tract has no connection with the anterior lobes or in- | to preserve his own. Destructiveness, accordingly, lies tellectual organs.

mulate the organs, and then, whether we will or not, | deavoured to discover laws by which, in every mind, their emotions will be felt. Again, these feelings are this succession is regulated. The uniform associating called into action in spite of the will, by the presenta-powers, according to them, are resemblance, contiguity in tion of their external objects-Cautiousness by objects time and place, and contrast. The phrenological view is, of terror, Love by beauty, and so on. The force of that the predominant faculties in each mind create the the feelings, whether excited from within or without, associations. Association is a very important principle in will be in proportion to the activity of the tempera- mental science. There is a mutual influence of the orment. Excessive action of the affective faculties, or gans which produces associations; a natural association the removal of their object, causes pain. Excessive between certain external objects and certain faculties; rage is painful to Destructiveness; and the death of an and artificial associations may be formed between obinfant pains the Philoprogenitiveness of the mother. jects and faculties. For example, long exercise of a Insanity is a frequent result of over-activity of the particular organ or organs in performing certain acts, affective feelings. An affective faculty may be dis- renders those acts easy, by the rapid association of the eased, and yet the intellect sound. The converse is ideas necessary to their performance. Professional skill, also true. When the organ is small, its feeling cannot in all its varieties, is thus accounted for. Mutual acbe adequately experienced. Hence the frauds of those tion of the faculties arises from the beautiful arrangewith small Conscientiousness and large Secretiveness ment or grouping which we have already described. and Acquisitiveness. The will can indirectly excite the PASSION is any faculty in excess. Thus there are as affective feelings, by setting the intellect to work to find many passions as faculties. Love is the passion of Amaexternally, or conceive internally, the proper objects. tiveness in union with Veneration; avarice of AcquiThis accounts for different turns and pursuits. Lastly, sitiveness; rage of Destructiveness. the affective faculties do not form ideas, but simply feel; and therefore have no memory, conception, or imagination. They have Sensation only; in other words, they feel; hence Sensation belongs to all the faculties which feel, and to the external senses and nervous system in general. Sensation, therefore, is a state or condition, not a faculty, as is held by the metaphysicians.

The KNOWING and REFLECTING FACULTIES, or Intellect, form ideas, perceive relations, and are subject to, or rather constitute, the Will; and minister to the affective faculties. They may be excited by external objects, and by internal causes. When excited by the presentation of external objects, these objects are perceived, and this act is called PERCEPTION. It is the lowest degree of activity of the intellectual faculties; and those who are deficient in a faculty cannot perceive its object.

PLEASURE and PAIN also belong to each faculty, according as it is agreeably or disagreeably affected.

PATIENCE and IMPATIENCE are respectively the results of certain combinations of faculties. Thus Benevolence, Veneration, Hope, Conscientiousness, and Firmness, with moderate Self-Esteem, produce a quiet, meek, resigned, and patient spirit. Apathy is quite different, although often confounded with Patience; it arises from lymphatic temperament or deficient brain. On the other hand, Self-Esteem, Combativeness, and Destructiveness, when larger than Benevolence, Conscientiousness, and Veneration, will be impatient of contradiction. Large Time and Tune give impatience of bad music.

Joy and GRIEF arise from agreeable and disagreeable affections of the faculties by causes of considerable power. Wealth, power, and praise give joy to Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem, and Love of Approbation; while, on the other hand, the death of a beloved relative affects Adhesiveness with grief.

