is to yield to a distinct menace, which they do not think it honourable to do. If that view is correct, questions about the number of rifles in hand will have about as much weight as the question of his skill with the sabre would have on a French gentleman who had been struck.

Marshals Niel and Macmahon, think the tion to Holland, but only of the insolence of Army prepared for a great war? If they do Prussia in garrisoning a fortress which does not, war is pretty certain to be postponed, not belong to her, and which menaces but it is excessively improbable that any France. It is the point of honour on which one except the Emperor and one or two Frenchmen are now insisting, and when a men in their own close confidence know Frenchman, growing grave and white, talks their real opinion. Paris thinks it does, and seriously of the point of honour, he is usually the Bourse thinks it does, and many news- very near action. Our own belief is, that paper correspondents think they do, but the French Army, and great masses of the French Marshals and their Staffs are not French people, have made up their minds given greatly to chatter about the highest that their honour is concerned in the Prusmilitary secrets, and the Emperor has a fac-sian evacuation of Luxemburg; that not to ulty for silence. Nobody really knows insist on this, and yet give up the province, this point, and the only hint by which foreigners may guide their judgment is this. If the Emperor cannot go to war, it is his interest, by saying that he will not, to make commercial France a present of many millions, and he does not do that, shows no intention of doing that. Then are the people of France, and by people we mean all who We see but two distinctly conservative vote under a universal suffrage, inclined for elements in the situation the desperate war? On this point, again, probably no one magnitude of the stake for which the Embut the Emperor and M. de Lavalette know peror must play, and his own growing irresthe precise truth. All reporters decide ac-olution on great questions. Apart altogethcording to the class among which they hap- er from changes of frontier, of possible terripen to live, the papers are not good guides, being either official or influenced by Parisian opinion alone, and the masses have no means of expressing their thoughts. But it is notable that the freer a paper is, or a member, or a person, the more bitter it is against Prussia. M. Emile de Girardin is at present among journalists the freest, and La Liberte openly says the alternatives are the evacuation of Luxemburg as an amende to France or war. M. Ollivier is a Liberal who supports the Empire, and is therefore for the hour a Free Lance, and he declares that France is humiliated by Prussia. The workmen are the freest men in Paris, and they have attacked the Prussians in the Exhibition for crowning their King's statue with laurel. Reasoning from these slight but continually recurring indications, from the known jealousy of the French for their position in Europe, and the known soreness of the Army at the unavoidable humiliation involved in the retreat from Mexico, it is reasonable to believe that the balance of opinion in France is in favour of war. It is the more reasonable, from the sudden and very remarkable change in the mode of describing the probable cause of war. Nobody talks of the value of Luxemburg, or its rela

torial losses by treaty after war, all of which would fall on France, as well as her Sovereign, Napoleon if he goes to war must, by the conditions of his position, stake his throne. The Empire would not survive defeat by Germany six days. The Emperor is not, like his uncle, necessarily Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Defence, and would either be compelled to give place to the man who was, or by appealing to the representatives of the people for aid and counsel, to terminate his own regime. France will not lose rank and liberty too, of that we may be sure. The Emperor would have feared this tremendous risk at any time, did fear it in the Mexican affair, and now all accounts represent his irresolution as increasing. He intervenes less and less in business, transfers his power more and more to M. Rouher, allows his will to be turned by his Cabinet much more frequently than of old. He may in the end prefer to meet the series of minor difficulties to which retreat would expose him, rather than risk for a final triumph, which would seat his dynasty for a century, its final overthrow, and this is, we honestly believe, the strongest obstacle remaining in the way of war.

From the Saturday Review, 13th April.
FRANCE AND GERMANY.

As M. DE MOUSTIER has lately informed
the Legislative Body, the acquisition was
to be effected in the most peaceable and
regular manner.
It was intended to pro-
cure the consent of the GRAND DUKE, to
consult the parties to the Treaty of 1839,
and, finally, to procure a vote of annexation
by universal suffrage. The King of the
NETHERLANDS willingly named his price,
and England and other Powers declared
that the treaty which secured the federal
privileges of the province had been practi-
cally abrogated by the dissolution of the
German Confederacy, and that the GRAND
DUKE could not be compelled to assert his
dynastic rights. Universal suffrage, as prac-
tised by France, strongly resembles the
WHARNCLIFFE meetings which are called to
sanction Railway Bills after they have passed
the House of Commons. The shareholders
can withdraw the Bill if they think fit, but
they feel that they are in the hands of the
Directors. and that it will probably be un-
wise to reverse a deliberate decision. If
there had been no Prussia to consult, the
Luxemburgers would not have ventured to
offend a Government which had bought
them before it asked their consent to the
sale. A clever French prefect would have
soon contrived to secure an overwhelming
majority to approve of an accomplished
fact. At present, however, it seems doubt-
ful whether Luxemburg will ever be re-
quired to hold its WHARNCLIFFE meet-
ing.

