, the very trivial ground of quarrel may prove a reason, not for its speedy settlement, but for its long and exhausting character. Economy means the skilful adapting of a means to an end, so that your expenditure of means shall not be lavish in relation to the specific end you have in view. But the less specific is the end you have in view, the less is anything like economy practicable. You cannot economize war, or any other agency that is undertaken not for a specific end, but for a vague general end, like establishing the supremacy of one nation over another as a European Power. That is intrinsically an object which can only be gained by absolutely exhausting the spirit or the resources of one or other of the combatants. But neither Germany nor France is likely to give in for want of spirit till she gives in for want of strength. And no short war can well drain the strength of either of these great peoples. The more blood has been shed, the more lives have been sacrificed, the less willing will either nation be to make peace without achieving the end for which they fought,-Germany, to show that she will not give up an inch of German ground to please France, - France, to ex 531 tort a concession of some sort from Germany which shall, at least, prove to the French that the prestige of France has not yet been eclipsed by the growing prestige of Germany. With these views of the character of the war which now threatens Europe, we confess we feel great uneasiness at the rumor of those" identical notes" in which it is said that England has taken part, and the tenor of which is supposed to be persuasions addressed to Prussia to agree to the neutralisation of Luxembourg. We do not attach any very great value to these rumours. At such a time, such rumours are sure to prevail. We have every reason as yet to put confidence in Lord Stanley's prudence. But the rumours to which we refer at least justify us in expressing a very strong opinion that it would be very unwise in England to take either part, even so far as to give advice. As her opinion was asked about the obligations incurred under the treaty of 1839, she could not, of course, refuse to express her opinion as to the nature of those obligations. But anything like pressure addressed to either party-and we should say especially to Germany, who is in possession of the fortress of Luxembourg, and with whom the people of Luxembourg undoubtedly have more close ties of country than with France, to induce her to give way, would appear to us a very false step, of which we cannot easily suppose Lord Stanley to be guilty. If the newspaper rumours, to which, as we said before, we attach exceedingly little importance, be true, England's influence has been used, with that of other powers, to persuade concession on the part of Germany, and to justify to someslight extent the policy of France. Now,. the initiative in this case undoubtedly belonged to France. Germany only aspired. to maintain the status quo. If we have given a shadow of support to the French rep-resentations, we have, in reality, rendered it much more difficult for the Emperor of the French to recede. If he is so far in the right that the other powers appeal to Germany to make a concession, there would. seem to be something like fear in drawing back, and France cannot show fear. The effect, therefore, as it seems to us, of any throwing of our influence on the French side, must be to render France less likely to give way. And as Germany is, and has long been, in possession of the disputed territorial point, and as it is necessarily much more difficult for national pride to give way so far as to evacuate a fortress at the com-mand of another, than even to resign new pretensions to a fortress which you have a big friend whom some day we would set on Prussia to avenge us and Denmark. The German side of the quarrel is accordingly thrown into the background, and if we hear from German authorities that Prussia is determined not to give way, this resolution is treated as a piece of mad insolence or of blind and besotted obstinacy. Calling them names, however, will not make the Germans less determined; and if we wish to guess on fair grounds whether there will be war, we must begin by inquiring how it is that the Germans are so determined. If we do this, we shall soon find that with the Germans the present question is not a question of nationality. They do not claim Luxemburg as German. Count BISMARK has expressly renounced this view. Germany, as he declares, does never possessed, the fact of lending our moral aid to France must be, we think, to diminish the most considerable (even if inconsiderable) ground of hope for peace which existed at all. And, of course, the fact of our intervention, if we have in any sense intervened, to persuade Prussia to submit, cannot have been pleasing to Prussia. This we ought not to consider, if there were any good end either in the way of peace or justice to be gained by our interposition. But this, we think, we have shown to be very unlikely; and, on the other hand, we do know that if ever we have to redeem our pledges to defend Belgium, it will not be against Prussia but against France, while Germany would be our best ally in such a struggle. Could it be wise, then, to deepen the unfriendly feeling already too strong between England and Germany, by a policy not want Luxemburg, and Luxemburg which is not conceived either in the interests of peace or of justice?-for, as regards justice, while it is difficult to maintain that there is any important concession to justice involved in continuing to subject Luxembourg to the military power of Prussia, it is impossible to maintain that any such concession is involved in handing over Luxembourg to France. There never seems to us to have been a foreign complication in which it was so clearly our duty to keep neutral, even to the point of withholding moral support from both parties alike. The struggle is really one for European supremacy, and on the question of the European supremacy of France or Prussia, England has certainly no conviction, and, probably, no strong wish. does not want Germany. But Prussia is in possession, not of the territory of Luxemburg, but of the. fortress, and why should Prussia be turned out? Prussia was placed there by Europe to watch against the ambition of France, and especially to protect Germany against France; and yet the King of HOLLAND thinks that he is to be allowed to sell this very fortress to France, and then the French are to tell the Prussians that they are on French soil, and must walk out. But the Prussians are told that they need not mind this, because things are changed, and they are so much relatively stronger than they were that they need not object to