the very manifestations of the Ego are themselves objective and strictly a part of the non-Ego." That is to say, the states of consciousness which we began by accepting as indicia of the Ego, are themselves objects or presentations to a subject, and to that extent non-Ego. What is known is ipso facto an object; there is therefore perpetually postulated a subject which we can never reach, because to reach it would be to make it an object and thereby to create another subject to know that object. Mr. Thompson deserves credit for the clearness with which he brings out the dilemma, but this very clearness should have made him hesitate to identify this subject-Ego, simply because we cannot make an object of it, with something "whose substance is unknown and unknowable." Why not be content with knowing it as it is; why insist on making an object or thing of it; that is, on knowing it as it is not? As subject we do know it; that is, we recognise its presence by reflective analysis. What right have we to suppose that it is anything else than that as which we know it, namely, the necessary correlate and unity-point of all knowledge? But this is not a matter to be charged against Mr. Thompson individually. It is only the crowning phase of that great mystification which philosophers have long practised upon themselves, and to which, as Berkeley sarcas tically puts it, they " are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well."

Very different in every respect from Mr. Thompson's work, though called by the same name, is Rosmini's "Psychology," of which the first volume is now published in translation. Any one passing from the one to the other might be excused for wondering how one term could so far vary in connotation as to include both treatises. If the one is empirical and scientific in its method and contents, the sole interest of the other is philosophical or metaphysical. Rosmini treats of psychology only so far as it is a philosophical science, that is, he takes it as an introduction to Ontology, or what he himself calls Theosophy. The work of the great Catholic philosopher appears at first sight to have little in common with the modern spirit. A book whose first part is entitled "Of the Essence of the Human Soul," daunts a reader of to-day by its hopelessly scholastic look. But even the scholastics have been rescued of late from the unmerited contempt which it has been the fashion to heap upon them. Moreover, Rosmini wrote in full view of the results of modern philosophy, both empirical and transcendental. He put forward his philosophy as the only way of escape from the Subjectivism (whether of the senses or of the intellect) to which he maintained that most modern thought had succumbed. His work, therefore, demands to be carefully studied; for the Subjectivism referred to is not entirely an imagination of his own. Even though he may fail to win us for his own metaphysic of substance and essence, he may help us to discover the weak places in our modern armour. Certainly no one can read the General Preface to his metaphysical works, printed at the beginning of this volume, without recognizing the clearness of vision and firmness of grasp with which the field is mapped out. In the "Psychology" itself, his remarks on the nature of perception and the correlation of sychology." Three volumes. By Antonio Rosmini Serbati, Vol. I. London: 11, Trench & Co. 1884.

feeling and the real, are especially worthy of note in a philosophic al regard.

Mr. Jardine's "Psychology of Cognition "* is "designed principally for the use of students who are beginning their philosophical studies." Perhaps there is rather more controversial matter in the book than is warranted by this account of its aim. But Mr. Jardine also admits that "one principal object which he kept before his mind in the preparation of the book was to show the inadequacy and unsatisfactoriness of a prevailing system of psychology, which may be indicated by the word phenomenalism." This system is mainly attacked in the person of John Stuart Mill. The author's own account of Perception has its good points, though the account of extension ultimately adopted seems to take "localizing" somewhat loosely as equivalent to grouping or clustering of sensations in Berkeley's sense. The empiricist might reply that sensations may be grouped, clustered, or associated without introducing the peculiar fact designated by localization in space. It might be difficult to define exactly Mr. Jardine's general philosophical position, but his affinities are in the main with Hamilton and the Scotch school. It is like Hamilton, but somewhat at variance with his own declaration above about phenomenalism, when Mr. Jardine entangles himself in the same puzzle as Mr. Thompson about an allknowing but unknown self. "This peculiarity of self," as he quaintly calls it, "makes it the most intractable and puzzling element of our conscious existence." What has been said will be enough to show that Mr. Jardine approaches psychology more, from the philosophical than from the scientific side; and as a consequence the handbook is rather meagre in its treatment of the sensational elements of knowledge. On the other hand, there is too much purely logical matter in the concluding chapter on "The Elaboration of Knowledge." But the book as a whole is agreeably written, and it appears now in a second edition.

