from proving, by his own oath, a debt against the estate of a bankrupt, the commissioners will be directed to admit the proof upon such evidence as shall be satisfactory to them, though the debt be of considerable amount (ƒ).

A reference may be made to the Master, in cases of lunacy, to expunge scandalous or impertinent matter contained in proceedings in lunacy (g).

The statutes (h) of limitation do not expressly extend to equitable claims, but Courts of Equity act by analogy to those statutes; and, therefore, generally, if a party does not prosecute his equitable title within the period which he must have made his claim, if legal, in a Court of law, he will be barred in equity (i), except in cases of fraud (k). The legal provisions have been so strictly adhered to, that persons labouring under any of the disabilities specified in the statute of limitations, have been allowed the same time as they would be entitled to in the case of a legal claim (1). Thus, redemption of a mortgage of lands of a married woman, on account of her disability of coverture, was decreed to her heir after a sale and the lapse of a long period (m). And Lord Talbot said, "That the Court of Chancery had not in general thought proper to exceed twenty years, where there was no disability, in imitation of the first clause of the statute of limitations; so, after the disability removed, the time fixed for prosecuting in the proviso, (which is ten years), ought in like manner to be observed" (n).

In one case the Court refused, after the lapse of twenty years, and two subsequent purchases, at the suit of the

(f) Ex parte Clarke, In re Waugh, 2 Russ. 575.

(g) Ex parte Le Heup, 18 Ves. 221;

In re Frank, 24th Mar. 1830.

(h) See ante, pp. 403-405, n. (ƒ). (i) 1 Cox's Rep. 149; 1 Ball & B. 166; 19 Ves. 96; 1 Sch. & Lef. 429; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. 175, 191.

(k) 3 Br. C. C. 633, 639, n.; 4 Br. C. C. 258; 2 Ves. jun. 87; 5

Ves. 480; 14 Ves. 91; 2 Sch. & Lef. 607, 630; 1 Ball & B. 62, 156; 4 Br. P. C. 198.

(1) Lytton v. Lytton, 4 Bro. C. C. 441; Blake v. Foster, 2 Ball & Beat. 565; Harrison v. Hollins, 1 Sim. & Stu. 471.

(m) Cornel v. Sykes, 1 Ch. Rep.

193.

(n) In Belch v. Harvey, 3 P. Wms. 287, note. See 17 Ves. 184.

son of a non compos, to impeach a conveyance executed by the latter (o).

No petition of appeal from any decree or sentence of any Court of equity in England or Ireland, or of any Court in Scotland, will be received by the House of Lords after five years from the signing and enrolling, or extracting, of such decree or sentence and the end of the next session ensuing the said five years, unless the person entitled to such appeal be non compos mentis; in which case, such person may be at liberty to bring his appeal for reversing any such decree or sentence, at any time within five years next after his coming of sound mind, and the end of the next session of Parliament ensuing the said five years (p).

SECTION II.

Of Suits against Lunatics.

IDIOTS and lunatics defend suits in equity by their committees (a), who are, by order of the Court, appointed guardians for that purpose, as a matter of course (b); and, if it happens that an idiot or lunatic has no committee (c), or the committee has an interest opposite to that of the person whose property is intrusted to his care (d), an order may be obtained for appointing another person as guardian for the purpose of defending a suit (e).

(0) Winchcomb v. Hall, 1 Ch. Rep. 41. See 1 Fonbl. Eq. 334, n. (t). See ante, p. 282. See Whalley v. Whalley, 1 Mer. 436. S. C. 3 Bligh, p. 1. See Chap. vi. s. 3.

(p) Lords' Journals, 24th March, 1726.

(a) 1 Vernon, 106; Lyon v. Mercer, 1 Sim. & Stu. 356; Thomas v. Howorth, Toth. 130.

In many cases, it is not prudent in committees to take upon themselves the responsibility of defending suits instituted against lunatics without having obtained the direction of the Lord Chancellor, who, on application by petition, usually refers the consideration of the propriety of defending suits to the Master (f).

The practice of the Court of Chancery in appointing guardians for persons who cannot be found to be lunatics, or of unsound mind, by inquisition, was compared by Lord Eldon to the power exercised by that Court with respect to infants; and he said that such practice, and that of paying the expenses out of the property of such persons, could be justified only by the necessity of taking care of them (g).

