Aristocracies. An aristocracy, a class of privileged nobles, has its origin in the circumstance that greater skill, enterprise, intelligence, and perseverance, at first threw a comparatively great amount of wealth and power into the hands of a few families; that the management of that wealth, and the exercise of the power and influence, were occupations calculated to give a greater practical development to the propensities and faculties of their descendants, than the routine drudgery of those who earned their daily food by their daily labour. We have no desire to palliate the evils of aristocratic government. That degree of enlightenment which enables inen to lord it over others, is not necessarily accompanied by that higher enlightenment which teaches the beauty and utility of self-control, and the exercise of justice to all. But we must not, therefore, shut our eyes to the fact, that aristocratic government is one of the stages through which all societies must pass in their way to something better; that society advances as man walks, by putting one part of the body foremost, and dragging the rest up to it; that the love of power, and skill in acquiring and exercising it, must be realised in the few, in order to excite the desire of a share of it in all. That inequality of civilisation which gives rise to aristocratic power and influence, exists in many different forms and modifications. Even in our own country an uncivilised class is found that unfortunate class which supplies the precarious demand for the lowest kinds of unskilled labour, and which fills our police-offices and other courts of justice with the greater number of the victims to the security of society. In a rude society, there is wanting that enlightenment which is necessary to confer upon the subjects or citizens the power of keeping their government in the path of its duties. In a partially-civilised society —a society in which some classes are considerably advanced in civilisation, while others are still rude, helpless, and ignorant-only a portion of the citizens will be able to exercise this control. They will exercise it to their own advantage, neglecting the interests of the powerless classes, most frequently from thoughtlessness, but sometimes at the impulse of motives still less excusable. The only guarantee men can have for good government, is their power to exact it; and the foundation of that power is knowledge or intelligence -intelligence imparted by civilisation, and heightened by teaching-knowledge diffused through every section of the community. Wherever there is an ignorant class, it will be weak; and wherever men are weak, they will be oppressed. No chain can be stronger than its weakest link; no society more powerful than the most ignorant section of its members. Experience has shown to both governors and governed that the preservation of rights from attempts at invasion is a paramount duty. The Roman plebeians, as measures of self-defence, obtained from their rulers, at different times, tribunes invested with power to guard their rights, the right of electing one of their own number to be consul, and various other concessions, all which at the time appeared to them to be sufficient to assure them of just government in time to come. In our own country, Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights were bargains struck between the governors and the governed for the same purpose. All these arrangements, whether well adapted to promote the end in view or not, are what are called constitutions, or constitutional governments. They are bargains struck between the government and the people at large, awarding to each party certain powers or privileges, which the other becomes bound to respect. The object in view is to render it possible to check those evils at the very outset, which, if allowed to go on, lead to revolts and revolutions to enable the people, by keeping a steady watch over the motions of their rulers, to mark their first aberrations from the right, to remonstrate in time to prevent injustice, instead of revenging it. Constitutions of government have been devised and adopted as various as the habits, opinions, amount of wealth and knowledge, and distribution of them among the people who have devised them. A constitution is adopted in the belief that it will secure the enjoyment of their just rights, alike to the governors and the governed; it is an arrangement by which the privileges of all are equally secured; or, to use a familiar explanation, it is a bargain made between the governors and governed, or among the whole members of society mutually, as to how the government shall be conducted, so as to insure civil and religious liberty-liberty of action, and liberty in the expression of opinion, within certain legal limits. A constitutional is thus the highest form of government-the only kind of government worthy of a civilised community. Despotisms. At the present time, the greater proportion of the governments throughout the world are of the character of despotisms, and comparatively few possess what are called constitutions. Of the multifarious class of despotisms which exist among barbarous nations, it is here needless to say anything; for the question of form of government only becomes interesting when applied to a wholly or partially - civilised people. The three great despotisms in Europe are Russia, Austria, and Prussia-though the latter is now perhaps entitled to be removed from this class, in consequence of the king having granted a modified constitution. Austria and Russia are rigorous despotisms, each being governed exclusively by an emperor. In these countries, any one can be legally seized, without previous notice, and transferred to a dungeon for life, or sent as an exile to a distant part of the empire. The press is under a rigorous censorship, travelling is regulated