tion for his office is one that King George could hardly have developed had his life been mainly passed in the British Isles. Circumstances hitherto have made him a better-known and more conspicuous figure in the dominions beyond the seas than at home. As Heir-Presumptive he was naturally overshadowed by the personality of Queen Victoria, and by the unfailing adequacy with which his father discharged all the social and ceremonial duties devolving on the Court. As Heir-Apparent again he played in the general life of the nation a subordinate part that was in curious contrast with the activities and publicity of his father's life during his long apprenticeship as Prince of Wales. There would seem to have been two main reasons for King George's self-effacement. In part it was the reflex result of the extraordinary, the still only half realized, competency with which King Edward fulfilled his role, not only as supreme head of the State, but as the centre of Court and social life; and in part it was his deliberate choice. A man of the simplest and most domesticated tastes, modest to a fault, of an extreme conscientiousness and delicacy of scruple, devoted to his father, yet sharing little of his father's frank delight in pageants, ceremony, and the diversions of society, King George, from motives that did him nothing but honor, always, as Prince of Wales, tended to keep himself in the background. takes a long while for any man to stamp his personality upon the public mind, even if he be a man whose profession is publicity. But it takes longer for a Prince than for anyone else. The country as yet can hardly be said to know its new Sovereign at all; it has caught from his speeches a few flashes of his inner self, but only a few; and amid all the affectionate solicitude with which he has been welcomed to the throne, there is noticeable

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a certain negativeness and indecision in the popular guesses as to what manner of man he may be. Some things, indeed, are clear already. The absolute blamelessness of his private life, his modesty and good nature, his sportsmanship, his insistent sense of duty, his frankness and honestythese are fundamental attributes that declare themselves in his face, his demeanor, in every speech and action of his career. To these qualities the nation holds, just as it holds to the transparent benevolence, good sense and practicality of Queen Mary, and to the certainty that the new King and Queen will maintain a Court that in dignity and simplicity might serve as a model for any household in the land. But probably only his intimates are aware that the King possesses a far more vivid individuality than the country yet suspects. One cannot, indeed, talk with anyone who knows his Majesty really well without being made to understand that in his own way King George has a personality not less pronounced than was King Edward's; that he has, for instance, a power of emotionalism unusual in an Englishman; that he belongs distinctly to the category of men who "do things"; that he has developed a mastery of business without losing the vitalizing touch of imagination; that he does his own thinking, is a close student of public affairs, and in all his intercourse with Ministers will state his Own views frankly, openly and emphatically, and will insist on a similar candor and decisiveness in return.

It need not, therefore, be in any way "a poor compliment" to the King, as some journals have foolishly argued, to advocate a truce to our present controversies. King George is in most respects as amply qualified to cope with the situation that lies ahead of him as was King Edward; in a few respects he

is, perhaps, less qualified, and in a few others more so. Naturally he would prefer time to look round and take a few observations. But even if the programme that was marked out a month ago were to be carried out in its entirety; even if a few weeks from now the Prime Minister were to approach the Crown with the request for guarantees; the King, there is not the least reason to doubt, would be wholly equal to the emergency and would act with the same propriety, steadfastness, and regard for the interests of the nation as a whole that his father would have displayed. Certainly, though he would regret the necessity of having to make a decision so early in his reign on so vital an issue, the responsibility would not frighten him. His training as a sailor taught him how to make decisions and meet responsibilities; he is probably already as well posted on the pros and cons of the main question as the average Member of Parliament, and if the obligation were forced upon him of taking a definite stand, he would have no hesitation in facing it. Indeed, to preach peace on the merely personal ground that the King is not equipped for the rough and tumble of our politics, is an undertaking to which no one with any knowledge of King George's character, or any sense of humor, could possibly address himself. That his Majesty should have fair play, should not be hustled, should be given time for consultation, and opportunity for looking all round the situation-all this is eminently right and proper, and may justly be made the basis of an argument in favor of postponement and delay. But to found the case for a truce on the supposition that King George lacks anything of the nerve or knowledge or the capacity to look before and after, that will be abundantly required of the Monarch it the Government persevere with their scheme, is simply to expose oneself to

the ridicule of all who are acquainted with his Majesty's mind and temperament.

