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!. bit of reason; for the two houses dit wowed with legislative authority, and
trust of preservation of the frame, by the fundamentals of the kingdom; which the people, out of those houses, are not. Again, the government being composed of a threefold consenting power, one to restrain the exorbitance of another: All three together are absolute and equivalent to the power of the most absolute monarch. . The concurrent will of all three makes a law, and so it is the kingdom's lair.
To the last, I answer, In every state some must be trusted, and the highest trust is in him who hath the supreme power. These two, the supreme trust, and the supreme power, are inseparable; and such as the power is, such is the trust; an absolute power supposes an absolute trust! A power, allied with the connexion of another power, as here it is, supposeth a trust of the same nature. A joint trust, yet, saving the supremacy of the monarch, so far forth as it may be saved, and not be absolute, and the other's authority nul. lified. It may be further argued, that it being the prerogative royal to have the managing of the sword, that is, legal force in the kingdom; none can, on any pretence whatever, use lawful force, either against him, or any, but by his will; for it is committed to him by law, and to none but whom he assigns it to; so that the laws of the kiogdom, putting all power of force and arms into his trust, have placed him, and all those who serve him, in a state of irresistibleness in respect of any lawful force. This is a point much stood on, and, on this ground, the parliament now assuming the disposing of the militia by an ordinance, it is complained on, as a usurping of what the law hath committed to the king, as his prerogative; the opposing of which ordinance, by a commission of array, was the beginning of this miserable civil war. I will distinctly lay down my answer hereto, submitting it to every impartial judgment.
1. The power of the sword, being for defence of the laws, by punishing violators, and protecting subjects, it is subservient to government, and must needs belong to him who is intrusted with the government, as a necessary requisite, without which he cannot per. form his trust.
2. As it is an appendix to the power of government, and goes along with it, so it goes under the same terms, belonging to the prince, as the other doth, scil. absolutely, to use at will, where the monarchy is absolute, or with limitation, to use according to law, where the monarchy is limited; so that, in this government, the arms and sword of the kingdom is the king's, to a defined use committed to him, viz. For defence of the laws and frame of government established, and not for arbitrary purposes, or to inable ministers to execute commands of mere will.
3. The two houses, in vertue of the legislative authority, in part residing in them, are interested in the preservation of laws and government, as well as the king: And, in case the king should mis. employ that power of arms to strengthen subverting instruments; or, in case the laws and government be in apparent danger, the king refusing to use the sword to that end of preservation for which it an extraordinary and temporary ordinance, assume those arms where. with the king is intrusted, and perform the king's trust : And, though such ordinance of theirs is not formally legal, yet it is emi. nently legal, justified by the very intent of the architects of the govern. ment, when, for these uses, they committed the arms to the king. And no doubt they may command the strength of the kingdom, to save the being of the kingdom: For none can reasonably imagine the architectonical powers, when they committed the power of govern, ment and arms to one, to preserve the frame they had composed, did thereby intend to disable any, much less the two estates, from pre. serving it, in case the king should fail to do it in this last need. And, thus doing the king's work, it ought to be interpreted as done by his will; because, as the law is his will, so that the law should be pre. served is his will, which he expressed when he undertook the govern, ment; it is his deliberate will, and ought to be done, though at any time he oppose it by an after will, for that is his sudden will, as Dr. Fern himself, Sect. i. doth teach us to distinguish.
In what cases the other Estates may, without, or against the King's Personal consent, assume the arms of the kingdom ?
Sect. 1. Whether it be lawful to take up arms against the Magistrate, per
power to a wrong end? WHOEVER were the authors of that book lately pnblished, stiled, ‘Scripture and reason pleaded for defensive arms, have laid new and over-large grounds for resistance. Two assertions they endeavour to maintain: First, “Those governors (whether supreme, or others) who, under pretence of authority from God's ordinance, disturb the quiet and peaceable life in godliness and honesty, are far from being God's ordinance, in so doing, Sect. iii. Secondly, this tyranny, not being God's ordinance, they, which resist it even with arms, resist not the ordinance of God.' Hereon, Sect. iv, They free christians, even in the Apostle's time, and so under the Roman Emperors, or any other government, from a necessity of passive subjection in case of persecution; affirming, that the christians, in those first persecu. tions, had they been strong enough, might have used arms for defence against the tyranny of their emperors. Their ground is from the reasons used by the apostle, Rom. xiii, where he commands subjec. tion, and forbids resistance to the higher powers, because they are God's ordinance, his ministers, for praise to well doers, for terror to evil doers. But I must profess myself to dissent from them in this opinion, conceiving, that the apostle, in urging those reasons drawn from the ends of power, doth intend to press them to subjec. tion, by shewing them what benefit comes to men by authority in its due use; and not to shew them how far they are bound to be subject, and in what cases they may resist : For, bad he had such a meaning at that time, when the governors did altogether cross those ends of their ordination, he had taught them rather a doctrine of resistance, than subjection. Shall we conceive, that he would press subjection to powers in the hands of heathens and persecutors, if he had not intended they should passively be subject unto them, even under those persecutions? Rather I approve the received doctrine of the saints in ancient and modern times, who could never find this licence in that place of the apostle, and do concur with Master Bur. roughs, professing against resistance of authority, though abused :
If those (saith he, in his answer to Dr. Fern, Sect. ii.) who have power to make laws, make sinful laws, and so give authority to any to force obedience, we say, here there must be either flying, or passive obedience. And again: We acknowledge, we must not resist for religion, if the laws of the land be against it.' But what do they say against this? In making such laws against religion, the magistrates are not God's ordinance; and therefore to resist is not to resist God's ordinance: As an inferior magistrate, who hath a commission of power for such ends, is resistible, if he exceed his commission, and abuse his power for other ends; so princes, being God's ministers, and having a deputed commission from him to such ends (viz. the promotion of godliness, peace, and justice) if they pervert their power to contrary ends, may be resisted, without violation of God's ordinance. That I may give a satisfactory answer
I to this, which is the sum of their long discourse, I must lay it down in several assertions.