by passports; and the whole people are under the eye of a strict military police. We may be sure that the community which submits to all this is still in a transition and unsatisfactory condition. Constitutional Monarchies. Europe abounds in constitutional governments, but many of them are scarcely entitled to the name. Sardinia, Saxony, Sweden, Hamburg, and all the smaller German states, have constitutions of one kind or other; that is to say, the king, grand-duke, chief ruler, or by whatever title he is called, is restricted in his designs by estates composed of delegates from different orders of the people. We should consider it quite useless to present detailed explanations of these constitutions, because all, or nearly so, are little better than a mockery. The reigning monarch can either directly neutralise the will of the estates, or he and they, together or separately, are under the influence of armed intervention. The Dutch have a constitution, but they have no right of public meeting for political objects; their press is under a censorship; all must carry passports; and every citizen, in any kind of trade or profession, is required to pay for a license. The infant and still disorganised constitutions of Spain and Portugal it is unnecessary to notice. At present, Germany is making efforts to establish a constitution of the different states collectively; the probability is that these aims will not be realised without much disorder and suffering. British Constitution.-From the raw and ill-regulated constitutions of most continental nations we ascend to the old-established and well-guaranteed constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The government of this large empire (which we need not here particularise, as it will be fully treated of in our article CONSTITUTION AND RESOURCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE) is a perfect anomaly, and, though frequently imitated, has never, in a monarchical form, been excelled. The legislature, as is well known, consists of a hereditary sovereign (king or queen, as the case may be), a hereditary House of Peers, and an elected House of Commons. A Parliament is the term used to express the collective bodies of King, Lords, and Commons. Electors of members of the House of Commons must be native or naturalised subjects, males of twenty-one years or upwards, of sane mind, not concerned in the management or collection of the revenue, not holding any office in the metropolitan police, and not legally convicted of perjury, subornation of perjury, or bribery. In counties, an elector must be possessed of property in perpetuity or liferent to the value of £10 yearly, or lands held at a yearly rent of £50. In cities or boroughs he must be proprietor of a house or shop valued, along with the land attached to it, at £10 yearly and upwards; or must occupy premises for which he pays a rent of at least £10 per annum. Such, with certain modifications, is the principle on which members are elected. In practice, it is found that much of the elective privilege is exercised by, or under the influence of, the landed gentry, in which we include the titled aristocracy of the country. At no time have what are called the lower or workingclasses (freemen excepted) possessed the elective privilege; and it has only been since the Reform Act of 1831-Liberty of speech within constitutional limits; a that the middle classes (shopkeepers, master tradesmen, manufacturers, farmers, &c.) have had the semblance of direct representation. With this alteration, however, it cannot be said that the legislature has undergone much material improvement. Too frequently the members are still nominees of the landed gentry, or of corporations; and so much time is usually spent in electoral intrigues, parliamentary debates which lead to nothing, as well as the conciliation of parties, that the business of the nation is continually falling behind, or but indifferently executed. In whichever way it is viewed, the legislature of the United Kingdom is essentially the reflex of the landed gentry and aristocracy, and consequently the interests of these classes are uniformly the chief matter for consideration. The next great interest cared for has till lately been the West India interest; next the shipping interest; next the military and naval interests; and lastly, the commercial interest, and the interest of the people. The executive, reposed in the hands of a responsible ministry, takes its character from these competing interests. The execution of any project of law or government is, to all appearance, rarely a result of principle, but in almost every case an immediate consequence of temporary expediency. Power is attained by skill in gaining a number of supporters, and retained by skill in keeping them together. So much of the British statesman's efforts, during his apprenticeship to power, and his exercise of power, are devoted to the getting and keeping of power, that he is necessarily deficient in natural and acquired administrative talent. The manner in which the administrative functions of government are executed, depends upon the industry and honesty of officials not responsible to public opinion, not liable to be dismissed unless convicted of gross dereliction of duty, and of whom their chiefs ask little more than sufficient attention and skill to save them from successful criminations by opposition. This kind of organisation weakens the direct pressure of public opinion upon administration; and, at the same time, by encouraging personal canvassing for political support, and the cultivation of impressive oratory, diverts public attention from the dry business of government, to sympathise with personal squabbles, and attention to abstract questions, more imposing, but less immediately important, than practical details. The consequence is, that the British