From The Saturday Review, 29 Jan. A EUROPEAN CONGRESS.

prudence, to shelter herself behind her natu- | powerful Channel Fleet, not merely to imral bulwark-a Channel Fleet. We do not prove the general organization of the navy, believe that the additional expenditure for but as an ever ready protection against risks such a purpose need be considerable; but let to which England need not and should not the cost be what it may, it will be a trifling be exposed. The material support of an irrepremium to pay for absolute immunity from sistible force in the narrow seas is as neces all attack. Twenty sail actually in commis- sary for our own safety as for the dignity of sion, supported by the force of gunboats that our foreign policy, and if there be any truth could be rapidly got ready for sea as they in the rumor that a considerable addition to were wanted, would leave us little to fear the Navy Estimates is in comtemplation, it from any quarter. The Channel would be our may be inferred that Ministers have resolved own, whatever course the affairs of Europe to leave our shores no longer in their present might take; and it is not impossible that, by defenceless state. For once, the wisest course maintaining a home fleet, England would con- will be also the most popular, and Lord Derby tribute more effectually to the preservation of will consult the interests of his party no less peace abroad than by flattering the caprices than those of the country by placing England or adopting the policy of the present occupant once more in absolute security behind the of the Tuilleries. It is not merely the possi-guns of a Channel Fleet. bility of sudden danger that renders a Channel Fleet essential to the efficiency of our navy. Unwilling as we may be to admit it, it is notorious that the Queen's service is not popu- THE proposal of a Congress, which appears lar among seamen. Whatever scheme the in so many French papers and pamphlets, is Commission on the manning of the Navy may as gratifying as the lawyer's letter which suggest, we have at present no compulsory announces an unprovoked Chancery suit. The means of securing crews for the fleet, nor suggestion that a quarrel which was not known have we succeeded in tempting the better to exist may possibly be adjusted without class of sailors to prefer a frigate to a mer- proceeding to extremities, might provoke an chantman. It is not very astonishing that irritable temper into a defiance of the ag able seamen, who can double their wages by shifting from the navy to the ships of any of the great mail lines, should demand their discharge on the very day that their period of service expires. At the existing rates of pay, the most surprising thing is that any sailors should be induced to ship on board of a manof-war, when they can command much higher pay in the merchant service, or in the American navy. Unless some kind of conscription is established, there are but two ways of securing a ready supply of sailors. One is by a very considerable increase of wages, and the other by the permanent maintenance of a large body of men either actually afloat or under obligations to serve when wanted.

So far as the mere question of manning the navy is concerned, the object might no doubt be attained by either method, but it is not improbable that the entire cost of an effective Channel Fleet kept constantly in commission would be less than that of raising the scale of pay sufficiently to give to the navy the command of the market. As a mere matter of economy, therefore, the policy of keeping up a Channel Fleet may be the best that could be adopted; and it will, we trust, come to be considered as much a matter of course to garrison the Channel at all times with our ships as to man the fortifications of Dover or Portsmouth. But the present urgency is not to be measured by these general considerations alone. While French policy is what it is, and the French navy what it is, we need a

gressor to do his worst. While all the arsenals of France are ringing with sounds of preparation, the pretext for a rupture seems to be constantly shifting, nor is it even certain where the blow will fall. The calculated insolence of the address to Baron Hübner was understood to menace an attack in Italy, but the organs of the French Government have since been instructed to rake up the embers of the endless Turkish controversy. It seems that there has been bribery at Jassy, or intimidation at Bucharest; and the Austrian demonstration on the Save, if it had taken effect, might have threatened the independence of the Servian Assembly. The diplomatists of Europe are therefore invited to meet, that the Imperial mind may no longer be shocked by violations of constitutional freedom in the Principalities, the Legations, or any other foreign province. The preliminary demand of a litigious plaintiff for an equitable adjustment of alleged differences may be intended either to faciliate the immediate attainment of his object, or to furnish a pretext, if the offer is rejected, for ulterior measures of oppression. In either case, a kind of advantage is secured by a negotiation, which seems to imply that there is somethin to negotiate about.

