other paffions, which is feldom or never the cafe ; for whim, caprice, ambition, intereft, and connections, even the moft vicious, frequently form the cement that unites the particular friendship that are to be met with in this age of fenfe and avarice.

The love of our country is ftill more refined from fenfe, and adds indelible luftre to the character that is poffeffed of it; but ftill it is confined to a particular spot of earth, to a certain number of individuals, and frequently hurries us on to great acts of injuftice and inhumanity; Benevolence is the ultimate of human perfection, 'tis the true emanation of that Divine Spirit that fpoke this fyftem of the univerfe into existence, and called forth from nothing myriads of beings into confcious happiness. 'Tis confined by no place, nor connected with any particular number of individuals, but takes in the whole fpecies, and breaths love and focial fympathy upon the whole creation. It strengthens all the other bonds of fociety, purges the groffer paffions from their drofs of fenfe and appetite, and diffufes peace, joy, and tranquillity, over the mind that is poffeffed of it. In a word 'tis the effence of our intellectual being; 'tis the fource and spring of our happiness here, and the hope of our felicity hereafter.

Benevo

is

Benevolence may be defined, That habit of the mind that takes delight in the happiness of the human fpecies, and meafures its own felicity by the degrees of pleafure it can, or is willing to communicate to the reft of its fellow creatures. It differs from sympathy, as pain does from pleafure; for fympathy, ftrictly fpeaking, is that painful reflection which we feel when we fee any one of our fpecies in diftrefs. Sympathy will always be found where there is Benevolence, but it may be likewife found where there very little of that divine affection; for 'tis obfervable, that women and men of the weakeit minds are fooneft moved with the vifible distress of the objects they converse with; but on other occafions have very fmall, or very confined notions of Benevolence. The emotion they feel, is owing to the crafis of blood, to fear, and to a certain horror that feizes them on the fight of any moving object: the fight gives them pain; and out of regard to themselves, and for their own eafe, they with the object removed, or perhaps relieved; but the mind, the rational and focial part of man, is not properly affected; for at the fame time that they they are administering to the feeming want and diftreffes, perhaps of a cunning counterfeit, that has got the art of mov ing the paffions, and exciting an immediate fenfe of pity, their minds boil over with hatred against half

half the fpecies; and they would not part with an hour's reft, or a fhilling, to promote the happinefs of a thousand others that are removed at too great distance to affect the fenfes. In a word, fympathy is a foftness of nature, a milkiness of blood, and fcarce to be ranked in the clafs of moral virtues; whereas Benevolence is a steady virtue, founded upon rational principles, and actuated as little by fenfe as 'tis poffible for humanity. And though 'tis impoffible for the truly benevolent man not to be affected with the pain, anguish, and diftrefs of his fellow-creatures, yet that feeling does not deprive him of his reflection: he can leisurely enquire into the caufe, and deliberately examine the circumstances that affect him, and wishes or adminifters relief to the object not because the fight of his diftrefs gave him pain,

but from that warm Benevolence which awakens the most ravishing joy; what he feels, is not in proportion to the painful reflections raised by fympathy, but to the degree of eafe and pleasure. communicated to the diftreffed object.

To explain the difference between this effeminate virtue, fympathy, and the god-like habit, Benevolence, let us fuppofe that a beggar in the street, with fome putrid ulcer, attacks one of the female fex; fhe is highly fhocked at the fight,

fhe

fhe fcreams out with fear, and is moved with pity for the poor fuffering wretch; fhe gives him fomething out of charity, and he vanishes; she is pleased at his removal, juft in proportion to the pain she felt whilft he was prefent. Her pleasure may be very great, because her delicacy might have been hurt by the fhocking fight; but the pleasure and the pain has fcarcely any relation to the unhappy object; it rifes not from a just reflection on his anguish, or the relief fhe has offered him, which may be very trifling. Now mark the difference between a perfon actuated by Benevolence, and this charitable lady. The fight may equally offend his fenfes, and in that refpect may feel the fame degree of pain; but he joins with it a reflection on the miferies to which human nature is expofed, he wishes it in his power to heal the malady, and gives in proportion to his abilities.

The object is removed, but the pain of the benevolent man is not; for though his fenfes are not affected with the loathfome disease, yet his foul feels the anguifh of the fuffering wretch; and as he knows what he was able to give him could contribute very little to remove his sufferings, the thoughts of his own liberality gives him very little fatisfaction; at leaft the pleafure refulting

from

from the confcioufnefs of having done his duty, is much allayed by the painful thought that one of his fpecies was truly miserable, and that it was not in his power to make him happy.

However, though fympathy or pity differs fo much from Benevolence, that unlefs it is accompanied with it, it degenerates into weakness, if not into vice; yet it is a habit of the mind, that if carefully cultivated, efpecially in young people, may beget a habit of Benignity and univerfal Benevolence, and may be productive of the greatest happiness both to the person poffeffed of it, and to the peace of fociety. For a mind eafily touched with the diftreffes of others, is fitly and naturally difpofed to acts of Benevolence and humanity; and may in time, and by due culture, be brought to relish the true habits of univerfal goodness, from difinterested regard to mankind, and the pure pleasure of doing good. This is a difpofition the easier nourished in the mind of man, as Benevolence and compassion seem to be almost innate affections in the human foul; for experience teaches us, that unless the mind is perverted by the force of habit, or warped by fome accident that changes its difpofition, it naturally compaffionates the sufferings of others, and is inclinable to do them all the good in its power, and finds a kind of horror when it is