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ments and fects ufe the language of liberty and toleration : they exclaim against the barbarous cruelties of the Church of Rome. They fay-" We would not for the world be guilty of cutting your throats; but we will make it not worth your while to live, and then it is to be hoped you will fave us the difhonour, and cut them yourselves."

I am apt (fays our Author) to speak harfhly when I mention intolerance; because there is no principle I deteft so much.' -Mr. Williams feems indeed to fpeek feelingly, and with all his heart. His reflections on this fubject difcover evident fymptoms of a mind that still fmarts from the recollection of ill treatment from bigotry and zeal. But can he not apply to himfelf his own benediction- Bleffed be thofe glorious fpirits who fill ftruggle for the freedom of human reason, and all the great rights of human nature!' Thus fhrouded beneath the wing of his own bleffing, he may fmile at the impotent efforts of malice and envy, and fet even Prefbyterian art and treachery at defiance. The faints (fays Bp.Warburton) are vindictive.'-But he faid it in a jeft, when he oppofed their power to their

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"Unchain'd then let the harmlefs monsters rage." For the fame good Bifhop obferves, that the most they can do is to "mumble, with toothlefs fury, the game they have not the power to destroy.”

Mr. Williams, in the fucceeding Lecture, treats of Creation. He enumerates the various opinions of the ancient philofophers on this extremely difficult fubject. Moft of them he confiders as abfurd and improbable, in the highest degree. In fpeaking of the fyftem of Democritus [who defined the Deity to be" the images and ideas of all fenfible objects"-which images and ideas he confidered as "the only things that have exiftence"] our Author obferves, that the opinions of this philofopher were revived by Dr. Berkley, and have been adopted by many who have perfuaded themfelves to fancy that there is no material world. This opinion of Democritus was adopted by Taulerus, a celebrated myftic divine of the fourteenth century. In his treatise on the Tree of Life (a fubject Mr. Williams hath paffed over, and alfo the Garden of Eden, in his Lecture on the Creation) this illuminated Doctor of the fchool of St. Dominic afferts, that there is no material world. We fee nothing that hath a real existence without us. The whole vifible univerfe is but a fhadow-a mere object of intellect, and as unfubftantial as an image in a mirror.

Dr. Priestley, by divefting matter of its impenetrability, and allowing it nothing but powers unfupported by folid fubtances, hath, in the opinion of many, advanced fo very near

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to the Berkleian hypothefis, that the difference between him and the Bishop of Cloyne is almoft too minute to be diftinguished.

Mr. Williams acknowledges that the fubject of Creation is very ambiguous, whether we confider the account traditionally given of it by Mofes and the ancient poets and philofophers, or whether we fpeculate on it ourfelves, without regarding the hypothefes of others. We have no ideas (fays he) of Creation, or making a world, farther than that of difpofing, or rendering ufeful, materials already made and endued with certain properties.What we call making, or inventing, or creating, means no more than difcovering what effect, what beauty, or what use arife from certain arrangements of materials and qualities.Ingenious men have therefore meant by Creation, the difpofition of things from diforder to order, and from deformity to beauty. If we grant them a chaos confifting of all the principles, materials, and laws which will bring the world together and form it, they will give us a very tolerable idea of the procefs of Creation.In the difpofition of thofe things we find moft eminently thofe qualities which we admire -Wisdom, power, and goodness. Thefe qualities uniformly co-operate with each other; we therefore refer them to one great principle, which we call God.'

In the feventh Lecture, the Merit of Believing,' is confidered. On this fubject the Author advances nothing new. He treats, with great contempt, what he calls the fophifm of believing what is above our comprehenfion, but not contrary to our reafon. There is (fays Mr. W.) as much fenfe, and truth, and poffibility, in believing what is above our underftanding, as in feeing what is beyond our fight, hearing what is out of hearing,' &c. &c.

Is not Mr. Williams, in his eagerness to expofe a fophifm, led into one himfelf? If the writers, whom he thus ridicules for what he calls a jingle upon words, invented for the purpofe of imposing on the ignorant,' had laid it down as a theological polition, that we might underfland what is above our understanding, and comprehend what is above our comprehenfion, his allufion to the eye, the ear, &c. might have been proper and confiftent enough: but he himself hath firft created the abfurdity, and then expofed it as the fophifm of others. When divines fpeak of believing what is above our comprehenfion, they frequently mean an affent of the mind to the revelation of facts, which they are unable to account for on the common principles of human nature. The eye is bounded by certain objects: the understanding limited by a certain degree of knowledge and comprehenfion: but belief gives credit for more than we fee or know. What can we know of the eternity of God?

Surely

Surely it exceeds all the poffible comprehenfion of a finite underftanding; and yet, is it not an object of belief? Doth not the mind acquiefce in the truth of this first principle of the Deity? It cannot comprehend it; but juftly concludes that the thing is real, and fubmits with faith and reverence. Mr. Williams himself allows that a perfon may believe in the miraculous birth of our Saviour, in the miracles which he wrought, his refurrection from the dead, and his afcenfion into heaven, without committing himfelf to the refuge of myftery and abfurdity; for he grants that a perfon may confider them as ftanding on the fame ground of evidence as the actions of an Alexander or a Cæfar, to be believed on the credit of historians, who had no intereft to deceive, and because the things related were poffible and even probable. In this cafe (fays our Author) what is there in believing Chriftianity more than believing any historical fact which we clearly comprehend, and has nothing in it that we should deem impoffible?' We are glad that Mr. Williams hath condefcended to make this conceffion to the faith of Chriftians. And yet they will tell him that they do not understand, nor can they comprehend the miraculous conception of a virgin-nor the afcenfion of a body into heaven, though they firmly believe, i. e. affent to, the truth and reality of thefe facts, on the teftimony of credible hiftorians. Nothing more than this modeft affent of the mind is required by divine revelation when it relates facts which human reason cannot account for, and of the mode of their operation it can form no poffible idea.

