I. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVEREIGN THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN, AND THE PRIVILEGE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. PART I. PREROGATIVE AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. CHAPTER I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. Definition of THE government of England is conducted in conformity. with certain traditional maxims, which limit the exercise of all political powers therein. These parliamentary maxims are, for the most part, unwritten and government. conventional. They have never been declared in any formal charter or statute, but have developed, in the course of centuries, side by side with the written law. They embody the matured experience of successive generations of statesmen, and are known as the precepts of the constitution.1 The principle of a constitutional or parliamentary government is essentially different from that either of a republic or of a despotism. A constitutional king is not responsible to the people, but he is bound by the laws; he is not free to govern as he pleases, but must rule in conformity to the recognized usages of the constitution. In a parliamentary government, the obligation of a king to rule righteously is as 1 See Freeman, Growth of Eng. Const. c. iii.; Bonamy Price, Cont. Rev. v. 38, p. 943. VOL. I. B Power of the sovereign under parliamentary government. Relation of ministers to But great as that of a people to obey those who have the rule over them. It is indeed more difficult to control and punish a sovereign who may abuse his office than to call people to account for treason and rebellion. in a parliamentary government the kingly power is subjected to such rigid limitations that its abuse is difficult, if not impossible. The axiom that the king can do no wrong, is necessary for the protection of the monarchy; but it is rendered innocuous by the affirmation of the doctrine that ministers of state are responsible for every exercise of kingly authority. These ministers have been permitted to share, with the crown, in the functions the crown. of royalty, on condition that they assume a full responsibility before Parliament and people. And as no minister could properly undertake to be responsible for a policy which he could not control, or for acts which he did not approve, it has necessarily followed that the direction and administration of the policy of government have passed into the hands of the constitutional advisers of the crown. By these means, the services of statemen in whom the country has confidence have been secured on behalf of the empire; while the equilibrium of the state has been preserved, amidst the recurrent changes of its actual rulers, by the permanence of the monarchical principle in the person of the sovereign. Such are the theory and practice of the British constitution, which it will be the endeavour of the author to explain in the following pages. 1688. The great and leading maxims of the British constitution Revolution of are the personal irresponsibility of the king, the responsibility of ministers, and the inquisitorial power of Parliament. For the complete recognition of these cardinal principles, the nation is indebted to the statesmen who effected the Revolution of 1688. Prior to that epoch, the government of England was mainly Government by carried on by the king in person, with the advice prerogative. and assistance of ministers appointed by himself, and responsible to him alone. Under this system Parliament had no voice in the selection of ministers of the crown; and, whenever adverse opinions in regard to questions of administration were entertained by either House of Parliament, there were no means of making those opinions known, except by retrospective complaint and remonstrance. This occasioned frequent contests between the crown and Parliament, which sometimes ended in civil war. While the sole executive authority of the realm was possessed by the king—in whom, together with his ministers and officers of state, was vested the exclusive right of administering the laws of the land-the legislative authority was divided between three co-ordinate powers, the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. Each of these branches of the one Parliament enjoyed co-ordinate legislative authority. Balance of constitution. So long as this form of government prevailed, it was customary to assume that the well-being of the English commonwealth depended on the preserva- powers in the tion of the balance of power between these branches of the supreme Parliament, so that any abuse of authority on the part of one, might admit of correction by the interposition of the authority of another. For example, the power of the two Houses of Parliament to frame laws was presumed to be held in check by the king's negative. Again, the arbitrary exercise of the king's veto was restrained by the power which Parliament possessed of refusing a grant of supplies for the service of the crown. On the other hand, freedom of speech, though nominally conceded to Parliament from a very early period, was not invariably respected by the crown. In some instances, the Tudor monarchs went the length of charging the Speaker of the Commons to forbid members from meddling with matters of state. Occasionally we read of free-spoken representatives being cited before the Privy Council, interrogated and reprimanded, or sent to the Tower. In selfdefence, the Commons adopted a standing order for the exclusion of strangers during debate, and making it punishable to repeat out of doors what had passed within. And, in order to maintain the due independence of the legislative chambers, it was held to be an infringement of constitutional privilege for the king to take the initiative in legislation by submitting any bills to the consideration of the two Houses-save only acts of grace and pardon—or even for the sovereign to take formal notice of any resolution or proceeding of Parliament which did not affect the interests of the crown, until the 1 1 Macaulay, Hist. of Eng. v. 3, p. 543; Park's Dogmas, p. 104; May, Parl. Prac. c. iv. |