and, apart from this, it would be infinitely more satisfactory in every way if the strength to adopt the wise and right course came wholly from within. The reforms that are essential have already been indicated, and it has also been said that the carrying of them out is certain to be left in the hands of one particular statesman.

A conclusion may, therefore, be made with an earnest appeal to M. Tricoupi. He has the fortunes of Greece in his hands—the fortunes of a country, that is, whose history we all honour, and the patriotism of whose inhabitants we admire even while we criticise. His long residence with us is perhaps rather a snare to him. He may imagine that he has in Greece, as we have in England, the resources of a rich and powerful country on which to draw, a country which can answer with alacrity any calls made upon it. But in Greece it is not so. The population is scanty, the soil, even where rich, is undeveloped, and its crops are precarious. The right course is, therefore, absolutely clear. Let internal development precede ambitious schemes for aggrandisement. Self-interest, if no worthier feeling, counsels this course, for the Powers will assuredly extend a measure of sympathy and protection towards progressive Greece that they will wholly deny to aggressive Greece.

A final word of warning. The longer the army reduction is delayed the more difficult will it be to carry out. A powerful military clique is being rapidly formed, which asks for nothing better than to be allowed to continue to pose in showy uniforms and to eat the bread of comparative idleness. If, then, the resolve to carry out the reduction is too long postponed, Greece will stand an excellent chance of having to submit for a time to an experience of that most intolerable of all forms of government, a military despotism.


PS.—Since the above remarks were written a Ministerial crisis has occurred in Athens. M. Tricoupi was defeated in the Chamber during the debate on the Budget by 4 votes (108 to 104), owing to the chance of some of his usual supporters being absent. He at once resigned, and the leader of the Opposition, M. Deliyannis, was commissioned by the King to form a Government. He failed in the attempt, and M. Tricoupi was therefore recalled. On his advice the King has dissolved the Chamber. M. Tricoupi remains in office during the elections, which take place on April 19, and it may therefore be confidently expected that he will obtain a substantial majority in the new Chamber. No more favourable opportunity could therefore be possible for the adoption of a fresh political departure, which will be heartily welcomed by all well-wishers to Greece. The simultaneous arrival at Athens of a new British Minister, Sir Horace Rumbold, would also seem to point to an excellent occasion for the offer of a little friendly advice and support.