CONCEPTION is also a mode of action of the faculties, not a faculty itself. It is the activity of the faculties from internal causes, either willed, or involuntary from SYMPATHY, as its name (from the Greek) signifies, is natural activity. IMAGINATION is Conception carried to feeling with another, or partaking of his emotions. The a high pitch of vivacity. Thus Perception is the lowest laws which regulate the activity of the faculties show degree of activity of any of the intellectual faculties, the nature of this affection and the circumstances in Conception the second, and Imagination the highest. which it occurs. Two individuals of similar constituMEMORY, too, is not a faculty, but a mode of action. tion of mind naturally feel alike. This is the sympathy It necessarily follows that there can be no such thing felt in the theatre, listening to eloquence, or witnessing as the general memory of the metaphysicians, but every distress and suffering. But there is another kind of faculty must have its own memory. Memory belongs, sympathy-namely, that which is called up by the however, only to the intellectual faculties. It differs activity of a particular feeling in another's mind, mafrom Conception and Imagination in this, that it recol-nifested by the natural language of the active faculty; lects real objects or events which it has actually per- thus the haughty air of Self-Esteem instantly calls ceived, and adds the consciousness of time elapsed since up a defensive Self-Esteem in those who witness it, if they were perceived. The other named modes of action do not require realities or time.

JUDGMENT, in its proper sense, is the perception of adaptation, fitness, and necessary consequence; and is a mode of action of the reflecting powers. In a certain sense, the Knowing Faculties may each be said to possess judgment; as Colouring judges of colours, Form of forms, Tune of music. When, however, we use the word judgment, we mean right reasoning, sound deciding. To this a proper balance of the affective faculties is essential. There can be no sound judgment where any of the feelings are excessive.

CONSCIOUSNESS is the knowledge which the mind has of its own existence and operations, whether these last are affective or intellectual; but as it does not reveal the existence or nature of the powers themselves which think and feel, it was an error in some of the metaphysicians to attempt to discover these powers by merely reflecting on their own consciousness.

ATTENTION is not a faculty, but the application, or tension, of any or all of the intellectual faculties.

ASSOCIATION is that succession of ideas in the mind, each seeming to call up that which succeeds; so that, in our waking hours, the mind is never without an idea passing through it. This is a state or condition of the faculties, not a faculty. The metaphysicians have en

the faculty be powerful in them. On the other hand, Benevolence, with its kind natural language, excites the same feeling in another. Wonder, too, spreads rapidly; and so on.

HABIT may be defined as the power of doing anything well by frequently doing it. But before it can be done at all, there must be the faculty to do it, however awkwardly. Habit, then, is the acquired strength of the faculty by its repeated exercise.

TASTE was held by Mr Stewart to be a faculty, and acquired by habit. Phrenology holds that good taste is the result of a harmonious action of all the faculties. Bad taste is evinced when particular faculties, especially the propensities, break out beyond due limits. Social converse is injured by bad taste in various ways-by displays of vanity, disputatiousness, &c. Bad morality is bad taste; but it is more, it is turpitude. A standard of taste, about which so much has been written, is not a decision of certain objects or qualities of objects as beautiful or perfect to all men. This were a vain attempt; but it may be approximated by appealing to the taste of individuals of very favour able and harmonious organisation, which has received the highest possible culture. It cannot fail to strike that good taste, sound judgment, and good morals all require well-balanced faculties.

LOGIC.

OBJECTS OF THE SCIENCE.

TRUTH is commonly held to be the great and proper object of human curiosity-the end of all inquiries, the indispensable attribute of everything we call knowledge, and one of the greatest achievements and most glorious possessions of man.

Now all these phrases point to something not always possessed, not obvious, and it may be hard to acquire; and yet there are things correctly called true which are not of this description. It is true that I write, that the walls of a room surround me, that I walked in the streets yesterday; and the personal experience and conscious history of each individual will furnish him or her with an unlimited number of the same kind of truths; but there is neither labour, nor anxiety, nor a very great feeling of exultation accompanying them. It cannot, therefore, be this sort of truth that is so highly extolled.

These facts of personal experience, however, are not the whole of truth or knowledge; they are only a very limited portion of the things known and believed in. We receive many events as true on the experience of others; we can acquire a conviction of the reality of occurrences that have taken place in former ages, or in remote countries. Moreover, in respect to what is yet future, we have often the same certainty as if we actually experienced it. And it is our having to find out, with accuracy and precision, things existing only in the experience of others, and things past, distant, and future, that renders the discovery of truth frequently arduous, as well as worthy of being achieved.

