Third, the reigning sovereign has always, and especially when the Privy Council was a numerous body, selected, and by his prerogative had a right to select, certain persons of that council, in whom he could especially confide, and by whose advice he more particularly acted. So that it may be said that at no period has the king of England been without sworn advisers who could be held responsible for all his public acts. Fourth, the authority and jurisdiction of the Privy Council have been made from time to time the subject of parliamentary regulation; but the difficulty of enforcing the responsibility of ministers to parliament under prerogative government was such that, except in case of high crimes and misdemeanours, which could be punished by impeachment, it was virtually inoperative. Fifth, the want of a cordial understanding between the sovereign and the legislative assemblies was the fruitful source of dissension and misgovernment, which led, in 1649, to the overthrow of the monarchy, and in 1688 to the transference of the crown to a prince of the House of Orange, who was "called in to vindicate practically those maxims of liberty for which, in good and evil days, England had contended through so many centuries." 1 And, lastly, the attempt under the Commonwealth to establish a Council of State which should reflect the opinions of the House of Commons, and be composed of the most prominent and influential members of that body, however promising at the outset, speedily and entirely failed, from the lack of that element of stability which the authority and influence of a constitutional monarch can alone 2 supply. Growth of constitutional It is also noticeable that, even during the reign of the Tudor sovereigns, when the power of the crown was predominant over everything, and parliament was government. weak and subservient, principles were at work which ultimately tended to the further advancement of constitutional government. It was then that the great offices of state began first to assume form and method, and the complex 1 Taylor, Book of Rights, p. 211. 2 I have again left Mr. Todd's text unmodified, but it seems to require modification. Stability can be secured by other forms of government as well as by constitutional monarchy; and stability was wanting during the Commonwealth, because the institutions of the country were unsettled and uncertain.-Eaitor. machinery of administration to settle into something like its modern aspect. The Secretaries of State, originally mere clerks appointed to do the king's bidding, became by degrees potent functionaries, with certain defined powers and responsibilities. The office of Chancellor, too, was at this period brought nearly to its present shape. That of Lord High Treasurer, or First Commissioner of the Treasury, and that of Lord High Admiral, or First Commissioner of the Admiralty, came to be then of fixed appointment and establishment. Thus, instead of the arbitrary and irregular selection of early times, the principal officers of state were duly appointed to discharge the functions of administration, and to advise the sovereign in the government of the realm. The persons appointed by the king to fill these posts, if not already of the Privy Council, were invariably added to that dignified assembly; and, as the most trusted servants and advisers of the crown, they formed the nucleus of the confidential council, which was afterwards known as "the Cabinet." This powerful The Cabinet governing body, heretofore a pliant instrument in made responsithe hands of the reigning monarch, was made ble to parliaresponsible to parliament by the revolution of 1688. The Bill of Rights, while it left unimpaired the just rights and privileges of the crown, rebuked the excessive claims of prerogative, redressed the grievances of the people, gave vigour and certainty to the efforts of parliament, secured its independence, and recognized its inquisitorial functions, so that henceforth it was free to assume that watchful oversight and control over the administration of public affairs, which is now acknowledged to be its peculiar and most important vocation.1 1 See Mr. Adam's speech, Parl. Deb. v. 16, pp. 2 **** ment. -7 **** CHAPTER III. THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. In the endeavour to enforce the principle of ministerial responsibility for all acts of government, it speedily became apparent that some constitutional provision was necessary to require that the advisers of the crown, through whose agency all affairs of state are conducted, should be publicly known— in order that they might be held accountable to Parliament for the advice they had given to the sovereign, and for the consequences of acts which had been brought about through their Case of the Treaties. own instrumentality. This was strikingly exemplified in the case of the Partition Treaties, which occurred in 1698. The House of Commons were of opinion that these treaties were highly injurious to the public interests, and it was proposed to impeach Lord Somers, who, as Chancellor, had affixed to them the great seal. Somers, in his defence, alleged that he had opposed the treaties, but that he had put the great seal to one of them by the king's command, considering that he was bound to do so. Dissatisfied with this