Dr. McCosh has begun a "Philosophic Series" of "didactic" and "historical" pamphlets, intended to rehabilitate "old and fundamental truths in religion and philosophy," and more especially directed against Agnosticism. Dr. McCosh enunciates his own positions with much clearness and vigour; but though they are not infrequently sounder than those which they controvert, the author's attitude is too uniformly apologetic and controversial to admit of his being always in line with the modern shape of the questions at issue. This cannot be said of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's thorough-going Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society on "The Relations of Philosophy to Science, Physical and Psychological." The substance of the pamphlet will not be new to readers of the author's works, but the differentiation of the psychological from the philosophical problem has never been more luminously put by him than now. This is probably the most valuable part of the Address; at all events, it is likely

"The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition." By the Rev. Robert Jardine, B.D., D.Sc. Edinburgh; ex-Principal of the General Assembly's College, Calcutta. Second edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1884.

+"Philosophic Series." I. Criteria of Diverse Kinds of Truth; II. EnergyEfficient and Final Cause. By James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., D.L., Author of "Intuitions of the Mind." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1884.

"The Relations of Philosophy to Science, Physical and Psychological." By Shadworth H. Hodgson, Hon. LL.D. Edinburgh, &c. Williams & Norgate. 1884.

to be the most useful at the present juncture. Writers of books on psychology would do well to take to heart the stricture with which it closes. Even the best and most scientifically minded are accustomed to begin their treatises with the stereotyped formula that they are merely treating of the phenomena of the subject, and that the real nature of the mind is a question for philosophy. "As if," adds Mr. Hodgson, "the consideration of the real nature of anything which is admitted to be a real condition of consciousness could be omitted from psychology, and yet psychology could preserve its scientific character.

Neither will it escape you how injurious to philosophy is this attempt to put off upon its shoulders an inconvenient and indeed impossible task, as the psychologists in question well know it to be, the wild-goose chase of mind as an entity. Philosophy exposes the fallacy of the conception; it is hardly fair to saddle it with the capture of the thing." Mr. Hodgson's own position in regard to psychology is, while avoiding the assertion that no real conditions exist but physical ones, that the business of psychology is altogether exhausted in connecting the several moments, states, or events of consciousness with their conditions, organic and extra-organic. He points out with truth that "the revolution which has recently taken place, and is still going on in psychology, and to which its present proud position among the positive sciences is owing, consists in bringing the phenomena of consciousness, that is, its states and processes, into immediate connection with physiological processes," and adds that "its scientific character rests upon this kind of investigation and comes to an end with it." When we depart from this ground, he seems to say that "we are merely giving a preliminary description and provisional description of the phenomena." This is an exact description of the old Psychologies-such good general reading in parts from the acute observation of men and manners which they imply, so dreary at other times from their amount of tabulated commonplace.

The ethical bent of English philosophy continues to assert itself. Professor Fowler, in his pleasant Essay on "Progressive Morality," * has endeavoured "to exhibit a scientific conception of morality in a popular form," detached as far as possible from the "discussion of theoretical difficulties." The Essay is written with the lucidity of style which we meet in the best philosophical writers of last century, and, as becomes a writer who is seeking common ground beyond the strife of theories, with studied tolerance for varieties of expression where these may fairly be held to cover the same essential meaning. The term Conscience he in general, avoids on the ground that, as popularly used, it suggests-partly through Butler's influence-" a sort of mysterious entity," divinely endowed "with the unique prerogative of infallibility." "In any intelligible or tenable sense of the term, conscience stands simply for the aggregate of our moral opinions reinforced by the moral sanction of self-approbation or self-disapprobation. That we ought to act in accordance with these opinions, and that we are acting wrongly if we act in opposition to them, is a truism. 'Follow conscience' is the only safe guide when the moment of

* " Progressive Morality." An Essay in Ethics. By Thomas Fowler, M.A., LL.D., President of Corpus Christi College, Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co. 1884.