It is, of course, in considerations that affect the Monarchy even more than the Monarch, in the inherent decency of things, in the sense of our signal indebtedness to King Edward, and in the dangers that threaten not only to destroy our whole Constitutional framework but to change the whole spirit and temper of our politics, that the main arguments must be sought for proclaiming an armistice to our present contentions. A truce of a kind there is bound to be; the demise of the Crown makes obligatory a number of arrangements and readjustments that can only be carried out by Parliament. The plan of campaign as it was mapped out before the King's death must in any case remain for a while in suspense. This has been recognized on all sides; and nothing could be better than the taste and considerateness with which both the Government and the Opposition have so far joined in smoothing the new Sovereign's path and in laying down their arms, or, at least, in resting on them. When Parliament reassembles on June 8th, it will be to deal with certain necessary matters that, though delicate, ought not to rouse any heated controversy. The Civil List for the new reign must be settled, and as the Heir-Apparent is still two years under age, a Regency Bill must be brought in. A Bill for altering the terms of the Royal Declaration and relieving the Sovereign from the odious necessity of beginning his reign by insulting the religious convictions of many millions of his subjects, is a reform on which among sensible people there can hardly be two opinions; and while sensible people are not always those to whom Members of Parliament pay or can afford to pay the most attention, there really seems a chance that this unique anachronism

-unique in combining a maximum of offensiveness and vulgarity with a minimum of quaintness, and in serving no excusable purpose whatever-will now at long last be swept away. It may not be done without a certain amount of friction; there is admittedly room for argument between those who hold that the positive affirmation of Protestantism is enough, those who contend that no Declaration is necessary, since the Protestant Succession is already sufficiently guarded by the Act of Settlement, and those who, in addition to a profession of Protestantism, wish to see a definite, but not an insulting, repudiation of Catholicism; and, of course, the odium theologicum always lies not far below the surface of the British character. Nevertheless, only a very little firmness on the part of the Government, and only a very little goodwill on the part of the Opposition, will be needed to carry through this small but most desirable concession to toleration and good manners. After that it will be necessary to obtain a certain amount of Supply, and as by then we shall be well on in July, a general invitation will be extended to Mr. Lloyd George to temper the justice of the old Budget with the mercy of a new one. Mr. Lloyd George, by exercising a severe self-control, will produce a Budget as nearly humdrum as any measure in which he has a hand can possibly be-a Budget whose principal feature, presumably, will be the abolition of the pauper disqualification in connection with the Old Age Pensions. It will be passed with something like universal consent, and the House will then be prorogued for the summer holidays amid all the signs of what Americans call "an era of good feeling."

Such is the forecast of events to which those of an optimistic turn of mind incline. But apart from the fact that there is no immediate urgency in

the matter of the Royal Declarationthe King not having to make the Declaration until his Coronation or until a new Parliament meets-and that, therefore, the House of Commons may have more time on its hands than some people expect, there is this very obvious defect in the programme I have sketched-namely, that it ignores the House of Lords. Whether the truce -it cannot at best be other than an armed truce-is to last, is to lead up to a round-table conference, which in its turn will bring forth a settlement of the whole question on a basis of compromise, depends, not indeed absolutely, but very largely, on the action taken by the House of Lords during the next few weeks; and that action depends-here again not absolutely, but very largely on the personal views and wishes of Mr. Balfour, Lord Lansdowne, and perhaps four other men. When Parliament assembles, what do the Peers intend to do? It has been announced that one, at any rate, of their present intentions is to proceed with the Rosebery resolutions. No possible objection can be taken to that. The spectacle of the Peers discussing their own reform is one that excites many emotions, but, except in Lord Halsbury's inexpugnable breast, anger is not among them. A debate on the motions of which Lord Rosebery has given notice, conducted with the gravity and sincerity which recent events must have inspired even in the wildest of the backwoodsmen, will not provoke strife but allay it, and will have the further advantage of developing and giving substance to the only alternative which the Unionist Party has yet put forward to the Government's policy. From the standpoint of a possible peace there can be no harm and there may be much good in having the Lords expound with as much clearness and precision as possible what they mean by reform. But, after all, in the opin

ion of the Government-the only Government, remember, that can carry on without an immediate appeal to the country-the reform of the House of Lords is a side-issue. What Ministers are interested in and what all their followers are interested in is to see the reception that is to be given to their Veto proposals. How will the Lords treat them? On the answer to that question, more than on any other factor in the situation, hangs the issue of war or peace.

