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heard amid the filence and ftillnefs of the night, they become doubly fo. Darkness is very commonly applied for adding fublimity to all our ideas of the Deity "He maketh darknefs his pavilion; he dwelleth in the thick cloud." So Mil

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tion may be ftrongly affected, and, in fact, often is fo, by objects of which we have no clear conception. Thus we fee, that almost all the defcriptions given us of the appearances of fupernatural beings, carry fome fublimity, though the concep tions which they afford us be confufed and indiftinct. Their fubli

Thick clouds and dark, does heaven's all- mity arifes from the ideas, which

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Thefe paffages I quote at prefent, not fo much as inftances of fublime writing, though in themfelves they truly are fo, as to fhew, by the effect of them, that the objects which they prefent to us, belong to the clafs of fublime ones.

"Obfcurity, we are farther to remark, is not unfavourable to the fublime. Though it render the object indiftinct, the impreflion, however, may be great; for, as an ingenious author has well obferved, it is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination; and the imagina

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they always convey, of fuperior power and might, joined with an awful obfcurity. We may fee this fully exemplified in the following noble paffage of the book of Job. "In thoughts from the vifions of the night, when deep fleep falleth upon men, fear came upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to fhake. Then a spirit paffed before my face; the hair of my flesh ftood up: it stood still; but I could not difcern the form therof; an image was before mine eyes; there was filence; and I heard a voice-Shall God?" (Job iv. 15). No ideas, mortal man be more just than it is plain, are fo fublime as thofe taken from the Supreme Being; the most unknown, but the greatest of all objects; the infinity of whofe nature, and the eternity of whofe duration, joined with the omnipotence of his power, though they furpafs our conceptions, yet ex. alt them to the higheft. In general, all objects that are greatly raised above us, or far removed from us, either in fpace or in time, are apt to ftrike us as great. Our viewing them, as through the mist of distance or antiquity, is favourable to the impreffions of their sublimity.

"As obfcurity, fo diforder too, is very compatible with grandeur; nay, frequently heightens it. Few things that are strictly regular, and methodical, appear fublime. We fee the limits on every fide; we feel

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ourfelves confined; there is no room for the mind's exerting any great effort. Exact proportion of parts, though it enters often into the beautiful, is much difregarded in the fublime. A great mafs of rocks, thrown together by the hand of nature with wildnefs and confufion, ftrikes the mind with more grandeur than if they had been adjusted to each other with the most accurate fymmetry.

"In the feeble attempts, which human art can make towards producing grand objects (feeble, I mean, in comparison with the powers of nature), greatnefs of dimenfions always conftitutes a principal part. No pile of building can convey any idea of fublimity, unless it be ample and lofty. There is, too, in architecture, what is called greatnefs of manner; which feems chiefly to arife, from prefenting the object to us in one full point of view; fo that it fhall make its impreffion whole, entire, and undivided, upon the mind. A Gothic cathedral raifes ideas of grandeur in our minds, by its fize, its height, its awful obfcurity, its strength, its antiquity, and its durability.

"There still remains to be mentioned one clafs of fublime objects: what may be called the moral, or fentimental fublime; arifing from certain exertions of the human mind; from certain affections, and actions, of our fellow creatures. Thefe will be found to be all, or chiefly, of that clafs, which comes under the name of magnanimity or heroifm; and they produce an effect extremely fimilar to what is produced by the view of grand objects in nature; filling the mind with admiration, and elevating it above itself. noted inftance of this, quoted by all the French critics, is the celebrated Qu'il Mourut of Corneille, in the

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tragedy of Horace. In the famous combat betwixt the Horatii and the Curiatii, the old Horatius, being informed, that two of his fons are flain, and that the third had betaken himself to flight, at firit will not believe the report; but being thoroughly affured of the fact, is fired with all the fentiments of high honour and indignation at this fuppofed unworthy behaviour of his furviving fon. He is reminded, that his fon ftood alone against three, and afked what he would have had him to have done?" To have died," he answers. In the fame manner Porus, taken prifoner by Alexander, after a gallant defence, and afked in what manner he would be treated? anfwering, "Like a king;" and Cæfar chiding the pilot who was afraid to fet out with him in a ftorm, "Quid times? Cæfarem vehis;" are good inftances of this fentimental fublime. Wherever, in fome critical and high fituation, we behold a man uncommonly intrepid, and refting upon himfelf: fuperior to paffion and to fear; animated by fome great principle to the contempt of popular opinion, of felfith intereft, of dangers, or of death; there we are struck with a fenfe of the fublime.

