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he has called into being. He may do this with spirit as well as with body. But as He does not thus with the body in the moment of death, so also the presumption is that He does not thus with the soul. This presumption is heightened when we remember the unity of that soul, in all of its present acts and operations; that many of its powers, those for instance, of reflection and abstraction, have no necessary dependence on bodily organs, in fact, are sometimes thwarted and hindered by the connection. Let it be admitted that there is something distinct from the body, that the soul has a present substantial existence, and at once the natural presumption holds that this principle will continue, until reason be seen for its cessation. The remark has been frequently made in reference to Butler's effort to prove the independence of man's spiritual nature, that still it does not prove that this independent principle can not cease to exist, which, indeed, is very true, but which is without any relevance to the argument which it pretends to criticise. The object of that argument is not to prove the necessary immortality of the soul from its immateriality. But rather to show that the death of the body which we see is not necessarily death of the soul, which we can not see; and to insist upon proof, of which there is none, that these two things are simultaneous and identical. When, therefore, it is urged that God can take away His own gift, the life of the soul, as He does His other gift, the life of the body, the reply is obvious. Doubtless He can. But we are not authorized in the absence of all evidence to assert that He does, or will. All the analogies of His established system of things suggest an opposite conclusion. The natural adaptabilities of the human soul agree with this deduction. Until positive information as proof be adduced, that the soul dies with the body, the presumption is that its

this although we know that there are things unseen around and above us quite as substantial and of much greater importance. How hard, for instance, to realize the constant process of change and restoration in that element which we breathe, but which we can not see. How marvellous the immutability of that which has been ever regarded as the type of change; the indestructibility and wonderful preservation, in all its constituents, of that which in itself was so long thought of as nothingness and vanity. On the earth, in the air, and in the waters, there is, as to form and appearance, constant change-as to substantial being, immutability.

separate existence is continued. "Physicians," says Cudworth, "speak of a certain disease or madness, the symptoms of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water. So all Atheists are possessed of a certain kind of madness that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being infected also with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter and worship that as the only numen." This same disease, as well in its positive as its negative manifestation, is quite as distinctly characteristic of those who deny man's future existence, as it is of those who deny all separate existence from body, even that of the Infinite Spirit Himself, nor is it difficult in either case to see its origin. There is an unerring instinct-not dependent upon logical processes for its conclusions, yet like all truthful instincts capable of logical verification-by which it is seen, or rather felt, that if there be a spirit in man, then bodily dissolution does not necessarily destroy this spirit. So keen is this instinct, that we believe it will be found, that in every argument extant against the immortality of man, this denial of his proper spiritual existence in the present is either tacitly implied or distinctly brought forward. An immaterial being is not necessarily immortal. But a man who believes intelligently the former of these facts will be apt to believe the latter. The one, in absence of all positive contrary proof, if it do not imply the other, opens the way to its reception. But the point now before us is that whether the fact of the pure spirituality of the soul be yielded or contested, there is no evidence, in death, of its annihilation; there is this presumption from the immutability of all natural substances in favor of its continuance. If, for instance, it be said of the soul, that it is ethereal, or it be described by any of those attenuating expressions sometimes made use of to disguise materiality, still the fact remains unaltered. If it be something over and above mere flesh and blood and bones, the presumption is, that like these it may be changed not annihilated in death; this change of the soul being, like that of the body, according to its own peculiar nature and modes of operation; as will also be its future, and, so far as we can see, indefinitely prolonged exist

ence.

"Till it be determined," says Butler, arguing upon the principles of his opponents, "that it-that is, the soul-is larger than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve; there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it." We know of no annihilation in that which is least, and "some God must tell us," before we dare assert it of that which is greatest.

2. Consentaneous with this fact in the world of matter and of substantial existence, is another in the world of mind no less remarkable: the wide prevalence of belief in the soul's future existence, in all ages of the world. The force of the argument upon this point has been questioned, and it may be well to call attention to these objections as presented from two opposite directions. It is urged, for instance, by Christian writers, by way of showing the necessity of a revelation, that the heathen were in perfect darkness as regards a future life; special reliance being placed in the argument, upon quotations from the philosophical writers of heathenism. On the other hand, it is objected by the annihilationist, that there are certain savage nations who have no idea or belief whatever in regard to this doctrine. A word or two upon each of these objections will be sufficient.

