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mere conception of the mind; but only a mode of pre-eminence can be attributed to it, according to which it is understood to comprise within itself and to exceed all the perfections of all things: This mode may be declared in this one expression, "The Divine Essence is uncaused and without commencement."

VII. Hence it follows, that this Essence is simple and infinite; from this, that it is eternal and [immensam] immeasurable; and, lastly, that it is unchangeable, impassible, and incorruptible, in the manner in which it has been proved by us in our public Theses on this subject. (See page 116.)

VIII. And since [unum et bonum] unity and goodness reciprocate with being, and as the affections or passions of every being are general; we also affirm, that the essence of God is one, and that God is one according to it, and is therefore good, nay the Chief Good; from the participation of which, all things have both [quod sint] their being, and [quod bona sint] their well-being.

IX. As this Essence is itself pure from all composition, so it cannot enter into the composition of any thing: We permit it to become a subject of discussion, whether this be designated in the Scriptures by the name of "holiness," which denotes separation or a being separated.

X. These modes of pre-eminence are not communicable to any thing, from the very circumstance of their being such: And when these modes are contemplated in the life of God and in the faculties of his life, they are of infinite usefulness in Theology, and are not among the smallest foundations of true religion.

DISPUTATION XVI.

ON THE LIFE OF GOD.

I. LIFE is that which comes under our consideration, in the Second [momento] impulse of the Divine Nature; and that it belongs to God, is not only evident from its own nature, but is likewise known per se to all those who have any conception of God. For it is much more incredible that God is something [inane] senseless and dead, than that there is no God. And the Life of God is easily proved [a posteriori] from experience. For as whatever is beside God is from Him, we must also attribute life to Him, because among his creatures are many things which have life; and we affirm, that God is a living substance, and that life belongs to Him, not only eminently but also formally, since life is simply perfection.

II. But, as life is taken, either in the second act, and is called "operation;" or in the first, principal and radical act, and thus is the very nature and form of a living thing; we attribute this, of itself, primarily and adequately to God: So that He is the life of himself, not having it from his union with another thing; (for that is the part of imperfection,) but existing the same as it does: He being life itself, and living by the first act, but bestowing life by the second act.

III. The Life of God therefore is most simple, so that it is not in reality distinguished from his essence; and according to the confined capacity of our conception, by which it is distinguished from his essence, it may in some degree be described as being "an act that flows from the essence of God," by which is intimated that it is active in itself; first, by a reflex act on God himself, and then on other objects, on account of the most abundant copiousness and the most perfect activity of life in God.

IV. The Life of God is the foundation and the proximate and adequate principle not only of ad intra et ad extra, an inward and an outward act, but likewise of all fruition by which God is said to be blessed in himself. This seems to be the cause why God wished Himself, principally in reference to Life, to be distinguished from false gods and dead idols; and why He wished men to swear by his name, in a form composed thus, "The Lord liveth."

V. As the Essence of God is infinite and most simple, eternal, impassible, unchangeable and incorruptible, we ought likewise to consider his Life with these modes of being and life; on which account we attribute to Him per se immortality, and a most prompt, powerful, indefatigable, and insatiable desire, strength, and delight to act and to enjoy, and in action and enjoyment, if it be lawful thus to express ourselves.

VI. By two faculties, the Understanding and the Will, this Life is active towards God himself; but towards other things it is active by three faculties, Power or Capability being added to the two preceding. But the faculties of the Understanding and the Will are accommodated to fruition, and this chiefly as they tend towards God himself; secondarily, and because it thus pleases Him of his abundant goodness, as they tend towards the

creatures.

DISPUTATION XVII.

ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD.

I. THE understanding of God is that faculty of his life which is first in nature and order, and by which the living God distinctly understands all things and every one, which, in what manner soever, either have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, a being of any kind: By which He also distinctly understands the order, connection, and relation of all and each of them between each other; and the entities of reason, those beings which exist, or which can exist, in the mind, imagination, and enunciation.

II. God knows all things, neither by intelligible [species] representations, nor by similitude, but by his own and sole essence; with the exception of evil things, which he knows indirectly by the good things opposed to them, as privation is known [mediante habitu] by means of the habit.

III. The mode by which God understands, is, not by composition and division, not by [discursum] gradual argumentation, but by simple and infinite intuition, according to the succession of order and not of time.

