SECTION IV. CASES OF PROVIDENCE. "Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well, 6 HAMLET. "I rejoice to have got thus far," said St. Lawrence, "for if I have succeeded in showing you that Providence may be Providence and yet not interfere with man's freedom, the illustrations of that proposition by examples, in the examination of second causes, will not only be easy, but agreeable. It will amply make good the observation of Bacon, that a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no farther; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." ووو "This certainly falls in," said Campbell," with your general arrangement at the beginning of time, of all that is to happen afterwards." "Before we proceed, however," continued St. Lawrence, "it will be right to have no misunderstanding about one another's terms; which in all discussions, but especially one like the present, leads to inconvenience. I would therefore beg to remind you, that I have endeavoured to show that what in general is called providential, by which is meant particular Providence (as when there has been some wonderful piece of good, or escape from evil fortune), is in fact no more providential than every thing we see and do every day of our lives; since all is under the guidance and has been actually foreseen by the eye of Heaven." "Yet if foreseen and allowed, it surely," said Campbell," cannot fail to take place; and if it cannot fail to take place, what again becomes of Freedom?" "I thought we had settled that point," answered St. Lawrence; " and indeed the language I have used, that a thing may be foreseen, but not instigated, goes the whole length of such difficulty as there is (which I hold to be very little) in reconciling the foreknowledge of the Almighty with the free will of man. The accomplishment of many of the prophecies are at once decisive of this, so, as I think, to relieve us from all further difficulty about the matter." "Yon would say," replied Campbell, "that though the prophets foretold events, they did not cause them: which is true. But you forget it was the Almighty who did cause them,—the Almighty who gave the inspiration." "And where is the difference, though it be derived from Heaven," asked St. Lawrence, "unless the foreseeing a thing is causing it; which I trust you do not hold?" "In "I do not," answered Campbell; "but, if foreseen, can a thing happen otherwise than as it is foreseen, and, if so, where is the liberty of choice?" Easily explained," said St. Lawrence. your own words, man proposes, God disposes. In proposing, the will of man is free; in disposing, the power of God defeats success; but the defeat has nothing to do with the intention. I may resolve to kill another, and God, without a direct interference with my mind, may not be able to alter my resolve; but he may deprive me of life, and so prevent its effect. Would you, on that account, say my will was invaded?" "I am answered," said Campbeil; "for even if this death had not been decreed from the beginning, but resolved upon only at the moment, the will is certainly not interfered with." "You will find," said St. Lawrence, "this will pervade every possible case in this division of the subject." You will "You can then probably make out," said Campbell, "more clearly than I think it is done in Tremaine, one of his exemplifications of Providence, acting by second causes, though without an express interference; I mean the preservatio of Evelyn from a rabid dog, and of Tremaine himself from the bullet of the Garde de Chasse. recollect that Evelyn had time to shut the gate only in the moment when the dog flew at it; and the Garde de Chasse only missed Tremaine, because a snake happened to cross his path, in the moment he was taking aim at the dog.* I own I never sufficiently understood this; for if, as seemed to be laid down, Evelyn was made to arrive at the gate at the exact time that he did, and the snake was made to cross the path on purpose to prevent the shot taking place, how is it possible that this could not be an express interference." "Your remark is not unnatural," answered St. Lawrence, "but also easily explained, if I have made myself understood in my premise, that all the events of the world were cast and provided for at the commencement of time. In that case, Providence had provided thousands of years ago, for the escape both of Evelyn and Tremaine, and foreknowing that these events would take place, and * See Tremaine, vol. iii. 117. resolving they should be harmless, had so arranged the course of second causes, that Evelyn was at the gate, and the snake in the path way, precisely when they were. Thus there was no sudden interference, as if the danger had not been anticipated, nor was there any miraculous meddling with the laws of nature, to interrupt or alter the free will of any of the parties. In point of fact, the difficulty consists merely in the ambiguity of the word you have used, in saying that Evelyn was made to be at the gate, and the snake made to cross the path." "You have made this clear," said Campbell, "and I thank you; I have, however, many more cases. "As many as you please," said St. Lawrence, "for I wish the soundness of my doctrine to be tried to the utmost." "Well then," continued Campbell, "was not the King of Prussia, though called the infidel king, right, when after a victory he cried Dieu mercie et mes gros battaillons? If the gros battaillons by their courage won the battle, in the usual way in which battles were won, how was it Providence?" "The answer is," replied St. Lawrence, "that Providence had decreed the battle should be won, ages before Frederick was born; and had also |