The precedents which are quoted in support of the scheme of a General Congress are either inapplicable or discouraging. Assem blies of the kind have, in almost all instances, been held for the purpose of coercing or set

impertinence, only tending to envenom the character of the war which must necessarily follow. It is indeed difficult to suppose that the master of Poland would gratuitously establish the precedent of interference in behalf of subject nationalities, but the agitation which is at present officially encouraged in France can scarcely tend to any more plausible result.

ting aside one of the Great Powers who evident that no act of supreme legislation can assumed the collective policy of Europe; and be necessary for the maintenance of existing at present England and Prussia will assuredly charters, and it is absurd to suppose that any not be prepared to join any coalition against Great Power will accept the decision of foreign the security of Austria. At Vienna, the vic- Governments on matters relating to the contorious allies were engaged in settling among tinuance of its own territorial sovereignty. A themselves the terms which were to be in-vote given by France and Russia for the posed on France; and some years later, at detachment of Lombardy from the Austrian Aix-la-Chapelle, the Duke of Richelieu was Empire would be an act of useless diplomatic still soliciting from the assembled sovereigns the withdrawal of the army of occupation. The Congress of Verona was engaged in overruling the opposition of England to the policy of the Holy Alliance, and its_result consisted in the dispatch across the Pyrenees of the army which Chateaubriand directed and which the Duke of Angouleme commanded. Minor Conferences of the same kind were held at Töplitz and elsewhere, when the absolute The impudence of the loyal pamphleteers sovereigns of Northern and Eastern Europe is worthy rather of American filibusters than thought it expedient to counteract the meas- of publicists accustomed to that equality of ures of England and of constitutional France. strength and similarity in civilization which No instance can be quoted in which the five have created for Europe a system of public Great Powers met by solemn appointment for law. One amateur diplomatist has discovered the purpose of consulting harmoniously on the in the practice of railway expropriation an means of promoting a common policy. For analogy for the forcible removal of Austria such purposes the representatives of the differ- from Italy, moyennant finance. If private ent Governments at any capital of Europe property may be taken by legal authority for may be instructed to enter into communica- purposes of public utility, why should not an tion. without pomp or notoriety. A Congress enlightened Congress give a notice, under the implies a resistance which can only be over-international "Lands Clauses Act," for the come by the use of some extraordinary machinery.

At Paris, after the conclusion of the armistice with Russia, the plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers undertook to join the successful belligerents in negotiating the terms of submission on the part of the Czar; and it soon appeared that, while Austria was in earnest, France had virtually changed sides for the purpose of laying the foundation of a separate coalition with her recent antagonist. The arrangements which were made under these conflicting influences were in many respects unsatisfactory, but still they were in the nature of contrivances for the settlement of disputed questions. The firmness of the English Government afterwards defeated some of the intrigues by which French diplomacy attempted to relieve Russia from the stipulations of the treaty, and although many difficulties still remain, it cannot be said that the condition of Europe has in any respect been rendered more insecure by the decisions of 1856. The proposed Congress, on the other hand, is asked to unsettle territorial relations, to re-open the treaties of Vienna, and to enact, or rather to assume, a novel code of international law. The professed advocates of the project affect to insist on the legal rights already secured to the dependencies of Turkey, while they demand an exceptional intervention in favor of certain Italian provinces. It is

acquisition of Lombardy by the King of Sardinia, or, perhaps, by one of his connections? The analogy would be perhaps still more perfect, if a precedent existed for the compulsory transfer of land from a private owner to his needy or covetous neighbor; but the principal objection to the process consists in the ultimate necessity of carrying out the ejectment by force. If war must come at last, England might perhaps prefer to dispense with the superfluous establishment of a principle which would soon be found applicable to the Channel Islands, or to Ireland itself. A Congress to consider the claims of the Phoenix Club might think fit to expropriate the usurping descendants of Henry II.; and even in the case of Lombardy, the provision for compensation seems to be rather indefinite.

Another writer, appealing more directly to what French sophists call the logical instincts of the nation, oracularly announces that France is le soldat de Dieu-a phrase which seems borrowed from Attila's famous title of the Scourge of God. There seems to be an inveterate belief in the popular mind, that the armies which overran the Continent under Napoleon left behind them, in the countries which they conquered, some invaluable doctrine in exchange for the by no means valueless commodities which they took away with them, or consumed on the spot. Whether Germany ever received ideas worth the two

serve as an excuse or a preparation for war. The task of diplomacy is happily not exhausted, but all necessary communications will result in the warning that the author of wanton hostilities will probably be the victim of his own lawless ambition.