action has arrived. But it is equally important to insist on the fallibility of conscience, and to urge men, by all means in their power, to be constantly improving and instructing their consciences, or, in plain words, to review, and wherever occasion offers to correct, their conceptions of right and wrong." Holding thus the common-sense view that the moral sanction or sentiment varies, as to the actions it approves and disapproves, in different ages and communities, and even in the same individual at different periods of his life, Professor Fowler points out, after Hume, that "reason and sentiment concur in every ethical estimation of action. The nature of the moral feeling, as a feeling, is not affected by the objects to which it attaches itself. Progress in morality is due, therefore, to the development of the rational rather than the emotional element in the ethical actin other words, to that wider horizon and increased accuracy in judging the tendencies of actions which are the heritage of civilized man. In seeking an ultimate scientific statement of the object of the moral sentiment, Professor Fowler chooses the term "welfare" rather than "pleasure" or "perfection," as being least misleading in its associations, and holding out most prospect of a common understanding. But the welfare of the individual and of the society to which he belongs consists in adjustment to his and its surroundings, and this implies again the fluid character of morality. For as men's knowledge of their social and physical environment becomes clearer and ampler, they are gradually led to rectify the comparatively crude generalizations of an early time. And in addition to this, as their circumstances themselves continue to change, a constant process of readjustment goes on. The work of the moralist and of the social reformer consists in criticism of the defects of current moral sentiment with a view to elevate the standard of feeling and action. By their consciously reflective action they "detect those aspects and bearings of conduct which are not obvious to the general intelligence;" but their work is "best regarded as corrective of and supplementary to the work which mankind is constantly doing for itself." Professor Fowler himself essays this criticism of existing morality in his concluding chapter, which contains some interesting practical applications. There are proofs that Green's " Prolegomena to Ethics" continues to occupy English thinkers. In the newly published third edition of his "Methods of Ethics,"* many of Mr. Sidgwick's alterations and additions seem to have been made with reference to Green. The current number of Mind also contains an article by Professor Calderwood, entitled "Another View of Green's Last Work," highly appreciative in tone, though controverting certain of Green's main positions from the standpoint of the Scottish philosophy. Such discussions can only do good. Mr. Malcolm Guthrie concludes his elaborate criticism of Mr. Spencer's system by a small volume devoted to the "Data of Ethics."+ He contends forcibly that "the purely biological explanation of ethical injunctions is insufficient as a means of understanding their imperative

"The Methods of Ethics." By Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Third edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1884.

+On Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics." By Malcolm Guthrie, Author of "On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," and "On Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge." The Modern Press. 1884.

character." In other words, "the mere study of what has been, and the consequent prevision of what will be, establishes no rule of right." While admitting the presence of elements of the utmost value in Mr. Spencer's Ethics, as in every other department of his system, Mr. Guthrie nevertheless concludes that the system as a whole is like "Nebuchadnezzar's dream-god"-"a thing apparently perfect and complete in configuration, but inevitably falling to pieces under the strain of sustained criticism."

Mainly historico-critical in character are Professor Flint's "Vico," the latest volume of the Philosophical Classics for English Readers, and Mr. Masson's "Atomic Theory of Lucretius." Mr. Masson has devoted great pains to working out at all points the exact sense of Lucretius's conceptions of the world and universal law. He compares them in an instructive way with the conclusions of the most recent science. The chapter which the author devotes to combating the conclusions of Professor Tyndall and others rather interferes perhaps with the unity of an able and sympathetic study. Professor Flint's "Vico" is a welcome sheaf from the rich garner of the author's erudition. The fact that Vico is so little known in this country makes the volume all the more valuable. An age which especially prides itself upon its historic sense ought to have a peculiar interest in the founder of the philosophy of history. The title "Scienza Nova," which Vico gave to his great work, was no mere presumptuous boast. "His picture of the heroic age," says Professor Flint, "was a prophecy and prefiguration of the achievements alike of a Wolf and Niebuhr, and of a Walter Scott and Augustin Thierry." Readers of this little volume will hope that Professor Flint may soon be able to complete the subject of which this forms a part, and give the world a second volume of his Philosophy of History."

ANDREW SETH.

IV. GENERAL LITERATURE.

BIOGRAPHY.-The new year has been signalized by the appearance of the first volume of Mr. Leslie Stephen's "Dictionary of National Biography," the most complete and exact work of the kind that has ever been undertaken. The magnitude of the work may be guessed from the fact that the present volume of 474 large 8vo pages brings us no farther than "Anne." The editor has solved the difficulties of his task very successfully. He has omitted no name, it may safely be said, that anybody can have occasion to want information about, and it must be remembered that it is for the obscurer names on which other sources of information are wanting that a biographical dictionary comes most to our aid. Proportion, too, is well observed throughout, and a most useful feature is the paragraph of bibliographical references at the end

"Vico." By Robert Flint, Professor in the University of Edinburgh, &c. London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1884.

+ "The Atomic Theory of Lucretius contrasted with Modern Doctrines of Atoms and Evolution." By John Masson, M.A. London: George Bell & Sons. 1884.

"Dictionary of National Biography." Edited by Leslie Stephen. Vol. I. Abbadie-Anne. London: Smith, Elder & Co.