tion recently concluded with the other Powers, of which Her Majesty's Government itself in the first instance disapproved, threatening to send their passports to Musurus Pacha and the special ambassador unless they signed it within forty-eight hours.

The consequences of this policy have been of the utmost gravity. Had we maintained our former relations with the Sultan, it is most probable that the Egyptian question, which has cost England the sacrifice of so much blood and treasure, would never have arisen. As I have said, I had no difficulty whatever, acting with my French colleague, in obtaining from the Sultan the deposition of Ismail Pacha and his expulsion from Egypt. I do not stop to inquire whether the policy then pursued was a right or a wrong one; I merely wish to point out that such was the power of the Sultan, and the influence he exercised in Egypt, that he could, without any difficulty whatever, dismiss its ruler and appoint his successor. Can any one suppose that, if our influence had been maintained, there would have been any difficulty whatever in dealing with Arabi Pacha, and in preventing the series of events which led to the bombardment of Alexandria, the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and the ultimate occupation of Egypt by English troops. Arabi Pacha was a man infinitely less powerful than Ismail, and there can be no doubt that he would have obeyed a summons of the Sultan to present himself at Constantinople, and that the war which subsequently ensued would have been avoided.

To the unfortunate change of policy to which I have referred, and to the manner in which we have treated the Sultan, I attribute the very grave difficulties in which we are now involved. Russia has always been ready to avail herself of the opportunity, when England was involved in difficulties, to make a further stride in the East, and to carry out her secular policy—a policy which she has been steadily following for the last 150 years.

We know how, when the hands of England were tied in consequence of the Franco-German war, she was able to pursue that policy with impunity, and, without the fear of interference on the part of any European Power, to tear up that part of the treaty of Paris which prevented her from fortifying Sebastopol and reconstructing her fleet in the Black Sea. She now sees us engaged in war in Egypt; she finds that, owing to the foreign policy of the present Government, England is left without one ally in Europe; that we have affronted both Germany and Austria, and cannot rely upon them; that we are upon far from friendly terms with France. She believes, therefore, that in the event of a war with her we could count upon no support from any European State.

She takes advantage of this state of things to make further

:

progress in the far East and to advance another step towards our Indian frontiers. She has placed us in the unfortunate alternative of having to choose between war and humiliation for to accept what she has done would be to admit that we are powerless to oppose her and can be insulted and offended with impunity. We may endeavour to justify to ourselves an acceptance of the events which have occurred, and the country may be led to believe that Russia has given us sufficient satisfaction, but we shall never be able to persuade Eastern peoples that we have not recoiled before her menaces. They cannot understand how such questions can be settled without an appeal to arms, and when they see that Russia has openly menaced us, that she has attacked our ally and slaughtered that ally's subjects, that our Commission which was to have acted with the Russian Commission has been insulted and compelled to withdraw, and that England has patiently submitted to these acts of aggression directed against herself, they cannot but believe that we are powerless to oppose Russia; and such being their conviction, they will naturally turn to her rather than to England. But unfortunately, as we can no longer count upon the Sultan, as we have alienated him from England, and have deeply offended him, we are deprived of that assistance which would enable us to carry on a war with Russia with effect. Had Turkey been our ally, the Dardanelles would have been open to us, and it is in the Black Sea that in the case of war with Russia she is most vulnerable. It is now said, and apparently with truth, that Germany, Austria, and France have called upon the Sultan to maintain his neutrality, and to close the Dardanelles against us, and have even threatened to make him responsible for the consequences either if the Dardanelles are open to us, or if we force them. If we forced them, it could only be at a great risk and great loss, and the consequence would further be, that instead of having Turkey as our friend and ally, we should compel her to join our enemies.

