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pageant. Though divested, by the growth and development of our political institutions, of direct political power, the crown still retains immense personal and social influence for good or evil.

functions.

One of the most important branches of the regal functions is that wherein the crown, as "the symbol of Ceremonial national sovereignty," appears in public for the and personal performance of those acts of state which peculiarly appertain to the kingly office-such as opening and proroguing Parliament, holding public receptions, or ceremonials for conferring marks of distinction and royal favour upon particular persons, and according, on behalf of the nation, a hospitable welcome to foreign sovereigns, or other eminent persons from abroad, who may visit the kingdom. These duties, while they frequently entail heavy burdens upon the sovereign, cannot be intermitted—except for unavoidable causes, and for a limited time-without impairing the dignity and influence of the crown itself. The presence of the sovereign in the midst of his people, dispensing favours, or engaged in the performance of high acts of state, affords opportunity for the public expression of the loyalty or personal devotion of the people to their king. For "loyalty needs to be stimulated by external display, by the pomp and circumstance of power, by all the kindly feelings which personal intercourse creates between sovereign and subject. If a sovereign omits to keep it alive by such means, he leaves unfulfilled that one function which no one else can perform in his stead.""

Moreover, notwithstanding the supreme political power which is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister for the time being, the court, presided over by the sovereign, Social preis still the highest point in the social scale. No eminence. prime minister, or leader of a political party, can attempt to vie with his sovereign in this particular. The personal preeminence of the king invests himself and his surroundings with a dignity which is absolute and unapproachable. The most exalted position in English society is thereby withdrawn from the arena of political competition, which is an immense benefit to the best interests of the nation. Were it otherwise, "politics would offer a prize too dazzling for mankind." If, in addition to the advantages that at present attend upon a

1 Sat. Rev. March 26, 1864.

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successful parliamentary career, "the highest social rank was to be scrambled for in the House of Commons, the number of social adventurers there would be incalculably more numerous, and indefinitely more eager;" and an overwhelming preponderance would be given to a force which is "already perilously great." From all these disturbing influences, our political system has been preserved by the position assigned therein to the monarch. The court of our sovereign is therefore an important element in the forces whereby the legitimate influences of royalty make themselves felt in the body politic; and if the favour and hospitalities of the court are beneficially dispensed and its recreations becomingly directed into moral and healthful channels-the social and moral tone of the upper classes, and, by their example, of the whole community, are proportionably elevated."

The influence which properly appertains to the opinions of the sovereign, when constitutionally expressed, would naturally be exerted to place the government of the country in the hands of a minister whose policy was in accordance with the views entertained by the crown itself; but unless those views found a response from the nation at large, and were accepted by Parliament, they could not ultimately prevail. For "the greater part of the power still practically retained by the crown depends upon the influence it can exercise on individual statesmen, and through them on the dominant party of the day." In the last resort, no opinions or policy can be carried out by the government of England but such as meet with the sober approval of parliament and of the people.

1 Bagehot, Eng. Const. p. 73.

2 See Mr. Gladstone on this subject in Cont. Rev. v. 26, p. 13, and in the Church Quar. Rev. v. 3, p. 487. And see a well-written "Letter to the Queen, on her Retirement from Public Life: by one of her Majesty's most Loyal Subjects" (London, 1875).

THE

CHAPTER II.

PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN, AND THE PRIVILEGE OF
PARLIAMENT.

THE term "prerogative" may be defined as expressing those political powers which are inherent in the crown, Prerogative and that have not been conferred by Act of Parlia- defined. ment, and which accordingly continue within the competency of the sovereign, except in so far as they have been modified or restrained by positive legislation. For the king's prerogative is a part of the law of the realm, and hath bounds set unto it by the laws of England. All that is meant by prerogative, however, nowadays is, "the practical division which it is necessary to make between the duties of the executive and the duties of the legislative power." "

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The prerogatives of the sovereign of Great Britain are of vast extent and paramount importance. In the crown is centred the whole executive power of the empire, the functions appertaining to the administration of government, and supreme authority in all matters-civil, judicial, military, and ecclesiastical.

The king is, moreover, the head of the legislature, of which he forms an essential constituent part; the generalissimo, or first in command, of the naval and military forces of the state; the fountain of honour and of justice, and the dispenser of mercy, having a right to pardon all convicted criminals; the supreme

1 Cox, Inst. p. 592; and see Ld. Cairns' speeches on the Army Regulation Bill, Hans. D. v. 208, p. 520; and on the Irish Peerage, lb. v. 225, p. 1214. [The word" prerogative" is simply a synonym for privilege. It is customary to talk of the prerogative of the crown and the privilege of parliament, but it would be just as accurate to speak of the privilege of the crown and the prerogative of parliament.-Editor.]