The Emperor NAPOLEON, bent on satisfying his countrymen that the union of THE French negotiation for the purchase Germany was compatible with the aggrandof Luxemburg was a grave mistake. Dy-izement of France, cast his eye on the halfnastically the province had no sovereign, vacant territory of Luxemburg, without except an alien Grand Duke, who was reflecting that the fortress was occupied. willing to sell for a reasonable sum rights which were not unlikely to be confiscated without compensation. The Dutch subjects of the King of the NETHERLANDS had nothing to do with the matter, except that they probably regarded the German dominion of the House of ORANGE as Englishmen formerly regarded Hanover. The golden link of a Crown uniting two reciprocally independent States generally involves an inconvenient strain on the more powerful and independent Government. In the eighteenth century England was always engaged in wars on behalf of Hanover, and the Dutch probably feared that the connexion with Luxemburg might at some time involve a quarrel with Prussia or with France. It was not quite certain that the province would break off at the proper line of severance, for within recent experience Schleswig had come away from Denmark with the purely German province of Holstein. Untroubled by domestic opposition, the King of the NETHERLANDS thought himself as free to sell Luxemburg as if he had been an Emperor of RUSSIA dealing with a frozen territory on the other side of the globe. The difference was that, in the old language of diplomacy, there were souls in Luxemburg, whereas the souls of the few hundred Russian settlers on the North American coast are of little account. At the Congress of Vienna, as for many previous generations, it was customary to award thousands or millions of souls to princes who were supposed to have established a Every rational Frenchman would allow title to compensation; but modern opinion that Luxemburg is in itself not worth a sindisapproves of the diplomatic trade in hu- gle day of war. It was one of the early man beings, and the Luxemburg souls hap- conquests of the Republic, and with many pened to be Germans, as well as inhabitants other acquisitions it was reclaimed from of the Grand Duchy. On the dissolution Frane in 1815. Almost any border disof the Confederation they were left outside trict would be equally useful in rounding of all political organizations in an obviously the frontier, and the national honour provisional condition. Count BISMARK was in no degree concerned in the quarrel had the less reason for preferring an immediate claim to the Grand Duchy, because a Prussian garrison held the fortress, which is also the capital. It was thought expedient not to notice the hostile measures of the GRAND DUKE, as they had not been followed by military preparations. Sooner or later, Luxemburg, if it was not absorbed by a foreign Power, was nearly certain to form a part of the inheritance of the old Confederation.

before the interference of Prussia with the proposed purchase. But the interruption which has occurred has converted a trivial arrangement into a question of etiquette or of temper. French politicians declare that, although France is not called upon to require additions to her territory, she can tolerate no interference with her reasonable demands. It can only be said in answer, that it is better to retract a blunder than to persist in maintaining it by force. The

FRANCE AND GERMANY.

when it was attacked by a foreign enemy. The minor princes who were once the tools of French ambition know that their thrones would be instantly forfeited if they refused to join in the struggle against an invader; and Austria herself would probably forfeit her German provinces by an alliance with France in the present quarrel. It is a discredit to civilization that war should still be possible on an arbitrary pique or point of honour; but in the present instance the French Government has created the difficulty for itself, while Prussia has only objected to front to Germany a measure which necessarily seemed an af

Emperor NAPOLEON, who may almost claim to have invented the doctrine of nationality, ought to have remembered that the Luxemburgers share the descent and language of their powerful neighbours. Before the war of 1866 Luxemburg was a Federal fortress with a Prussian garrison, and no French interest is compromised by the continuance of the former arrangement. The Germans, even in their divided state, were never thoroughly reconciled to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, although both provinces have been united to France for a century and a half. the first French Empire, not a German vilSince the fall of lage has been alienated, and the policy of the present Government of Prussia has ded by war, the inconvenience to neutral If the pending quarrel were to be decibeen accepted by the entire nation because States would be measured by the interrupthe creation of a great German monarchy tion of commerce; but a contest between furnished a security against future spolia- two Powers of the first order has always a tion. It seemed tolerable to allow the tendency to spread. France will not conKing of the NETHERLANDS to retain the quer Germany, nor will Germany dismemGrand Duchy for a time; but the projected ber France; but the independence of Holannexation of a German province to France land or of Belgium might be sacrificed in was at once regarded as When the subject was first mentioned in developed liberties of Germany would be a challenge. the gigantic conflict. The delicate and unthe North German Parliament, Count Bis- temporarily crushed by the necessities of MARK prudently used ambiguous language; war, and it is not the interest of France to but it was fully understood that he sanc-injure a rival Power by converting a partioned the protests against the alienation of tially constitutional Government into a miliLuxemburg, and he is believed to have tary monarchy. added largely to the garrison of the fort- might result from a great European war If there is a sacrifice of French pride are too complicated and uncertain to be The consequences which in the withdrawal of an injudicious claim, distinctly foreseen. It is enough to know the completion of the bargain would have that the belligerents could by no possibility involved an unprovoked slight to Prussia. do good to themselves or to others, except If war should unhappily ensue, the Em- in the accelerated consolidation of German peror NAPOLEON and the French people unity. The incipient panic in the Exwill probably be acting against their incli- changes of London and Paris represents nation, as well as against their interest. the effect of even a threatened quarrel on It is impossible to believe that either the peaceful industry. The Governments which dynasty or the nation can profit by an unnecessary war with an equal Power. There anxious to avoid a collision; and it is easier are most immediately concerned must by is perhaps some security for peace in the for France to withdraw an unnecessary practical difliculty which must attend the claim than for Prussia to evacuate the fortopening of a campaign. Duchy is, for military purposes, fully occu- championship of Germany. If attempts The Grand ress of Luxemburg, or to abdicate the pied by the Prussian army; nor is it de- are made to settle the dispute by diplomatsirable to commence offensive operations ic arrangements, friendly States might by the siege of a great fortress. It would easily raise convenient difficulties by debe impossible to take Luxemburg without clining to approve the cession of Luxema pitched battle against an enemy who burg. If the King of HOLLAND is propriewould enjoy every advantage of position. tor of the territory, he is also trustee for EuA French army is always formidable, and rope, and the parties to the conveyance often victorious, but the chances of war may plausibly insist on the performance of would, in the first collision, be scarcely all attendant conditions and duties. equal. M. THIERS himself must compre- France is bent on war, remonstrance would hend the imprudence of taking issue with be useless, but it would be expedient to Germany on the question of the national encourage a meditated retreat by building integrity; for good or bad fortune would a golden bridge. equally tend to cement German unity

