thoroughly practical strain, the practitioner being told precisely what he is to do in such circum stances. Three chapters are devoted to an exposition of the new law as to Bills of Sales of Ships. The treatise is followed by a collection of precedents, many of which were supplied to the author by practitioners who had taken an interest in the work during its first periodical publication here. Of these precedents and forms no less than twenty-four are supplied, meeting almost every requirement. A copious index affords ready access to any part of the subject sought for. Off. Lombard-street. Sept. 17, at one, Oct. 13, at two, Basinghall-street. Off. as. Edwards. Sol. Wyatt, Verulambuildings, Gray's-inn. Petition, Sept. 1. GILBERT, WILLIAM, butcher, Vine-place, Old-street-road, Sept. 14, at twelve, Oct. 13, at one, Basinghall-street. as. Lee. Sol. Pearce, Giltspur-street. Petition, Aug. 23. HEMINGSLEY, THOMAS, cut nail manufacturer, Willenham, Sept. 17 and Oct. 17, at half-past ten. Birmingham. Off. as. Bittleston. Sols. Motteram and Knight, Birmingham. Petition, Aug. 30. JORDAN, THOMAS, baker, Bloxwich, Sept. 17 and Oct. 17, at half-past ten, Birmingham. Of. as. Christie. Sols. Mot teram and Knight, Birmingham. Petition, Aug. 30. MARLEY, JOHN, butcher, Torquay, Sept. 6 and Oct. 11, at one, Exeter. Off. as. Hirtzel. Sols. Carter, Torquay; and Stogden, Exeter. Petition, Aug. 23. Kingston-upon-Hull. Off. as. Carrick. Sol. Brown, Lincoln. Petition, Aug. 29. PASSMORE, MARY ANN, umbrella manufacturer, Exeter, Sept. 13 and Oct. 11, at one, Exeter. Off. as. Hirtzel. Sol. Terrell, Exeter. Petition, Aug. 29. With the general features of this Work, its MAWER, Jou, butcher, Louth, Sept. 19 and Oct. 17, at twelve, clear statements of the law, its careful collection of cases, and its good writing, the readers of the LAW TIMES are of course already familiar. We can only say, therefore, of its appearance in this PYNE, GEORGE, Cordwainer, Bristol, Sept. 18 and Oct. 15, at new and improved form, that whatever merits it had before, have been largely increased by the labour bestowed by the author in the preparation of it for publication as a book. This is Mr. Beaumont's first work; but the Profession will see, with satisfaction, that it is not to be his last. He has two other treatises in progress on subjects equally well adapted for his practical mind. The New Law of Friendly Societies, and the New Law of Burial Boards, both of which are far advanced in preparation, have been selected for the next exercise of his abilities. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BROUGHAM-On the 1st. inst., at Liverpool, the wife of James FITZGERALD-NEWALL.-On the 30th ult., at Littleborough, GREENWELL-COOK.-On the 30th ult., at Eckerberg, near Stettin, William Pearson Greenwell, Esq., of Sunderland, to Georgiana, eldest daughter of the late Charles John Cook, Esq., County Magistrate of Essex and of Madras. KIRKES-LLOYD.-On the 1st. inst., at Christ Church, Marylebone, William Senhouse Kirkes. M.D., assistant-physician of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and of Lower Seymour. street, Portman-square, to Caroline, second daughter of J. H. Lloyd, Esq., barrister-at-law. SMITH-ANSTIR.-On the 29th ult., at St. John's, Nottinghill, Philip Anstie Smith, Esq., of Trinity College. Cambridge, barrister-at-law, son of J. G. Smith, Esq, Judge of County Courts, to Frances Emily, youngest surviving daughter of the late James O. Anstie, Esq. Bankrupts. Gazette, Sept. 4. shut 34 BERESFORD, SIR GEORGE DE LA POER, Bart., mining-agent, Fludyer-street, Westminster, Sept. 13 and Oct 19, at one, Basinghall-street. Off. as. Cannan. Sol. Warrant, Basinghall street. Petition, Aug. 7. DUNSFORD, MATTHEW LICHEGARY, cutler. Exeter, Sept. 13 and Oct, 11, at one, Exeter. Off. as. Hirtzel. Sol Laidman, Exeter. Petition. Sept. 3. EDWARDS, DAVID, jun., cornfactor, Portsea, Sept. 15, at twelve, Oct. 8, at one, Basinghall-street. Off. as. Lee. Sols. Ivimey, Southampton-buildings, Holborn; and Paffard, Price and Paffard, Portsea. Petition, Aug. 31. FRANCIS, ABSALOM, dealer in mining shares, George-yard, eleven, Bristol. Off. as. Aeraman. Sols. Bevan and Girling, Bristol. Petition, Aug. 24. ROXBURGH, WILLIAM, insurance-broker. Liverpool, Sept. 14 and Oct. 10, at eleven, Liverpool. Off. as. Turner. Sol. Roby, Liverpool. Petition, Aug. 31. Gazette, Sept. 7. ALDRIDGE, JOSEPH, chemist and druggist, Leeds, Sept. 20 and BRIDGMAN, CHRISTOPHER VICKRY. scrivener. Tavistock, EAGLAND, BRIGHT, and CRAMPTON, WILLIAM, cotton manufacturers, Bedford, Leigh, Lancashire, S. pt. 19 and Oct. 10, at twelve, Manchester. Off. as. Pott. Sol. Potter, Manchester. Petition, Aug. 31. FINLINSON, JAMES, share dealer, Headingley, Yorkshire, Sept. 27 and Oct. 26, at eleven, Leeds. Com. Ayrton. Off. as. Hope. Sols. Bond and Barwick, Leeds. Petition, Aug. 16. GODFREY, THOMAS, egg merchant. 3. Forston-street. Shepherdess-fields, Middlesex, Sept. 20, at twelve, Oct. 19, at half-past one, Basinghall-strect. Com. Fane. Off as Whitmore. Sol. Sturmy, Wellington-street, Southwark. Petition, Sept. 4. GOODWIN, THOMAS ORTON, earthenware dealer. Longton, HOPKINSON, JOHN GRANVILLE, beerhouse keeper, Notting- JACQUES, JACOB ABRAHAM, and SELIG LOUIS, traders. Sept. 20 and Oct. 11, at eleven, Liverpool. Com. Stevenson. Off. as. Turner. Sols. Evans and Son, Liverpool. Petition, Aug. 13. LINFOOT, THOMAS, builder, York. Sept. 20 and Oct. 18. at eleven, Leeds. Com. Ayrton. Off as Hope. Sols Newton and Robinson, York; and Bond and Barwick, Leeds. Petition, Aug. 31. MARRATT, WILLIAM, attorney-at-law, solicitor, conveyancer, maltster and brickmaker, Doncaster, Yorkshire, Sept. 22 and Oct. 20, at twelve, Sheffield. Com. West. Off. as. Brewin. Sols. Messrs. Collinson, Doncaster; and Hoole and Yeomans, Sheffield. Petition, Aug. 27. PATTULLO, WILLIAM, bake", Thornhill-place, Caledonianroad, and Saint James-road. Holloway, Sept. 19, at twelve, Oct. 16, at half-past twelve, Basinghall-street. Com. Holroyd. Off. as. Lee. Sol. Sadgrove, Mark-lane. Petition, Sept. 4. PLAYER, JOSEPH, mining agent, Winchester-buildings, Broad-street, Sept. 21. at one, Oct. 16, at two, Basinghallstreet. Com. Holroyd. Off. as. Edwards. Sols. Bishop and Sons, Bridge-street, Blackfriars. Petition, Sept. 6. READ, THOMAS, builder, Nottingham, Sept. 25 and Oct. 9. at ten, Nottingham. Com. Balguy. Off. as. Harris. Sols. Motteram and Knight, Birmingham. Petition, Sept. 4. SIMPSON, JOSEPH, painter and paper hanger. Leeds, Sept. 27 and Oct. 22, at eleven, Leeds. Com. Ayrton. Off. as. Hope. Sols. Richardson, and Gaunt, Leeds. Petition, Sept. 1. TAYLOR, ABRAHAM, lime and coal merchant, 30, Westgate, Dividends. INSOLVENT ESTATES. Bowers, C. G. silk manufacturer, 18. 6d. Apply at the County Court, Macclesfield.-Brant, J. boot and shoe maker, 28. 8d. Apply at the Conty Court, Windsor-Burgess, J. joiner and builder, 3d. Apply at the County Court. Macclesfield.-Greenfield, J. wheelwright, 98. 10d. Apply at the County Court, Brighton.-Leigh, J. 23. 4d. Apply at the County Court, Macclesfied.-Parker, J. 2s. 44d. Apply at the County Court, Aylesbury. Baldock, S. grocer, Saint Neots, Aug. 23. Trusts J. Light foot, grocer, Caxton, and J. Sinith, farmer, Eaton Socon Sol. Wilkinson, St. Neots.-Exley. J. manufacturer, Des bury, Aug. 24. Trusts. W. Knowles, machine maker, Gomersall, and R. Horsfall, card maker, Dewsbury. Sois. Scholes and Son, Dewsbury.-Freear, T. grocer and provision dealer, Salford, Aug. 4. Trusts. W. Dunkerley, whelake grocer, and R. Baxendale, corn merchant, both of Manchester. Sol. Sutton, Manchester.-Hall, G. grocer, Herne Bay, Aug. 21. Trusts C. Ruck, wholesale cheesemonger, King William-street, and J. Perram, coffee merchant, Austin Friars. Sols. Chilton and Burton, Chancery-lane.