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cedeth all these points recited; nay and in a manner dischargeth them, in the particular of a war against the Turk: which point, I think, would not have come into my thought, but that Martius giving us yesterday a representation of the empire of the Turks, with no small vigour of words, (which you, Pollio, called an invective, but was indeed a true charge,) did put me in mind of it: and the more I think upon it, the more I settle in opinion, that a war to suppress that empire, though we set aside the cause of religion, were a just war.

After Zebedeus had said this, he made a pause, to see whether any of the rest would say anything: but when he perceived nothing but silence and signs of attention to that he would further say, he proceeded thus:

ZEBEDEUS. Your lordships will not look for a treatise from me1, but a speech of consultation; and in that brevity and manner will I speak. First, I shall agree, that as the cause of a war ought to be just, so the justice of that cause ought to be evident; not obscure, not scrupulous. For by the consent of all laws, in capital causes the evidence must be full and clear: and if so where one man's life is in question, what say we to a war, which is ever the sentence of death upon many? We must beware therefore how we make a Moloch or an heathen idol of our blessed Saviour, in sacrificing the blood of men to him by an unjust war. The justice of every action consisteth in the merits of the cause, the warrant of the jurisdiction, and the form of the prosecution. As for the inward intention, I

leave it to the court of heaven. Of these things severally, as they may have relation to the present subject of a war against infidels; and namely, against the most potent and most dangerous enemy of the faith, the Turk. I hold, and I doubt not but I shall make it plain (as far as a sum or brief can make a cause plain), that a war against the Turk is lawful, both by the laws of nature and nations, and by the law divine, which is the perfection of the other two. As for the laws positive and civil of the Romans, or other whatsoever, they are too small engines to move the weight of this question. And therefore, in my judgment, many of the late Schoolmen (though excellent men)

good; except there be either a more urgent necessity, or a more evident facility in those inferior actions, or except they may both go on together in some degree? in hac questione de jure Belli Sacri contra Turcas.

take not the right way in disputing this question; except they had they gift of Navius, that they could, cotem novaculâ scindere; hew stones with pen-knives. First, for the law of nature. The philosopher Aristotle is no ill interpreter thereof. He hath set many men on work with a witty speech of naturâ dominus, and naturâ servus; affirming expressly and positively, that from the very nativity some things are born to rule, and some things to obey. Which oracle hath been taken in divers senses. Some have taken it for a speech of ostentation, to intitle the Grecians to an empire over the barbarians; which indeed was better maintained by his scholar Alexander. Some have taken it for a speculative platform, that reason and nature would that the best should govern; but not in any wise to create a right. But for my part, I take it neither for a brag nor for a wish; but for a truth, as he limiteth it. For he saith, that if there can be found such an inequality between man and man as there is between man and beast or between soul and body, it investeth a right of government; which seemeth rather an impossible case than an untrue sentence. But I hold both the judgment true, and the case possible; and such as hath had and hath a being, both in particular men and nations. But ere we

go further, let us confine ambiguities and mistakings, that they trouble us not.1 First, to say that the more capable, or the better deserver, hath such right to govern as he may compulsorily bring under the less worthy, is idle. Men will never agree upon it, who is the more worthy. For it is not only in order of nature for him to govern that is the more intelligent, as Aristotle would have it; but there is no less required for government, courage to protect; and above all, honesty and probity of the will, to abstain from injury. So fitness to govern is a perplexed business. Some men, some nations, excel in the one ability, some in the other. Therefore the position which I intend is not in the comparative, that the wiser or the stouter or the juster nation should govern; but in the privative, that where there is an heap of people (though we term it a kingdom or state) that is altogether unable or indign to govern, there it is a just cause of war for another nation, that is civil or polliced, to subdue them: and this, though it were to be done by a Cyrus or a Cæsar, that were no Christian. The second mis

1 Ambigua quædam, et a sensu vero sermonis nostri multum aberrantia, ne interpellant, abigamus et relegemus.

taking to be banished is, that I understand not this of a personal tyranny, as was the state of Rome under a Caligula or a Nero or a Commodus: shall the nation suffer for that wherein they suffer? But when the constitution of the state and the fundadamental customs and laws of the same (if laws they may be called) are against the laws of nature and nations, then, I say, a war upon them is lawful. I shall divide the question into three parts. First, whether there be, or may be, any nation or society of men, against whom it is lawful to make a war without a precedent injury or provocation? Secondly, what are those breaches of the law of nature and nations, which do forfeit and devest all right and title in a nation to govern? And thirdly, whether those breaches of the law of nature and nations be found in any nation at this day; and namely, in the empire of the Ottomans? For the first, I hold it clear that such nations, or states, or societies of people, there may be and are. There cannot be a better ground laid to declare this, than to look into the original donation of government. Observe it well, especially the inducement or preface. Saith God: Let us make man after our own image, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air and the beasts of the land, &c. Hereupon De Victoria', and with him some others, infer excellently, and extract a most true and divine aphorism, Non fundatur dominium nisi in imagine Dei. Here we have the charter of foundation: it is now the more easy to judge of the forfeiture or reseizure. Deface the image, and you devest the right. But what is this image, and how is it defaced? The poor men of Lyons, and some fanatical spirits, will tell you that the image of God is purity, and the defacement sin. But this subverteth all government : neither did Adam's sin, or the curse upon it, deprive him of his rule, but left the creatures to a rebellion or reluctation. And therefore if you note it attentively, when this charter was renewed unto Noah and his sons, it is not by the words, You shall have dominion; but, Your fear shall be upon all the beasts of the land, and the birds of the air, and all that moveth: not regranting the sovereignty, which stood firm; but protecting it against the reluctation. The sound interpreters therefore expound this image of God, of Natural Reason; which if it be totally or mostly defaced, the right of governinent doth cease; and if you mark all the inter

