A complete investment was therefore impracticable, without the employment of two separate armies, each having its own base of operations, and each of sufficient strength to compete by itself with the total force of the Russians in the Crimea. Again, the capture of either side by no means necessitated the fall of the other; for neither can be said to have any command over the other, on account of the great distance between them; and in the event of either side falling to the possession of the attacking party, the great basin would still form an almost insurmountable barrier to the further advance of the besiegers; so that to obtain entire possession of Sebastopol two independent attacks, one against the south, the other against the north front, would be requisite.

To undertake simultaneously the attacks on both sides required far more numerous forces than the allies had at their disposal; but the choice of either the one or the other was open to them. The north front was exceedingly strong by nature, and extended across a ridge of bold and rocky heights, intersected by steep ravines. A permanent fort, conspicuously situated in a commanding position, occupied its centre, and was supported on either side by earthen intrenchments and batteries. The entire front was exposed to enfilade from the right of the position, where heavy guns could readily and securely be placed; and all the approaches were commanded by the men-of-war and steamers in the harbour. This position was, moreover, defended by an army, which, although recently defeated, had retreated to its supports, and was still very powerful, as subsequent events clearly proved.

To assail such a position by a "coup de main" with an army but little superior to the defenders, with nothing but field pieces at its command, and with its flanks and retreat quite insecure, would have been a most desperate undertaking, with every probability of a failure or repulse, the consequences of which would have been most disastrous.

A regular siege, on the contrary, required heavy guns and stores of all kinds, and therefore a harbour. Now the only place to the north of Sebastopol where the disembarkation of stores could be effected was the narrow, shallow beach at the mouth of the Katcha, open to every gust of wind, difficult to defend, and which, from its distance in the rear, would have been much exposed, while its communications could have been intercepted at any moment by an enemy capable of such enterprises as he afterwards attempted at Balaklava and Inkerman.

On the south side, on the contrary, several harbours were known to exist; perfectly sheltered, easily defensible, and covered by or connected with the very commanding range of heights that subsequently protected the whole encampment. On this side lay the great dockyards and depôts of Sebastopol,

The defences

of Sebastopol.

the capture and destruction of which constituted the chief object of the campaign. It was reported that no fortification of any importance defended this side; that the enemy was taking no steps to strengthen it, but devoted all his energies to the north front; and that the allies, by marching round at once, would find the Russians quite unprepared to receive them.

Such were the arguments in favour of attacking the south side, against which the allies now proceeded.

Leaving a small force to menace the north side of Sebastopol, with the view to cover the flank march, the combined Anglo-French army left the Belbec on the 25th September, and, steering by compass in a south-easterly direction, through a dense wood, they reached the plain of Balaklava on that evening and the following morning.

The Russians, apparently surprised by this sudden and unexpected appearance of the allies in front of Balaklava, had no time to occupy in force this place, which, not only from its strong natural position, might have been disputed with some obstinacy, but the possession of which was of the greatest importance to the allies, to enable them to re-establish their communication with the sea, their only base of operations.

The small garrison of about 60 men that occupied Balaklava surrendered at the first approach of the Light Division, after firing a few shot from some mortars, and the small town was at once occupied by the British force, and placed in a state of defence. 1000 marines and some naval guns were disembarked, and encamped on the high ridge to the west of the town, which formed the key of the whole position. Advanced picquets, supported by field pieces, were posted in commanding positions on the small projecting spurs which connect this ridge with the valley below. Kadikoi, which covered the entrance to the town, was occupied by the main force, and a battalion, composed of the sickly men from each brigade, took up their quarters in the town, to assist in the disembarkation of the stores, guns, and ammunition.

Having thus secured their base of operations, and re-established the communication with the fleet, the main body of the British force advanced towards Sebastopol, and took ground on the western side of the plateau, near the "Maison d'Eau," whilst General Bosquet's division posted itself on the extreme right beyond Cathcart's Hill. The fire from the enemy's heavy guns checked their further approach, and even forced them to retire out of its range. The allies, however, had advanced sufficiently close to the place to ascertain that it was a position of great strength, far greater than had been anticipated, and that an immediate assault would be hazardous in the extreme.

The principal defences faced the sea, and on that front the works were of a permanent character, very extensive, and armed with powerful batteries.

At the entrance of the harbour, on the south side, stood the two forts of the Quarantine and Alexander, mounting 60 and 90 guns respectively; the former, a closed earthen redoubt, with its guns mounted en barbette, commanding the Quarantine Harbour; the latter, a permanent work of masonry, casemated, and likewise closed at the gorge by a crenelated wall. This latter fort, conjointly with the magnificent casemated batteries of Fort Constantine (for 110 guns) opposite to it on the north side, commanded the entrance of the harbour, and both were supported and flanked by powerful batteries to the east of them, placed at distances varying from 500 to 1,000 yards. These consisted, on the south side, of the Artillery Fort (an earthwork with 56 guns), and of the extensive casemates for 200 guns called "Fort Nicholas;" and on the north side, of the casemates of Fort Michael, for 90 guns, of two minor earthen batteries, one on each side of the latter, and of the extensive earth-works called Battery No. 4.

