Having by this time, I hope, given a fufficient Answer to the Bishop of Sarum's Objections, 1 will conclude this Point with a Paffage out of Mr. Cowley's Davideis, which contains a handfom Reprefentation of the Notion I have been defending. It is in his Defcription of Heaven, where I remember he has thefe Lines;

There thou thy felf doft in full Prefence show,
Not abfent from thefe meaner Worlds below;
No, if thou wert, the Elements League wou'd ceafe,
And all thy Creatures break thy Nature's Peace.
The Sun would stop his Courfe, or gallop back,
The Stars drop out, the Poles themselves wou'd crack:
Earth's ftrong Foundations wou'd be torn in twain,
And this vaft Work all ravel out again

To its first Nothing; for his Spirit contains

The well-knit Mafs; from him each Creature gains
Being and Motion, which he still bestows;
From him th' Effect of our weak Action flows."

Tho' your elegant Account of the beautiful PiEtures you faw at T. has rais'd in me a high Idea of the masterly Hands that drew thofe breathing Shadows; yet I fancy you have yourself drawn as fine a one as any of them, in your lively Defcription of the charming Scene by the River-fide. Without Flattery, I am extremely pleas'd with it, and have lodg'd it in my Memory among those favourite Paffages which I frequently entertain my Imagination with reviewing. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your fincere humble Servant,

H. NEEDLER.

To Mr. D.

Dear SIR,

Portsmouth, August 6, 1711.

HAving in my former Letters eftablish'd the Do&trine of the continual Dependence of all things upon God, I intend now to proceed, in order to give a compleat Idea of Divine Providence fo far as it relates to the Government of the Natural Wold, to prove likewife that 'tis God only, whos is the True Author of all the Changes that happen in Nature; or that all thofe regular Effects, which we observe to be produced therein, ought to be immediately attributed to him, as the true Anima Mundi or Active Principle of Nature; which Propofition I will not pretend to prove abfolutely, or deduce regularly from firft and felf-evident Principles, (for that wou'd exceed the Bounds of a fhort Epiftle), but from fuch Premifes as are in themselves reasonable, and have been well prov'd by others, and which I am fatisfy'd you will readily allow.

First then I fuppofe, That God is an All-perfect Being, or a Being of fuch fuperlative Excellency and Perfection, that 'tis impoffible to conceive any thing more perfect; from hence I deduce this Confequence, that the Power of God is nothing really different from the Efficacy of his Will; for I think it cannot reasonably be deny'd, that a Being who by the bare Efficacy of his Will produces whatfoever he wills, fo that he needs ufe no Means to accomplish his Defires, is more perfect than one who is forced to execute his Will by an A& diG. 3. ftin&

ftin&t from that Will; and which therefore he ufes as a Means to accomplish it. Can there be any Doubt, which is the moft Excellent Being, he whofe Will is neceffarily felf-efficacious and fufficient to create whatever he wills, or he who after he has will'd a thing, must put forth another A& to produce it? To this I may add, that Mofes in his Hiftory of the Creation reprefents God as giving Being to things by the pure Force and Efficacy of his Almighty Fiat or Will. And God faid, Let there be Light; and there was Light. Which Words feem fairly to intimate, that Light not only immediately follow'd, but was likewife produced by the Divine Will as its proper Caufe. But if God's Power be Nothing really diftin&t from his Will, 'tis evident that he cannot communicate any Portion of it to any other Being other wife than by willing, that what fuch an intelligent Creature fhall will, fhall come to pals. But then in fuch a Cafe it is plain, that 'tis the Divine Will, and not the Will of That intelligent Being, which is the true Phyfical Caufe of the enfuing Effect. If this Reafoning be good, it follows by a neceffary Confequence, that God is the true Author of all that is done in Nature; and that Creatures neither Do, nor can Do any thing.

Secondly, Let us confider what it is that is done. in the Natural World, and try if we can discover from the Nature of the Actions, who is the true Agent. All the Actions that we obferve in the World are of two Kinds; they are either those whereby Bodies are mov'd, or thofe by which Spirits are affected with various Senfations. Now I will endeavour to prove, that Matter has not the Power of Motion, nor of producing Senfations in Spirits; and that no Being but God is fufficiently qualified

qualified to do thofe things, in fuch a manner as they are actually perform'd in the World.

In order to prove the first, I fhall only fuppofe, that Matter cannot move of itfelf, or without the Action of fome external Force giving it Motion. This is what is in fome fort confirm'd by Experience, for it wou'd certainly be thought a Prodigy, to fee a Body move of itself, without any known Caufe Visible or Invifible. And it is upon this Principle, this Vis Inertia of Matter, that all the Demonftrations in Mechanics are founded. Now from hence it clearly follows, that a Body, as (A), cannot begin of itself to move towards (B), without the Im- Bpulfe of fome moving Power,

Scheme I.

T CA

M

as (M); and likewife that when by the action of (M) upon it, it has began to move towards (B), it can continue that Motion no longer than (M) continues to impell it. For if we fuppofe (A) to be moved to (C) by the Force of (M); and that when it arrives at (C), the moving Power ceafes to act upon it; and yet that afterwards it moves as far as (T); 'tis plain that the Body (A) moves from (C) to (T) of itfelf, without being impell'd by any external Force. This Argument is fo clear and cogent, that I can fcarce forbear fetting the Mathematical Mark upon it, and stamping it with a Q. E. D. Yet this is a Truth, which Philofophers are generally fo little aware of, that tho' they can not but acknowledge the Neceffity of a firft Mover unmov'd, to caufe Matter to begin to move ; of fome Immaterial Being to give the first Turn (as it were) to Nature's Wheel; yet they fancy that when 'tis once fet a going, it can continue to move well enough of itself, by Bodies communicating

G. 4

their

their Motion fucceffively to one another as they. meet. So that they fall into the fame Error in relation to the Motion of Matter, as they do in regard to the Existence of Creatures; falfely imagining, that tho' the one cannot begin to move, nor the others to exift of themselves, yet that, when they have been once put into Motion and Exiftence, they can continue therein without any external Aid.

Scheme II.

Perhaps it may be faid, that tho' it must be granted that Bodies cannot move of themselves, yet nothing hinders but that they may move one another, fo that a Body, as (A) (see CA the fecond Scheme), being moved by fome Immaterial Agent towards. (B), and meeting another, as (C) in its way, may carry that along with it. I anfwer, That tho' we fhou'd allow in this Cafe that (A) does really move (C,) yet it will be able to move it no longer than while it actually touches it; and fo thrufts it forward; and even that no longer than while itself is mov'd by the Immaterial Force. But after all, (A) is not the real Power which moves (C). 'Tis true indeed, that if the Immaterial Mover will have (A) proceed in a Right Line towards (B) after it is arriv'd at (C), he must move (C) with it; because (C) is impenetrable, and is now join'd to (A), and become, as. it were, one Body with it. So that the moving Body (A), meeting with (C), is the Occafion indeed of its Motion, but nevertheless 'tis the Immaterial Force that truly moves both thefe Bodies now join'd together.

But if Bodies cannot move themselves, nor one another, much lefs can they raise Senfations in Spirits. Our Senfations are excited by Bodies ftriking

upon