government, more than any other in Europe, has been characterised by the expenditure of immense energy, with very disproportionate results. Whether any further introduction of the democratic principle (lowering the elective franchise) into the constitution would improve its qualities, is extremely doubtful. The people, taken in the mass, are still far from being instructed. A vast number can neither read nor write; and such is the distressing state of poverty and wretchedness of large communities in towns, that, with their small knowledge of public affairs, and liability to be corrupted, it is to be feared they would appoint men of inferior qualifications, or whoever paid them most liberally. The freemen voters (working men) of Norwich, and some other towns, make a regular sale of their votes on the occasion of elections. In this strangely-complicated condition of affairs, the only real restraint on government is public opinion, expressed through the medium of the newspaper press and public meetings. Without these two qualifying elements, the government and legislature would be, not only in name, but in character, a powerful oligarchy. As the case is, the restraint, though clumsy, is, on the whole, efficacious; and therefore, with all its errors and anomalies, the constitution is one of the most favourable to civil liberty. The very weakness of the executive, as respects the means of keeping its place, and its obligation to conciliate parties, is highly favourable to popular freedom. In no monarchy on the face of the earth is the executive so liberal-that is, interferes so little with private conduct. Under its administration the following important conditions are secured: similar liberty of the press in all its departments; liberty of personal locomotion, no passports being required; liberty of carrying on almost every branch of trade without inquiry or license; liberty of meeting in masses to be instructed by lectures on political or other subjects; liberty of meeting to discuss any political topic, general or local; liberty of presenting petitions to parliament and memorials to the crown; religious toleration, and liberty for the performance of all forms of worship; liberty of setting up schools to instruct pupils in any branch of learning; protection from the law to life and property, without respect of person; privilege of trial by jury, and of forcing on a trial for any alleged offence; privilege of being held as innocent till proved to be guilty; incorruptibility of judges, these being no way exposed to intimidation either from power or popular prejudice. To these great bulwarks of civil liberty may be added the absence of military conscription; the non-existence of fortified or walled towns; the. promptitude with which riotous proceedings are quashed and the peace preserved; and the absence of any restriction to prevent the most humble individual from rising to the highest rank and consideration. The drawbacks on all these advantages may be comprised in the following circumstances:-The existence of a set of laws so complex as to be unintelligible, and so expensive in administration, that legal redress, as far as private interests are concerned, is almost beyond the reach of the lower classes; certain restrictions on free commercial intercourse with foreign nations; the too prevailing treatment of all great questions in parliament with reference to classes instead of to the whole people; and lastly, the absence of a national system of education, which might in time elevate the minds and morals of the people, and altogether produce a more wholesome social condition. Fortunately, these circumstances are all of a nature which admit of amendment; and they will, as a matter of course, be amended, as public opinion, enlightened by knowledge, is brought to bear upon them. Republics. A republic or commonwealth is a form of government in which the people, or at least a large portion of them, are acknowledgedly the source of power, and have the direct appointment of the officers of the legislature and executive. There are few of this class of governments in existence. The only republics worthy of the name in Europe [we lay aside consideration of the untried, and, we may say, yet unconstituted republic of France] are those of the Swiss cantons; each of which is a territory of generally a few square miles in size, and inhabited by a few thousands of people, chiefly engaged in husbandry. In these cantons there are no great properties, and no families equivalent to our landed gentry. There are some wealthy and intelligent merchants in the large towns; but the bulk of the population are a hard-toiling race of small farmers, and little is seen above a condition of mean medio- | stand highest on the list. If for the person having the crity. The legislative and executive functions are conducted in accordance with this state of things. Some of the laws are contemptible, from the narrow-minded views they exhibit-such as those in some cantons to prevent dancing, and to prevent the purchase of houses or land by strangers; but other enactments, particularly as to freedom of trade, are much to be commended. These republics, centering in a general diet or congress, are greatly under the influence of Austria and other monarchies, by which, indeed, they are in a great measure tolerated only from mutual jealousy, and because the country is in some places almost inaccessible to hostile invasion. A constant drainage of the Swiss overplus population into France and to North America, helps to avert the catastrophe of a universal degradation to semi-pauperism. most votes for Vice-President, a majority of all the electors have voted, he is declared Vice-President; if not, the Senate names one of the two who stand highest on the list. The President and Vice-President must be natural-born citizens, thirty-five