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ISHOP TEMPLE'S Bampton Lectures * have a striking peculiarity which distinguishes them from an overwhelming majority of their predecessors. They have not a single note, supplement, or appendix; and are of a length which renders it possible that every word of the printed volume may have been delivered from the University pulpit. They are consequently brief; yet notwithstanding this brevity, we are bound to say that the lecturer has treated the subject with singular ability. We think that there are portions in these lectures which require a more expansive treatment, and others which require to be set forth with greater distinctness; yet notwithstanding these, which we cannot but consider drawbacks, we are of opinion that the work itself constitutes one of the most important contributions to the literature of the subject. The first lecture treats of the origin and nature of scientific belief. In it both Hume's and Kant's theories are examined, and their inadequacy pointed out. Then the author subjects our idea of causality to a rigid analysis; and proves that it is not satisfied by being resolved into the antecedents and consequents of physical science; but that its conception is derived from our consciousness of ourselves as causes—i.e., of our consciousness of possessing a power to act or to forbear acting, and of a power to originate motion, of which power we are especially conscious when we encounter obstacles in the way of effecting our pleasure. This, which constitutes our primary idea of causation, we transfer by metaphor to agents in the physical universe which are destitute of will. On the other hand, the postulate without which science is impossible is the uniformity of nature. The ground of this belief is none other than that we find it to be so in our daily experience. Being thus derived from experience alone, it follows that we can only affirm it positively within the range of experience; but as every addition to that experience affords fresh instances of this uniformity, we are justified in assuming, with a very high degree of probability, that the uniformity of nature is universal. Still, the foundations of physical science are not absolute like those of mathematics, which possess a universal validity; but are only absolutely valid as far as our experience extends. Science, then, having to do with the facts of experience alone, questions of causation lie beyond its cognizance; and the phenomena with which the student of science deals present themselves to him simply as antecedents, followed by unvariable consequents. Consequently the utmost that science can say of an event which believers in Revelation designate a miracle, is that it is an event which transcends its experience; and supposing it to be an actual occurrence, that it expects that increasing knowledge may bring it within the uniformities of nature; but inasmuch as all its knowledge of that uniformity is limited to an experience, respecting its possibility or impossibility it can affirm nothing. Lectures II. and III. treat of the origin and nature of religious belief, and of the apparent conflict between religion and science on the subject of free-will. It will be impossible for us even to summarize the contents of these two lectures. We can only say that the treatment of both these subjects is admirable. Lecture IV. is on the apparent conflict between religion and the doctrine of evolution. Its object is to prove that, instead of this doctrine destroying the evidence of design in the structure of the universe, it not only removes the objections which are urged against it, but that it greatly strengthens the evidence on which it rests. The argument, as stated by Paley, assumed a number of special creations. The principle of evolution, on the other hand, presupposes that things have become what they are through a succession of gradual developments. The difference between them is therefore simply a question of the modus operandi in the formation of things. Lecture W. is on “Revelation, the means of developing and completing spiritual knowledge.” In this lecture the lecturer proves that from the earliest dawn of science to the science of the present day, our present scientific attainments are the result of a gradual evolution of scientific knowledge. In a similar manner, the history of revelation, as contained in the Bible, presents us with a number of evolutions of religious truth, each gradually rising higher and higher, until they culminate in the work and teaching of Jesus Christ. The evolution of religious knowledge in the Old Testament is a patent fact. Still more so is the advance made in the New Testament when compared with the Old, the former being professedly the realization of the imperfect truths which are contained in the latter. In a word, revelation has not been communicated once for all in a complete form, but has been a slow and gradual growth. So far, the doctrine of evolution has nothing to urge against it, but everything in its favour. Progress in religious knowledge, however, has not been due to thinkers intellectually gifted, like the progress of science, but to prophets and apostles claiming to have received from God revelations suited to the mental condition of those to whom they were addressed. Lecture VI. treats of the apparent collision between religion and the doctrine of evolution. Here the lecturer enters on an examination of the current doctrines of evolution as they have been propounded by scientific men, and points out the places in the long chain of development where there is a gulf which all the efforts of science have as yet failed to bridge over. Among these stand conspicuous the introduction of life; the cause of those variations, without the existence of which evolution cannot advance a single step in the production of the various forms of animal and vegetable life; and, above all, the moral law and the moral nature of man. Having discussed these questions, the lecturer proceeds to show that the account given in Genesis of the origin of things is not inconsistent with a doctrine of evolution. Lecture VII. is on the apparent collision of science with the claim to supernatural power. One of the important points in this lecture is an attempt to prove that, even if the doctrine of evolution, as held by advanced scientific men, should eventually be proved to be true, the miracles which are recorded in the New Testament, even