Vannin. In Amphitheatro Providentiæ Divinæ. Ex

ercit, 2.

with defign to have infinuated, in a Work he published under the fhew of opposing Atheifm, but in effect and reality, that he might fpread his Poyfon the more fecurely, when he gives this Description of the Deity, which i either good or bad, according to the Sense you put upon it, or the ufe you make of it. Sui ipfius & principiam & finis, utriufue carens, neutrius egens, utriufque parens atque Author. Semper est fine tempore, cui præteritum non abit, nec fubit futurum. Regnat ubique fine loco, immobilis abfque ftatu, pernix fine motu, extra omnia omnis, intra omnia, fed non includitur in ipfis; extra omnia, fed non ab ipfis includitur. Intimus hæc regit, extimus creavit, bonus fine qualitate, fine quantitate magnus, totus fine partibus, immutabilis cum cætera mutat cujus velle potentia, cui opus voluntas, fimplex eft in quo nihil in potentia, fed in actu omnia, imo ipfe purus, primus, medius & ultimus actus.

De

nique eft omnia fuper omnia, extra omnia, intra omnia, prater omnia, ante omnia, & poft omnia om

nis.

Which feeming Contradictions proceed from these Three Heads; viz. First, From the Infinity of God; who is raised above our Conceptions. Secondly, From the weakness of our Underftanding, which finds nothing in or without it felf, that it judges fit to reprefent God. And Thirdly and Laftly, From the Disproportion there is between Corporeal Ideas, which our Imagination makes ufe of to defcribe him, and his incomprehenfible Nature, which is never to be defcribed as it ought to be; and therefore it is not any Contradiction between the Attributes of

H 4

God,

God, but a Difproportion between our Undertanding, and the nature of the Supream Being; which obliges us to correct all the Images our Imagination makes ufe of to represent him; and this difproportion is fo neceffary, that to take it away, would be to annihilate the Exiftence of God.

V. But does it not feem, that by the Deity, might be understood the Universe it felf? For if we believe that the Subject we apply that Name to, is fupreamly perfect, the Atheists will alfo maintain, that nothing is more perfect than the Universe. As we pretend that our God is infinite in every refpect, and that he has no limits, either in his Duration, in the extent of his Being, or his Perfections, fo they will alfo fay, that the Univerfe is eternal, infinite in extent, and fo compleatly regular and perfect, that nothing more regular can be conceived, there being no Qualities nor Perfections, but what this Univerfe contains; the Universe being a full com prehenfion of all things.

We anfwer, that the Universe bears too vi fible marks of its being a Work to be look'd upon as the Artificer. It is a compofition not made by it felf, fince its parts have but an Arbitrary Relation to one another. For when the Heavens were made, what need was there of the Earth? When there was Light, what neceffity was there of an Eye? Why, when fo many wonderful things were made, fhould a Soul be formed with a capacity of admiring them? 'Tis not the neceffity of Things that would have it fo, fince thefe Things have no Natural Connexion with one another, but may be feparated, and oftentimes are fo. Tis

a Rational Neceffity that makes the World to be after this manner; because Reason tells us, that these things ought to be united. They have a relation of Reafon and Wisdom, which the Universe could not know, because it self is nothing else but a Collection of those things which have a relation to one another, how infenfible foever they are of it, as has been already proved.

Befides, all these Difficulties which feem confiderable, there are some other flight Objections of the fame kind, which require but a short Answer.

;

'Tis faid first, that if there were a God, he would be obliged to hear the Prayers of Men and their Prayers being for the most part contrary to one another, he could not hearken to them, without contradicting himself. We anfwer, That Vide Merfennum in God does not always hearken Genefim. to all forts of Perfons, nor all forts of Prayers; fo that the Objection which supposes the contrary, is not of any confideration.

'Tis again objected, that if there were a God, he would be the Supream Good, and if he were the Supream Good, there would be no Evil in the World; fince the Supream Good excludes all forts of Evil. This Difficulty is only a Ridiculous Complication of fome Scholaftical Ideas. The Supream Good excludes all fort of Evil in it self, but not out of it self. Evil may exift out of God, but it cannot be in God.

Another

Another Objection is, that if there be a God, he must be of infinite Knowledge; and if his Knowledge be infinite, he must know the utmost Number; and if he knows the utmost Number, there actually is an utmost Number. But 'tis a Contradiction, that there fhould be an utmost Number, becaufe an utmost Number being fupposed, fomething may still be added to it, and fo there would be an utmost Number, and yet there would not be an utmost Number. We anfwer, that God knows the utmost Number fuch as it is in it felf, that is, impoffible and contradictory; perfectly knowing what Number foever that is poffible, but not knowing the utmost Number, because there is no utmost.

Lastly, 'tis urged, that if there be a God, he governs Things below; and if he governs Things below, he humbles himself, and takes fuch Cares upon him, as are unworthy of his Nature. We anfwer, that God humbles himself no more by the Cares of his Providence, the Sun does by scattering his Light upon these inferior Places.

than

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

A continuation of the Objections of Atheists.

S we propose the Oeconomy of our Thoughts

As and Passions, the Subordination of the Motions of our Heart, Natural Law, Conscience, and thofe Inclinations which unite Men together into Society, as fo many proofs of the Existence of a Supream Wisdom, which has skilfully contrived the Compofition of Man; fo Atheists on the contrary endeavour to prove their Opinion, by the Disorders of the Thoughts and Paffions, and by thofe Crimes God fuffers Men to commit.

2

For, fays the Atheist, if there be a God, either he cannot prevent Sin, and then he must want Power; or he will not,

and then we conceive him to be Wicked. The First Reflection to be made in anfwer to this Objection, is, that we must diftinguish Power confidered as purely Abfolute and Supream, from the fame power confidered as temper'd by Wifdom, Fuftice and other Vertues. If you confider only the Abfolute Power of a King, he may cause half his Subjects to be put to Death in one Day. But if you confider this power as tempered by his goodness, and his other Vertues, you will own that he cannot do it, and that it is a happy and commendable impotence which denotes his Strength, and which springs from his Perfections: So that to know, not what God, but

what