There are thus two distinct kinds of truth and knowledge: the one furnished by personal experience, commonly termed Intuitive, which is of narrow limits, but of the highest possible certainty; the other not obtained from personal experience, and extending over the whole world, and into past and future time. To arrive at a knowledge of this last class of truths, and to acquire certainty regarding them, is an operation of labour and care, and must be gone through in a particular way, which it is possible distinctly to point out.

The class of things not ascertainable by direct experience become known by being connected with known things by a bond that direct experience has ascertained. When we see a flash of lightning, we have a direct experience of a luminous appearance, and we further know that a noise of thunder will follow; that is, we can anticipate and believe in what has not yet been actually perceived. In this case every one is aware that the grounds of the anticipation are, that we have formerly had experience of both events, and that the one has been found to follow the other. And when, on observing that five seconds have elapsed between the flash and the noise, we believe that the place of the thundery agitation is a mile off, it is because the previous experience of the travelling of sound has shown it to be at the rate of one-fifth of a mile per second. So, having observed that flame is usually accompanied with heat, we are ready at any time, when we see a flame, to believe that heat is given forth, though we should not actually feel it. What nature seems to associate together in the world, we come to associate in our minds, and we need only to be directly cognisant of one part of the combination to realise all the rest. This kind of knowledge is called knowledge by Inference; and it will be obvious that it is derived through our previous experience of the occurrence of united events. But as it is not every case of two things happening together which will enable us to feel sure that they will in all future time happen together, we require to have some means of discriminating the conjunctions No. 73.

that will always occur, from such as may fail at the very time when we trust to them.

If nature furnishes conjunctions of events, or companion circumstances, enabling us, on finding one, to make sure of the presence of a second which may be hidden from the immediate view, it is important that we should know them all; for they will serve to expand our vision, and will give us the means of acting on what concerns us, although not before us. The discovery of all these natural conjunctions, called Laws of Nature, is the discovery of Truth, and the reducing of them to their most naked and simple form, is Science; the conceptions of which approach more closely than any others to the deepest and clearest possible insight into the scheme and mechanism of the universe.

Language, or speech, originally contrived for the communication of meaning, thought, and emotion or feelings, has become a great and indispensable instrument in the discovery of the laws of things, or the natural conjunctions, and united events established in the world. This instrumentality is not absolutely essential to our gaining of knowledge by Inference, any more than it is to knowledge by Intuition: the once whipped dog knows that if it do a certain act another whipping will follow, and this knowledge comes from a pre-established connection of events, which enables the animal to draw the inference. But it is found that we cannot advance far in tracing out the actual conjunctions of nature, nor in deducing conclusions from them in the applications to life, without the help of language or speech, together with certain classes of marks and symbols that are not employed in ordinary conversation, although somewhat of the nature of language. This necessity is owing to the abstruse and hidden character of the greatest and most comprehensive uniformities of nature; for if these lay all on the surface, like the coincidence of sunrise with daylight, our mere notion of the two connected things, derived through one or more of the senses, would be quite enough to put us in possession of the laws.

Logic (derived from the Greek word logos, which literally signifies speech or discourse) is the science that treats of the methods for assisting and guiding the human faculties in the discovery of the true natural conjunctions of the world (which are the subjectmatter of the various sciences), and in the verification of all alleged conjunctions, and everything that can be a matter of belief or disbelief. It is the science of discovery and proof; it gives the rules for sifting and testing everything we call evidence. By investigating to the bottom the grounds of certainty in all cases of affirmation or denial, it enables us to arrive at what is the truth in instances where the human faculties, unassisted by its methods, would entirely fail.

NAMES AND ASSERTIONS.

As the truths of which Logic takes cognisance are all mixed up with Language, it is essential at the very outset to give an account of the various classes of names that are involved in affirmations and denials, or that serve to embody the conjunctions found in nature.