France being strengthened. That is, they are asked to give up a strong position to France because they are better able to fight her. In other words, Germany has to indemnify France for the injury France has sustained by a strong confederacy being substituted in Germany for a weak one. Why should this be? If Germany makes her unity THE best mode of approaching all ques- still more complete and her confederation tions affecting foreign nations is to study still more effectual, are the French to claim the claims, the views, and the feelings of some further compensation? Are they to that party to a quarrel which is least in have a slice, bigger or smaller, of the left favour with Englishmen. At present, Prus- bank of the Rhine, to make up for Bavaria sia is not so much in favour with English- and Wurtemberg associating their fortunes men as France is. The Prussians have altogether with those of the Northern been very successful lately, and bystanders States? This the Germans will never conhave an uncomfortable feeling at the spec- sent to. They may fight and be beaten, tacle of too much good fortune. The and may have to give up Luxemburg Prussians personally are an insolent, over- and a great many other places of more imbearing race; they make themselves far portance; but at any rate they will do their more disagreeable than the French do; best to keep what they have got. To Gerand there is still lingering in some quarters man eyes the case presents itself as a the foolish feeling provoked by the Danish whole. They ask whether they are to adwar, that although we could not conve- mit the principle that, as between themmiently fight Prussia ourselves, yet we had selves and France, they are to be called on From the Saturday Review, 27th April. WILL THERE BE WAR? to give up something to France because when the reign of the present EMPEROR they improve their political condition. Is terminates. The military despotism may it we alone, they may ask, that have im- continue, and the next EMPEROR may feel proved our political condition? Have we that, with a weaker title, and a more prealone made ourselves stronger for military carious hold on power, war is the first conpurposes? Certainly not. France has sub-dition of his existence. The only way for stituted a military despotism for a constitu- Germany to avoid being victimised is to tional government, and one of the very show herself perfectly prepared for war, and strongest claims which the Second Empire perfectly ready to fight. A long and undehas on the feelings of Frenchmen is that, cisive war is as unfavourable to a military even if it makes them less free at home despot as no war at all. The Germans may it makes them more powerful abroad. reasonably hope that, if they either fight It enables them to carry on war more well now, or succeed in averting war by swiftly, effectually, and successfully The proclaiming themselves quite ready for war, Germans, in their turn, have adopted they may henceforth ward off a serious, a new organization, which enables them to pressing, and permanent danger. These, bring into the field more troops and better right or wrong, are the feelings and calculatroops under a better system; and then, tions of the Germans. They decline to because they have done this, and have so admit the principle that, because they infar followed the example of France, they crease their political and military strength, are told that they must give France France is entitled to ask for compensation. a fortress to make things square. Their They wish to convince the military despots only reply, the only reply possible for them of France that they are not to try to reto such a demand, is that, if the French cover prestige at the expense of Germany. want the fortress of Luxemburg, they must So far, therefore, as the preservation of come and take it. peace may be supposed to depend on the Germans giving way, it may be confidently said that there is no hope of peace. They most certainly will not give way. The Germans have also a feeling that they are being most unfairly sacrificed to the necessities of the French Empire. They think that the EMPEROR feels his throne to be in danger, and wants a war to make himself safe. He has lost prestige in Mexico; he passed last year in a state of discreditable vacillation. Now he feels that war must come, or he will be lost; and the Germans strongly object to being made war upon in order that the French may be tempted to forget that they were ordered out of Mexico by the United States, and that the EMPEROR has no longer a very brilliant position in Europe. Nothing can be more aggravating to a nation than the thought that it is to have its commerce cut up, and its taxes doubled, and its families desolated, and its soldiers killed, because a foreign Sovereign calculates that it would suit him better to have a war than a revolution. People who feared that such an injustice was going to be done them might very well argue that the least concession would be ruin, and that nothing could possibly save them except a boldness which would show that to fight them would be a most dangerous risk, and that their enemy, if he wants war as a protection against revolution, would do well to make a war that promises to pay better. The Germans reflect that the causes which, as they conceive, are nearly producing war now, may produce it very easily hereafter. No one knows what will happen in France But will France give way? No one can answer this. If the French nation thinks its honour involved in turning the Prussian garrison out of Luxemburg, there must be war. A few weeks ago it was perfectly indifferent to Luxemburg and its garrison. Nor does it much care about either now. But a great many Frenchmen feel sore about Prussia. They think they have cut a very poor figure last year; and somehow, although they do not clearly know how, they now find themselves in such a position that, if they let this Luxemburg question drop quietly, they think their conduct will be ascribed to fear. Just as, to all appearance, the Germans are not actuated by an absurd desire to claim Luxemburg on the ground of nationality, so it must be confessed that the French do not appear to be actuated by a desire for territorial aggrandizement. The Germans are, in a general way, fond of making out that half-German races are wholly German; and the French are, in a general way, fond of acquiring territory, and their general habits of thought are not discarded entirely on this occasion. But the main motive, the leading thought, is not German nationality or French aggrandizement. And it must also be said that even if the general theory entertained by the Germans about the character of the French Empire is correct, and although no one can |