. of a 66 gentleman. Bacon, it is true, speaks, in reference to " mystery," There is, however, one class to whom the term gentleman is peculiarly attached-we mean ATTORNEYS, who are said to be "Gentlemen by Act of Parliament." We have made some search to see by what Act this is so, but, among the various statutes relative to attorneys, we can nowhere find the enactment. May not the idea have arisen from the term general attorney-attornatum gen'alem," used in a very early statute, that of Westminster, 2. the 13th Edward I., St. I. c. 10, the words becoming corrupted into "gentleman attorney?" Whether that be so or not, we think this peculiar application of the term gentleman to attorneys is at best but invidious. Setting aside any statutable designation, the occupation of an attorney, when honestly and rightly exercised, is clearly that of a gentleman. To this class of a GENTLEMAN BY OCCUPATION belong those who are Gentlemen by office; and it may here be remarked, that according to the lawyers, the one individual may be a gentleman, and at the same time belong, in some capacity, to a class which is beneath gentility. For instance, the Lord Mayor of London and the Aldermen may be, and generally are, tradesmen, yet, as Mayor and Aldermen, they are undeniably gentlemen. In such circumstances, the better, and perhaps the more correct plan would be, to give the party his superior designation of Gentleman. In concluding this subject of "Who is a Gentleman ?" we would observe, and we feel gratified in doing so, that in its every sense, the status of a gentleman legally requires, for its duration, the strict preservation of honesty and honour. We now arrive at the more easily to be answered question of WHO IS AN ESQUIRE? To begin with the origin of the term Esquire. This appellation comes from the French escu, and the Latin scutum, a shield; and they both derive from the Greek σKUTOS, which signifies the hide of which shields were anciently made, and with which they were afterwards covered. An Esquire was originally he who, attending a Knight in time of war, carried his shield, whence he was called escuier in French, and scutifer or armiger, (armour-bearer) in Latin. "The Squires," says James, in his History of Chivalry, "had often important duties to perform. It was for them to follow their lords to the battlefield; and while the knights, formed in a long line, fought hand to hand against their equals, the squires remained watching eagerly the conflict, and ready to drag their master from the melée, to cover him if he fell, to supply him with fresh arms, and in short to lend him every aid; without, however, presuming to take an active part against the adverse knights, with whose class it was forbidden for a squire to engage." Hotoman, in the sixth chapter of his work upon Feuds, says, that those whom the French call Esquires are a military kind of vassals, having jus scuti, that is, liberty to bear a shield, and in it the ensigns of their family, in token of their gentility or dignity. But this about the ensigns is evidently too fanciful a meaning, and applies to a subsequent use of the term. The former derivation and explanation, in accordance with James's account of the Esquire's duties, appear to be far more reasonable and correct, especially since the law, as will be presently seen, connects the dignity with office and employment, and not with mere condition. The whole judicial construction of the right to be called Esquire is so admirably compressed and put forth in the second volume, p. 553, of the third edition of Jarman and Bythewood's Conveyancing, edited by a learned counsel, Mr. Sweet, that we cannot do better than give the entire extract, leaving out only the references, which are somewhat troublesome to the general reader, and may be easily had by looking into the book itself. "No lord or lady of a manor, under the degree of an ESQUIRE," says the work, "could appoint gamekeepers to seize guns, nets, and other engines used for the destruction of game, under the 22 & 23 Car. 2. c. 25. s. 2., whatever the estate might be;' for no landed estate, however large, will confer the title, as the term Esquire has no relation whatever to landed property; but it must be acquired either by office, the King's patent, or some of the means laid down by Selden and Camden. A lord of a manor is certainly not an Esquire by virtue of his manor, or royalty, though in common acceptation he is considered as such. ESQUIRES, in law, and properly so called, are the sons of all the peers and lords of parliament, in the lives of their fathers; the eldest sons of the youngest sons of peers, and their eldest sons in perpetual succession, and consequently the younger sons of peers after the death of their fathers. All the noblemen of other nations, and Scotch and Irish peers if they be not knights (but now, by the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland, Scotch and Irish peers retain their rank in this country). The eldest sons of baronets, the eldest sons of knights, and their eldest sons for ever. Esquires created expressly with a collar of S S, and spurs of silver, of which at present there are none. Persons of whom the King gives arms by letters patent, with the title Esquire, and their eldest sons for ever. Esquires of the Knights of the Bath, each of whom formerly constituted two at his installation, but the number now is three; for by the statutes of the Order of the Bath, article 15, 23 May 1725, 11, Geo. 1., at which time the Order was revived, each Knight is required to have at his installation one young esquire, and two esquires governors; all of whom have the same rights and advantages as gentlemen of the Privy Chamber and it is by the same section declared, that the eldest son of every of these esquires shall have and use the addition and title of esquire in all acts, proceedings, and pleadings. Barristers-at-law by their office or profession. Justices of the