The invention of names has been determined by the character of the objects to which they are applied, or at least by the conceptions formed of those objects. This has been illustrated in a preceding paper (No. 52, Vol. II.) on LANGUAGE. The classification of names for our present purpose will be somewhat different from the order of their invention, although coinciding with it in several points. For logical purposes, there are two great classes of names of objects, apart from the verb which serves for affirmation.

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The Different Kinds of Names.

The first class of names includes individual and proper names, or the names of single objects-as Eng-name without any formal intimation. Thus instead land, the Nile, Mont Blanc, Niagara, Napoleon; they are the marks or designations of certain individual things or existences, whether natural objects or individual men or animals. They serve merely the purpose of marking out some one thing from among the multitude of things at large, exactly as would be done by pointing to it with the finger, or in any way indicating it to another person. They give no information, and involve no assertion, nor any matter of belief or disbelief; neither do they in general make any comparison between the object and other objects. These names serve the bare purpose of communication, and they are the only names which are of themselves destitute of all logical function.

The second class of names includes general names, which are of various sorts, but have áll a common character as distinguished from the foregoing. It being found that, notwithstanding the variety presented by nature, there is a great extent of similarities, or many instances of likeness between objects, this likeness striking the human mind has led to the application of a common name to the individuals of each resembling group. Thus supposing Nile were the proper name of the first river which came under the notice of a people, and that they afterwards met in with a second river, the similarity of the two objects would strike them at once, and the name Nile would be used as the mark of the second as well as of the first. The same process would be applied to a third, and fourth, and so on, till it became the common name of rivers in general. It would now cease to be the exclusive mark of one object, and would denote one of a class of objects possessing common features. To serve the purpose of pointing out a specific individual, some second name would have to be superadded, or some device used, for showing which one of the group was referred to: the first would answer its original purpose of a proper name only by being coupled, or qualified, as grammarians term it, by a second name having reference to one individual of the class, and to no other.

rent things, it is of the highest advantage to man to detect this similarity; and when once detected, it can be declared and published by the use of a common of having ten proper names for the ten rivers above supposed, and of publishing declarations abroad that each has been found to resemble each, which would amount to a most voluminous mass of statements, all that is requisite in common discourse is to apply the one name to them all. The fact of similarity is thus insinuated and conveyed by every instance of the use of the common name. When a great discovery of identification has been made, like Franklin's discovery of the resemblance of thunder and lightning to the phenomena of a common electrical machine, it is published to the world most effectually by henceforth using the same name for both things; as when the newspaper accounts of thunder-storms use the phrases electricity' and electric' as part of the description. General names have thus a high and important function in respect to our knowledge of the world, and it is essential that they should be properly and guardedly used. Since they assert identities of objects, they may mislead us by a mere pretended identity; in which case our whole procedure respecting the objects would be perverted. It is therefore one part of the business of Logic to state the precautions necessary for the use of common or general names.

At first sight this may seem a cumbersome and clumsy process, since it ends in requiring that each object should have two names instead of one. But, in fact, several very important steps have been gone through, in their nature quite different from the mere affair of giving names for distinguishing individual things from one another. There is, in the first place, a series of discoveries as to a number of natural objects. It has been found out that certain distinct things situated apart from each other in the world, are, nevertheless, to a certain degree like one another. Now the discovery of a likeness in two things is not only an agreeable satisfaction to the human intellect, which would otherwise have to acquire an entirely distinct notion of each, but it shortens and facilitates human labour in many ways. For so far as the likeness holds, the things will serve the same practical purposes, and may be indiscriminately applied according to convenience: it does not require a separate investigation to see what each is good for, but the conclusions from the one can be instantly adopted for the other, thus diminishing the trouble of inquiry; and if we wish to make known their appearance and character to our fellows, it will suffice to call attention to one of them, so that we also lessen the toil of the acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, if we make any new discoveries about one, they are made at once for both, as certainly as if we had gone through the operation for each. If ten objects receiving the common name 'river,' were once completely identified, and if the characters of water, and the origin and movements and termination of a single river were found out, a great deal of knowledge would be gained concerning all the ten without the labour of detailed inspection.