IV. The succession of order in the objects of the Divine Knowledge, is in this manner: FIRST. God knows himself, entirely and adequately, and this understanding is his own [esse] essence or being. SECONDLY. He knows all possible things in the perfection of their own essence, and therefore all things impossible. In the understanding of possible things, this is the order: (1.) He knows what things can exist by his own primary and sole act. (2.) He knows what things from the creatures, whether they will come into existence or will not, can exist by his conservation, motion, assistance, concurrence, and permission. (3.) He knows what things He can do about the acts of the creatures [convenienter] consistently with himself or with these acts. THIRDLY. He knows all entities, even according to the same order as that which we have just shown in his knowledge of things possible.

V. The understanding of God is certain and infallible: So that He sees certainly and infallibly even things future and contingent; whether He sees them in their causes, or in themselves. But this infallibility depends on the infinity of the essence of God, and not on his unchangeable will.

VI. The act of understanding of God [causatur] is occasioned

by no external cause, not even by its object; though if there be not afterwards an object, neither will there be any act of God's understanding about it.

VII. How certain soever the acts of God's understanding may itself be, this does not impose any necessity on things, but it rather establishes contingency in them. For as He knows the thing itself and its mode, if the mode of the thing be contingent, He must know it as such, and therefore it remains contingent with respect to the Divine knowledge.

VIII. The knowledge of God may be distinguished according to its objects: And, FIRST, into the theoretical, by which He understands things under the relation of entity and truth; and into the practical, by which He considers things under the relation of good, and as objects of his will and power.

IX. SECONDLY. One [quality of the] knowledge of God is that of simple intelligence, by which He understands himself, all possible things, and the nature and essence of all entities: Another is that of vision, by which He beholds his own existence and that of all other entities or beings.

X. The knowledge by which God knows his own essence and existence, all things possible, and the nature and essence of all entities, is simply necessary, as pertaining to the perfection of his own knowledge. But that by which He knows the existence of other entities, is hypothetically necessary, that is, if they now have, have already had, or shall afterwards have an existence. For when any object whatsoever is laid down, it must of necessity fall within the knowledge of God. The former of these precedes every free act of the Divine will; the latter follows every free act: The Schoolmen therefore denominate the First "natural," and the Second "free knowledge.”

XI. The knowledge by which God knows anything [si hoc sit] if it be or exist, is [media] intermediate between the two [kinds] described in Theses IX & X: In fact it precedes the free act of the will with regard to intelligence. But it knows something future according to vision, only through its hypothesis.

XII. Free knowledge, or that of vision, which is also called "Prescience," is not the cause of things: But the knowledge which is practical and of simple intelligence, and which is denominated "natural," or "necessary," is the cause of all things by the mode of prescribing and directing, to which is added the action of the will and of the capability. The middle or intermediate [kind of] knowledge ought to intervene in things which depend on the liberty of created [arbitrii] choice or pleasure.

XIII. From the variety and multitude of objects, and from the means and mode of intelligence and vision, it is apparent that infinite knowledge and omniscience are justly attributed to God; and that they are so proper or peculiar to God according to their objects, means and mode, as not to be capable of appertaining to any created thing.

DISPUTATION XVIII.

ON THE WILL OF GOD.

I. THE will of God is spoken of in three ways: FIRST, The faculty itself of willing. SECONDLY, The act of willing. THIRDLY, The object willed. The first signification is the principal and proper one, the two others are secondary and figurative.

II. It may be thus described:-It is the second faculty of the life of God, flowing through the understanding from the life [ulterius tendente] that has an ulterior tendency; by which faculty God is borne towards a known good. Towards a good,-because this is an adequate object of every will. Towards a known good, not only with regard to it as a being, but likewise as a good, whether in reality or only in the act of the divine understanding: Both, however, are shewn by the understanding. But the evil which is called [culpa] that of culpability, God does not simply and absolutely will.

III. The good is two-fold: The Chief Good, and that which is from the Chief. The first of these is the primary, immediate, principal, direct, peculiar and adequate object of the divine will: The latter is secondary and indirect, towards which the divine will does not tend except by means of the Chief Good.

IV. The will of God is borne towards its objects in the following order: (1.) He wills himself. (2.) He wills all those things which, out of infinite things possible to himself, he has by the last judgment of his wisdom [judicavit] determined to be made. And First, He wills to make them to be; then He is affected towards them by his will, according as they possess some likeness with his nature, or some vestige of it. (3.) The third object of the will of God, are those things which He judges fit and equitable to be done by creatures who are endowed with understanding and with free will: In which is included a prohibition of that which He wills not to be done. (4.) The fourth object of the divine will is his permission, that chiefly by which He permits a rational creature to do what He has prohibited, and to omit what He has commanded. (5.) He wills those things which, according to his

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