In the event of a war with Russia, one of our main objects should be to eject the Russians from Batoun, and to restore that port to Turkey. If we could renew our ancient relations and alliance with the Turks, and induce the Sultan to join with us in a war with Russia, we ought in return to obtain the restitution to him of Batoun. It was a grave error on the part of the Congress of Berlin to have compelled the Turks to cede Batoun to Russia. There are strong grounds for believing that if England had declared her determination not to permit its cession, Russia, rather than incur the danger of a rupture of the Congress, would not have pressed her demand for it. With the Black Sea closed against us, Russia can make use of Batoun as a base of operations. That

port is within a few hours' sail of Odessa, whence the Russian Government can send troops, ammunition, and all the necessaries of war to her armies in Turkestan, which otherwise she would have very great difficulty in supplying. The danger of allowing Russia to occupy Batoun had been long foreseen, and one of the most fatal results of the late Russo-Turkish war was the cession of that port to her.

I am convinced that if this country is determined to arrest the progress of Russia in the East, and to prevent her obtaining an allpowerful influence in the whole of Asia dangerous to our Indian Empire, we must return to our ancient policy as regards Turkey, which has been so strongly denounced by Mr. Gladstone and the Radical party. It is indeed somewhat late to do so, as in consequence of the results of the late war further elements of dissolution have been introduced into the empire.

But much can yet be done. Turkey is still a considerable empire, and the Sultan a very powerful sovereign, not only as the ruler of warlike races, but as the head of the Mahommedan religion. In the latter capacity he still exercises an immense influence over the Mussulman populations in all parts of the world, and his assistance is of the utmost importance to us in dealing with those Mahommedans who are under our rule. The people of this country must be shown that they have been misled in being induced to believe that in guaranteeing the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and in forming an alliance with Turkey, we in any way countenance or encourage bad government. On the contrary, if that alliance existed, and if we could restore our ancient friendship, England would be able to promote the cause of civilization, and to obtain the introduction of such improvements and reforms in the administration of the Ottoman empire as would promote the welfare of the Christian and other populations. At the same time we should have a powerful ally in the event of a war with Russia, which must inevitably take place sooner or later. It is useless to conceal from ourselves the fact that the object of Russia is, if not for the present the actual invasion of India, to occupy such a position as will enable her at any time to threaten the tranquillity of that country, and to prevent England from opposing her views and policy, not only in Asia but in Europe-in fact, to paralyze the action of this country.

Not only have we neglected Turkey, but we have neglected Persia as a further barrier to the advance of Russia in the East. We formerly sent able statesmen to that country to represent us. We did our utmost to conciliate the Persians and their Government, and Persia, like Turkey, looked to England as her friend and ally.

But that policy too has of late years been reversed. We have allowed Persia to fall into the hands of Russia. We have consequently at this moment both Turkey and Persia against us, and can count upon neither in the event of a war with Russia. It is the knowledge of these circumstances which renders Russia indifferent to our protests and remonstrances, and encourages her to make further advances towards our Indian frontier.

I have omitted to mention that an alliance with Turkey would insure us at all times the services of some of the finest troops in the world, if placed under English officers-troops which the late war has proved are more than a match for any possessed by Russia.

THE NATIVE ARMIES OF INDIA.

AT

Ta time when-in reference to certain contingencies-we are reckoning up the military resources of India, it is important to consider in general terms what really are the Native forces of that empire.

As is well known, the Native troops belonging to the British Indian Government, and bound to serve the British Sovereign, number about 130,000 men of all arms. They are distributed among the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and consist of three armies that is, one army in each of the three Presidencies. This total strength is certainly moderate for so extensive and populous an Empire as India. From motives of policy as well as of finance, it has been kept comparatively low ever since the Mutiny of 1857, and is now hardly half as large as it was before that grave epoch. It is really on a peace footing-that is to say, in time of profound tranquillity the Government could not do with fewer Native soldiers. In time of war or trouble it would have to be increased considerably. And to a certain extent such increase would be practicable—that is to say, the men necessary for the augmentation could be procured. In former days such augmentation would have been easily feasible; it is hardly an exaggeration to say that a recruiting authority had only to hold up his hand and a hundred men would spring forward, while the head of a district could embody a thousand soldiers almost with a stroke of the pen. It was thus currently believed that the Indian Government, with 200 millions of Asiatic subjects under its sway, besides more than 50 millions in the Native States, had a virtually unlimited supply of soldiers available. There might be difficulty in arming, equipping, maintaining, and transporting very large forces. But in procuring the men there would be, it was believed, no difficulty