vigorous coöperation, it would go on, achieving far greater victories than it now does. But there is too much humility among some men on this subject. They are rather remarkable for thinking meanly of their personal influence, whenever they are asked to join a temperance society, or to abstain from the traffic in ardent spirits. This false modesty is sadly out of place. In carrying on the temperance reformation, individuals are every thing; and they are every thing for the plain reason, that they make up the public for whose welfare this reformation is commenced. "I am but one man and cannot do much ; we can hear some person "You are but one man,' (we would almost indignantly reply,) "you are but one man and cannot do much!" Suppose every man should say this, where would our cause, our country, the souls of our brethren be? "But one say. man ! وو Know you not that it is only by moving one man at a time, that the community is ever moved? Feelings and opinions may rush through society like an electric shock, it is true, but even then they pass distinctly from individual to individual, and occupy time in their progress. "But one man, and you cannot do much!" Look into history and see how it has been. How was Christianity introduced and spread, did the world rise up like one man to receive it? Or did its beautiful truths take the multitude captive, by impressing heart after heart? How was the reformation commenced and carried on? By an unconcerted and simultaneous movement among the disaffected in the Romish church; or by the boldness and zeal of Luther, and the awakening of one mind after another? How, too, was our revolution effected? By all the colonies, lifting themselves like a mass, and throwing off the yoke of bondage? Or was the army of patriots enlisted man by man? Every one can answer these questions. And as it was in these great reformations, as they may all be called, so must it be with the temperance movement. Each individual must be interested and active in it. The cup is not full, if a drop be wanting. The friends of temperance cannot spare a single man, because the excuse which will justify the desertion or lukewarmness of one, will as well justify that of a thousand. It is as one drunkard reforms, as one temperate drinker abstains, as one producer gives up his distillery, one vender ceases to sell, that the work goes on prosperously. Let it then never be forgotten, that the cause is prospered or retarded by individuals; and let every man feel that the progress of temperance depends, in part, upon him. We have thus, as we proposed, discussed the question as to the morality of the production and sale of ardent spirits, as a drink. We have also examined the arguments, commonly urged in t e justification of this traffic, and endeavoured to account for the continuance in it of so many respectable, intelligent, and virtuous men. We have spoken plainly, but we trust not in such a manner as to wound the feelings of any. We know that kind and true words are the proper weapons for the friends of temperance; and we would not intentionally use any other. We ask for our remarks a candid perusal, and if they shall do any thing to break up the trade in that which is the source of so much misery and crime, we shall have had our reward. ART. IV. — Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, and the Investigation of Truth. By JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M. D., F. R. S. New York. New York. J. & J. Harper. 1832. 18mo. pp. 349. IT could hardly have been dreamed one hundred years ago, that metaphysics would ever become fit " Knowledge for the People,' a matter to be applied to the common concerns of life, and made intelligible to the common reader. For, as the old philosophers must have looked upon modern simplification in the light of degeneracy, all who counted upon the progressive improvement of the race, must have been quite astonished on being informed that, instead of a successful hunting after the "essences," and "species," and other favorites of theirs, we had altogether given up the chase, called ourselves but children in the school of philosophy, and had drawn little else from our studies than a conviction of the errors of past ages. With much pains we have laid the foundation, and the superstructure has already cominenced. In the mean while, as other parts of the circle have been successively shown to the now inquiring many, it was not meet that the centre should be long kept from public view. At the same time it was most important that it should be seen in a clear light. It was necessary that all the discoveries of modern science should be applied to it, for the better removing of those errors, which the sanction of antiquity had made so venerable. Still another character was wanting besides simplicity and clearness, viz., a practical character, as contrasted with the curious speculations of former times, that had no foundation in fact, and no useful application, "ad bene beateque vivendum." Much has indeed been said against applying the standard of utility to mental science; but if the subject be rightly looked into, it will be found, we think, that the dispute is merely verbal. No one of modern days will undertake seriously to affirm, that utility is not the proper test of all science; but care will be taken that the word be used in its very broadest, which is at the same time its truest sense. The sciences are all useful in two ways, directly and indirectly. In most of them, the former is the more important. With metaphysics, it is the reverse. The study of intellectual philosophy is of far greater moment as affecting our habits and modes of thinking, than as having any immediate bearing upon our daily actions. It is true, however, that beginners in the science put but little value upon this