To understand fully the different species of general names, we must consider a process that takes place subsequent to the operations of identifying different objects and imposing a common name, and to the general use of this name to indicate their similarity, as well as to serve for their designating mark. This process is what is termed abstraction,' and is often a process of nice and delicate analysis, and of subtle invention. When we have found that several objects make nearly the same impression on our minds, without its being altogether the same, we desire to divide our conception of each into two parts-the one being the coinciding portion, and the other the differing portion-and to give a name or description of each, so as to keep them apart in our own minds and in the minds of others. This splitting up of a complex conception, with the view of fixing and describing it, is sometimes very easy, and sometimes one of the most difficult operations of the human understanding. If we see two knives exactly the same in the blade, but differing in the handle, we can easily state and describe both the agreement and the difference. A mechanical division of each into two parts, and the giving of one name to the common blade, and two distinct names to the differing handles, and pointing out what we mean by each, would be sufficient. We should thus be able to state why we used one name for both, and also why the common name would not always be enough to point out each. But if we take the general group named 'houses,' which have common properties as well as a common name, we cannot divide the conception so easily. The thing common to all houses could not be cut off from one of them, leaving exactly the points of its distinction from all the rest; neither can we point to any portion of the object as the thing common to all. We must bring in extraneous matter into this case, and state the common attributes of houses by a reference to other objects besides themselves; we must say, what is common to a house is its affording shelter, accommodation, and protection to human beings, or their valuables. But this is not an effort of mere analysis: it involves a complicated reference and a complicated description; it is, nevertheless, the only way of pointing out to ourselves, or to others, what that common thing is which enables a common term to be used for this class of objects, and a constant assertion of similarity to be made through that common term. And when once we know the agreeing part of the objects, we can find the non-agreeing part by what remains; or we can see that houses differ in size, Wherever nature furnishes similarity between diffe- | form, colour, material, &c.; so that when one has to be

specified from all the rest, if it has not a proper name (such as St Paul's, St Peter's), language must be found to describe exactly what are the features wherein it differs from other houses, or from houses in general. The common attribute, once distinguished and represented to the mind, is called the abstract idea of the objects, because it is supposed to be withdrawn or cut away from the total mass as existing in nature. In the case of two knives of the kind we supposed, the abstract part is a material portion of the thing; in the case of the house, it is not a material portion, but a complicated description of relations with other objects. In thus going through the wide range of classes, or identified groups, we will find the greatest variety in the nature of the common parts of each class, and in the mode that must be had recourse to in order to state it. We shall here present a few examples of these varieties:

The case of mechanical division of the agreeing from the differing part is of frequent occurrence, but requires no farther exemplification. A case somewhat more complex is when different objects contain a common ingredient mixed up or diffused through them-as in the case of wet bodies (which agree in containing water), salt bodies, sugary substances, and the like. The process of abstraction in this case would consist in separating the common ingredient, or determining what it is, and giving it a name; or if it has a name already, then the common designation of the class of objects would be derived from this name. Thus ores containing iron as their chief ingredient, are called iron ores; so we speak of siliceous minerals, clayey soils, &c.

&c. Bodies acting on the sense of hearing, in addition
to the other senses, are conceived apart and designated
apart from their audible impression without any diffi-
culty. There are also objects that agree not in any
impression on the senses, but in some deeper impres-
sion on the more inward emotions as things grand,
terrible, beautiful, &c.—which effects can be separated
by the intellect from the other effects, although the
causes of them are inseparably joined with other causes
or properties. In all such cases the formation of what
is called an abstract conception may be made clear and
intelligible; and the subsequent processes of naming
and describing this conception, so as to make it an
object of communication and common understanding,
will be intelligible also; as in like manner the applica-
tion of this common designation as a name of the whole
group of objects that are found to produce on our minds
the agreeing impression.

things existing in nature which were at the base of the
whole. For instance, the mathematical idea of inte-
gration, and the chemical idea of double decomposition,
are the results of a series of conceptions elaborated out
of one another, although having their first commence-
ment in the impressions of the objects of the material
world. In them the purely intellectual operations of
naming, describing, and combining greatly predominate
over the operations of comparing sensible impressions.