peace, while in the commission, but no justices of the peace of corporate towns,* &c. Persons chosen esquires to the body of the Prince, of which at present there are none, their place being supplied and rendered unnecessary by means of a We take this to mean such magistrates as become justices in coporate towns by virtue of their respective charters. The justices, however, for boroughs, under the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 76., are appointed by the Queen's commission, and consequently have as much right to the title of Esquire as justices for counties. We moreover are strongly inclined to the opinion that all mayors and justices are Esquires, since, however appointed, they are the conservators of the Queen's peace, with power to hear and determine, within their respective jurisdictions, and consequently are high officers of trust under the Crown. standing army. Persons attending upon the King's coronation in some employment, or persons employed in any superior office in the kingdom, or serving in some place of better note in the King's household. And it has been supposed that all who bear an office of trust under the Crown, and who are styled Esquires by the King in their commissions and appointments; as they are once honoured by the King with the title of Esquire, they have that distinction for life; such, for instance, as sheriff's of counties, or captains in the army or navy. Notwithstanding the 44 Geo. 3. c. 54. s. 26, enacted that all officers in corps of volunteers, having commissions from lieutenants of counties, should rank with the officers of His Majesty's regular forces, yet a commission signed by the Lord Lieutenant of a county, and announced in the Gazette, constituting a person captain commandant of a corps of volunteer infantry, and styling him an Esquire, does not create such a person an Esquire, because the Lord Lieutenant cannot confer honours; and the Court of Common Pleas, in the case of Talbot v. Eagle, Taunton's Reports, p. 510, said there was no pretence to call such a gentleman Esquire. Although Mr. Serjeant Len's opinion, that the eldest son of a clergyman is not as such qualified (as the son of an Esquire) under any of the descriptions of the statute 22 & 23 Car. 2. c. 25. s. 3; * and that it makes no difference in this respect that the father is a Master of Arts in an English University, and in the commission of the peace:' still it seems that a clergyman in the commission of the peace, lord of a manor, would have been considered as not being under the degree of an Esquire, according to the description of the repealed statute. The ground of the learned serjeant's opinion perhaps is, that such a clergyman is neither an Esquire nor a 'person of higher degree.' 6 In addition to this, we find at p, 380. of the same volume of the same work, that In "As barristers in England are called Esquires, the attornies in all the colonies, excepting Jamaica and Barbadoes, are also called Esquires: because the departments of counsel and attorney are there united. Jamaica and Barbadoes, where the departments of counsel and attorney are distinct, the attorneys are described, as in England, gentlemen in all legal proceedings." It is quite apparent from the law as above laid down, that the degree of Esquire does not result from gentle birth or landed possessions, but is nothing more than a dignified appointment, which either comes mediately or immediately from the Crown, and may exist by itself; or which necessarily attaches to the filling, or, as it would seem, to even the re *The words of the 22 & 23 Car. 2. c. 25. s. 3., are, "That every person not having lands and tenements, or some other estate of inheritance, in his own or his wife's right, of the clear yearly value of £100 per annum, or for term of life, or having lease or leases of ninety-nine years, or for any longer time, of the clear yearly value of £150, (other than the son and heir-apparent of an Esquire or other persons of higher degree, and the owners and keepers of forests, parks, chases, or warrens,) is prohibited from having, keeping, or using any guns, bows, greyhounds, setting-dogs, ferrets, coney-dogs, lurchers, hays, nets, lowbels, hare-pipes, gins, snares, or other engines aforesaid." Pursuant to the curiously strict ruling of the courts of law, the qualification marked in italics in the above section, was not accorded to the Esquire or person of higher degree himself, but only to his son, and heir-apparent, and that merely during the father's lifetime, because, pursuant to Lord Mansfield's decision, "the son ceases to be heir-apparent upon his father's death." Jones v. Smart, 1 Term Reports, p. 44. versionary contingency of filling any office of trust and honour in the service or about the person of the Monarch. True it is that in some cases the title of Esquire is hereditary, but this (the case of the sons of Esquires of the Bath being a mere statutable exception) is only where the royal patent so makes it, or, apparently where those in succession, as in the case of a peerage, have the possibility of obtaining a superior dignity and office to which they are in remainder. This is the more evident from the fact of the sons of justices of the peace and barristers not being consequently Esquires, since their fathers' functions terminate with their lives, and do not go to their descendants. The eldest sons of Knights being Esquires, may seem to contradict this position, but Sir Edward Coke (one authority for the statement) is not very clear upon the point. His words (2 Inst. 596.) are, "The eldest son of a Knight is an Esquire, as his father ought to be before he was called to the dignity of Knighthood;" which would seem to infer that the son was not an Esquire by birth, but had some claim or right to be made one in the way his father was prior to being Knighted. Moreover, it was determined by a decree of the Earl Marshal's Court, 18 March, 1615:-"That there are