--Jones, H. draper and grocer, Leigh, Aug. 8. Trusts. W. Ryland, warehouseman, and E. Robinson, tea merchant, both of Manchester. Sols. Briggs, Bolton; and Livett, ManchesterTaylor, W. shopkeeper, Jump, Heyland, July 28 Trusts J. Marsden, corn miller, J. Braime, tea dealer, and W. Till draper, all of Barnsley. Sols. Tyas and Harrison, Barnsley. -Turner, R. H. draper and milliner, Liverpool, Aug 1. Trusts. T. Railton, merchant, Manchester, and D. Sout, timber merchant, Liverpool Sols. Sale, Worthington and Shipman, Manchester. Gazette, Aug. 31. Astbury, W. and Barshell, H. K. iron founders and copartners, Bedford, Aug. 15. Trusts. W. Sutton, iron, steel, and tin plate merchant, and F. Ash, both of Birmingham, Sois Turnley and Sharman, Bedford.-Boyne, S. widow, Feece Inn, Horsforth, now of Ardsley House, Barnsley, Anza Trusts. B. Wilson and J. Mallorie, spirit merchants, Les Sol. Booth, Leeds.-Brown, G. shoe dealer, Manchester, Anz 8. Trusts. E Teasdale, leather dealer, and J. H. Roby, 16. countant, both of Manchester. Sol. Cooper, ManchesterFord, W. innkeeper, Fenton, Stoke-upon-Trent, Aug 1 Trusts. C. Glover, Longton, and T. Hindle, Newcastle-und Lyme, brewers. Sol. Moxon, Hanley.-Gerring, P.. ju. innkeeper, Fernham, Aug. 24. Trusts. G. Dent, browery agent. Highworth, and G. Franks, brewer, Faringdon Sel Crowdy, Faringdon.-Jones, P. grocer, draper, and general shopkeeper, Talgrath, July 5. Trusts. W. J. Edgecombe wholesale grocer, Worcester, and T. S. Cartwright, merchant Bewdley. Sols. Goolere, Merthyr Tydvil; Corles, Worcester, and Pardoe, Bewdley.-Wilkinson, J. draper, Skipton, Ag 25. Trusts. J. Watts and R. Doncaster, merchants Me chester. Sols. Alccck and Robinson, Skipton. Insolvents. Petitions to be heard at the County Courts. Back, J. groom and coachman, Lewes, Sussex, Sept. 1, at twelve. Lewes.-Butler, R. baker, mealman, dealer in a. coals, wood, bacon, and offal, Burnham, Sept. 17, at ha ten. Windsor.-Davies, D. boot and shoe maker, Rhynny, Sept. 18, at twelve, Tredegar.-Danells, W. pork butcher and eating-house keeper, Brighton, Sept. 8, at ten, BrigitDickens, J. bonnet blocker and straw bonnet maker, Lan Aug. 29, at eleven, Luton.-Fielden, G. woollen and y cloth manufacturer, Kirkburton, Sept. 10, at eleven. Los firth-Flowerday, W. journeyman baker, commission and general dealer, Drypool, Sept. 7, at ten. Hull-ran, T. draper. grocer, and general shopkeeper, Llanicles. Next 18, at eleven, Llanidloes-Jones, J. draper, grocer, and provision dealer, Brierley-hill, Ebbw Vale, Sept. 18 at twelve, Tredegar.-Jones, J. licensed victualler and dealer in earthenware, china, and glass, Luton, Aug. 29, at eleven, LutenSept. 21, at eleven, Cardiff-Mower, H. miller, bar, and Mason, W. tailor, grocer, tea and provision dealer, Cari corn dealer, Briston, Sept. 22, at half-past ten, Helt-Phemer, M. grocer and general dealer, and straw bonnet and has manufacturer, Luton, Aug. 29, at eleven, Luten-Kris, R. W. straw bonnet and straw hat manufacturer and pla dealer, Luton, Aug. 29. at eleven, Luton.-Wrigh, E stationer, librarian, and dealer in music and musical instr.ments, Brighton, Sept. 8, at ten, Brighton. Partnerships Dissolved. Gazette, Aug. 28. Ainsworth, R. and Hill, J. engravers to calico pres Bury, Aug. 23.-Barlow, J. and Moss, S. bricklayers a contractors, Manchester, Ang. 27.-Browning, T. ar W Bird, G. J. and Dearlove, H. timber merchants, Waterin Bridge-wharf, Lambeth, Aug 24.-Coates, T. and Sc Liverpool, Aug. 25.-Cox, G. H. and E. common brewer soda water, apple wine, and ginger beer manufactur hop merchants, and maltsters, Ashton-juxta-Birmingh Sept. 29, 1851.-Cramp, J. and Tabterer, W. F. timber, kidde and stone merchants, Warwick, and Leamington Priors Ang 24.-Dart, P. F. and White, W. brickmakers and buides White Post-lane, Hackney-wick, and White-buildings, Betinal-green, Aug. 22.-Davies, R. S., W. and R. S., and Em P. C. clothiers or woollen cloth manufacturers, Stonehest as regards Evans, Aug. 25.- Ditchburn, M. and White, J.be and porter merchants. Newcastle. Aug. 18 Debts paliy Ditchburn.-Duncombe, L. and W. job masters and restable keepers, Abercorn Mews Abbey-place, Saint Job wood, Aug. 23. Debts paid by L. Duncombe-Dutton, I. D. and T. R. Aug. 20.-Halkyard, D. and Wallwork, J. erthin spinners, Oldham, Aug. 23. Debts paid by WallworkHarding, R. and W. foreign flour merchants, Manchester Aug. 20. Debts paid by W. Harding-Harris, J. and Deng, J. coal masters. Halesowen, Aug. 24. Debts paid by Darly Hirst, A. and Howgate, T. and E. woollen manufacture Batley Carr, Dewsbury, June 27.- Howard, W. and G. Ka board and splint cutters, and wholesale box manufacturers, York-street, Blackfriars-road, Aug. 22. Debts paid by G Howard.―Jameson, R., Doyle, C., Jones, C. and Mowls G engineers, Manchester, Aug. 23-Kennedy, H. and W. R. known as the Hoematite Ore Company, for the sale of warehousemen, Birmingham, Aug. 24. Debts patty Simkic ore, Aug. 23-Marshall, D. and Simkin, E. W. Manchester -Marshall, S. and Norton, J. J. commission agents adi general dealers, Newcastle, Aug. 25.-Penaber, J. and Labor S. cabinet makers and upholsterers, Manchester, Asg. 2Scott, D., Carter, W. and Watson, R. A. timber merchants, Liverpool, Aug. 18-Sykes, B., J. and J. jun, cleta m facturers, exporters, unporters, and merchants, Hod Ha Huddersfield, and at Huddersfield and New York, Aug 2 Debts paid in England by B. and J. Sykes, and at New Yorby J. Sykes, jun.-Visger, H. and Miller, T. and G. ma facturers and merchants, Bristol, and merchants and co agents, at Cape Verds, as regards T. Miller, Juae 30-3 J. W. and Cooper, T. accountants, estate, coinmissa and insurance agents, Po: tsmouth, Aug. 24. Debts paid by Way. To Headers and Correspondents. M. R. L. desires to communicate with the Solicitors in a case (not named) which he says was reported in the LAW TIMES within the last six months, in which A. had with his money purchased Consols in the names of his wife, brother and Assizes this year, six cases, which might have been legal business of the company, and, we believe, to devote himself to it exclusively. It has been asked by some of our readers if such an arrange. ment is professional. We see no reason why it should be otherwise esteemed, The infant child, and now wants to sell out; but the child, being in the evening, and my fees for each of these days companies have a right, of course, to offer still an infant, he cannot do so without an order of the Court, which was granted in the case alluded to. The Solicitors in that case will oblige him by a line addressed "M. R. L.," at the LAW TIMES Office. A SOLICITOR (Leamington).-No charge will be made to affect clerks already articled. X-Pleading is no longer a subject for a volume, it has been so simplified. He will find all the instruction he needs in "Paterson and Macnamara's New Practice of the Common Law." Law," now publishing as part of "The New Practice of the SowerTOR (Manchester).—It is the practice for official assignees so to keep their accounts. But it is one that should be for bidden by statute. Its consequences are seen in the recent failure of Mr. Hutton, the official assignee at Bristol, A. H.-Yes. J. R. (Bridgwater.)