Mind, 8. kötetOxford University Press, 1899 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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absolute abstract activity actual æsthetic analysis analytic proposition appears Arbuckle Aristotle assertion axioms Beauty causality character Chemism concepts connexion consciousness criticism definition Descartes desire discussion distinction doctrine Ehrenfels elements Ethics existence existential propositions experience explain expression external fact feeling Félix Alcan finite geometry Hegel Hegelian Hence idea ideal identity imagination implies individual inference infinite involves judgment Kant Kant's knowledge language Leibniz logical mathematical matter meaning memory ment mental merely metaphysical method mind moral motion natural signs nature necessary object Ollé-Laprune organic reaction perception philosophy Plato position possible present presupposes principle priori problem Prof proposition psychical psychology purely quantity question reality recognise reference regard relation result Saleilles scholasticism scientific seems sensations sense signs social space spatial Spinoza sum of pleasures Teleology theory things thought tion true truth unity universal Weber's Law whole words writing
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477. oldal - But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead tlie judgment ; and so indeed are perfect cheats...
292. oldal - The consideration then of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
292. oldal - ... those huffing opinions they are swelled with, if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what ideas are, or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, by any enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language...
97. oldal - For as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars, yet in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice...
502. oldal - ... at the distance of about three feet. He was now allowed to open the eye, and, after attentive examination, he called the lines by their right denominations.
477. oldal - ... harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.
516. oldal - If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal." " If equals be taken from equals,
198. oldal - I am no stranger to his lordship ; and, excepting in what relates to the church, there are few persons with whose opinions I am better pleased to agree...
436. oldal - Along with whatever any Intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.
192. oldal - That a judgment is universally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary r whether it be true or false. That it must be either true or false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or the world in space and time. For both of these must be supposed to exist, in some sense, if the truth of our judgment is to depend upon them ; and then it turns out that the truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the judgment,...