two degrees that give the title of Esquire by birth, 1st. Younger sons of Peers of the Realm and the heirs-male of their bodies; 2d The direct heir-male of Knights;-and the heirs-male of younger sons of Peers take precedence of the heirs-male of Knights." How the sons of Baronets (and we think all the sons of Baronets, if any,) come to be Esquires is, probably, because the dignity had originally attached to it the honourable office of assisting the Crown in the reduction and plantation of a province. There is a very common error abroad, that a grant of arms from the Heralds' College gives of itself the title of Esquire; but this is decidedly not so. It is only where a direct patent from the Crown names the grantee Esquire, that he becomes entitled to the addition, should he not already possess it. This is so well understood in the College of Arms that it is the invariable practice there never to call the person to whom the grant of arms is made, Esquire, in the patent, unless the party is already actually and strictly an Esquire, according to law. Indeed, we are inclined to doubt whether a mere Heralds' College grant of arms, as it is not a direct grant from the Crown, confers gentility at all. A Herald's grant of arms to a mere mechanic or tradesman, the regal direct donation not appearing in the patent, seems to us to leave him but a mechanic or tradesman still. This, however, may admit of dispute; but one thing is certain—the grant of arms of itself does not confer the title of Esquire. Barristers-at-law are Esquires pursuant to a right legally and universally acknowledged. In one case reported in the first volume of Wilson's Reports, p. 224, the Court of Common Pleas refused to hear an affidavit, because a barrister named in it was not called Esquire; and all the courts now invariably require counsel to be so styled. Some writers think this an anomaly, and declare the dignity to have been obtained by barristers through usurpation. Yet are not barristers in some measure superior officers, or officers of trust in the court of the Sovereign? They were first appointed by an ordinance of King Edward I. (1 Blackstone's Com. p. 23. n.), and they now derive their degree from the benchers of the Inns of Court, who have their authority for this purpose from the ruling power. Barristers certainly do on their admission take a very strong oath of something even more than common allegiance to the Crown. Moreover, they are within the principle we detect in the law above laid down; they have the contingency of filling stations of high trust and honour in the state; they form the body from whom the judges, the attorney and solicitor general, the Queen's serjeants, and Queen's counsel, must of necessity come. If the son of the peer or minor noble be an Esquire because he may inherit the dignity and duty of his father, how much more so is he who may one day have to protect the rights of his sovereign by his knowledge and ability, or to do the Crown the most essential service of all, in learnedly interpreting the statute and common law for the furtherance of the common weal, and in wisely and impartially and mercifully administering justice. With regard to doctors of medicine or physicians, they hold a rank on the scale of precedence above that of an Esquire, but they are not consequently Esquires. Indeed, there seems no ground whatever for giving them that title. None of the law writers and law reports (and they, after all, are the real authorities on this subject) attach Esquire to the degree of doctor, although they do gentility and rank. "A degree in either University," it is said in Bacon's Abridgment of the Law, title "Misnomer," ‚""is a good addition, yet a doctor in divinity may be described by the addition of clerk, as well as by that of doctor." Here, then, though a further addition is mentioned, no allusion is made to an Esquire. In the case of Jones v. Smart, reported in the first volume of the Term Reports, p. 44, which was a question as to qualification under the Game Law, it was not for a moment contended that a doctor was an Esquire, but that he was a person of higher degree. The College of Physicians is an incorporate body of great learning and dignity, but there is nothing in their charter (the 14 and 15 Hen. VIII., c. 5) which could lead to their assuming the addition of Esquire. With respect to doctors of physic, not members of the College of Physicians, and consequently disabled from practising in and within seven miles of London, the following expression is used in Burn's Justice, last edition, vol. v. p. 532 :-" As to the testimonials granted by the Universities on a person's taking the doctor's degree, these may have the nature of a recommendation, and give a man a fair reputation, but confer no right." In the case of Jones v. Smart, above alluded to, where the question arose after the Union with Scotland, Lord Mansfield, in giving his judgment, thus spoke of a doctor of medicine of a Scotch University :-" Whatever rank such doctor may hold by courtesy in this country, he is not, in point of law, to be considered as a doctor to this purpose," viz. with respect to giving qualification as a person of a higher degree than an Esquire under the game statute of Charles II. Consequently, we conclude that a doctor of medicine, as such, is not an Esquire: he, however, holds a position superior to that of the Esquire, except he be a doctor who is not licensed by the College of Physicians, and whose degree or diploma comes from a foreign university, or indeed from any university but those, such as Oxford, Cambridge, or Dublin, which give a right to practise in England. A doctor of a Scotch or foreign university has no rank in this country beyond that of mere gentility alone. It should be understood generally, as well as in the case of physicians, that the addition of Esquire has nothing to do for its existence with the scale of precedence: a person may be far 66 |