We were told before the King's death that any disposition on the part of the Peers to hang up the Veto Resolutions would be treated by the Government as equivalent to their rejection, and that if the House of Lords declined, as I apprehend it would have a perfectly valid right to do, to take them into consideration until they had been embodied in a Bill that had run its normal course in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith would be compelled to advise the King to employ the Royal prerogative. This somewhat pistolling attitude on the part of the Government struck me from the beginning as a little excessive-it is surely a new thing in our Parliamentary procedure to treat Resolutions as though they had the force of a Bill and as though attention to them and discussion of them could be claimed as a right-and the change wrought by the demise of the Crown has clearly, as it seems to me, rendered it untenable. If the Lords, in other words, were to ignore the Resolutions and to announce that they preferred to wait for the Bill, I doubt whether the Government would feel itself in a position to proceed to the threatened extremities. It could not, while pursuing a highly unusual and irregular demand of its own, and while resisting a perfectly normal request of the House of Lords, approach the King within a few weeks of his Accession and urge him either to create enough

Peers to swamp the Opposition in the Upper House at once, or to pledge himself to their creation in the event of a Liberal victory at the polls. For such a course would be branded from every Unionist platform, and would undoubtedly appear to the electorate, as an attempt to press the Crown unduly; and Ministers, if they are wise, if they have at all gauged the fervor of monarchical devotion which has been stimulated by the death of King Edward and by the overpowering demonstrations that attended his lying-in-state and his funeral ceremonies, will avoid at all costs even the appearance of coercing what is by far the most popular and the most potent institution in the country. Tactically, therefore, the Lords would score heavily, and would place the Government in a most awkward quandary if they declined to debate the Resolutions until they had been submitted to them in the customary form of a Bill. country would fail to recognize that the Government had any legitimate grievance, and Mr. Asquith could neither resign nor dissolve without incurring far greater risks and a far greater loss of prestige than anybody anticipated six weeks ago. Ministers would be all but compelled to introduce their Bill in an autumn session and to follow up its inevitable rejection in the House of Lords by another January election.

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But this would amount merely to a postponement and embitterment of the strife, not to its cessation. The truce is no truce if it is used by either side as a cover for a strategical advantage. What we are seeking, what all moderate men are hoping for, is a way out. For the Lords to ignore the Veto Resolutions is not a way out; it is a way that ends in the very heart of the morass. To reject them, on the other hand, outright is to bring the crisis to an immediate head. So direct a challenge the Government could not if it would, and would not if it could, over

look. It must, I think, be very obvious to a dispassionate looker-on that the Ministerialists, rightly or wrongly, do not dread an appeal to the country, and that among the rank and file, among the Radicals, the Labor men. and the Irish especially, there is a strong body of opinion in favor of forcing the pace. They are far more confident to-day than they were when the new Parliament first met. They have passed the Budget; they have survived all the embarrassments and humiliations that beset them at the opening of the session; they have won nearly every point in the Parliamentary battle; they have held enthusiastic meetings in all parts of the country; their organization was never in better trim or more amply endowed with funds and candidates; for all fighting purposes they are as much a compact and united force on the question of the House of Lords as are the Unionists on the question of Tariff Reform; their majority on this specific issue is a solid majority, an earnest and belligerent majority; and they have evolved a definite policy which, whether one approves of it or not, is at least a wholesome and virile contrast to the shuffling negatives of the Unionists, who seem to have no programme of their own either in regard to the Veto or to the composition of the House of Lords, and who have been forced to fall back on Lord Rosebery for their single, solitary flash of constructive statesmanship. If, therefore, the Lords reject the Veto Resolutions forthwith nothing can prevent the Government from pushing on with their original plan of action. The Liberals, I repeat, are prepared, if necessary, if no other honorable and satisfactory alternative presents itself, to go to the King with their request for guarantees, to resign office if he declines to act on their advice, and to dissolve Parliament only on the distinct understanding that an

endorsement of their programme by the electorate means, in case of need, its enforced adoption by the House of Lords. That is their temper if the worst comes to the worst; and it has to be reckoned with. On the other hand, they recognize not only the im policy of seeming to browbeat the Crown, particularly at such a juncture as this, but the deep national desire that the death of a beloved Monarch should be marked by the restoration of Constitutional peace; they have paid tribute to this desire, and they have left the door open to a possible settlement by cancelling some hundreds, if not some thousands, of meetings; they have done and said nothing since the King's death that has darkened the chances of a friendly conference. But they insist that the initiative must come from the Opposition; that the Government policy has been formulated in the sight of all men; that it is impossible for them to suggest its withdrawal or modification; and the next move-whether in the direction of hostilities or of compromise-rests with the Unionists.

Such being the situation, or some, at any rate, of the vital elements in the situation, it is clear that a very grave responsibility rests at this moment upon the Unionist leaders. It falls to their lot in as momentous and perplexing a crisis as this country has faced for two hundred years to say the word that will either make war inevitable or that will open up a pathway-a dubious pathway, no doubt, and full of pitfalls to a possible peace. The moment is intensely critical, and if, now that the hearts of the politicians have been tragically disposed towards harmony and the nation has been moved to realize itself as something infinitely bigger and better than the sum of all parties; if, now that the deepest mood of all men is towards conciliation; if this providential opportunity, purchased at so terrible a price, is al