-His letter has been sent to the reporter of the Court of Chancery. We cannot undertake to return rejected communication by the name and address of the writer; not necessarily Office in payment of sums not exceeding 5s. Remittances for all sums above 5s. must be by post-office order. THE LAW TIMES. In the case of the Queen against Saintsbury, I can with truth assert that I did not in any way promote the prosecution; the magistrates felt that, as the two prisoners were positively sworn to, they had no alternative but to commit them for trial, and to leave it to a jury to decide whether they were guilty or not. If they acted erroneously, they were at all events supported in their view by the Grand Jury who found the bill. It is for your Lordship to consider whether it is consistent with the principles of English justice for a judge to sit in judgment upon any man, more especially on one to whom character and respectability are everything, condemn him ex parte and upon a mere impression, and make observations which go forth to the world, through the medium of the newspapers, calculated to affect his reputation. In addressing your Lordship, I beg leave to add SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1855. that I do so with the utmost respect for the judicial position you hold; and I remain, Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant, HENRY MINETT. To the Right Honourable the Lord Chief Baron Pollock. THE LAW AND THE LAWYERS. Friday, Sept. 14. Ir seems that at the last Hereford Assizes the Lord Chief Baron made some remarks upon the conduct of Mr. B. MINETT, of Ross, the clerk to the magistrates, implying that he had been instrumental in procuring the improper committal of two persons on a criminal charge, for the sake of the fees. We did not see any report of his Lordship's observations, and we are, therefore, unable to say if they justified the construction put upon them by Mr. MINETT. But, as even a suspicion of such an offence is not to be endured by any man of right feeling, it is due to Mr. MINETT to give the widest possible circulation among his professional brethren to the very emphatic and indignant denial which he has published in the local newspapers, in the form of a letter to the Judge. Everybody who knows Sir F. POLLOCK will acquit him of any intent to inflict a deadly wound upon the character of a gentleman of unblemished reputation, and we are sure that his Lordship will regret, more than anybody, the construction that has been put upon his observations. Mr. MINETT'S letter is, however, something more than a self-defence. It is a spirited vindication of magistrates' clerks generally from the charges to which they are too often subjected by the press and by the public. Ross, 3rd Aug. 1855. My Lord, I am aware that there is an overwhelming difference between the position of a Judge of Assize and that of a Magistrates' Clerk; but as you, in your public capacity of Judge of Assize, have attacked me in my capacity of Magistrates' Clerk, I make no apology for troubling your Lordship with a few observations in justification of myself with reference to the remarks which fell from your Lordship in the case of the Queen against Saintsbury, tried at the last Hereford Assizes, by which your Lordship has given the inhabitants of Herefordshire to understand that I, from the sordid and contemptible motive alone of putting a few pounds into my pocket, had been instrumental in placing two persons on their trial for the offence of highway robbery. If the observations had emanated from a humbler quarter, I might have afforded to take no notice of them; but, coming from an individual holding the high position your Lordship fills, I feel it to be incumbent upon me to defend myself, whatever the consequences of the step I take to do so may be. If I had been in court when your Lordship's observations were made I should not have been permitted an opportunity there of defending myself, but I happened to be in London attending to other business; and it was not until I looked into the Hereford Times this evening that I became aware of the necessity of taking some notice of what fell from your Lordship. I write on the spur of the moment, conceiving that, in such a case, not an hour should be lost in vindicating my character. It appears to be a favourite theory of some judges that prosecutions are promoted by magistrates' clerks, with reference only to the profits they may derive from them. I will only, in refutation of such an imputation, as far as I am concerned, mention that, between the times of holding the Spring and Summer VOL. XXV.-No. 650. The holders of railway shares are lamenting We have observed of late, that by way of di- any terms they please. May a Solicitor, unblamed, accept them? Why not? He does not thereby degrade the Profession, nor inflict an injury on other members of the Profession; and these are the only tests of what is unprofessional. The Solicitor to a great company, although he has no other client, is surely as respectable as the Solicitor who sits in his office to receive any client who comes, whatever his character or his rest of the Profession, for every company must cause. And no injury is done thereby to the have a Solicitor, and it will have only one; and whether it calls him Law Clerk, and gives him a salary, or terms him its Solicitor, and pays his bill, precisely the same number of Solicitors are engaged. Nay, if anything, there will be an advantage to the Profession generally by the retaining of Solicitors as Law Clerks; for while employed only as Solicitors, they are not wholly retained, but their position enables them to secure extensive practice beyond the business of the company. If converted into salaried Law Clerks, and limited to the service of the company, all the general practice they would otherwise command goes to other members of the Profession, who thus profit by an arrangement which is not unlikely to be largely adopted by great companies, whose litigation usually provides ample work for one Lawyer. 1 The case of Mr. T. W. LAWFORD has been adjudicated upon by the Bristol Bankruptcy Court. The bankrupt was a nephew of Mr. EDWARD LAWFORD and his catspaw. It will be remembered that immense sums were borrowed from the Insurance Offices, ostensibly by the nephew, really by the uncle, the latter offering himself as the surety, on the pretence that he did not like lending money to a relation, but preferred to be surety to another lender. It was stated that this nefarious system was of slow growth; that the nephew was actually borrower at first on his own account, but that when the uncle got into difficulties, the nephew borrowed for his uncle also: in plain terms, they jointly plundered their victims and divided the spoil. We confess ourselves unable to discover any substantial difference between the offence for which PAUL and Co. are to be tried, with liability to transportation if convicted, and the offence for which Mr. T. LAWFORD is mildly punished with a third-class certificate suspended for twelve months. The Commissioner remarked that his errors "were caused rather by an over-sanguine temper, and extreme infirmity of judgment, than by want of rectitude." What a strange notion of rectitude must that be, which can so describe Insurance Offices, knowing, as they must have a deliberate conspiracy to obtain money from known, that it could not be paid, and falsely representing the nephew as the borrower, when in fact the borrower was the uncle. We are aware that we have some what are called "oldfashioned notions" on this subject; we have not yet learnt the modern lesson, borrowed from America, that it is justifiable, if not praiseworthy, to cheat any persons who will permit themselves to be cheated. proclaimed in Parliament and approved by the But, although that principle is newspapers, and the obligations of debtor and creditor are no longer held to be worthy of recognition by the law, we are astonished to find that its should have penetrated to the judgmentseat, and that in the very place where the strictest principles of honesty should be most firmly maintained, a Judge