sion, if the period of time required for the assemblage of the troops at the several stations should not sufficiently account for it. His Excellency is of opinion, that the Peishwa will readily admit the policy, with reference to his own interests, of suffering the contending parties to weaken each other by a continued contest, and thereby facilitating the re-establishment of his authority. In his Excellency's judgment, therefore, this argument may be successfully stated to the Peishwa, without exciting in his mind any suspicion of a design on our part to evade the obligation of our engagements, or furnishing him with a plea for retracting his own. At all events his Excellency deems it necessary, that, previously to the advance of the troops, the Peishwa should be required to execute a formal treaty on the basis of the propositions to which he has already assented, unless the state of circumstances should render the arguments assigned for the suspension of the march of the troops inapplicable to the actual situation of affairs; and this requisition may be made with the double view of justifying the delay, and of securing and improving the terms of the engagement on the part of the Peishwa.

10. His Excellency desires that you will suggest to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Resident at Hydrabad, the extent of the force which in your judgment it is expedient to detach from the establishments

of those presidencies and from Hydrabad respectively, for the accomplishment of the late arrangement, as well as the particular stations at which it is advisable to assemble the several detachments previously to their advance into the Mahratta territory.

11. The commanding officers of the several detachments will be required to conform to your instructions, with regard to the time and the mode of advancing those detachments respectively, for the support of the Peishwa.

12. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Resident at Hydrabad, and those authorities will be required to conform to the suggestions which you may communicate to them, in conformity to the tenor of the 10th paragraph of this letter.

13. A copy of these instructions will also be transmitted to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindia.

14. His Excellency will take an early opportunity of communi cating to you his sentiments on the subject of the arbitration of the claims of the Peishwa on his Highness the Nizam.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

INCLOSURE

event.

5. It is possible in this event (although certainly not probable) that, with a view to the exclusion of the British influence and power in the Mahratta empire, Scindia and Holkar may be induced to compromise their difference, to place upon the Musnud a Peishwa of their own nomination, and to unite their power for the support of that arrangement; a plan in which they may expect to obtain the co-operation of the Rajah of Berar. In such an event, either the British government would be compelled to have recourse to arms for the subversion of that arrangement. and for the re-establishment of Bellojee Rao's authority, or by remaining neuter, would abandon all prospect of concluding with any of the Mahratta states those defensive engagements which are so essential to the complete consolidation of the British power in India, and to the future tranquillity of Hindustan. With respect to the justice of supporting the cause of Ballojee Rao, under the engagement which has already been contracted with him, no question can arise: in such a state of circumstances, therefore, his Excellency would not hesitate to employ every effort of the British power for the reinstatement of Ballojee on the Musnud of Poona.

6. It is possible also, that if the contest between Scindia and Holkar be decided by force of arms, the successful party may offer to the Peishwa terms of accommodation, which the Peishwa may be disposed to accept rather than be indebted to the influence or the exertions of the British power for

thority. The same offer may pos sibly be made to the Peishwa, under the circumstance of a combination among the Mahratta chieftains: adverting to the characteristic jealousy, instability, and treachery of the Peishwa's disposition, it is not improbable that he would accept such offers, even after the engagements between the British government and him should have been reduced to the form of a definitive treaty; in such an event, it would be useless to adopt measures to compel the Peishwa to adhere to his engagements. It is not the intention of his Excellency that any restraint should be imposed on the Peishwa: if he cannot be induced to rely upon the aid of British power on júst and reasonable terms, it will be impracticable to secure with him the advantages of a defensive alliance, which necessarily supposes the concurrence of the contracting parties in the arrange

ments,

7. With a view, however, to preclude any of the events above supposed, or any other contingency which might tend to frustrate the accomplishment of his Excellency's objects, it will be proper that, on the arrival of the Peishwa at Bombay, a negotiation should be immediately opened for the conclusion of a definitive treaty of alliance and defence with the Peishwa, on terms adapted to the actual crisis of affairs, as well as calculated for the accomplishment of his Excellency's original views.

