division of the county of Kent, but did not become included in the area of any borough. Upon the coming into operation of the said Act, 28, Dillwyn road, Lower Sydenham, became included in the area of the then newly created parliamentary borough of Lewisham.

It was contended in support of the claim, that a person had a right to a vote for the borough of Lewisham, in respect of immediate succession from a dwelling-house which was formerly in the west division of the county of Kent (but is now, by virtue of the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885, included in the Sevenoaks or west division of the said county) to a dwelling-house which was formerly in the said west division, and had, by virtue of the above-mentioned Act, become included in the borough of Lewisham. The revising barrister decided against the said contention, and rejected the claim of the said Frederick Grimwood, and the claims of other persons similarly situated, whose appeals were consolidated herewith.

The court, reversing the decision, held, that the meaning of section 17 of the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885, was that the law applicable to successive occupation which requires the subjects of occupation to be situated in the same area, should, for the purposes of the registration in 1885, be suspended in those cases where, but for the alteration of area, the circumstances were such that the vote would have been obtained Down v. Steele, 1 Colt. Reg. Cas. 458.

Orders of Local Government Board under the Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876, and the Poor Law Act, 1879, held not to have the effect of altering boundaries of counties in their relation to the parliamentary franchise (a).

NORTH LEICESTERSHIRE. C.'s name was objected to in the list of voters for the parish or township of

(a) See now sect. 18 of the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885.

Seals, on the ground that his qualification was not situate within the said parish or township.

The entry was as follows:

Cave, Sir Mylles Cave | Stretton-en-le- | Freehold | Donisthorpe. Browne, Bart. field. land.

On and up to 24th March, 1884, the property, in respect of which the voter claimed to be entitled to vote, was situate within an isolated or detached part of the parishes of Oakthorpe and Donisthorpe, and was for parliamentary purposes included in the register of voters for the said parish or township of Seals, but, on that date, by virtue of an order of the Local Government Board, pursuant to the Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876, and the Poor Law Act, 1879, this portion of the said parishes of Oakthorpe and Donisthorpe was detached from the said parish or township of Seals, and amalgamated with the parishes of Oakthorpe and Donisthorpe, which are situate within the limits of the southern division of the county of Derby.

The revising barrister considered that the case fell within the principle of the decision of the court in Foster and others v. Medwin (ante, on p. 453), and he therefore refused to expunge the name of the voter from the register of voters for the said parish or township of Seals.

The court affirmed the decision.
Jones v. Reeve. (Not reported.)

PRACTICE.

Due transmission of statement and notice to the masters, a condition precedent to the court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.

An appellant had neglected to transmit to the masters within the first four days of Michaelmas Term (a), the statement and notice, pursuant to 6 Vict. c. 18, ss. 62, 64.

On motion (unopposed) that the master be directed to receive the statement and notice, and enter the appeal,

Held, that the condition in section 64 of 6 Vict. c. 18, not having been complied with, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, or allow it to be entered: Autey v. Topham, 5 M. & G. 1; 7 Scott, N. R. 402; 1 Lutw. 1; 13 L. J. C. P. 39; 7 Jur. 995; B. & Arn. 1.

Due transmission of notice to the masters, a condition precedent to the court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.

An appellant had duly transmitted the statement of the case to the masters, but had neither sent therewith, or within the first four days of Michaelmas Term, the notice required by 6 Vict. c. 18, ss. 62, 64.

The court (in accordance with Autey v. Topham, supra) refused to allow the appeal to be entered, on the ground that they had no jurisdiction to hear it: Simpson v. Wilkinson, 5 M. & G. 3, note; 7 Scott, N. R. 406; 1 Lutw. 5; 13 L. J. C. P. 39; 7 Jur. 995; B. & Arn. 3, note.

(a) Although the Michaelmas Sittings (commencing on the 24th of October) have been substituted for the old Michaelmas Term (commencing on the 2nd of November), yet, for the purposes of Registration Appeals, the old Michaelmas Term remains in force.

No formal order of the court required for correction of register under section 67 of 6 Vict. c. 18.

The court having reversed the decision of a revising barrister, it became necessary to correct the register by inserting the appellant's name therein under 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 67. On an application being made for an order for that purpose,

Held, that no formal order was required: Whitmore v. Bedford, 5 M. & G. 9, 13, 14; 7 Scott, N. R. 494, 495; S. C., nom. Peele v. Hinton, B. & Arn. 14.

In a registration appeal the appellant begins.

On the hearing of an appeal from the decision of a revising barrister the appellant begins, because such appeal is not like a case from the sessions, but more in the nature of an appeal to the Privy Council, where the appellant always begins: Webb v. Aston, near Birmingham, 5 M. & G. 14; 1 Lutw. 6; 7 Scott, N. R. 435; 13 L. J. C. P. 57.

Material omission in statement of case cannot be waived by consent.

Where, in the statement of a case facts were omitted, which, in the opinion of the court, were material for the purpose of enabling it to give judgment, it would not allow such facts to be supplied by consent, but remitted the case to the revising barrister under section 65 of 6 Vict. c. 18 (a): Webb v. Aston, near Birmingham, 5 M. & G. 14; 7 Scott, N. R. 435; 13 L. J. C. P. 57.

(a) In Whithorn v. Thomas, 7 M. & G. 3, 4, the court, adhering to the course adopted in the above case, refused to allow alterations to be made by consent, but directed that the original case should be handed to the revising barrister, who was in court, that he might at once make the proposed alterations. This was accordingly done.

Where, on a case being called on, it appeared that respondent had delivered paper books (a) to the two junior puisne judges, but that none had been delivered to the Lord Chief Justice and senior puisne judge, the court ordered that the case should stand over.

By 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 60, it is enacted that all appeals from revising barristers shall be "prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and practice of the court with respect to special cases (b), so far as the same may be applicable, &c."

On a case being called on for argument, it appeared that the respondent had delivered paper books (a) to the two junior puisne judges, but that none had been delivered to the Lord Chief Justice and the senior puisne judge.

The court said that the appellant ought to have delivered paper books (a) to the Lord Chief Justice and the senior puisne judge according to the rules of the court with respect to special cases, and that, if the respondent had supplied them, he might have taken advantage of the appellant's default, and prayed judgment (c) of the court, but that, under the cir

(a) This term is now obsolete: see next note.

(b) The practice in relation to the special case in a registration appeal is now governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XXXIV.

(c) Notwithstanding the intimation of the court (as reported in Lutwyche) that the respondent, if he had supplied the paper books, would have been entitled to judgment, it may be doubted whether, if he had actually supplied them, and the attention of the court had been directed to section 66 of 6 Vict. c. 18, they would have considered the rule as to praying judgment applicable to the case, for by the above-named section it is provided, that every judgment of the court" shall be binding upon every committee of the House of Commons appointed for the trial of any petition complaining of an undue election or return of any member or members to serve in parliament."