As Mr. Williams hath divefted Faith of all merit, he alfo confiders what hath been called a previous difpofition to admit certain principles, as a thing of no value. No plausible argument (fays he) hath been left on the fide of uncharitableness and bigotry, but that which makes a right faith to be the confequence of being well and properly difpofed. It is very true that a man may difpofe himself, i.e. he may warp and bias his mind fo as to make any doctrine or principle fuit it. But all kinds of pre-difpofition and pre-arrangement are injuries to the judgment.'

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But though Mr. Williams fpeaks thus fcornfully of a predifpofed habit of mind, yet he allows of its beneficent influence in the following Lecture on the Fear of God. I need not (fays he) be at any great pains, to those who are well-difpofed, in fhewing the effects of this principle on the general conduct of a man's life.' The atheistic libertine might here retort his own language, and, by the moft mortifying of all arguments, the argumentum ad bominem, easily prove that a well-difpofed," is but a mere paffible term, for a biaffed and prejudiced mind;

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and that all kinds of pre-difpofition, &c. are injuries to the judgment.'

The great principle and duties of Chriftianity, though founded on the best reafon, yet owe much of their fupport and influence to a virtuous difpofition of mind. A good man would with them to be true, and a bad man would be interested in seeing them proved to be falfe. Both, it is certain, are under fome bias. But Chriftianity is not the lefs rational because the prepoffeffions of virtue are on its fide, and thofe of vice at eternal enmity with it.

In the ninth lecture, on Univerfal Religion,' our Author makes an apology for the name of Deift, with which,' he informs us, he had been reproached by ignorance.' He affures us, however, that fo far from difliking this nobleft of all appellations, he felt no other regret than that he was not worthy of it. I could,' fays he, look up to Jupiter and Apollo, to Mars and Venus, to Mofes, Chrift, and Mahomed, and not even from my errors and faults be afraid to wear their names: but to be called after the name appropriated to that perfectly wife and perfectly good Being, who animates and blesses the univerfe, feems to call for a character of understanding and virtue, which is alarming; and though I could rejoice in deferving, I fhould be very cautious in affuming it. We need make no comment on this paffage: but cannot avoid obferving, that for the indecency of the allufion, and the artful malignity of the infinuation, it hath fcarcely been paralleled fince the days of Julian the Apostate.

The lectures on Univerfal Toleration' contain little that is worthy of particular notice. The Author rings his changes fo often on liberty and free enquiry, that by repetition his fentiments become tirefome, and in their commonnefs lofe their influence. His compofitions, in general, bear the marks of great hafte; and these two lectures, in particular, feem to prove that he wanted much to get to the conclufion. Indeed, we seldom obferve any beginning or middle in Mr. Williams's productions. He appears to be always fomewhere or other about the end. This arifes from a want of a regular fyftematic plan; or a logical correctness and economy of thought.

The following reflections on perfons who pride themselves in having fouls made of fentiment, are very juft, though they might have been introduced as well in any other part of his work, as where we chance to find them. Try a fentimental man, or a fentimental woman, on any of the fubjects which they are diffolving or even dying upon, when reading fome quaint tale, and you will find them wholly destitute of the genuine and useful principles of nature; not in the fituation of perfons

perfons who want to be induced to act juftly and virtuously; but incapable of good impreffions. There are no brutes on earth fo unfeeling as thefe diffolving, dying people; nor any perfons fo incapable of virtue as thofe who wafte their whole lives in reading tales of the virtues of other people. Look on a modern mother, whofe time is fpent in reading hiftories and novels, and enervating her own conftitution and that of her children by the effects of fentiments. Look back into antiquity, and fee the virtuous matrons of Greece and Rome, fulfilling their duties with an active and amiable dignity; teaching their children to think and act fo as to contribute largely to the public happiness, and you will fee the difference between real and pretended knowledge.'

Our modern fentimentalifts are indeed very poor creatures! All their effufions, and all their feelings, are feldom any thing better than evidences of paralytic affections. Though they melt, and languifh, and die, on the foft pillow of fentimental tenderness, yet when their charity is tried, their exquifite fenfations vanifh in a moment, and benevolence is only a pretty word, that begins in fancy and ends in found!

Our Author's averfion to thofe fentimental beings, leads him to renew his fatire on them, in his fecond lecture on Modesty; in which, after drawing an admirable and truly characteristic picture of vanity, he obferves, that when religion had credit enough to ferve as a cloke to infirmities and vices, the vain man was always religious, and covered his pretences with it. But now, an undefinable and unintelligible matter called SENTIMENT, is the fubftitute. All that we know of what is commonly called Sentiment, is, that it fupplies the place of wifdom and virtue; and is a rule of life which every man and woman keeps in fome elegant receis of the mind; that it vibrates like a mulical inftrument, and all the events of life play upon it: but being totally different in different perfons, it admits of that wonderful mixture of wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, which we fee around us. There is no virtue refined enough for its regard: and no vice which it will not admit of. In short, by fetting afide the ufe of investigation, reafon, education, habit, and reflection,-Sentiment becomes the very principle of profigacy; and, by its ineffable and fupernatural emotions, renders

the mind abandoned and worthlels.

'Here therefore, if any where, vanity must have a chance of fuccefs. As fentimental virtues exift only in tales, letters, and converfation, where the imagination is at liberty to invent, and no more judgment is requifite than to preserve probability, one would think a vain man, who is effentially a liar, must find his account in this fentimental commerce. He does-fo as to impofe longer upon men in this way than in any other. The

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