explanation, the commons resolved upon his impeachment. They also determined to impeach Lord Portland, Lord Orford, and Lord Halifax, who, as prominent members of the administration, were held responsible for advising this objectionable measure. But it proved that these noblemen had had nothing to do with the matter, and that the treaties had been negotiated by the king himself. Lord Somers was acquitted by the House of Lords, notwithstanding the unwarrantable nature of his defence, in trusting for the justification of his conduct to the king's command; an excuse which was entirely at variance with the true principles of responsible government, and which, if recognized as sufficient, would deprive parliament of all control over the executive administration. The proceedings against the other members of the ministry were equally unsuccessful, it being impossible to prove that they had been parties to the obnoxious treaty.1 Foiled in their attempt to bring home to any one responsibility for this act of arbitrary power, the House of Commons set about the adoption of measures to prevent a repetition of the offence. This they endeavoured to effect by the introduction of a clause into the Act of Settlement which provided that, after the accession of the House of Hanover, "all matters relating to the well-governing of this kingdom, which are properly cognizable in the Privy Council by the laws and Responsibility Councillors. customs of this realm, shall be transacted there, of Privy and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council as shall advise or consent to the same." 2 This provision was meant to compel the discussion of all state affairs in full Privy Council, and to discriminate between the responsibility of those who promoted and those who opposed each resolution, by requiring all who voted for it to sign their names thereto. It was, however, soon perceived that such a system would cause infinite delay and embarrassment in governing the kingdom; while doubtless it was also obnoxious to the ministry, who were not as yet prepared to assume such a definite responsibility, involving with it prospective anticipations of impeachment and disgrace. Accordingly, in the following reign, before the time when it was to have come into operation, it was formally repealed.* Another clause in the Act of Settlement-which appears to have been framed in connection with the fore- Impeachment going-declared that no pardon under the great of ministers. seal should be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons. This salutary provision still remains in force, and is calculated to increase the sense of individual responsibility of ministers. It has been interpreted by Blackstone as designed to prevent the royal pardon from being available pending an impeach1 Hallam's Const. Hist. v. 3, p. 253; Campbell's Chanc. v. 4, pp. 156-158. 2 12 & 13 Will. III. c. 2, § 4. Creasy, Eng. Const. p. 332; Parl. Hist. v. 6, p. 474. 4 4 & 5 Anne, c. 8. ment, and in bar to its progress; but not to restrain a pardon after the conclusion of the trial.1 Although the Act of Settlement proved abortive to ensure the direct accountability of the advisers of the crown to parliament, yet that result was gradually brought about by the course of events, in a way that was quite unforeseen by the politicians and statesmen who effected the revolution. William III. William III. had been summoned to the throne of England by the two Houses of Parliament, in order that he might rule as a constitutional sovereign. The rights and liberties of the subject, for infringing which King James had forfeited his crown, had been declared by parliament in a document which was presented to the Prince of Orange upon his assumption of the government. They had afterwards been embodied in the Bill of Rights, as part of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and the motive and condition of the revolution-settlement. The king, on his own part, was sincere in his resolve and endeavour to discharge his sacred obligations with fidelity. But owing to the natural reserve of his disposition, and his large capacity for administration, he relied much less upon the advice of his ministers than would now be expected of a constitutional king. In fact, according to the testimony of Hallam, William was eminently his own minister, and was better fitted for that office than any of those who served him.2 In all domestic matters, as a general rule, he was wont to consult his ministers, and to govern through their instrumentality. Questions of war and diplomacy, however, the king reserved to himself; and his advisers, conscious that they were less versed in military and foreign affairs than their royal master, were content to leave with him the command of the army, and to know only what he thought fit to communicate about the instructions which he gave his own ambassadors, or concerning the conferences which he held with the ambassadors of foreign princes. We have seen the consequences of this policy in diplomatic affairs in the matter of the Partition Treaties; but so deep-seated was the conviction that military affairs were a branch of the prerogative that belonged exclusively to the king himself, that it was 1 Step. Com. Ed. 1874, v. 4, p. 471. 8 2 Hallam, Const. Hist. v. 3, pp. 252, 388. |