be satisfied, by an attentive observation of the conduct of the British government towards your Highness, towards the Nizam, and towards all our allies, that in concluding the late alliance with your Highness, my views and intentions have been just, amicable, and moderate; that your real and legitimate power is effectually secured by this alliance; and that under the operation of your engagements with the British government, you may confidently expect to enjoy that tranquillity and security, accompanied by respect and honour, which you have never experienced under the oppressive influence of your own subjects, servants, or feudatory chieftains, and which you could never have attained by the aid of any other state or power.

My anxious exertions will be employed to maintain the alliance between the two states in the spirit of its original formation, and

to cultivate your Highness's confidence and friendship by every demonstration of zeal for your prosperity and happiness, and of respect for your dignity, authori. ty, and honour.

May these sentiments ever continue reciprocal; and may the bonds of amity between your Highness and the British govern. ment be perpetuated by the mu tual experience of an united interest, and by the confirmed sense of a common benefit to the allies, and to every state interested in the preservation of general tranquillity, or in the maintenance of a just system of harmony and order between the respective powers of India.

For further particulars I refer your Highness to the verbal com. munications of the Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Close. (A true Copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE.
Per. Sec. to Gov.

BALLOJEE KOONGER replied, that he had been instructed by his Highness the Peishwa to inform me, without reserve, of all his transactions with Scindia,and with his ministers, and that he should have great pleasure in so doing. He then proceeded to state, that on his arrival at this court, he soon discovered that Ambajee Joglia had put evil designs into the head of the Maharaja, and was the principal person in caus, ing a change of measures at this Durbar. That, influenced by

Ambajee's suggestions, Scindia had indirectly reproached him (Ballojee Koonger) on account of the engagements which the Peishwa hal lately contracted with the British government. In answer to which he (Ballojee Koonger) had observed, that his Highuess had been driven from his capital by the violence of one of his servants; and as Scindia had delayed four months marching to the relief of the Pejshwa, his Highness was reduced to the necessity of seeking the protec M2

tion

tion of the English for the preservation of his life and of his honour.

Ballojee then expressed his surprise to Scindia that his Durbar had negotiated a peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, since formerly, when his Highness the Peishwa had proposed his mediation for the purpose of accommodating all differences between the Maharaja and Holkar, he (Scindia) had declined the offer; and that in fact it was y espousing the cause of the Maharaja, that the Peishwa had recently suffered both defeat and disgrace. Therefore, it would be proper and prudent in this court to act in consort with the English, in order to restore the authority of the head of the empire, in opposition to the evil designs of an ungrateful servant.

Ballojec Koonger apprized Mirza Bauker, that Dowlut Rao Scindia had endeavoured to obtain from him information regarding the articles of the treaty of Bassein; but that he plainly told the Maharaja,he should enter into no explanation on this subject until the retury of “doon Rao Bhow to this Durbar.

BAlojee Koonger says, he shall in the first place ascertain the real designs of Sindia and of his ministers, and that having so done, he will then demand of the Ma. haraja, whether it be his intention to act con ormably to the engagements which the head of the Mahratta empire had entered into with the English. That should Scindia promise obedience to his Ighness the Peishwa in the present instance, he would in that case disclose the articles of the new treaty ; but in the event of a refusal on the part of the Maha

raja to acquiesce in those engage. ments, he (Ballojee Koonger) would immediately solicit permission to leave this court.

The Vakeel has assured Mirza Bauker that Ambajee has now sworn to act in concert with him, and to support all his views. Ballojee Koonger also seems confident that he shall be able to detach Jadoon Rao, and the Berar Rajah, from the disaffected party; and declares that his Highness Baajy Rao would soon deprive Dowlut Rao Scindia of the assistance of all the Mahratta Sirdars in his service, should that chieftain attempt to obstruct the completion of the engagements concluded between the head of the empire and the British government.

(A true Extract.)
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Gov.

Extract from a Letter from Colonel John Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindia, dated 17th May 1803. (No. 253.)

DOWLUT RAO SCINDIA having readily assented to Ballojee Koonger's paying me a visit, that Vakeel waited on me this morning, and was received with marked distinction on my part.

Ballojee gave me the same assurances as he had before made to Mirza Bauker Khan, and which I did myself the honour of communicating to your Excellency in my letter of the 13th instant. Ile seems confident of success in his endeavours to dissolve the present contederacy, and is the more sanguine in his expectations on this head, in consequence of a letter which he lately received from Jadoon Rao Bhasker, containing the most explicit declaration of that minister's intention to act in every respect

respect conformably to the wishes of Ballojee Koongor.

Ballojee expressed himself highly satisfied with the arguments I had urged in my several confer. ences with the Maharaja and his ministers, the most material of which he repeated to me; and I must confess I was both pleased and surprised to find, that this Durbar had acted with candour in its statement of those conferences. Jadoon Rao Bhow is expected to arrive here in three days, and Ballojee Koonger is decidedly of opinion, that neither he nor I should take any steps in relation to the objects of our respective missions, until the return of that miaister to this court.