the resurrection of our Lord, may not be miraculous in a scientific sense, but that they may have been the results of unknown forces acting in conformity with the uniformities of nature. It is true that the lecturer does not propound this theory as one held by himself, but as one which is conceivably possible. We cannot, however, help thinking that he has here laboured in vain; for as long as there is a single miracle which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be brought within these uniformities, the entire argument is valueless. Such a miracle beyond all question is the person and work of Jesus Christ, as it is depicted in the Evangelists; for even if we reject the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, and confine ourselves to the synoptics, it is evident that the character therein portrayed, if historical, is a superhuman one, and cannot have been the result of any conceivable process of evolution. Consequently, if we could explain every other miracle recorded in the New Testament in conformity with the uniformities of nature, as long as this miracle remains thus inexplicable, we have done nothing to propitiate those who hold the extreme scientific theories in question; for if we are compelled to admit one miracle, there is no real difficulty in the admission of a hundred. Lecture VIII. draws the conclusions which result from the arguments in the preceding seven, and points out their application to the questions at issue between religion and science at the present day. In conclusion, we strongly recommend these lectures to the careful consideration of our readers. The title of Mr. Jameson's book* is an accurate description of its contents. The questions discussed in it are so profound, that great numbers of them are unfathomable by the human understanding. We cannot help thinking that some portions of this apparent profundity are due to the author's not unfrequently mistaking muddy waters for deep ones. For ourselves, we can only say that if the questions that are discussed in this work are the true philosophy of the creed of any Christian Church, or the genuine exponents of it, then the creed of that Church must differ toto coelo from that Gospel which our Lord declared in the synagogue of Nazareth that it was the end and purpose of his mission to proclaim. We can, however, promise those of our readers who delight in hard reading and abstract reasoning, that their taste will be fully gratified by a perusal of the work before us. The subject which is discussed in the work of Ewald referred to below,” is one the importance of which, in the present aspects of thought, can hardly be over-estimated, and its author, now deceased, was beyond all doubt a man of the most unbounded erudition in all questions relating to theology. Those, however, who are acquainted with his writings are painfully aware that he possessed one great mental defect—viz., a want of power to express himself with clearness and perspicuity. This is conspicuous even in historical writings; but we think that the present volume is a more striking example of this defect than any of his works which we have perused. It consists of three parts—viz.: Part I. “The Nature of the Revelation of the Word of God; ” Part II. “Revelation in Heathenism and on Israel; ” Part III. “Revelation in the Bible.” These are subjects which require to be treated with the greatest perspicuity; but we regret to say that, in perusing this work, we found ourselves involved in a London fog. Even the translator writes as follows:—“If in his spirit and temper Ewald had more of the fervour of the prophet than of the calmness of the philosopher, and in his style less of lucid brevity than of diffuse though magnificent eloquence, his fault is more than condoned by the lofty moral earnestness of his faith, and by the poetic glow of his massive periods.” We think, however, that a work on “Revelation, its Nature and Record,” if it is to be of any utility, ought to be treated with “the calmness of the philosopher,” and not with “the fervour of the prophet,” and above all, with “lucid brevity” and perspicuity, instead of “with diffuse and magnificent eloquence.” If we had written the passage above quoted, we should have designated what the translator calls “magnificent eloquence" and “massive periods” by the words obscurity and verbosity. The translator himself observes: “It is perhaps needless to add that, while commending this volume to the notice of all students in theology and Holy Scripture, neither the publishers nor the translator wish to be identified with the peculiar doctrinal views of its author.” For ourselves, we deeply lament the defects to which we have referred, because we are of opinion that the mode of investigation which is pursued by the author, in dealing with this most difficult subject—viz., the historical in contrast to the a priori method—is the only one which can lead to the solution of the problem in question. In conclusion, we feel bound to say that we have hardly ever read a work which has left a less definite impression on our memory, and we deeply pity the student who may have to stand an examination on its contents. The work whose title is quoted below f is another work in style and character essentially German, and is suited only for the learned student, though it considerably exceeds the work we have just noticed in lucidity of style. The author himself gives the term “Theologec ’’ as an alternative to “Encyclopaedia of Theology,” and we cannot do better than allow the translator to give his own definition of these terms. He observes: “It is the special function

* “The Relations between Science and Religion. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1884.” By Frederick Lord Bishop of Exeter. London: Macmillan & Co. 1884.

* “The Profound Problems in Philosophy and Theology.” By the Rev. G. Jameson, B.D., Minister of the First Charge, Old Machar. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1884. * “Revelation: its Nature and Record.” By Heinrich Ewald. Translated from the German by the Rev. T. Goodley, B.A., President of the Baptist Missionary College, Nottingham. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1884.

t “Encyclopædia of o By Dr. J. F. Rábiger. Translated, with additions to the History and Literature, by the Rev. J. Macpherson, M.A., Findhorn. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1884.

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