should be found to say that he could see no departure from rectitude in such conduct as that of the LAWFORDS. A starving boy who goes into a shop and says he is sent by a customer for a penny obtaining goods by false pretences, and punished loaf, and stays his hunger with it, is tried for with two months' hard labour and a good whipping, and the Judge lectures him, and the audience through him, on the enormity of his crime. A gentleman conspires with his uncle to go to assurance offices and obtain money by falsely representing himself as the borrower, and his uncle as the surety, when, in fact, he is borrowing for his uncle, and knowing that he has no means of payment, and a Judge says that this is infirmity of judgment rather than want of rectitude! In the face of this, can it be said that there is one law for rich and poor in this country? POSTSCRIPT. Law Times Office, Friday Night. GENERAL PELISSIER informs the Minister of War that 4500 wounded, of whom 240 are officers, have entered the ambulances. The amount of killed is supposed to be about one-third of this number. Five Generals are supposed to be killed. There is no other foreign news of importance. At the Bankruptcy Court to-day, Mr. HORNE, a railway contractor, passed his examination. At Guildhall, Mr. JOHN CARTER, charged with perjury in proving a will of his late brother, has been remanded. Consols, 90; for account, 903. THE SOLICITORS AND THE BOROUGH MAGISTRACY. Ir was with no little surprise that we read the letter of Sir GEORGE GREY, which is subjoined, refusing to appoint a practising Solicitor to be a borough justice. It was with still greater surprise that we read the reason assigned for the refusal: "Sir GEORGE GREY thinks it right to adhere to the rule which has been hitherto generally adopted, that practising Solicitors should not be placed in the commission." Adding, "if Mr. HALL relinquishes his practice altogether, which Sir GEORGE GREY does not understand him to have done at present, he will probably be a very fit person to add hereafter to the commission." First, for the fact. We deny that there has been such a rule, or at least we assert that there are so many exceptions as to make it a mockery. We do not know the precise number, but it is unquestionable that practising Solicitors are in the Commission of the Peace for many cities and boroughs. We have personal knowledge of one appointed by Lord ST. LEONARDS, and who is now the leading solicitor in the town, and its most active and useful magistrate. Doubtless our readers could supply many such instances. But we protest against any such rule, whether adopted or to be adopted. Neither principle nor expediency demands it, and in practice it can only be partially enforced. The objection is, we presume, to a Solicitor sitting in judgment upon persons who may possibly be his clients-for we are entitled to assume that no Solicitor being a magistrate would act professionally even to advise in any case likely to come before him judicialy; or if by any accident a case were to arise in which a bias on his part might be possible, we assume that he would do as is always done in such cases, leave the bench and commit the hearing and decision to the other magistrates. But the objection that a Solicitor might have to judge his clients, is not one exclusively applicable to him. It is an objection common to all local tribunals, and applies with equal force to all borough magistrates. The physician may be required to judge his patients, the tradesman his customers, the manufacturer his workmen, and yet the objection of interest is not deemed sufficient to exclude any of these classes; wherefore then should it be limited to Solicitors? Why are they alone to be excluded from the office of honour that is freely conferred upon the medical man, the manufacturer, and the trades with the law they administer, but what is still And if experience were invoked, as in such a We We trust that Sir GEORGE GREY will reconsider his resolution. If not, that it will be brought under the consideration of Parliament. subjoin the letter and the commentary of one of the local paper, the Lancaster Guardian:— THE APPOINTMENT OF BOROUGH MAGISTRATES.— It will be seen by the letters of Secretary Sir George Grey, addressed to the town council and the borough justices, in reply to their memorials praying that an additional number of magistrates might be appointed, that he has struck out of the list nominated by them the names of two gentlemen, on the ground that they were "practising solicitors." This appears to be a principle of exclusion adopted by the hon. baronet, and fitness of Mr. Gregson and Mr. Hall for the and no slur is therefore intended on the qualification honour to which they have been assigned by the council. We see so little reason in this objection, especially as manifested in the two cases in question, that we think it desirable to urge upon the corporation and the body of justices, to press the matter upon the attention of Sir George Grey, and endeavour to induce him to amend a decision which would deprive the town of the services of two useful magistrates. There is, perhaps, an obvious impropriety in an attorney practising in a court in which he at other George Grey, upon this view, has apparently based times is called upon to adjudicate magisterially. Sir his principle, but the operation of that principle would be harsh and derogatory to the Profession, if it admitted of no modification, and remained as unchangeable as the laws of the Medes and Persians. There are circumstances in these two cases, which entirely remove the scope from the objection held by the Home Secretary, and we think they ought to have had some weight with that authority. Neither Mr. Hall nor Mr. Gregson undertake any petty sessional business, and the former gentleman, we know, gave a distinct assurance in the proper quarter that he would abide by a resolution to that effect in case of his appointment. We are not aware whether Mr. Gregson took a similar step, but we have little doubt that he would be willing to do so. If these gentlemen undertake to accept no petty sessional business, the whole force of the objection breaks down, and the single reason for their is inexorable. He will not allow his pet principal to exclusion becomes obliterated. But Sir George Grey be invaded, and therefore will only promise that "if Mr. Hall relinquishes his practice altogether, he will probably be a very fit person to add hereafter to the commission." It is rather hard to ask a gentleman to give up his living in order that he may devote his time to the service of the public. A manufacturer But the objection, untenable in the abstract, would not be invited to abandon his mill, a clergyman becomes positively absurd and ludicrous when it his cure, or a surgeon his practice, if he were placed comes to be practically applied. If good for any- in the commission; and yet we are at a loss to see why thing, it goes to the entire exclusion of all practheir various professional duties are not just as likely tising Solicitors from the magistracy. This would conveyance of an estate or the drawing of a lease. to disqualify them for the magisterial functions as the be at least intelligible, and would be consistent, Indeed, the more the objection is considered, the less however uncalled for and unjustifiable the exclu- tangible does it appear, and not a whit more supportsion. But, in fact, they are not and cannot be able than that which would exclude manufacturers excluded. Practising Solicitors are eligible to be from the bench. Both the gentlemen we have named mayors mayors are magistrates, not merely for have passed the civic chair, and have