years of age, and fourteen years resident within the United States. The principle of electing representatives to the state legislatures is almost that of universal suffrage; in most instances, every male citizen above twenty-one years of age who has resided a year in the state is an elector. With an immensely large unoccupied territory, and general thinness of population, it is impossible to draw any just inference as to the stability of this still comparatively raw and untried republican government. It is suitable to the present condition of the country; but whether it will maintain this character after its population has become as dense as that of England, and great diversities of wealth and intelligence have arisen, is a question which time alone can determine. In the meanwhile, the general character of the executive is feeble. The people, in a sense, are masters of the law, and have it in their power (in virtue of elective privileges) to intimidate its officers, or absolutely to set them at defiance. In the middle and eastern states, the efficiency of government for the repression of crimes is about the same as in Great Britain; but in the western states neither life nor property is safe from popular outbreak. The prevalence of slavery in the southern states aggravates this evil: personal se or Madrid. Still, with these drawbacks, the United States is a great nation, in which civil freedom is on a grand scale, and is worthy of the enlightened community which has established and supports it. Revolutions. On the continent of America, various republics have been founded on the wreck of the colonial institutions of Europe. The principal is the United States of North America, now upwards of half a century old. The form of the legislature and executive is very nearly that of England; the main difference being an elective President as chief magistrate, instead of a hereditary sovereign, and the appointment of judicial and other functionaries by the people, instead of by the crown. The country is not one, but an aggregation of republics; each state being independent of the others as respects internal management. The power of legislation for the States, in their united character, is vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate, jointly form-curity in New Orleans is at a lower ebb than in Italy ing a Congress. The House of Representatives is composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the United States. The electors in each state are required to have the qualifications requisite in the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Representatives are apportioned among the several states of the Union according to their respective numbers, which are determined by adding to the whole number of free persons (including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed) three-fifths of all other persons. The House of Representatives consists of one member for every 77,700 persons in each state, estimated according to this rule: the enumeration is made by a general census taken every ten years. No person is eligible as representative who has not completed his twentyfifth year, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who is not, when elected, resident in the state for which he is chosen. The Senate of the United States is composed of two senators from each state, elected by the legislature thereof for six years. Onethird of the Senate goes out, and is replaced by a new election every two years. A senator must be thirty years of age, nine years a citizen, and resident in the state for which he is elected. All members, both of the general and state legislatures, are paid for their services. The President is elected by the whole people, for a term of four years: at the close of that period he may be re-elected; and, with the exception of three, all the presidents of the United States have been re-elected for a second term. Each state appoints a certain number of electors, who meet in their respective states, to vote for President and Vice-President, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of the state. In Delaware, South Carolina, and Tennessee, the legislature chooses the electors; in Maine and Maryland, electors are chosen by the people voting for one or more in each district; in all the rest of the states, they are chosen by a 'general ticket,' upon which the whole of the electors vote. The electors transmit sealed lists of all the persons voted for as President, and all those voted for as Vice-President, to the President of the Senate, who opens the lists, and counts the votes, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives. If for the person having the greatest number of votes for President, a majority of the whole electors have voted, he is declared President; if fewer, the House of Representatives elects by ballot one of the three who A revolution is the overthrow of a government by some kind of convulsion out of the usual course of law, and the establishment of a new one in its stead. Modern history contains several examples of revolutions:-The deposition of monarchy and execution of Charles I., and the establishment of a Commonwealth, with Cromwell as dictator, formed the greatest revolution which has occurred in England, though it is never spoken of under that definition. The change of dynasty in 1688, with the guarantee of a constitution, is referred to as the Revolution, and no doubt it was the commencement of a new system of government. This revolution had the singular merit of being effected with little or no violence. The revolt of the American colonies, and their assumption of independence, was a distinctly marked revolution, effected by military force, and crowned with a degree of success which astonished Europe. It was shortly followed by the revolution in France in 1789, to the violence and consequences of which no