indirect influence, for experience only can show us its full extent. In times like ours, then, it is specially needful, in order to make the science attractive, that we exhibit it to the world as an agent for bettering our condition-giving us rules, which all may understand, for improving our mental powers, and thereby enlarging our means of well-being. We have spoken of what was wanting in the literary world; and come now to that which has supplied, in some measure, this deficiency, the admirable work before us. Dr. Abercombie's book does not purport to be a treatise. Its modest title is, "Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers"; and these inquiries we may judge that he is amply fitted to pursue, even from his medical character alone. For the important office of bringing together authentic facts, especially in that most interesting branch of the subject, the effect of cerebral and other diseases upon the mental action, a physician, as Dr. Abercrombie well remarks, is peculiarly qualified; and the observation would seem to be borne out by the fact that so many acute metaphysicians have been of the healing profession. The inquiries are confined to that branch of mental science, which Dr. Brown Ethics, politics, and has called the physiology of the mind. natural religion are not touched upon. tions on the objects of science, and on the different sciences considered as certain and uncertain, he proceeds to consider in the first part, "the nature and extent of our knowledge of mind." The second part treats of the origin of our information in respect of mind and matter. Part third treats of the intellectual operations; part fourth of the application of the rules of philosophical inquiry to medical science, and part fifth contains some remarks on the conditions necessary to a well-regulated mind. It is not our purpose to examine the conduct of the work in all these parts. The author needs not our praise, even were it wanting from other quarters. In going over the book, our attention dwelt especially on that division of it, which treats of the investigation of truth; and as no subject can be more important to us as intelligent beings, we shall say a few words concerning it in this place, suggested by the remarks of Dr. Abercrombie. When one has reached that period of life, at which selfexertion begins, some curious and most weighty questions offer themselves. Those who have gone on farther towards maturity, are seen for ever striving with each other about opinions. Time and toil and trouble are spent on these. The heat of controversy is burning all around, and in the devouring flame are swallowed up all private feelings however tender. The world is cut up into parties, and the party bond is found to be stronger than the tie of friends and kindred, and all this is for opinions. Opinions, then, one concludes, must be a most serious matter, if the cause of such serious consequences; and it is naturally asked, how far man is responsible in forming his opinions a question of such high interest, and in our view so little understood or examined, that we may be pardoned for dwelling on it at some length. Our author has discussed this subject in much fewer words than its importance seemed to demand. His remarks are all within the compass of one page, and that little is not very satisfactory. "Upon the grounds," says he, "which have been briefly referred to in the above observations, it will appear, that the principles on which a man should form his opinions, are essentially the same with those by which he ought to regulate his conduct. If this conclusion be admitted, it will enable us to perceive the fallacy of a dogma which has often been brought forward with much confidence, that a man is not responsible for his belief. When taken abstractly, this is true; but in the practical application of it, there is a great and dangerous fallacy." p. 153. Now there is this essential difference between forming our opinions, and regulating our conduct. In the latter case, we have set before us what we are to shun, and what we are to pursue. Ignorance of duty, we all know, is one of the rarest excuses that can be pleaded for crime. But when opinions are to be formed, we have no one standard which all must follow; for this were to suppose infallibility on one side, and prejudice on the other. Nor can we see any "dangerous fallacy" in the "practical application" of the principle which he condemns. If terms be rightly understood, and the result of inquiry be not mistaken for the process of investigation, the doctrine seems to us practically useful. This we hope to show in the course of the following remarks. Is belief, then, we would inquire, independent of the will? The question may appear to some quite unnecessary, because so often asked. But men are yet far from being agreed on this point; and to us the affirmative seems so clear, that we are inclined to think some circumstances foreign to the question must have been taken into view by those who doubt it. Thus some of the infidels and free-thinkers happen to have decided rightly upon this subject, and certain zealous Christians in consequence formed an opposite opinion; forgetting in their indignation that wise precept, "fas est et ab hoste doceri." Again, the doctrine that belief is involuntary, has been thought to contradict what is found in the Bible. We shall attempt hereafter to show the falsity of this notion. In the mean time we may remark, that it is at least unwise to inquire into the supposed tendency of a principle, before we have ascertained its truth. Moreover, much dispute on this question, as on many others, has doubtless arisen from a misapprehension of terms. When we declare belief to be involuntary, we mean that the conclusion which we draw from contemplating the relations of certain |