From The Economist, 29 Jan. CONGRESSES: THEIR USE AND ABUSE

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or three hundred millions sterling which were extorted by Napoleon and his Marshals, is a question which, in the absence of a recognized standard of comparative value, it would be difficult to answer. Englishmen are afflicted with an obstinate incapacity for discovering in the Imperial crusades any theory except the familiar doctrine," that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can." Under the Restoration, the mission of the French soldier consisted in the abolition "CANNING," says the historian of the Thirty of the Spanish Constitution, and in the subse-Years' Peace, quoting from Mr. Canning's quent resumption of absolute power by the biographer, "always protested against the excellent Ferdinand. But Alexander, who system of holding Congresses for the governtalked over Montmorency and Chateaubriandment of the world." We are now told that a at Verona, may claim some share in the hon- European Congress can alone settle the quesorable achievement; and Austria, which had tions at issue between France, Piedmont, and three years before, under precisely similar Austria. We must renew Mr. Canning's procircumstances, restored another Ferdinand to test and in the present instance it applies the throne of Naples, may be thought to have with double force; for it is not simply a proearned a share in the honor of executing the test against holding a Congress for the " decrees of Providence. Once more, in 1849, ernment of the world," but against holding the divine mission was carried out by the one for the express purpose of unsettling bombardment of Rome, the suppression of such "government of the world" as a former the Republic, and the restoration of the Pope Congress had established. It was the Conto the power which he still exercises under gress of Vienna which established Austria in the protection of a French garrison. It is Lombardy, and now unreasonably enough it strange that the same authority should be appears to be proposed to hold a similar Conquoted in support of a project of making war gress for the purpose of excluding her from on Austria for sharing with equal right the Lombardy. This appears to be the only same sacred protectorate. At a time when peace suggestion which has been heard from It has been sudthe soldat de Dieu was acting in concert with high quarters in France. the Holy Alliance, and while the Most Chris- denly taken up by the Journal des Débats, tian King still reigned by right divine, Bé- which had hitherto refused all concession to ranger enumerated with indignant accuracy the war spirit, and it is canvassed by the the various claimants to the divine sanction press of this country with more or less favor for the exercise of their various powers, and in proportion to the Austrian or anti-Austrian his réfrain furnishes the best criticism on the leanings of the particular organ. Those papretensions of the present disturber of Europe pers which, like the Times, ridicule the cry to make a similar appeal :for Italian nationality, repudiate also the juris diction of a Congress ;-those, on the other hand, which, like the Daily News, favor that cry, call out for a revision by a new Court of Arbitration of the territorial limits of Austria on the ground that her present position seems to threaten the peace of Europe.

"Si c'est de par moi qu'ils regnent de la sorte, Je veux, dit le bon Dieu, que le diable m'emporte."

To us it seems that the side taken as to the

The only securities for the peace of the world consist in the strength of independent Powers, and in the just dislike of the French people to taxation and to the conscription. expediency of a European Congress ought The large force which Austria possesses in not to rest in the least on the Italian or Aus Italy will make the aggressor hesitate if he is trian bias of different politicians, but on the serious in his ostensible purpose, and it may common-sense consideration of what a Con be hoped that a Channel fleet will soon be a gress could be expected to do, and what it conclusive argument against any more treach- could not be expected to do, without the ut erous design. It is difficult to explain the ter failure, confusion, and disappointment of capricious folly which has sacrificed the results our hopes. There is no political mistake of years of effort to be admitted into the greater than that half-policy, which gratui legitimate family of kings. The would-be tously gives an opportunity to a power really conqueror sinks back into the military usurper, desirous of war of getting credit for an apparand reminds Europe that his dynasty is in- ent wish to preserve the tranquillity of Europe compatible with peace, as he has already by its willingness to debate in Congress what proved to France that it was necessarily fatal it is absurd to suppose that any Congress can to freedom. There is no danger, under pres- really determine. The Government of France sent circumstances, that the Great Powers will consent to a Congress which could only is at present obviously desirous of war, and

yet desirous also to get the credit of wishing for peace. What can be more unwise than to lay into his hands, by helping France to represent afresh as open questions in a European Congress, the very points which have been regarded as politically closed ever since the Congress of 1815, but, which, once treated as open questions again, would give her a colorable diplomatic position which she has not at present got?