parallel is found in history. Revolutions are almost invariably a result of misgovernment. Tenaciously clinging to old usages, and opposing themselves to every species of equitable reform required by alterations in society, governments sometimes, as in the foregoing instances, become so repugnant to the feelings of the nation, that at length a rebellion ensues, and if successful, it becomes a revolution. The revolution which placed Cromwell at the head of affairs in England, originated in Charles I. levying taxes without the concurrence of parliament. The revolution of 1688 was caused by James II. assuming arbitrary powers vexing to the nation. The American revolution occurred in consequence of government imposing taxes on the colonists, while they were not represented in parliament, and therefore in violation of the constitutional maxim of-no taxation without representation. The cause of the French Revolution, in 1789, was an entire disorder in society; but it was precipitated by the refusal of the clergy and nobility to contribute any share whatever of the national taxes. A timely concession on the part of these bodies to aid the declining finances, by giving up a portion of their unjust exemptions from taxation, would probably have averted | insolvency. Besides an utter annihilation of private the terrible calamity which ensued. resources, the revolution in France led to the judicial From every revolution which has occurred, all govern-murder or massacre of upwards of a million of the inhaments may learn the valuable lesson of acting with a bitants; the bulk of those destroyed being of the lower prudent regard to constantly changing circumstances and middle classes, notwithstanding that from these and feelings. Without yielding to every clamour, it ranks (some of the judges had been criminals in the is their duty and interest to adapt themselves to the galleys) the tribunals and assemblies were composed. progressive views of mankind; graciously advancing The French revolution of 1848, though less bloody, with the intelligence of the age, and not franticly, as led, as is well known, to the prostration of trade, the has been too often the case, rousing a public indigna- ruin of many families, and, in general, great suffering. tion, which perhaps may lay them in ruins. Lessons equally useful, however, may be learned by the people Concluding Remarks. from revolutions. To step in the slightest degree beyond the limits of constitutional law, and assume an attitude hostile to government, is always dangerous in the extreme-treasonable if defeated, and perhaps productive of unspeakable horrors if successful. Judging from the Cromwellian and the French Revolution, besides some successful revolts of lesser note, it would appear that a revolution in general circumstances runs a certain specific course. First, the old government is overthrown, and one thought to be more liberal is established. Second, the new government being composed of men who acted from a conscientious conviction of evils to be redressed, is soon found not to go far enough in its measures; it is accused of being too moderate, and is overthrown. Third, a violent set of men, animated by feelings of vengeance, and professing boundless liberality, construct a fresh government. Fourth, anarchy sooner or later ensues, the nation is in universal disorder, and life and property are no longer secure. Fifth, out of the convulsion arises an individual, who, by his military genius, conquers inferior demagogues, and brings back a degree of tranquillity at which every one rejoices. Sixth, this tranquillity is speedily found to be a military despotism: a Cromwell or a Napoleon is at the head of affairs. And, brought to this condition, a long course of suffering is endured before the nation returns to the constitutional point whence it set out. Varied according to circumstances, such is likely to be the progress of every revolution occurring from heedless, though well-intentioned, democratic invasion. An expectation that the original movers of a revolution will be suffered to conduct it to a conclusion, is pretty nearly hopeless. The agitation brings all sorts of wild schemers into play, and one party after another is remorselessly trampled down in the contest. On this subject, which cannot be considered with too much calmness, Alison has the following observations; he is referring to the consequences of the French Revolution:- Upon the occurrence of a revolution, the working-classes are the first to suffer, because they have no stock to maintain themselves during a period of adversity, and being wholly dependent on the daily wages of labour, are the earliest victims of the catastrophe which has interrupted it. It is this immediate effect of a revolution, in spreading misery through the labouring poor, which in the general case renders its march irresistible, when not arrested in the outset by a firm combination of all the holders of property, and precipitates society into a series of convulsions, from which it can hardly emerge without the destruction of the existing generation. The shock given to credit, the stoppage to speculation, the contraction to expenditure, is so excessive, that the lower orders are immediately involved in distress; and the same causes which increase their discontent, and augment their disposition to revolt, disable government, by the rapid fall of the revenue, either from administering relief or exerting force. The consequence is, that fresh insurrections take place; more extravagant and levelling doctrines become popular; a lower but more energetic class rises to the head of affairs; desperate measures of finance are adopted the public expenditure is increased, while the national income is diminished; and, after a succession of vain attempts to avoid the catastrophe, national bankruptcy takes place, and the