This front had been still further strengthened by moving several menof-war (out of distant range from the sea), so that their broadsides might sweep the entire harbour; and as a greater security against a naval attack, seven vessels had been sunk at the entrance of the harbour, answering the purpose of an outer boom, supported at about 1,000 yards in rear by a second boom, formed of iron cables (vide dotted line on plan). All these defences towards the sea were of so formidable a character as to nullify one of the great advantages which the possession of a most powerful fleet gave the allies over the Russians; so much so, that the co-operation of the fleet in a joint attack with the land forces could not produce any decisive effect upon works of such strength and magnitude.

On the land side the works of defence to the south of Sebastopol were at this time comparatively trifling, but they occupied very commanding positions, and were placed on ground which nature had strongly fortified.

A single stone wall, crenelated†, but quite exposed, surrounded part of the town, and extended partly as a "bastion trace," partly as an "indented line," from the Artillery Bay to the Central Bastion. A wide and steep ravine, answering the purpose of a huge ditch, ran in front of the line, from the Quarantine to the Central Bastion, and so completely separated it from the ground beyond that all approaches by trenches on that side were subsequently found to be quite impracticable. This wall, along its whole extent, was lined with numerous pieces of artillery, of which those in the most prominent positions were of heavy metal. Exclusive of the 56 guns in the Artillery

* Vide Appendix No. 12.

† This wall was about 12 feet high and 6 feet thick, and had a ditch in its front, excepting where, from its abutting on to the edge of a steep declivity, such was rendered unnecessary.

Fort, about 42 pieces of ordnance of various calibres were then in position in rear of the crenelated wall.

To the south-east of the Central Bastion, but separated from it by a deep ravine, across which a dry stone wall had been hastily constructed, and armed with about 24 field pieces, was an earthen battery, nearly completed, called the Flagstaff Bastion, occupying a very commanding site, and furnished with 12 heavy guns.

Such were the works of defence on the west side of Sebastopol. Of these the Flagstaff Bastion formed the key, for it took in reverse all the works to the west of it. But although the possession of this battery might have led to the fall of the town side of the place, it would have been difficult to hold it, without at the same time obtaining a footing on the eastern side, as the ground and works to the east of the Dockyard Creek, in their turn, commanded this battery, and took it in reverse.

On the eastern side, which was perfectly separated from the western by the deep and precipitous ravines at the head of the dockyard creek, were the following works:

1st. An earthen battery, called from its shape the "Redan," which was armed with 17 heavy guns, and at which large working parties were still busily engaged. Immediately in its rear, a dry stone wall, skirting the brow of the hill, branched off in a westerly direction to a place subsequently called the Barrack Battery, where at present 10 field pieces were in position to flank the Redan and the ground to the west of it; and in the valley just beneath it, at the head of the Dockyard Creek, about a dozen field pieces, protected by a low stone wall, fully commanded all the approaches to the town from the valleys beyond.

2d. The semicircular masonry tower of the Malakoff, mounting five heavy guns "en barbette," around which was a circular intrenchment, with a short flank at each end, nearly completed, and armed with 10 heavy

guns.

3d. A battery called the Little Redan, still incomplete, but most probably armed.

4th. Adjoining the harbour, a considerable sized stone building in the shape of a cross, which had been converted into a defensible barrack. Of all these defensive works the Malakoff had the most commanding position, and formed the key of the whole of the south side of the place. It took in reverse all the works on the eastern side, and from its position on an

* The information respecting the defences has been obtained from Russian official sources.

independent high knoll afforded a good site from which to repel assaults at any time. The enemy appeared fully aware of the importance of this site, and employed large working parties in strengthening it, and he had even commenced in its rear a dry stone wall, which surrounded part of the Karabelnaja suburb, and answered the purpose of an inner or second line of intrenchment.

Such were the fortifications on the south side, which, although not strong in themselves, were powerfully armed, and occupied a position most favourable for defence. Both flanks were unassailable; the left flank rested on high land abutting on the great harbour, and was protected in front by an extensive wet ditch, in other words by the "Careening Bay," which, with all approaches to it, was under the command of the shipping in the harbour; while the right flank, in front of which was the wide and steep ravine referred to above, was raked by the fire of the guns in the gorge of the Quarantine Fort, and by the men-of-war, that could at any time be posted under cover of Fort Alexander. The centre of the position was occupied by the three main batteries, the Flagstaff, Redan, and Malakoff, powerfully armed, nearly all equally salient, and on commanding positions, at the extremity of three leading spurs by which alone an enemy could approach, and over which the garrison had full view for a distance of more than 2,000 yards to their front. The ravines between these ridges, although winding, generally run directly towards the batteries, and were consequently enfiladed throughout, and commanded by the enemy's guns. Men-of-war likewise were moored in the dockyard and careening creeks, and at the head of the harbour, with their broadsides bearing on such of the lines of approach as might be taken by the storming parties.

Whether the assailants, therefore, advanced along the ridges or defiled through the ravines, they must be exposed to the fire of the batteries, and to that of the men-of-war and steamers in the harbour. Their attack must have been made from a very extended diverging circumference, over ground quite unknown, which was broken by deep and in parts almost impracticable ravines, rendering mutual support quite impossible; whereas the enemy occupied a central position, from which his works were easily accessible, while these works communicated with each other without difficulty. The allies would have had to advance with forces whose numerical strength could not have been greater than that of the defenders, and with nothing but field pieces at their command, exposed for a distance of upwards of a mile to a galling fire of more than 100 pieces of artillery, exclusive of the guns of the shipping, and without any retreat in case of a reverse.

In a memorandum written a few weeks subsequent to this date it was stated, that the place appeared to be in such a state, and the garrison so

C