The truth is, that there is no open question of any importance between Austria and France, which a European Congress could at the present moment pretend to determine. Every one knows that the real bone of contention is Lombardy. It may be said that the political condition of the States of the Church might be discussed, and the terms on which the French and Austrians should withdraw their army of occupation. And no doubt that would be made the starting point for the discussion, if any European Congress were to assemble. At the same time we all know that the real difficulty on which all such discussion would immediately turn would be the state of Lombardy. Austria would decline to withdraw her garrison from Ancona, on the plea, that the retirement of foreign troops would be the signal of insurrection in the Pope's dominions, and that the flame of rebellion once kindled could not fail to spread to her own dominions in Lombardy. Nor could such an answer fail to raise the broad question as to the expediency of her rule in Lombardy,―a question which Austria would, of course, entirely decline to enter upon. And so the Congress must end with merely lending an appearance of moderation to the attitude of France, and a show of diplomatic ground to her present policy, of which it is in fact entirely destitute.

power. This may be just or unjust,-and quite as often unjust as just,—still it is all a Congress can do: any effective appeal against the actual preponderance of any one great military power in a European Congress,unless it be a preponderance so dangerous as to unite all the other powers against it,-is useless in a mere conference. Each power is certain to hold its own, and to break up the Congress altogether rather than be deprived of what it believes it has the power to retain. Thus in 1815 the annexation of Poland to Russia was an act of even far grosser injustice than the recognition of the right of Austria to Lombardy; and yet the protests of the dissentient powers were quite unable to prevent it. It is perfectly clear that a Congress is in general only able to arrange European affairs on the general basis of admitting that each State shall keep what it has at present within its grasp, that it is at least only on the minor questions of boundaries, mutual exchanges, and compensation,-on which something might be yielded for the sake of peace, that it can act with effect.

If any more radical change than this is to be effected, it can only be effected by war, and whether the change be just or unjust can make no difference. Poland could only have averted her unjust fate in 1815 by a successful resistance. And now Lombardy, however just the cause of Italian liberty may be considered, can never expect to expel the Austrians from their long occupation except by war. Congresses are not fit instruments for the revision of the map of Europe. And they are equally unfit, whether the revision proposed be proposed by a power like France, bent on aggression and conquest-or by a power like Piedmont, bent on restoring a national Government to a neighboring prov A Congress is only in place where there ince that has long groaned under a foreign exists a real desire, on the part of all the in- yoke. Congresses are of use only as family fluential States which compose it, to come to agreements are of use-where the general an agreement, and a sufficiently near approxi- terms are already assumed, and only the demation of opinion to render discussion useful tails need discussion. A just, but long uninstead of dangerous. It is absurd to sup- recognized, claim, is as much out of place pose that any fundamental revolution in the when pleading in a European Convention, as state of Europe,-whether just or unjust in a is an unjust and unrecognized claim. Both moral point of view, matters not,-can be alike must make good their power to combrought about by a Congress. A Congressmand a revision of the map of Europe, before must always take its stand either on a pre- they can expect to be gravely listened to in a scriptive right of long standing and obvious European Congress. justice, or on the status quo. It has no pretence for interfering with the status quo, unless it be in accordance with the indignant moral opinion of Europe violated by some flagrant breach of international equity. Then, indeed, and then only, an overwhelming combination against the offending State may compel it to disgorge its prey. But in any other case it can only settle the affairs of Europe in accordance with the existing balance of