ress.

If

From The Economist, 13 April.
THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

-

Of

inquired of the Prussian envoy at the Hague whether he was in a position to tell him what the Prussian Government would think of his parting with the sovereign WITHOUT wishing to criticise the wise rights he owned as Grand Duke of Luxemcheerfulness which the Chancellor of the bourg," and further, that after this question Exchequer told us last week that he thinks had been answered, "the Dutch Governit wise to cherish concerning the attitude ment charged their representative at this of foreign affairs, we cannot avoid express- capital (Berlin) to offer us their good offiing our own opinion that there is at all ces in the event of our needing them in events plenty of reason for grave anxiety those negotiations with France, which they in the situation of Europe. Whenever thought would be shortly opened." men of the world hear of a shrewd attorney course it may be true, as it is now stated, buying up the little debts and obligations that those negotiations have been suspenddue to any one of his acquaintances, they ed, as a consequence of that conversation in usually infer and generally, we think, the German Parliament. But whether the newith justice that that attorney is intend-gotiation is cut short or not, the same lesson ing to press for a discharge in full of those is to be read from the obvious eagerness of liabilities, and that he supposes that he has France to buy up a weak power's political a better chance than his acquaintance of claims on Prussia. It is clear that France obtaining a satisfactory discharge of those wishes to get these political claims on liabilities. And when, in like manner, we Prussia. She might not enforce them at hear of a shrewd emperor buying up the once she may even be unwilling to accept little political debts due from a great pow- them just yet, because she may think it preer to a small one, we may usually infer mature to enforce them. But anyhow, that that emperor is intending to press for France is avowedly inclined to pounce upa discharge in fuil of the liabilities incurred on such claims. She could not have felt by the great power to the small, and thinks disposed to do so without a distinct intenthat he shall, probably, succeed better in tion of pressing for payment. And that compelling that discharge in full than his distinct intention of pressing for payment weaker acquaintance who has transferred, must have, meant either war with Prussia, or wishes to transfer, the right. Now this or, perhaps more formidable still, is, as we understand it, precisely the pres-" transaction with Prussia, of which the ent situation between France, Holland, and object would be to satisy both parties. And Prussia. The King of Holland obtained, we fancy that of this last possibility, there by the treaty of 1839, one third of the old is some trace in Count Bismarck's lanDuchy of Luxembourg, including the impor- guage. It was obvious not only that he tant fortress of that name - the other was very anxious, while stimulating the two-thirds, Belgian-Luxembourg that is, national pride of Germany, to say nothing in having been, at the same time, incorpor- any way disagreeable to the pride of France, ated in Belgium. But Prussia had, and but that there was even a doubt lingerstill assumes to have, the right to garrisoning in his mind, not certainly as to the cesLuxembourg, and the right to demand the evacuation of Luxembourg by Prussia is the real obligation which Holland is now willing to transfer to France, and which France is anxious to enforce. It is certain that Holland has been encouraged by France to transfer to her, for a consideration, all her sovereign rights to the fortress and territory which belonged to her, and which is now garrisoned by Prussia, and also certain that the cession of Luxembourg has at least been offered by Holland to France, and not rejected by the Emperor. In the important conversation between Count Bismarck and Herr von Bennigsen, which took place on Monday week in the German Parliament, Count Bismarck admitted as much as this, that a few days ago, the King of the Netherlands orally

a

sion of Luxembourg, but as to the proper object of retribution in case that cession should be attempted. The King of Holland, he said, in a very marked manner, would be left to the responsibility of his own acts. Was there not here a sort of hint as to a possible door out of the difficulty? We may be quite sure that the Emperor of the French will never rush into a European war for so small a corner of territory as the Dutch portion of Luxembourg. All the teaching of our recent history shows that wars are now waged for great objects, and no man would feel more keenly than the Emperor that a great risk and a great war for so small an object as the possession of one fortress, and the annexation of a territory containing much fewer than the population of Marseilles,