A still higher and very numerous class of abstractions are those exemplified in the previously-quoted case of houses, where the objects do not produce an identical impression except in company with other related objects. The process, however, is still essentially the same. The coinciding part of the various individuals makes an impression of its own, which may or may not be separable in the immediate sense from other things where the individuals differ, but which is separable by the devices known to the intellect—namely, verbal description, or pictorial or other representation; which description or representation is the abstract term and common handle of the conception, enabling it to be considered by the mind, and made known from one A more subtle case of analytical abstraction is pre-person to another; it will also serve as the general sented by objects which agree in things that cannot exist name of the things possessing the common attribute. apart from the objects themselves, and whose designa- Most of the abstractions of science are of this complex tions therefore must not be such as to suppose a sepa-kind-as, for example, force, affinity, pressure, magrate existence. Thus colour is generally such a com- netism, analysis, vitality, virtue, imagination, governmon attribute; likewise form, hardness or softness, ment, security, civilisation, &c. In all these a complisolidity or fluidity, taste, smell, are of the same cha-cated group of material objects has to be involved; and racter. No substance can exist having one of these sometimes one class of conceptions, direct from the effects alone in the absence of all other effects. Matter material world, has to be wrought up with another is so constituted as commonly to act upon the human like class, and these again refined upon until the reorgans in two or three ways at once; and we can dis-sulting conception is many removes from the actual criminate the effects in our minds, although we cannot separate the properties causing them into different individual substances. Thus an orange may act upon the touch, on the sense of form, on the sight, on the taste, and on the smell, and we may have conceptions of each effect in some measure apart from all the other effects. We may smell it without receiving any other impression; the only impressions apparently inseparable are the sight and the form. But although these are not easily separated in the action upon the sense, An important distinction among general names they are felt to be a joint, although co-existing effect; and is brought out in the use of the phrases generic and the intellect can effect a separation by giving a name specific names. In natural-history classifications these and description to each, according to the feeling of the are constantly employed. Certain objects are called part of the impression that each produces. Thus we species in reference to certain others called genera, and recognise an identity in all objects having the round the one is usually said to be included into the other. form, whatever the colour may be; and although this Thus Man is a species, and the class of two-handed form is always of some colour, we separate the form animals is a genus, including the species Man along from the colour intellectually in two ways-the one, with others. Iron is a species, the metals are a genus. by giving a name that shall express the impression of A species must be a class of objects agreeing in all the form to the exclusion of an impression of colour; the properties common to the genus, and in some other other, by making a round form with a thin outline, or properties not belonging to the whole genus. Thus with the smallest possible amount of coloured or ma-iron has all the characters of the class of metals, and terial surface to indicate that we wish to confine our certain others not belonging to the class. But the consideration to the form by itself. Both methods are class metals' itself might be the species to a more adopted in the study of forms in geometry: names are comprehensive genus- simple bodies;' and this might given to them apart from substance and colour; and be a species in a still more comprehensive genus-mafine outlines are made so as to exclude as much as terial bodies;' just as two-handed' might be a species possible these other impressions from the view of the compared with animal, and animal a species compared mind. In the more complex case, therefore, of inse- with living bodies, which include both vegetables and parable material attributes, it is still possible to recog-animals; so that genus and species are correlative nise identity in the midst of differences; to have a distinct conception of the agreeing portion of the objects; and to give a name, a description, or a diagram to the common part which may be adopted as the general name of the group so agreeing. Thus we have things bitter, sweet, hard, rough, red, white, round, square,

terms, being both connotative general names; but the
one connoting fewer attributes than the other, is on
that account less exclusive or more comprehensive.

But there is one particular and important applica-
tion of the term 'species,' founded upon the existence
of a marked and distinguishable class of natural ob-

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