thofe unlimited Spaces, I can add our Globe, which I had before divided from it by Thought; and fo there will be fomething that is both finite and infinite all at once. And if those Spaces which I divide from the Earth remain finite, it follows that Two Finites, viz. The Earth, and thofe Spaces joyned together, make an Infinite ; which is no less contrary to Reafon.

What answer will they make to those that demand whether there be an actual infinity of Parts in a Ball of Wax? It is certainly capable of Division to Infinity, and fo clearly demonftrated to be fo by Geometry, that a Man must be one of another World to offer to difpute it. And if it be infinitely divifible, it is divisible into an infinity of Parts; and if it may be divided into an infinity of Parts, thofe Parts cannot be one and the fame thing, for then they could never be divided: And if that Ball may be divided into an infinity of Parts, which tho well joyned together, are not for all that, the fame thing; it will follow, that there is in that Lump of Wax, an infinite number of Parts actually diftinct, though they are not actually divided. In the mean time, if you increase the bulk of that Wax, with an addition of new Matter to it, you must undoubtedly increase the number of Parts which you have fuppofed to be infinite, and to which confequently you have affirmed, that nothing could be fuperadded; and thus the very fame Number is Infinite, and not Infinite.

So then laying afide all thofe Mysteries of Nature which exercife the Minds of Natural Philofophers, fuch as the Ebbing and flowing of the Sea, the Vertue of the Load-ftone, the Prin

ciple

ciple of Meteors, the Production of Plants, the Formation of Animals, &c. and all the Phenomena which Men are wholly ignorant of, or know but very imperfectly, and upon which the Wit of Man is continually framing Difficulties, in infinitum; we need only confider the Two moft undetermined and general Attributes of Matter, to shew that the Spirit of Man has but a narrow Sphere of Action, and foon finds it felf stopt in its course, and furrounded with unfathomable Depths and impenetrable Difficulties, when it goes about to reafon upon every Object that prefents it felf to it.

Nay, it is further manifeft, that as foon as ever we have renounced the Truth of the Exiftence of God, we are ftopt and embarassed our Enquiries, not only by thofe Difficulties common to all Men, but alfo by abundance of others which spring immediately from Atheism. Every thing becomes a Riddle, every thing is Paradox, or rather every thing is turned upside down in our Ideas. The greatest Light is to us the most dismal Obfcurity. We are a Thousand times more confounded by the Wisdom which appears in the Universe, than we should be by the greatest irregularity and diforder. What we find done there with the greatest shew of Reafon, makes us in fome manner lofe our own Reason, when we no longer acknowledge a God, because we have then no principle at all to af cribe all those wonders to..

Is it not therefore the highest pitch of Folly and irregular thinking, to comprehend nothing in Natural Knowledge, and at the fame time to pretend to comprehend every thing in Religion to reject the general Opinion of all

other

other Men, under pretence of not wholly comprehending it, and embrace another that includes a great many more Difficulties, and more incomprehensible Objects; to complain of not being throughly acquainted with the Defigns and Perfections of a Being, fupposed to be infinite in Perfection and Wifdom, and at the fame time to be ignorant of such things as are most proportioned to the Capacity of Man, and feem to be of a Nature and Condition inferior to his; to quit an Opinion upon account of those very Difficulties which are the fame, but far greater in the Atheists Hypothefis, and fuch as admitted, change our fureft and leaft fufpected Notions into an inexplicable confufion, and profound Darkness? 'Tis indeed, just as if one should pull out ones Eyes, in order to fee the bet

ter.

Our Reasons are all taken from what we comprehend, whereas the Atheists have theirs from what they do not understand. We have as many proofs of the truth of our Opinion, as there are things which fhew us any Characters of Wifdom. The Atheists on the contrary, have no reafons to alledge for theirs, but what may be reduced to thefe Two general ones, I do not fee, I do not comprehend God: As if this necessary difproportion which there is between their Soul and the Supream Being, could form any allowable Prejudice in their Favour: As if this very difproportion, were not the most Essential Character of a Deity fovereignly exalted. If you admit of the Reasons of the Atheists, they will oblige you to call in question the Existence of Matter, as well as make you doubt of the Existence of God. But if you fuppofe the Existence of Matter,

you

you have answered the principal Objections of thofe that attack the Existence of God.

CHA P. XVIII.

Wherein we shall conclude this Section, by examining whether there be truly and properly Speaking any fuch thing as an Atheist.

It is no difficult matter, after what has been IT

faid, to decide that famous Question, viz. Whether there be any Real Acheifts in the World, or whether it be poffible there fhould be any.

We answer in one Word, that there are fuch as are Atheists in their Heart, but there cannot be any that are fo in their Understanding. For we learn both from Experience and Reafon, that our Paffions do eagerly embrace thofe Objects and Opinions which favour them moft; it cannot therefore be thought ftrange, if they take off our Understanding from the confideration of the Proofs of a Deity, from the Contemplation of his Works, or at least from the Characters of Greatnefs and Wifdom to be feen in them; or if by fufpending the Enquiries of our Understanding, by breaking off its Reflections when they are not favourable to them, and fixing it ftrongly upon all the Doubts that feem to make for them, they form fuch an Habit of Incredulity in Men, as may reasonably enough be called the Atheism of the Heart.

The

I

The Atheist himself fhews us plainly enough, what was the principle of his Incredulity, when fome times in a fharp Fit of Sickness, he ab jures his Impiety; and we might very well put this Question to him, Why he has alter'd his Opinion? If his first Opinion sprang from the lights of his Understanding, he ought to keep it ftill; fince his Understanding is rather more free, and more difintagled from all Extrinfecal Impressions now, than it was before. What is it then that obliges him to change his Opinion, but only the change of his Heart? 'Tis becaufe his first Opinion proceeded from the Paffions, but the Second fprings from the pureft Lights of the Understanding.

And certainly it is a very glorious thing for the truth of this grand Principle, that there are none but little Souls corrupted by the Vanity they have of imitating great Wits, and making a vain shew of fuch Abilities as they are not furnish'd with; or elfe Debauched Persons who are Slaves to their Paffions, that make Profeffion of Doubting in this refpect. Whence we may perceive that this Monster is bred by the Paffions that are fruitful in Illufions and Errors, and is not the Iffue of found and right Reason.

He that knows how powerful the Paffions are to feduce us, will not wonder at this, nor be furprifed to fee fome of thofe Miferable Wretches that are deceived by their Passions, continue their Incredulity and Obftinacy even to the Grave; the reason of this, is that the Habit which they have taken up of fubmitting their Understanding to the regular motions of the Heart, is become a Second Nature to them; 'tis because the impreffion of the Passions is more lasting in fome

than