2 Coke, 3 St. Tri. p. 68.

3 Mr. Gladstone, Hans. D. v. 214, p. 476; and see Law. Mag. 4th ser. v. 8, pp. 260-275.

governor, on earth, of the national church; and the representative of the majesty of the realm abroad, with power to declare war, to make peace, and to enter into treaty engagements with foreign countries.

It is beside the object of the present writer to consider the prerogatives of the crown in their legal aspect; for information on this subject the treatises of Chitty and Bowyer on Prerogative must be consulted. The present inquiry is confined to an investigation of the prerogative from a constitutional point of view, in reference more particularly to the legitimate control of parliament over the exercise of the same on the part of ministers of state.

Responsibility of ministers for

every exercise of the prerogative.

For it must be observed, of all the royal prerogatives, that they are held in trust for the benefit of the whole nation, and must be exercised in conformity with the constitutional maxim, which requires that every act of the royal authority should be performed by the advice of councillors who are responsible to parliament, and to the law of the land.1 This responsibility is now acknowledged to be thorough and complete; and as no public act of the sovereign is valid which is not performed under the advice of some responsible minister, so, on the other hand, for every exercise of the royal authority ministers must be prepared to account to parliament, justifying it, if need be, at their own peril.

From the high and commanding position occupied by the Appointment of Sovereign, it would be natural to infer that he

ministers by

the crown; their choice

and dismissal.

2

should be free to secure the services of the wisest and ablest men as his advisers. Accordingly the British Constitution distinctly recognizes his right to make choice of all his responsible ministers. Lord Brougham asserts that it is the "unquestionable power of the crown to choose and to change its servants;" and that "no one would think of questioning the foundation of this power, of objecting to its existence, or of wishing to restrict it," provided only that it is exercised "on grounds capable of being stated and defended." The grounds upon which the sovereign

1 See ante, p. 81; Palmerston, Hans. D. v. 153, p. 1415.

2 Hallam, Const. Hist. v. 3, p. 392; and see a resolution of the House of Lords, on Feb. 4, 1784.

may constitutionally dismiss a ministry he has thus defined: "If they exhibit internal dissensions amongst themselves; if they differ from the sovereign, or from the country at large [upon a question of public policy]; if their measures are ruinous to the interests of the country, at home or abroad; or if there should exist a general feeling of distrust and disapprobation of them throughout the country." 1

Furthermore, as observed by Mr. Pitt, "the sovereign exercises his opinion on the sentiments as well as capacity of his ministers; and if upon either he judges them to be incompetent, or in any degree unfit, it is the prerogative and, with perfect loyalty let me add, the duty of the crown to dismiss such ministers." 2 For "the king cannot be required to take advice from men in whom he cannot confide; and, were there no other reason, a diminution of confidence is a sufficient ground for a change in his Majesty's councils." 8 But these abstract considerations are modified and restrained by the necessity for obtaining the approval of parliament to the choice of ministers by the crown. For constitutional usage requires that the sovereign shall not exercise his undoubted right of dismissing his ministers from mere personal motives, but solely in the interests of the state, and on grounds which can be justified to parliament.

ministers.

It is the undeniable right of either House of Parliament to advise the crown upon the exercise of this or any Advice of Parother of its prerogatives. It has been contended, liament on the indeed, that "it is the right and privilege of the appointment of House of Commons to express its opinion and judgment, and even to offer advice to the sovereign, as to the circumstances, and the mode in which, he may have been advised to exercise his undoubted prerogative of choosing the ministers of the crown." But such an interference with the free choice of the sovereign would be justifiable only in the extreme case, if we may suppose that such could occur, wherein the crown had selected unfit or improper 1 Mir. of Parl. 1835, pp. 28, 29; and see May, Const. Hist. v. I, P. 122.

2 Parl. Hist. v. 35, p. 1121.

Ld. Selkirk, Parl. D. v. 9, p. 377. See Mr. Gladstone's comments upon the dismissal of the Melbourne Ministry, in 1834, by William IV. (Gleanings of the Past Years, v. I, p. 231).

Lds. Morpeth and Stanley, Mir. of Parl. 1835, p. 74.

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