High virtue is the most natural and fertile fource of this moral fublimity. However, on fome occafions, where virtue either has no place, or is but imperfectly displayed, yet if extraordinary vigour and force of mind be difcovered, we are not infenfible to a degree of grandeur in the character; and from the fplendid conqueror, or the daring confpirator, whom we are far from approving, we cannot with-hold our admiration.

"I have now enumerated a variety of inftances, both in inanimate objects and in human life, wherein

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the fublime appears. In all thefe inftances, the emotion raised in us is of the fame kind, although the objects that produce the emotion be of widely different kinds. A queftion next arifes, whether we are able to discover fome one fundamental quality in which all thefe different objects agree, and which is the caufe of their producing an emotion of the fame nature in our minds? Various hypothefis have been formed concerning this; but, as far as appears to me, hitherto unfatisfactory. Some have imagined that amplitude, or great extent, joined with fimplicity, is either immediately, or remotely, the fundamental quality of whatever is fublime; but we have feen that amplitude is confined to one fpecies of fublime objects; and cannot, without violent ftraining, be applied to them all. The author of a Philofophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful," to whom we are indebted for feveral ingenious and original thoughts upon this fubject, propofes a formal theory upon this foundation, that terror is the fource of the fublime, and that no objects have this character, but fuch as produce impreffions of pain and danger. It is indeed true, that many terrible objects are highly fublime; and that grandeur does not refufe an alliance with the idea of danger. But though this is very properly illuftrated by the author (many of whofe fentiments on that head I have adopted), yet he feems to ftretch his theory too far, when he reprefents the fublime as confifting wholly

in modes of danger, or of pain. For the proper fenfation of fublimity, appears to be very diftinguishable from the fenfation of either of these; and, on feveral occafions, to be entirely feparated from them. la many grand objects, there is no coincidence with terror at all; as in the magnificent profpect of wide extended plains, and of the starry firmament; or in the moral dispofitions and fentiments, which we view with high admiration; and in many painful and terrible objects alfo, it is clear, there is no fort of grandeur. The amputation of a limb, or the bite of a fnake, are exceed ingly terrible; but are deftitute of all claim whatever to fublimity. I am inclined to think, that mighty force or power, whether accompanied with terror or not, whether employed in protecting, or in alarming us, has a better title, than any thing that has yet been mentioned, to be the fundamental quality of the fublime; as, after the review which we have taken, there does not occur to me any fublime object, into the idea of which, power, ftrength, and force, either enter not directly, or are not, at least, intimately affociated with the idea, by leading our thoughts to fome aftonishing power, as concerned in the production of the ob ject. However, I do not infiit upon this as fufficient to found a general theory: it is enough, now to have given this view of the nature and different kinds of fublime objects; by which I hope to have laid a proper foundation for difcuffing, with greater accuracy, the fublime in writing and compofition.

ON BEAUTY, AS À SOURCE OF THE PLEASURES OF TASTE.

[From the fame Work.]

EAUTY, next to fublimity,

highest pleasure to the imagination. The emotion which it raifes, is very diftinguishable from that of fubli mity. It is of a calmer kind; more gentle and foothing; does not elevate the mind fo much, but produces an agreeable ferenity. Sublimity raises a feeling, too violent, as I fhowed, to be lafting; the pleasure arising from beauty admits of longer continuance. It extends alfo to a much greater variety of objects than fublimity; to a variety indeed fo great, that the feelings which beautiful objects produce, differ confiderably, not in degree only, but alfo in kind, from one another. Hence no word in the language is used in a more vague fignification than beauty. It is applied to almost every external object that pleases the eye, or the ear; to a great number of the graces of writing; to many difpofitions of the mind; nay, to feveral objects of mere abftract fcience. We talk currently of a beautiful tree or flower; a beautiful poem; a beautiful character; and a beautiful theorem in mathematics.