If a person, who is in the condition of an idiot or lunatic, though not found such by inquisition, is made a defendant, the Court, upon information of his incapacity, will direct a guardian to be appointed; but if the demand in question was considerable, it was said that the regular way would have been to have taken out a commission of lunacy (h). In another case, where a motion was made that the answer of a defendant, who was a trustee only under a will without any beneficial interest, might be taken without oath and without signature, upon the ground that the defendant was in so infirm a state, both of body and of mind, as to be wholly incapable of putting in an answer-Lord Eldon observed, that the usual course in such a case is, to appoint a guardian for that purpose, and that it was much better, where there is no commission, to throw round a person, under such circumstances, the protection of some capable person, than to let her answer at all hazards; but no order was made in this case (i).

On the motion of a plaintiff in a cause, a guardian will be appointed to put in an answer for a defendant who is a lunatic, if such fact is verified by affidavit (k). If the fact

(f) See ante, pp. 179, 203, 204.
(g) Sherwood v. Sanderson, 19 Ves.
283, 289.

(h) Anon. 3 P. Wms. 111, n.
(i) Wilson v. Grace, 14 Ves. 172.

(k) Howlett v. Wilbraham, 5 Madd. 423; Attorney-General v. Waddington, 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 321; Pryce v. Page, Ibid. note.

of the defendant's being, from infirmity of mind, incompetent to answer, be disputed, it will be referred to the Master to inquire into it; and in one case an order was made for the defendant to attend the Master, with liberty for him to call in such medical assistance as he might think necessary in making such inquiry (7). Where it appeared in evidence that a defendant was both senseless and dumb, and incapable of instructing his counsel to draw his answer, it was ordered that no attachment, or other process of contempt should be awarded against the defendant for not answering without the special order of the Court (m). Where the defendant became impaired in his mind after the decree, a guardian was appointed him, by whom he might produce books, &c (n).

If a bill is brought against a lunatic, stating him to be such, it is a matter of course to apply to the Court for a commission to assign him a guardian, and to take his answer by such guardian; but if the bill does not state the defendant to be a lunatic, in that case an affidavit or other evidence will be required to shew his lunacy, before he can be permitted to answer by guardian (o). But where it was stated by the bill that one of three defendants thereto was a lunatic, and another his committee duly appointed by an order of the Court of Chancery, and the third, the receiver and manager of the estate in question, it was held, that the defendant, the committee, was, in that character, fully competent to sustain the defence of the lunatic, without an order of the Court of Exchequer appointing him his guardian (p). The practice is the same with respect to idiots and such persons as by age or infirmity are reduced to a second infancy. A dumb man has been directed to answer a bill, and also interrogatories, in person. But a person not only dumb, but too senseless to instruct counsel to draw an answer, would not be permitted to answer personally (q).

(1) Lee v. Ryder and Others, 6 Madd. 294; Reg. Lib. B. 1821, fol. 435.

(m) Altham v. Smith, Cary, Rep.

(n) Gason v. Garnier, 1 Dick. 286.
(0) 1 Fowl. Exch. 422.
(p) Ibid.

(1) Toth. 140, Wy. Pr. Reg. 292.

In a case where it was clear that a man was incompetent to put in an answer to the bill filed against him, Lord Redesdale said, he could only (like an infant) have answered by another person. If he had been so brought into Court upon an attachment, and an answer had been put in by the guardian appointed by the Court, on an apprehension that he was not of such an unsound mind, that a commission of lunacy ought to have been taken out, yet of such imbecility that a guardian was necessary, then the answer of the guardian ought to have been merely, that he knew nothing of the matter, and submitted his case to the protection of the Court (r). The distinction between town and country causes is not attended to in cases of commissions to assign guardians to persons non compotes mentis, which may be executed any where. The orders for the commissions having been drawn up, passed, and entered, names of commissioners must be left with the clerk in Court of the defendants, for insertion in the commissions; which differ in no respect from those to appoint guardians to infants, except in stating the parties incapable from the unsoundness of their understanding; the proceedings, mutatis mutandis, are the same as under commissions to appoint guardians to infants (s).

It is provided by a recent statute (t), that, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court, that any prisoner confined for a contempt is an idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind, although no commission has issued, the Court shall appoint a guardian to put in his answer and discharge the defendant, providing for the costs in any of the ways. pointed out by that act, as shall seem just; and if the Court shall see fit, the defence may be made by such guardian in formá pauperis.

If a defendant in a cause becomes a lunatic, a supplemental bill must be filed against him and his committee (v); and if a new committee is appointed, the Court will direct

(r) Carew v. Johnston, 2 Sch. & Lef. 293.

s. 15, rule 9.

(v) Johnson v. Legard, Reg. Lib. (s) Hind. 251. See Harr. Ch. Pr. A. 1815, fol. 556; and see 1 Sim. & by Newl. 361-366. 2 Madd. Ch. 523.

Stu. 356;

(t) 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 36,