The Fifty-year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold WarNaval Institute Press, 2000 - 597 oldal While other authors have portrayed the period as an uneasy "peace" enforced by mutually assured destruction via atomic and nuclear weapons, Norman Friedman dashes the prevailing notion that the Cold War was but a loose succession of related events and shows instead that it was World War III, conducted at a much slower pace than a hot war and allowing for the enduring technological, cultural, and social effects of the past five decades. Friedman is the first to amalgamate geopolitics with the technical and military developments of the last fifty years. Avoiding the trap of blaming it all on ideology, he connects each side's politico-military strategy and central defining character. Among the many questions he discusses are: Was it communism versus capitalism or just old-fashioned Russian imperialism cloaked in a largely irrelevant ideology? |
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1 - 3 találat összesen 89 találatból.
162. oldal
... October Mao told Kim that he would soon intervene in the war . Chou En - lai went to Moscow to settle details of military cooperation . 74 As the Americans advanced , Stalin told Chou that he might not be able to pro- vide much help at ...
... October Mao told Kim that he would soon intervene in the war . Chou En - lai went to Moscow to settle details of military cooperation . 74 As the Americans advanced , Stalin told Chou that he might not be able to pro- vide much help at ...
163. oldal
... October organized North Korean resistance had virtually ended . President Truman feared that MacArthur would push the Chinese into the war . He apparently was not convinced otherwise by a 12 October CIA paper , which argued , despite ...
... October organized North Korean resistance had virtually ended . President Truman feared that MacArthur would push the Chinese into the war . He apparently was not convinced otherwise by a 12 October CIA paper , which argued , despite ...
269. oldal
... October ) , which was far above the 888 permitted by the 1954 Geneva accord . This was hardly , as some have supposed , a decision to pull the United States out of the war . Kennedy's explicit interest in changing the Vietnamese ...
... October ) , which was far above the 888 permitted by the 1954 Geneva accord . This was hardly , as some have supposed , a decision to pull the United States out of the war . Kennedy's explicit interest in changing the Vietnamese ...
Tartalomjegyzék
War and Communism | 3 |
Stalins Soviet Union | 16 |
The West in 1945 | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
The Fifty-year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War Norman Friedman Nincs elérhető előnézet - 2007 |
Gyakori szavak és kifejezések
accept administration aircraft allies already Americans apparently arms army attack bases became began bomb bombers Brezhnev British Central chief China Chinese Cold command Communist considered continued coup defense demanded destroy developed divisions early East East German economic effect Eisenhower Europe European example feared fight forces foreign France French German given Gorbachev hoped Ibid important industry intelligence interest Italy January Kennedy Khrushchev Korea late later less limited major March military missiles Moreover needed never Nixon North Vietnamese nuclear October offered officers operations ordered particularly Party percent political possible President Press probably problem production secretary seemed showed soon South South Korea Soviet Union Stalin strategic strike thought threat told treaty troops Truman U.S. government United Viet Vietnam wanted weapons West Western World