First, I acknowledge, God's ordinance is not only power, but power for such ends, scil. the good of the people.
Secondly, It is also God's ordinance, that there should be in men, by publick consent called thereto, and invested therein, a power to chuse the means, the laws and rules of government conducing to that end; and a judging, in relation to those laws, who be the welldoers, which ought to be praised, and who the evil doers, who ought to be punished. This is as fully God's ordinance, as the for. mer; for, without this, the other cannot be performed.
Thirdly, When they, who have this final civil judicature, shall censure good men as evil.doers, or establish iniquity by a law, to the encouragement of evil-doers; in this case, if it be a subordi. nate magistrate that doth it, appeal must be made (as St. Paul did) to the supreme; if it be the supreme, which, through mistake, or cor. ruption, doth miscensure, from whom there lies no civil appeal, then, without resistance of that judgment, we must passively sub. mit.' And he, who in his own knowledge of innocency, or goodness of his cause, shall by force resist, that man erects a tribunal in his own heart against the magistrate's tribunal; clears himself by a private judgment against a publick, and executes his own sentence by force against the magistrate's sentence, which he hath repealed and made void in his own heart. In unjust censures by the highest ma. gistrates, from whom there is no appeal, but to God, the sentence cannot be opposed, till God reverse it, to whom we have appealed. appeal, 1 Pet. ii. 23. and so must we, notwithstanding our appeal, 1 Pet. iv. 19. for he did so for our example. If an appeal to God, or a censure in the judgment of the condemned, might give him power of resistance, none would be guilty, or submit to the magistrate's censure, any further than they please. I desire those authors, before they settle their judgment in such grounds (which, I fear, will bring too much scandal) to weigh these particulars: First, their opinion takes away from the magistrate the chief part of God's ordinance, scil. power of definitive judgment of laws and persons, who are the good, and who the bad, to be held so in civil proceedings. Secondly, They justify the conscience of papists, hereticks, and grossest malefactors, to resist the magistrate, in case they be per. suaded their cause be good. Thirdly, they draw men off from the commands of patience under persecution, and conforming to Christ and his Apostles, in their patient enduring without verbal, or real opposition, though Christ could not have wanted power to have done it, as he tells Peter. Fourthly, They deprive the primitive and modern martyrs of the glory of suffering, imputing it either to their ignorance, or disability. Fifthly, It is a wonder, that since, in Christ's and his Apostles time, there was so much use of this power of resistance, they would by no express word shew the christians this liberty, but condemn resistance so severely. Sixthly, There is, in the case of the parliament now taking up arms, no need of these offensive grounds, religion being now a part of our national law, and cannot suffer, but the law must suffer with it.
2. When they may be assumed. Now to the proposed question I answer, First, Negatively, scil. I. It ought not to be done against all illegal proceedings, but such which are subversive and unsufferable. Secondly, Not publick re. sistance, but in excesses inducing publick evils. For to repel private injuries of the highest nature with publick hazard and disturbance, will not quit cost, unless in a private case the common liberty be struck at. Thirdly, not when the government is actually subrerted, and a new form (though never so injuriously) set up, and the people already engaged in an oath of absolute subjection ; for the remedy comes too late, and the establishment of the new makes the former irrevocable by any justifiable power, within the compass of that oath of God: This was the case of the Senate of Rome, in St. Paul's time. Secondly, affirmatively: I conceive three cases, when the other estates may lawfully assume the force of the kingdom, the king not joining, or dissenting, though the same be by law commit. ted to him: First, When there is invasion actually made, or immi. nently feared, by a foreign power. Secondly, When by an intestine faction the laws and frame of government are secretly undermined, or openly assaulted : lu both these cases, the being of the govern.