therefore sat as the year of their mayoralty, but for the year ex-officio magistrates for two years. Indeed, within In point of fact, upwards of fifty prac- very few years no less than five solicitors have been tising Solicitors are at this moment magis-elected chief magistrate of the borough, and not a trates by virtue of their office as mayors for breath of disapprobation has been raised at their this or for last year. How ridiculous, then, to refuse to add two more to the list! The argument really resolves itself into this. Either it is or it is not wrong that practising Solicitors should be magistrates. If wrong, they should not be permitted to be mayors, by becoming which they are made magistrates for two years. If not wrong, the objection should not be raised against other solicitors being appointed as justices. man? after. Still, assuming that no Solicitor would act in a case in which he had been, however remotely, concerned professionally, we assert that no men can be found so well qualified for the office. Their legal education not only makes them acquainted mode of administering justice. Mr. Hall was noted opinion. But of what value to the council is such a we have been calling attention? Here we have two gentlemen of honourable character, integrity and fitness, whom the town, through its representatives, has delighted to honour, pushed on one side by the practice which Sir G. Grey has chosen to adopt-a hardship and injustice, without conferring one single practice which, in this case, we contend, involves advantage on the public, or at all necessary for the honest and impartial administration of justice. THE NEW MAGISTRATES FOR THE BOROUGH OF LANCASTER.-The following letter has been received by the borough justices, in reply to the memorial addressed by them to the Lord Chancellor, respecting the appointment of additional magistrates: Whitehall, 20th Aug. 1855. the borough of Lancaster, respecting the appointment With respect to Mr. Chippendall and Mr. Hall, who REMUNERATION OF SOLICITORS. THE more we think of this the more impossible it appears to construct any uniform scheme of remuneration. A plan that applies perfectly to one branch of business will be found altogether inapplicable to others. Combined with this variety in a Solicitor's business, is the complication arising from the double shape that his costs must assume, accordingly as they are to be calculated between party and party, or between himself and his client. In no other Profession do these difficulties present themselves. There is almost uniformity in the business of the medical man, the architect, the surveyor, and even the barrister. Hence it is not difficult to fix on a form of remuneration applicable to all cases, only varying in amount. But with the Solicitor, although his work is rudely classified under the common title of law, that which is strictly law is the smallest part of it; he is at once adviser, agent and actor, in a multitude of matters that have not the most remote connection with the administration of the law. Hence, the practical obstacles to the framing of any new form of remuneration. Whatever is suggested, however excellent at the first glance, is sure, when it comes to be applied to particular cases, to be found wanting in fitness somewhere. The fee system is inapplicable to bills that must be taxed between party and party. The measurement system is ill-adapted to modern practice, which tends to the abbrevia tion of procedure and the economy of words. The ad valorem principle is manifestly incapable of adoption indiscriminately. system has some advantages which the others do not possess, and each is peculiarly adapted to adapted for others. After all, then, we suspect it some kinds of business, while it is quite as illwill be necessary to resort to a composite scheme made up of all. But before a safe opinion can be formed as to this, facts will be necessary whereon to found it. Until it is ascer tained, with some approach to accuracy, what are the proportions which the principal branches of an Attorney's business bear to one another, it will be impossible to say what mode of remuneration will be best adapted for each, and how far changes can be made with confidence in the results. A leap in the dark in this matter might be ruinous, for it would be irretrievable. Let us not move in it until we are armed with facts which will enable us to see our way clearly and to make definite propositions, and urge them unanimously, because confidently: Nevertheless each information asked for last week. Let the Attor We repeat, that the first step is to collect the neys in good practice supply to us the proportions SEPT. 15, 1855.] of the various branches of their business, taking some fixed figure, say 20, as the total, and stating in what proportions their business would be divided amcg its various branches, supposing the whole to be worth 20; as 10 for conveyancAn uniform ing, 3 to common law, and so forth. report would thus be obtained, of which the totals We repeat that we may be readily classified. ask no figures, or items. We do not require strict accuracy. An approximation will suffice. Such a statement would give no information whatever as to the real value, nor do we want that; all that is needful for us is the relative value of each branch of the business to some imaginary total, which, for convenience sake, we may set down at 20. SOMERSET HOUSE LAW. WE lately alluded to a complaint which a solicitor has laid before us that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue refused to recognise the law laid down by the Court of Exchequer in Sanville v. The Commissioners of the Inland Revenue, 23 L. T. Rep. 223, and 10 Ex. 159, S. C. Our correspondent's case is not an isolated one; for we are aware that, notwithstanding that case, the officers at Somerset House have persisted ever since in repudiating the authority of the Court of Exchequer, and ignoring sect. 15 of the Stamp Act, simply saying, "We know better." This is not only injustice to the public, it is insulting to the Courts. The law is clear and beyond all doubt. We were present at the argument, and the counsel for the appellant was "stopped by the Court," as the reporter's idiom is, and the able counsel for the Commissioners had to surrender his case. The written judgment of the Chief Baron is distinct and conclusive, and none who can understand a point of law, or comprehend a judgment of a Court, can have a doubt upon it. During the argument we remember the Somerset House authorities looked "black" at the mode the Court dealt with the case, and blacker still at the judgment: but because they are out of temper and do not like the result, or cannot comprehend the process by which every legal mind arrives at it, they are certainly not at liberty to mulet the public, or insult the authority of the Legislature, as expounded to them by the Court of Exchequer. One word on the case itself. It is this. If a life policy is assigned to trustees of a marriage settlement, such policy is not liable to an ad valorem duty, as being a settlement "of a definite and certain sum of money" within the meaning of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, schedule Settlement. In other words, the settlement of a policy for 1000%. is not the settlement of 1000l. Can anything be clearer? What, then, do we advise the Solicitors to do? Let them require the Commissioner to fix the stamp, and then appeal and require a "case" by the Commissioners. This involves only the payment of 21., which will be returned to the appellant when the enemy is beaten. The fees to counsel and all costs will not amount to 51., even if it were carried into Court by the Commissioners, which we doubt; and perhaps, after an exposure of the absurd and illegal conduct, the nuisance will be abated. But a threat of an appeal would probably be enough, and the Commissioners would yield, if the Solicitor were firm, and sure of his law, as he ought to be. The law is, after all, so clear that any Solicitor is safe, either in disputing the stamp or in acting on the authority of Sanville's case, affixing the stamp himself, and ignoring the Commissioners. LAWYERS IN AMERICA. THE questions which we propounded last week relative to the position, profits and mode of remuneration of the Lawyers in the United States, have produced the following very interesting replies. We shall be glad to receive further information. LAWYERS IN AMERICA.