I suggested to Ballojee Koon

ger, that as Scindia had expressed an intention of marching to Poona with his forces, it might be proper in him, as Vakcel on the part of his Highness the Peishwa, to men. tion to the Maharaja, that if it were his design to repair to the capital of his Highness, it would be altogether unnecessary for him to take on this occasion more than 2,000 horse, and one or two battalions of sepoys, as an escort merely. Ballojee assured me, that the same idea had occurred to him; and that it was his intention to speak to Scindia on this subject, in terms similar to those I had proposed.

(A true Extract.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE, Sec. to Gov.

and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want, and excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be felt immediately, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance.

I hear nothing of any of Holkar's troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in this country.

No. 2.

may effect the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they view them with jealousy. I am far from thinking, however, that if in consequence of these en.

You will be desirous to hear from me, and to receive my opinion of the state of our military affairs in this country; and I take the earliest opportunity of writing to you, afforded by the junction of the Nizam's army.

My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have re ceived from the country all the assistance which it could afford. I have been joined by some of the southern Jaghiredars, and of the Peishwa's officers, who quitted him by his desire at Mhar, after he had fled from Poona; but there are many of both descriptions still absent. The Jaghiredars who have joined are princi. pally those who served with the troops under my command in the campaign of 1800, and the Sirdars are those lately raised by the Peishwa to high offices in the state from very inferior situations. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the cause of the Peishwa, but particularly in the Jaghiredars I have observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detestation of his person, and an apprehension of his power founded upon a long series of mutual injuries.

None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of our engagements with the Peishwa, or their sentiments upon them ; as, however, these engagements

by any thing like a confederacy of the greater Mahratta powers, we shall have to carry on this con test unassisted by these chiefs; but the number of those who will assist us, and the degree of assist. ance which they will give, will depend much upon the Peishwa.

We have undoubtedly an influ ence over those chiefs, one which is daily increasing, to which I at. tribute our successful progress to this moment. This influence is founded in some degree upon their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our sup port in forwarding their views, and of our protection against the violence and oppression of their own government, and the greater Mahratta powers.

Here we must depend upon the personal character of the Peishwa, and upon the manner in which the new treaty will work, upon which points I shall defer to write any thing until I am better informed.

Having brought up my corps thus far, and effected a junc tion with the Nizam's army, it is my intention to march to Poona, which place I shall reach about the 20th, and then to bring up the Peishwa from Bassein. I have already arranged a plan for this purpose, which I have sent to Colonel Close, according to which the Peishwa will ascend the Ghauts about the 28th. Holkar himself has gone towards Chandore,about two hundred miles from Poona, and his detachments under Futteh

Sing and Meer Khan, which were, the former near Meritch and the latter on the Nizam's frontier, near Besapour, have fallen back gradually as I advanced. They joined at this place, and went off towards Poona five days ago. You will have heard of Futteh Sing's treating with the Peishwa, and Meer Khan's treating with the Nizam, to enter into the ser'vice of those princes respectively. Futteh Sing offered himself to me, and I referred him to the Peishwa, and I heard last night from the Peishwa's Vakeel at Sattarah, who, I believe, conducted this treaty, that all matters between the Peishwa and Futteh Sing were arranged. If, however, they should not be so, and these chiefs should still continue in Holkar's service, I conclude that they will fall back still farther as I advance to Poona, and that they will take with them Amrut Rao, who is still in that city with a small force. I intend, therefore at present, to dispose of the troops between the Ghauts and the Nizam's frontier, in such a manner as that all will find forage and subsistence; and that if there should be any appearance of an attack, the whole may form and protect the part menaced without loss of time.

The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought to a decision as soon as possible:

First, Because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with great advantage during the rainy season:

Secondly, Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are not, and every day's delay after

this time is an unnecessary increase of expence to us, and an advantage to them:

Thirdly, Because we shall im mediately ascertain the views and intentions of the Peishwa regard. ing the alliance in general, and we shall leave no time for intrigues amongst the Jaghiredars in his aud our interest:

Fourthly, Because nothing but our determined and early opposi tion to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing it to exist. To withdraw from our engagements with the Peishwa will rather aċcelerate its attack, with the addition of the Peishwa's force.

In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peishwa should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive at Poona) to desire Scindia to recross the Nurbuddah. This chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by our minister at his camp. If Scindia should cross the Nurbuddah, and our minister is kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend.

We ought immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce the Poona detachment, whenever their services can be required, and to keep our northwest frontier of Mysore and the ceded districts in strength.

My reasons for thinking that the army here ought to be broke up, if Scindia goes across the Nurbuddah are, First, that it does not weaken us, because the same num. ber of native troops as we have at present, will be at Poona; we shall have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the Poona detachment; and the

cavalry