accumulations of ages are swept off in a general public and private In considering the nature and supposed influence of different forms of government, of which the preceding notices afford an example, it is important to guard ourselves against the too common error of mistaking names for things. A despotism has been described as the government of an irresponsible individual; and a republic as a government formed by the concurrence of the whole people. We should, however, be liable to commit an error, did we at once rush to the conclusion, that a despotism was invariably, and in its nature, tyrannical; and that a republic was as certain to be in every instance tolerant and commendable. It may happen that a despotism is really the most liberal and satisfactory of the two. This will occur when the despot is an intelligent and benevolent man. Instead of tormenting his subjects, he will take a pleasure in seeing them happy and prosperous; while by a sleepless and undistracted vigilance, he will conduct the government with a degree of firmness and efficiency not to be equalled by a miscellaneously-composed body. Such a beneficent government as this is said to be paternal; the sovereign acting as if he were the father and guardian of his people. Could it be possible to secure a continuance of sovereigns of this character, we might almost arrive at the conviction that despotisms were the best forms of government; but unfortunately there is no security on this score; an evil may follow a well-disposed ruler, and suddenly the nation may be thrown into confusion. On this account it should be the object of despotisms of the paternal character to prepare the people for the degree of self-government incidental to a constitutional monarchy; and having done so, to grant a constitution which will insure good government on a permanent basis. That republics may be liberal and tolerant only in name, we have too many examples in history. Not to go farther back than the French Revolution of 1789-93, what despotism ever equalled, or came within many degrees of, the republican Convention, which for years oppressed and deluged France in blood? Not even the tyranny of Nero or Caligula could be compared to the disregard of all public and private rights manifested by that iniquitous and popularly-constituted body. The weak point in all republics is, that the most noisy and forward, who are usually the most ignorant, gain the ascendancy, and, under colour of constitutional privilege, tyrannise over the more quietly disposed and intelligent. This is exemplified to a considerable extent in the United States of America, and on a smaller scale in many popularly-constituted bodies in Great Britain. Among these bodies, a handful of noisy demagogues is often observed to carry measures by the mere force of clamour; and as the measures so carried are publicly announced as the doings of the whole body, it actually happens that men, under the shelter of an association, may be exempt from responsibility, and commit the most tyrannical actions. In the presbytery meetings of the Scottish church, measures are frequently carried by this means which no bishop on his own responsibility would dare to enjoin. A republican government, therefore, with all the semblance of a popular constitution, may prove far more unscrupulous than the most stern despotism ever framed. All this we mention, in order to put people on their guard against the illusions of a name. Let it be remembered that government is a complex machine, fulfilling a wide variety of purposes, and that it is to be judged of less from the precise nature of its construction, than the quality of the work it performs. Another conclusion we arrive at is-That good government, although it certainly promotes the civilisation of a country, is much more its consequence than its cause; and that attention to the conduct and constitution of government, although a duty of the citizen, is only one of many public duties not less important and necessary both to the general wellbeing of society and the happiness of the individual. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION. Whatever be the form of government, it requires to be conducted by a set of functionaries capable of superintending the different branches of the public service. The chief officials at the head of affairs, and who act as the cabinet council of the sovereign, are usually styled ministers, a word signifying servants; and collectively they are called the ministry. The ministry are appointed by the sovereign, and in constitutional governments take on themselves the entire responsibility of all acts of the crown. The British ministry, which is constructed on no broad principle, but merely a result of occasional additions or special circumstances, is as follows:-1. First Lord of the Treasury; 2. Lord High Chancellor; 3. Chancellor of the Exchequer; 4. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 5. Secretary of State for the Colonial Department; 6. Secretary of State for the Home Department; 7. President of the Council; 8. Lord Privy Seal; 9. First Lord of the Admiralty; 10. President of the Board of Control; 11. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; 12. First Commissioner of Land Revenue; 13. Secretary at War; 14. Commanderin-Chief. Such, in general, compose the cabinet; but there are nearly twenty other ministers-as PostmasterGeneral; Lord Chamberlain; President of the Board of Trade, &c.; and occasionally several of these are included in the cabinet, while one or two of those above specified are excluded. There is, in short, no distinctly-settled ministry in England. The whole affair is a matter of arrangement at each change of ministry. The Secretary of State for the Home Department may be said to stand at the head of the executive as far as the internal affairs of the country are concerned. The appointment of judges, sheriffs, and other functionaries is in his hands. Military affairs come under the jurisdiction of the Secretary at War and Commanderin-Chief. The royal navy is similarly regulated by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and other members composing his council. In the matter of the church, education, and some other things, there is no distinct ministerial management. The finances come under the cognisance and responsibility of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For the sake of local administration, the country is divided into counties, divisions anciently under the charge of earls or counts, but now committed to sheriffs and other officers. The sheriff, however, is a functionary of old standing. The title is derived from shire and reeve-the reeve of the shire. Reeve is an old title for an officer of justice inferior in rank to an alderman, and is derived from the Anglo-Saxon term gerefa. In Scotland, the sheriff of a county is a judge ordinary of his bounds, besides being an executor of writs issuing from the crown. Towns possessing burgal privileges are exempted from the administration of sheriffs, and are governed by town-councils, including a burgh magistracy—such councils being annually elected by the ten-pound parliamentary voters or qualified inhabitants. The chief magistrate of a town in England is entitled Mayor, in Scotland Provost. In the principal cities only the prefix Lord is added. In towns, and also in the rural districts, there is a miscellaneous magistracy, styled Justices-of-peace, who are nominated by the crown, and who possess a certain jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. When an administration is radiated by a gradation of office, from the head functionaries downwards, it is said to be a centralised government; for everything centres in the chief authority. The British is the least central of any government in Europe, as it leaves much of the subordinate administration to authorities popularly chosen. In some respects this is advantageous, but in others it is detrimental to the general welfare: in certain towns, for example, the popularly-elected authorities are quite unqualified for their duties, and systematically oppose improvements which it ought to be their duty to encourage. The French, with less civil liberty than the English, enjoy a system of administration the most perfect in the world; it possesses some popular elements, but is thoroughly central. The ministry, as existing under the monarchical régime, consisted of-1. The Minister of the Interior; 2. Minister of Finance; 3. Keeper of the Seals and Minister of Justice; 4. Minister of Public Instruction and Ecclesiastical Affairs; 5. Minister of Commerce and Public Works; 6. Trade and Agriculture; 7. Minister of Marine and the Colonies; 8. Minister of War; 9. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Each of these is at the head of a department which is ramified over the whole kingdom and dependencies. From the Minister of the Interior down to a justice of peace there is an exact gradation, and through the whole a channel of intelligence is kept up. The prefects and sub-prefects of departments, the mayors, &c. are all in direct communication with their great chief in Paris. In England, the Secretary of State may have no knowledge of a remote magistrate; he probably has a difficulty in discovering his name; but in France, every functionary is known to the central government, and amenable to challenge. One advantage of this is, that the most exact body of information on any local subject can be at all times procured, without resorting to the clumsy and expensive expedient of appointing commissions. In France, also, the people enjoy the great advantage of a distinct and uniform body of laws,. administered by a series of courts of precisely the same nature all over the country. Diplomacy Is in all countries a separate branch of administration, and is that which relates to intercourse with foreign powers. The persons deputed to act as foreign ministers are of several classes. Those of the highest class, called ambassadors, are not merely the agents of their governments, but represent their sovereign personally, and receive honours and enjoy privileges accordingly. The second class are envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, and chargés d'affaires. A third class are called residents; and next to them are consuls. Consuls, however, are confined in their duties to commercial affairs, and conduct no correspondence in relation to state policy; yet, along with the whole ambassadorial class, they are expected to succour all subjects of the power which they represent, and facilitate their journey as to passports, &c. Ambassadors (to quote from the Conversations Lexicon'), and even ministers plenipotentiary, have young gentlemen with them called attachés, who have no particular charge, but merely this title, to connect them with the legation, and to give them thus admission into the highest society. Sometimes they are sons of noble families, who are preparing themselves for diplomatic offices, but think it beneath their dignity to accept an appointment as secretary of legation. The suit of ambassadors always includes more individuals than the business of the embassy requires, a certain degree of pomp being considered necessary. An ambassador has generally three, always two secretaries of legation; other ministers often but one. A foreign minister receives letters of credence from his court, which, after having delivered an attested copy of it to the Secretary of State, he gives himself to the monarch, or head of the government-if he is an ambassador, in a public audience; if not, in a private audience. After the reception of the credentials, the minister is said to be acknowledged. In some countries he puts the arms |