-Twenty years ago I went to America, and passing up Fulton-street, Broadway, I saw a large black tin signboard, with gilt letters in front of a large building, "John L. and James attorneys at law and solicitors and counsellors in chancery, and commissioners for taking acknowledgments of deeds by married women; John L. notary public." I was in their employ nearly two years, and the establishment was the largest in the States; there being a managing clerk, also a cashier and book-keeper at 2000 dollars per annum, and above a dozen other clerks, several being Englishmen, myself, the junior, being about eighteen, and receiving 400 dollars per annum, the lowest in the office except two boys. The bills in chancery were written on draft paper closely, and tied in the corner; convey THE LAW TIMES. ances, mortgages and bonds were printed on demy size paper, with blanks for names, sums, parcels, &c. had many hundred conveyances, mortgages, &c., to be obtained at the stationer's price, 61 cents. We speculation in building plots being all the rage. The charge for the conveyance was 5 dollars, mortgage 5, bond 24; and this was the lawyer's bill. There was a General Registry, charging 8 cents per folio for registering deeds-a State office. This was also charged to the client. About this time occurred the memorable fact which furnished Colonel George P. Morris with materials for his humorous tale of the Frenchman taking a boat and a pole to fish at the bottom of the East River for his lot. Bills of costs for general business were much the same in items and charges as in counsel in the causes of their own clients, sometimes England. Both my principals attended the courts as as advocates for other attorneys. There were a few barristers practising as draughtsmen, text writers, &c. The celebrated Ogden, Hoffman, and Mr. (afterwards Chancellor) Kent were amongst them. The courts were held in the City Hall, Mr. Walworth was chanThere were also the Supreme Court and United States cellor, Mr. Jones chief justice of the Superior Court. District Court, all common law courts; Richard L. Riker was recorder of New York. We had ex-sheriff Parkins in prison for contempt of an order made by "Chancellor Walworth," for discovery of his property that it might be seized to satisfy judgments in actions for slander. My principals were solicitors and counsel, and were appointed receivers in the chancery proceedings. However, we received nothing but an airgun and beaver-skin shooting-dress. few employing two, others merely a boy, others perhaps 300 lawyers, very few employing clerks, some frequenting taverns and actually having no office; and I was informed that there were not a dozen such or nearly such respectable offices as ours in the Union. We had three articled clerks; I think they served We did agency business for the lawyers three years. of other states and cities. They did the same for us. cheap, particularly so on bills of exchange, a great There was a great deal of common law, speedy and many injunction suits, and a perfect hurricane of conveyancing at times; we sometimes began and comlength of the parcels-the drafts being skeletons, as pleted from twenty to fifty in a day, according to the before stated, to be filled in with dates, names, sums and parcels. My principals kept magnificent establishments, were most liberal men, and made incomes of almost fabulous amount for lawyers. Many of the building plots were purchased by Irish emigrants, and 75 per cent. of the purchase-money allowed to remain on bond and mortgage, and the scenes that were room whilst the commissioner examined his wife, enacted when Paddy was told that he must leave the were ludicrous enough, and sometimes the explanations Manchester, Sept. 10, 1855. given could hardly reconcile him to the ceremony. There were W. S. R. was the course in the present case; and the coach- "The plaintiff in this case, wanting to transmit a parcel to London, sends it to Johnson, the on account of it, and delivers it to a person by postmaster of Bradford, who receives twopence whom it is carried to the inn at Melksham. That What is the inference from these facts? It will be noticed that in this case the plaintiff was the consignor; and that there was, therefore, an apparent infringement of the rule which will be considered later, that as in general the property of goods passes from the consignor to the conLAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES.-You will find signee by delivery to the carrier, the consignee, answers to some of the questions put by you in your and not the consignor, is the proper plaintiff in last number, in my pamphlet on the remuneration of the event of loss: (Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330.) attorneys, viz.:-Questions first, second and eighth, are or the goods were at the risk of the consignor, pretty fully answered in the quotation made by you from But in Syms v. Chaplin and other cases, the plainmy work at page 126 of your No. 560. To question the tiff apparently was consignee as well as consignor, fourth, I may say that 500l. a-year is considered a good income for a lawyer in New York to make the who therefore retained his right to sue: (Dunlop v, majority earn less. Question fifth; there are more Lambert, 6 Cl. & Finn. 600.) answers also question six. It is seldom that a detailed lawyers than work for them in New York-and this bill, such as we are compelled to supply, is made out by a lawyer in the United States; so seldom, that a R. R. PARKER. specimen of such a bill would be an exception and not a rule to guide you. 30, Moorgate-street, Sept. 10, 1855. BILITIES AND RIGHTS OF INLAND A TREATISE ON THE DUTIES, LIACARRIERS, ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND(a). (Continued from p. 276.) If there be no privity between the bookingoffice keeper and the carrier, the former will of course be personally responsible for the goods up to the time of the delivery to the carrier; but the liability of the latter will begin as soon as he is fixed with the acceptance of the goods, or as soon as they are traced into the hands of his authorised agent; and it will make no difference as to his liability, that the goods have passed through the hands of several sub-agents on their way to the carrier, if the evidence satisfy the jury that such sub-agents were acting, expressly or impliedly, by the authority of the carrier. This doctrine is well illustrated in Syms v. Chaplin, 5 Ad. & Ell. 634. There the plaintiff addressed a parcel to London, and paid for booking generally at A. The postmaster at A. had been accustomed to receive such parcels and forward them by B., the driver of the mail cart, to C. tomed, after receiving such parcels from the postmaster, to deposit them at C. with D. At C. the B. had been accus (a) By EDMUND POWELL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. The liabilities of carriers for the acts of their booking-office