And first, as to the theory of total or almost total heathenish darkness, urged by the defender of revelation. Is it not frequently the case that strong prevalent convictions may exist and exert an influence upon communities, who can give no satisfactory account of them? Is there not such a thing as popular belief without a definitely rendered reason? And is it not sometimes the case that an unsuccessful attempt to give a reason for this belief endangers it, at least with those who thus fail in their undertaking? This seems to have been actually the case among the ancients. There was light enough for popular belief in a future state after death. But there was not

enough for a systematic theology. The philosophers who at tempted to construct one, failed, shook their own faith, and exercised a pernicious influence upon that of the masses, but never destroyed it altogether. To quote the sentiments of these writers, as is done, for instance, by Whately, is not to give us

the convictions of the masses. These writers, in fact, frequently speak of the sentiments of the masses with the utmost contempt. Sherlock has well called attention to the mode in which this deteriorating process went on with one of these classes. He says that the popular belief among the Gentiles, as among the Hebrews, merely extended to the fact of man's life beyond the grave. Of some sort of difference between soul and body they had a conception; but as to the immateriality of the soul-its entire separation from all bodily organization-these and similar refinements had never presented themselves to their minds for consideration. They simply thought of the man as living after death, and as capable, upon special occasions, of making himself manifest. When, however, the philosophers began to refine, and to prove the immateriality of the soul, to separate it entirely and forever from the body, and thus logically to destroy its capacity of being manifested, they took away from themselves and their disciples all the materials upon which the popular mind can rest, and a portion of the material necessary to permanent philosophical conviction. This debauchery of belief would have been universal were it not for the fact that these theories did not widely extend to the knowledge or comprehension of the masses. So it is to a certain extent now. We distinguish between the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. But the popular mind does not and can not. And the great probability is, if this doctrine of the resurrection of the body be discarded, that not only the popu lar but the philosophical mind will retain such a weak hold upon the idea of future life, that it will exert little or no influence upon present conduct. No less forcibly has Professor Lewis called attention to the fact that Plato, in drawing up the argument for immortality which his master employs, makes him go back at last to these primitive and prevalent beliefs and traditions of humanity. The refined and philosophical are rarely the representative exponents of popular conviction. They are either above or below it; and whether above or below, they despise it. We must look for it elsewhere: in popular traditions, religious rites and customs, poetry, historical delineations of character and action. Thus looking for this VOL. VI.-2

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idea of a future life, we find it upon every recorded page of human history.

And so, as to the objection of the annihilationist, that drawn from all absence of idea or belief in regard to any such doctrine, among certain nations and tribes in the lowest state of savage bestiality. Without pausing to taunt him with the association into which he is thus doctrinally brought, the reply to this objection is no less direct and satisfactory. In speaking of any belief as universal, there is a natural limitation to our language which may be easily understood. The moral force of such general sentiment is not at all affected by rarely occasional exceptions. As we shall undertake to show further on, there may be facts connected with such exceptions which really heighten it. There are, for instance, in every community, individuals who, through certain abnormal conditions of physical, mental, or moral organization, may be regarded as idiosyncrasies. And yet, upon certain questions, and in spite of these cases which defy all rational classification, there is no practical difficulty in speaking of the settled convictions of that community as a whole. In the great communities of peoples by which our world is inhabited, there may be, and from the same causes, extending in their influence through a long 'series of years, individual nations and tribes which are no less incapable of such classification. And yet there may be just as little real difficulty in this, as in the former case, in getting the settled convictions of this world's community. The number of these exceptions has no doubt been exaggerated. Full and extensive observation has shown in some instances that cases cited as among these exceptions were wrongly classified. And such, doubtless, will be the future fate of others. It is but too frequently that investigations upon this and similar subjects, are conducted merely in a spirit of curiosity, by civilized men over whose own lives religious and even moral truth exert little controlling influence. The direct assertion or exhibition of practical belief on the part of the civilized man, is much more apt to bring out a practical response from the savage, than any amount of curious or scientific catechising. But taking into account the fact that some of these investigations have been carried on in a different spirit, and by men of a different cha

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