Whether, then, we consider the proposal for summoning a Congress from the French or from the Italian point of view, it seems to us equally inexpedient and inapplicable. As regards France, to allow her to bring the Italian question before a Congress would be to concede some kind of appearance of right to her dangerous and gratuitous interference in Italian politics. At present it is impossible to show that she has any grievance which

can even solicit the attention of a Congress | hend that Italy, condemned for being too exof European States. Once let her involve treme in her aspirations, will be left to the Europe in a discussion of her proposals, and fate of accident and of Austria. she would quickly find some color for the position she had assumed. As regards Italy, we must never forget that if the Italian party have justice on their side at all,-it is not the legal justice founded on European conventions and contracts, which are clearly on the side of Austria. No Congress could pretend to a higher authority than the Congress of Vienna which re-established Austria in Italy. If, therefore, her position there be disputed, it is vain to appeal to a Congress, for the authority of Congresses is ipso facto denied. No position could be falser than that of Italy sueing to a European Congress to undo what a European Congress did, and what has so remained for upwards of forty years. We believe the step contemplated by Piedmont is altogether a false one,-but at least she has no justification for it to which a Congress could listen, since she advances her claim on those deeper patriotic grounds that undermine the authority of such Conventions altogether.

From The Spectator, 5 Feb. DAYLIGHT THROUGH THE THUNDERCLOUDS.

THE opening night of the Session is calculated far more to cheer those who are anxious for peace, than those who are eager to see Italy relieved from the monstrous oppressions which she has so long endured, but which have become so intolerable since Italians have at once learned the measure of their national disgrace and the practicability of their rescue. If Leopold the First proved what could be made of Italians even under Austrian rule, Victor Emmanuel and his statesmen have shown that Italians of the present day may take their stand beside their forefathers at any age of the world. But they are kept down by a combination of alien Powers; and when there is a rumor that they may find help to rise up and shake off their oppression, they learn that England, whose land has been the cradle of liberty, discourages the attempt. On the opening night of the Session Ministers avowed the resolve" to maintain the faith of treaties" with Austria, frowning on the supposed mission of France to take up the sword for Italy, and reproving Piedmont for dynastic "ambitions." The leaders of the Opposition, Members of the late Government, not only concur in this tone and policy but almost dictate it; and Ministers have the support of those men who profess to represent the most cultivated, thoughtful, and philanthropic sections of the English upper classes, men like Lord Carlisle, Lord Grey, and Lord Brougham. At the first blush, therefore, we might appre

There is indeed an exception to this utterance. At the first meeting of Parliament it is from Lord John Russell that we hear a more emphatic and positive declaration of the wrongs that Italy has endured, as wrongs that ought to be redressed. And there is no doubt that Lord John only gives utterance to the feelings of Englishmen at large. Of course this country is anxious for the maintenance of peace, -trade always suffers in war; but who came forward more readily to support the war with Russia than our middle class? When the Spanish war to uphold a constitutional crown was announced on the Stock Exchange, the denizens of that commercial palace shouted for joy; but undoubtedly at the present day, Italy, always esteemed more than Turkey or Spain, is esteemed more than ever; while Piedmont has shown that the question of Italy has become what we English call practical.

On a little closer examination, however, we do not find that dissidence between the course proposed by Government and the course which would unquestionably be grateful to the country. At the Paris Conference in 1856, the Plenipotentiaries discussed the occupation of various states by foreign troops, and England undertook that her forces should be speedily withdrawn from Greece. Lord Normanby had agreed with the President of the Republic to send French troops to Rome, for the purpose of maintaining order, not, it was expressly said, of acting with hostility towards the Italians. Lord Normanby agreed in that mission; in the conference of '56 Lord Clarendon agreed with Count Walewski that it would be desirable to withdraw the troops. It is now explained that our Government will countenance no general appeal to arms on behalf of Italy at large, but simply an endeavor to expedite the withdrawal of troop from the Roman States with an amendment of the local administration. But that is precisely the practical commencement of the plan which Count Cavour laid before the Conference for the gradual and conservative redemption of Italy. He proposed that the foreign troops should be withdrawn; that the Legations should be placed under a secular government; that the Roman Government should give guarantee for better administration; and with respect to the other provinces, simply that while treaties should perhaps be more correctly observed, communications should be established with the moderate party in each Italian State, in order to promote a peaceful improvement of administration; but above all he insisted upon beginning practically with Rome; and we now learn that Ministers have fallen back upon that course, with the acquiescence of