keepers or other receivers are also Carriers Act). The fifth section of that Act enacts: subject to 11 Geo. 4 and 1 Will. 4, c. 68 (the "That for the purposes of this Act every office, warehouse or receiving-house, which shall be used or appointed by any mail contractor or stagecoach proprietor or other such common carrier conveyed as aforesaid, shall be deemed and taken to be the receiving-house, warehouse or office of as aforesaid for the receiving of parcels to be such mail contractor, stage-coach proprietor, or other common carrier: and that any one or more of such mail contractors, stage-coach proprietors, or common carriers, shall be liable to be sued by his, her or their name or names only; and that no action or suit commenced to recover damages for loss or injury to any parcel, package or person, shall abate for the want of joining any coproprietor or co-partner in such mail, stagecoach, or other public conveyance by land for hire as aforesaid." It has been held, under this section, that a deto receive the goods from the consignor, is a good livery to a carrier's servant, who had been sent delivery to fix the commencement of the carrier's liability: (Boys v. Pink, 8 C. & P. 361.) And if a message be left at the carrier's bookingoffice to send for goods, and the carrier send to receive them, his liability will be the same as if they had been delivered at the booking-office : (Davey v. Mason, C. & M. 45.) It was decided before the Act, that a contract tors as carriers binds all who were partners at of carriage made by one of several joint propriethe time, and all who subsequently become part ners: (Helsby v. Mears, 5 B. & C. 504; and 8 D. & R. 289.) The Duration and Termination of a Carrier's Liability. A carrier's liability runs from the moment of delivery and acceptance by him, or his agent, until the moment when he delivers the goods, actually or constructively, to the consignee; or at the stipulated place of consignment: (Fowles v. Great-Western Railway, 7 Exch. 699.) His liability ceases as soon as he has fulfilled either of these conditions: (Richards v. London and South Coast Railway, 7 C. B. 839.) This subject was incidentally discussed in the previous chapter, and it will be sufficient for most purposes to refer to it; but it contains, also, points and limitations which will now be considered. The great practical difficulty in determining when a carrier's liability has terminated, lies in the difficulty in determining when he has made a complete delivery. As soon as the delivery is complete the bailment is at an end, and the carrier's liability ceases. It is obvious, therefore, that in the majority of cases the time at which his liability ends can only be ascertained by considering and defining the circumstances, and the express or implied elements of the original bailA complete delivery, and a terminated liability, are in this case synonymous and convertible terms; but the facts which render it allowable to deny or to affirm either proposition in the case of a bailment to a carrier, are subject to rules of the utmost nicety. ment. the contracts of carriage and warehousing were held distinct, partly on the explicit understand ing between the contracting parties, but chiefly because the warehousing was gratuitous, and because it was not necessarily included within the ordinary transit. Accordingly, the distinction between the liabilities of a common carrier and of a warehouseman as such, was treated as fully established in Re Webb and others, 8 Taunt. 443. There, in consideration that S. would employ Webb and his partners as common carriers for hire, they promised to warehouse the goods of S. at the end of the transit, without charge, until it should be convenient for S. to send for them; and it was held that a payment, in the nature of an insurance, made to S. by Webb for the goods, which were accidentally burned while in the warehouse, did not entitle him to contribution from his co-partners, because the liability of the partners as warehousemen was totally distinct from their liability as carriers; and that, as they must be held to have been acting in the former capacity when the goods were burned, they were not liable on a gratuitous bailment, and without negligence. in their transmission from the carrier to the Hence, where there is a distinct understanding or usage that goods are to be warehoused at the end of the transit until they can be delivered to the consignee, the liability of the carrier ends at the moment when they pass from his hands into the custody of the warehouseman (Thomas V. Day, 4 Esp. 263); and if the goods are injured warehouseman, the latter will still be liable, it is The question in every case must be-what was said, if he accept them in their damaged conthe express contract, if there was an express condition: (Ib.) But there must be a complete tract? or what was the implied contract? if the delivery to the warehouseman or a wharfinger, bailment originated without an express contract. such as would enable the owner to sue the latter The common law requires the carrier to deliver for a subsequent loss; and the carrier's liability the goods to the consignee, or at the place to will not determine otherwise: (Buckman v. Levi, which they are addressed. Thus, in Forward v. 3 Camp. 414.) But as soon as the goods are Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, the goods were delivered to actually delivered to the warehouseman, the carthe carrier on a Thursday, and by the course of rier's liability generally determines; and the travelling could not be delivered until the follow-warehouseman becomes liable not as an insurer, ing Saturday. They were burned accidentally on but as an ordinary bailee for hire: (Randleson v the intervening Friday, and the carrier was held Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109.) clearly liable. But in Garside v. The Proprietors of the Trent and Mersey Navigation, 4 T. R. 581, we find symptoms of metaphysical perplexity. There the plaintiff, wanting to send goods from A. to C., hired the defendants as common carriers to carry them to an intermediate stage B.; and the defendants also agreed to warehouse the goods without charge at B., until they could be delivered on to the C. carrier. Here also the goods were accidentally burned while they were so warehoused, and before there was any opportunity of delivering them to the C. carrier. It was held that the liability of the defendants as carriers and insurers, had ended on the arrival of the goods at B.; that their liability as warehousemen was a totally distinct liability; and that as the warehousing was gratuitous and for the convenience of the plaintiffs, they were not liable in the absence of negligence. Here then the exemption from liability was founded on the broad and common distinction that exists between a contract to carry, and a contract merely to warehouse after the virtual termination of the transit. But this distinction becomes somewhat clouded by the almost immediately subsequent case of Hyde v. Trent and Mersey Navigation Company, 5 T. R. 389. There also the defendants, as common carriers for hire, undertook to carry the plaintiff's goods from A. to C.; and the plaintiff knew that in the transit the goods would necessarily pass through B. and be warehoused there; and that beyond B. the defendants were merely acting as agents for third persons to whom they were accountable for the profits of the carriage beyond B. The goods, on their safe arrival at B., were placed by the defendants in the warehouse of one of such third persons, and there burned accidentally. The defendants were held liable, on the ground that, as there had been