1 Franciscus de Victoria.

2

preters well, still they doubt of the case, and not of the law. But this is properly to be spoken to in handling the second point, when we shall define of the defacements. To go on. The prophet Hosea, in the person of God, saith of the Jews: They have reigned, but not by me; they have set a signory over themselves, but I knew nothing of it. Which place proveth plainly, that there are governments which God doth not avow. For though they be ordained by his secret providence, yet they are not knowledged by his revealed will. Neither can this be meant of evil governors or tyrants; for they are often avowed and stablished as lawful potentates; but of some perverseness and defection in the very nation itself; which appeareth most manifestly, in that the prophet speaketh of the signory in abstracto, and not of the person of the Lord. And although some heretics, of those we spake of, have abused this text, yet the sun is not soiled in passage.1 And again, if any man infer upon the words of the prophets following (which declare this rejection and, to use the words of the text, rescision of their estate to have been for their idolatry,) that by this reason the governments of all idolatrous nations should be also dissolved (which is manifestly untrue); in my judgment it followeth not. For the idolatry of the Jews then, and the idolatry of the Heathen then and now, are sins of a far differing nature, in regard of the special covenant and the clear manifestations wherein God did contract and exhibit himself to that nation. This nullity of policy and right of estate in some nations is yet more significantly expressed by Moses in his canticle, in the person of God, to the Jews: Ye have incensed me with gods that are no gods, and I will incense you with a people that are no people: such as were (no doubt) the people of Canaan3, after seisin was given of the Land of Promise to the Israelites. For from that time their right to the land was dissolved, though they remained in many places unconquered. By this we may see that there are nations in name, that are no nations in right, but multitudes only, and swarms of people. For like as there are particular persons utlawed and proscribed by civil laws of several countries; so are there nations that are utlawed and proscribed by the law of nature and nations, or by the immediate commandment of God. And as there are kings de facto,

in transitu per cloacas.

3 populi Cananæorum, et reliqui.

2 This clause is omitted in the translation.

and not de jure, in respect of the nullity of their title; so are there nations that are occupants de facto, and not de jure, of their territories, in respect of the nullity of their policy or government. But let us take in some examples into the midst of our proofs; for they will prove as much, as put after, and illustrate more. It was never doubted but a war upon pirates may be lawfully made by any nation, though not infested or violated by them. Is it because they have not certas sedes or lares? In the Piratical War which was achieved by Pompey the Great, and was his truest and greatest glory, the pirates had some cities, sundry ports, and a great part of the province of Cilicia; and the pirates now being, have a receptacle and mansion in Algiers. Beasts are not the less savage because they have dens. Is it because the danger hovers as a cloud, that a man cannot tell where it will fall, and so it is every man's case? The reason is good; but it is not all, nor that which is most alledged. For the true received reason is, that pirates are communes humani generis hostes; whom all nations are to prosecute, not so much in the right of their own fears, as upon the band of human society. For as there are formal and written leagues, respective to certain enemies; so is there a natural and tacit confederation amongst all men against the common enemy of human society. So as there needs no intimation or denunciation of the war; there needs no request from the nation grieved: but all these formalities the law of nature supplies in the case of pirates. The same is the case of

rovers by land'; such as yet are some cantons in Arabia; and some petty kings of the mountains, adjacent to straits and ways.2 Neither is it lawful only for the neighbour princes, to destroy such pirates or rovers3; but if there were any nation never so far off, that would make it an enterprise of merit and true glory, (as the Romans that made a war for the liberty of Græcia from a distant and remote part,) no doubt they mought do it. I make the same judgment of that kingdom of the Assassins, now destroyed, which was situate upon the borders of Saraca; and was for a time a great terror to all the princes of the Levant. There the custom was, that upon the command

1 de latronibus per terram et insidiatoribus viarum.

3

qui secus angustus vias et a viatoribus frequentatas habitant.

neque (ut prius de Piratis dictum est) principibus tantum vicinis hos debellare conceditur.

• Proculdubio hoc facere cum justitia possint.

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