S. It is possible, however, that notwithstanding the embarrassed situation of the Peishwa's affairs, and the dependent condition to which he is reduced, he may be insuper

insuperably averse to those additional concessions, which, under the present state of circumstances, his Excellency deems it expedient to require from him, and may declare his resolution to throw hinself into the power of Scindia or of Holkar, rather than acquiesce in the terms which may be proposed to him, particularly those which regard the arbitration of his claims on the Nizam on the basis of the treaty of Mhar, and the Nizam's total exemption from the payment of Choute. His Excellency therefore thinks it proper to apprize you, that it is not his intention to insist on the Peishwa's acquiescenec in all the proposed concessions, as an indepeusable condition of our assistance in the re-establishment of his authority. Accordingly, if you should find it impracticable to obtain the Peishwa's consent to those additional concessions, which, how ever, it must be your earnest and assiduous endeavour to secure, his Excellency authorizes you to relax in your demands, and even to conclude a treaty with the Peishwa on the terms to which he has already assented, provided that it contains no stipulation which can preclude the British government from the eventual conclusion of defensive engagements with Dowlut Rao Scindia. The conclusion of the treaty should be immediately followed by a communication to Scindia and Holkar, of the general nature of the engagements contracted with the Peishwa, and by a negotiation with those chieftains for the restoration of the Peishwa to the ,due exercise of his authority, under the stipulations of the defensive alliance; and this communication should be accompanied by a declaration to Holkar, that

the Peishwa is disposed to an amicable adjustment of existing differences, under the arbitration and guarantee of the British go

vernment.

9. It is extremely desirable that the re-establishment of the Peishwa on the Musnud of Poona, under the stipulations of the defen sive alliance, should be effected in concert with Dowlut Rao Scindia; but his Excellency is aware that necessity alone will induce Scindia to co-operate in the success of that arrangement. Although the cause which the British governmeat is now prepared to support is ostensibly the same as that in which Scindia is himself engaged, the interference of the British government, to the extent provided for by its engagements with the Peishwa, is calculated to defeat the ultimate object of Scindia's exertions, by rendering the Peishwa independent of his power; Scindia must, however, be sensible of his inability to oppose any effectual resistance to the accomplishment of the proposed arrangement when supported by the power of the British arms. It may therefore be expected, that rather than incur the hazard to which he would be exposed either by opposing that arrangement, or by his total exclusion from the benefits of the alliance, Scindia may be disposed to concur in that arrangement, and to listen to proposals for connecting his interests with those of the Peishwa in the general settlement of affairs.

10. It therefore appears to his Excellency to be advisable to combine with the negotiation for the re-establishment of the Peishwa's authority, the intended proposals to Scindia of admitting him to the benefits of the defensive alliance,

alliance, on terms similar to those, concluded with the Peishwa; and with this view it will be proper (if the Peishwa's consent can be obtained) to insert in the definitive treaty with the Peishwa a stipulation for the eventual admission of Scindia the benefits of the

alliance.

11. In conformity to this plan, it will be proper to accompany the notification to Scindia of the engagements concluded between the Peishwa and the British government, with an invitation to co-operate with us in the re-establishment of the Peishwa's authority, and with an intimation that his Excellency has authorized Colonel Collins to offer to Scindia's acceptance proposals of a defensive nature; and you will be guided in transmitting such a communication to Scindia, either directly from yourself, or through the channel of Colonel Collins,

by the progress which that officer may have made in his journey to Scindia's camp, and by the means which he may possess of communicating with Scindia at the time when it may be expedient to promulgate the engagements concluded with the Peishwa. A copy of the instructions which his Excellency has thought proper to issue to Colonel Collins for his guidance on this occasion is inclosed for your information, and I am directed to request your particular attention to the 10th paragraph of those instructions; and generally, to desire that you will consider those instructions as a rule for your guidance, as far as they may be applicable to your proceedings.

12. From the tenor of his Excellency's instructions of the 16th and 22 instant, and of those contained in the present dispatch,

you will infer, that provided the Peishwa shall think proper to rely on the aid and influence of the British power to be afforded him on just and reasonable terms, for the re-establishment of his authority, his Excellency will deem it expedient to employ every practicable exertion for the accomplishment of that object. In the event, therefore, of any of those contingencies which may require the employment of a military force for its accomplishment, you are authorized to call into action the several detachments which may have been embodied with a view to this eventual service. The general command of the troops destined for that service will be vested in who will

receive directions to conform to your suggestions for the movement of the troops under his command.

13. His Excellency is aware that circumstances may occur to render necessary some deviation from the order of the proceedings prescribed in the foregoing instructions; his Excellency therefore relies on your judgment and discretion for the application of the general principles and spirit of these instructions to contingent events.

14. Inclosed you will receive a copy of his Excellency's instructions to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, for the reception of the Peishwa at Bombay. You will observe by the 8th paragraph of those instructions, that his Excellency has authorized the Honourable the Governor of Bombay eventually to undertake the conduct of the negotiations committed to your charge. If the Honourable the Governor should have occasion to act under the authority thus vested in him, you will be pleased to

furnish