originally one payment for the whole distance, there was one indivisibile contract and continuing liability, on the part of the defendants, to deliver safely at C. The principle established by this case, as distinguished from that which precedes it, is that where there is a payment or a charge in the first instance for carriage beyond the known limits of the carrier's transit, the carrier's liability extends beyond such limits up to the ultimate point where the final delivery is to be made. In Garside v. Proprietors of the Trent and Mersey Navigation, When the carrier and the warehouseman are different and unconnected persons, there is little practical difficulty in determining when the liability of the former ends and that of the latter begins; but the difficulty is when the carrier and the warehouseman are the same person. In such a case the unity or divisibility of the liability will depend, as already stated, on the unity or divisibility of the original contract; and where the money consideration can be made to apply to the whole transaction, the courts have shown a disposition to treat the contract as one and entire; at least so far as to hold the carrier liable, in the nature of a bailee for hire, as a warehouseman, even though he be in that capacity nominally a gratuitous bailee, provided that the original consideration for the carriage can be made also to imply a promise to warehouse safely. Thus, where the defendants carried as common carriers for the plaintiff, and offered to deliver, but the plaintiff sent back the goods to the defendants' warehouse, there to await his orders, and the goods were subsequently lost, the defendants were held liable as warehousemen, because the original consideration for the carriage appeared to include an adequate remuneration for the warehousing, although it was not to be charged for. Lord Abinger, C. B. said: "A distinction has been properly drawn between the duties of a carrier and of a warehouseman. But the party may have so large a compensa tion as a carrier as to be sufficient also to re munerate him for acting as warehouseman, as is the case with many of the canal companies; and it is quite consistent with both these characters that he will for a certain time, until further orders, or for a reasonable time, keep the goods, considering the general remuneration for carrying sufficient to cover this risk also: " (Cairns v. Robins, 8 M. & W. 258.) It will be observed that in this case there was no attempt to charge the defendants as carriers, but only as warehousemen; and their liability in the former capacity had clearly determined when they tendered the goods to the plaintiff before they were sent back. When the delivery to the consignee is beyond the limits of the carrier's transit, his liability may either terminate with a delivery over to a carrier authorised to forward on, or it may be prolonged up to the moment when the goods are delivered to the consignee. But, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, if a carrier receive goods which are addressed to a place beyond the terminus of his transit, he will be liable beyond such terminus, and up to the time when they ought to be delivered at the ulterior and ultimate point. This doctrine is clearly the result of all the latest cases. Thus, in Muschamp v. Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421, the defendants, as common carriers, received a parcel directed to Bartlow, a place beyond Preston. The railway of the defendants ended at Preston. The agent of the defendants was requested to book the parcel, and was offered the charge for the whole distance; but he replied that it had better be paid on receipt by the consignee. The parcel arrived safely at Preston, and was there forwarded on by another railway. It was lost on this part of the transit. Rolfe, B. told the jury that "when a common carrier takes into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not by positive agreement limit his responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is prima facie evidence of an undertaking on his part to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed; and that the same rule applied although that place were beyond the limits within which he in general professed to carry on his trade of a carrier." The Court held this direction to be correct, and supported a verdict for the plaintiff. Lord Abinger held, that there was evidence for the jury of a contract by the defendants to carry the whole distance, and attached some importance to the fact that the charge was to be paid in one Lordship also distinguished the case of a carrier sum at the end of the whole distance. His from that of a contract with a booking-office keeper, who is discharged as soon as he has delivered the goods to the carrier. His Lordship added: "In cases like the present, particular circumstances might no doubt be adduced to rebut the inference which primâ facie must be made of the defendants having undertaken to carry the goods the whole way. The taking charge of the parcel is not put as conclusive evidence of the contract sued on by the plaintiff; it is only prima facie evidence of it, and it is useful and reasonable for the public that it should be so considered. It is better that those who undertake the carriage of parcels for their mutual benefit should arrange matters of this kind inter se, and should be taken each to have made the others their agents to carry forward." This case was confirmed in Watson v. Ambergate, Nottingham and Boston Railway Company, 15 Jur. 448. There the defendants were held liable for damages arising from the detention of the plaintiff's goods on an ulterior railway, by which the goods were forwarded on. This case is remarkable for the fact, that the plaintiff had been expressly told, at the time when he delivered the goods to the defendants, that they could receive payment only for the transit to their own ter minus; but there was some evidence that their agent had told the plaintiff that the goods would arrive in time at their ultimate destination. The Court confirmed the principle, that the ulterior railway must be taken to have been acting as agents of the defendants, and that there was evidence of an original contract by the latter to carry the whole distance. Erle, J. stated the rule succinctly to be that, "where goods are received at one terminus for conveyance to another, the company are answerable for all the intermediate termini; and the receipt of such goods is primi facie evidence of liability." The principle that primâ facie a carrier, who receives goods from another carrier to be forwarded on for the consignor, must be taken to be the agent of the first carrier, has been curiously illustrated and extended in the late case of Scothorn v. South Staffordshire Company, 8 Exch 341, and 22 L. J. 120, Exch. There the plaintiff had paid carriage for the whole distance of goods consigned to the defendants to be delivered in London. The defendants, according to their course of business, forwarded them from their terminus at Birmingham, by the London and North-Western Railway to London. After the arrival of the goods at London, but before they had passed out of the hands of the London and North-Western Railway, the plaintiff gave a countermand of the delivery to the agent of the latter railway. The goods were, notwithstanding, forwarded on to their original place of consignment, and lost on the transit. It was contended for the defendants that the agent of the London and North-Western Railway was not an agent for the defendants to receive a countermand, but only to forward on the goods, as he had in fact done, to their address. But the Court held that the |