"Hence we may easily perceive, that, among fo great a variety of objects, to find out fome one quality in which they all agree, and which is the foundation of that agreeable fenfation they all raife, must be a very difficult, if not, more probably, a vain attempt. Objects, denominated beautiful, are fo different, as to please, not in virtue of any one quality common to them all, but by means of feveral different principles in human nature. The agreeable emotion which they all raife, is fome1783.

what of the fame nature; and, there

given to it; but it is raifed by dif ferent caufes.

Hypothefes, however, have been framed by ingenious men, for affign. ing the fundamental quality of beauty in all objects. In particular, uniformity amidst variety, has been infifted on as this fundamental quality. For the beauty of many figures, I admit that this accounts in a fatisfying manner. But when we endeavour to apply this principle to beautiful objects of fome other kind, as to colour for inftance, or motion, we shall foon find that it has no place. And even in external figured objects, it does not hold, that their beauty is in proportion to their mixture of variety with uniformity; feeing many pleafe us as highly beautiful, which have almoft no variety at all; and others, which are various to a degree of intricacy. Laying systems. of this kind, therefore, afide, what I now propofe is, to give an enumeration of feveral of thofe claffes of objects in which beauty most remarkably appears; and to point out, as far as I can, the feparate principles of beauty in each of them.

"Colour affords, perhaps, the fimpleft inftance of beauty, and therefore the fittest to begin with. Here, neither variety, nor uniformity, nor any other principle that I know, can be affigned, as the foundation of beauty. We can refer it to no other cause but the ftructure of the eye, which determines us to receive certain modifications of the rays of light with more pleasure than others. And we fee accordingly, that, as the organ of fenfa

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tion varies in different perfons, they have their different favourite co

lours. It is probable that affociation of ideas has influence, in fome cafes, on the pleafure which we receive from colours. Green, for in ftance, may appear more beautiful, by being connected in our ideas with rural profpects and fcenes; white, with innocence; blue, with the ferenity of the fky. Independently of affociations of this kind, all that we can farther obferve concerning colours is, that thofe chofen for beauty are, generally, delicate, rather than glaring. Such are thofe paintings with which nature hath ornamented fome of her works, and which art ftrives in vain to imitate; as the feathers of feveral kinds of birds, the leaves of flowers, and the fine variation of colours exhibited by the fky at the rifing and fitting of the fun. These prefent to us the higheft inftances of the beauty of colouring; and have accordingly been the favourite fubjects of poetical defcription in all countries.

"From 'colour we proceed to figure, which opens to us forms of beauty more complex and diverfified. Regularity first occurs to be noticed as a fource of beauty. By a regular figure, is meant, one which we perceive to be formed according to fome certain rule, and not left arbitrary, or loofe, in the conftruction of its parts. Thus, a circle, a fquare, a triangle, or a hexagon, please the eye, by their regularity, as beautiful figures. We must not, how ever, conclude, that all figures please in proportion to their regularity; or that regularity is the fole, or the chief, foundation of beauty in figure. On the contrary, a cer tain graceful variety is found to be a much more powerful principle of beauty; and is therefore ftudied a great deal more than regularity, in

all works that are defigned merely to please the eye. I am, indeed, inclined to think, that regularity appears beautiful to us, chiefly, if not only, on account of its fuggefting the ideas of fitnefs, propriety, and ufe, which have always a greater connection with orderly and proportioned forms, than with thofe which appear not constructed according to any certain rule. It is clear, that nature, who is undoubtedly the most graceful artist, hatb, in all her ornamental works, purfued variety, with an apparent neglect of regularity. Cabinets, doors, and windows, are made after a regular form, in cubes and parallelograms, with exact proportion of parts; and by being fo formed they please the eye; for this good reafon, that, being works of ufe, they are, by fuch figures, the better fuited to the ends for which they were defigned. But plants, flowers, and leaves are full of variety and diverfity. A ftraight canal is an infipid figure, in comparison of the maanders of rivers. Cones and pyramids are beautiful; but trees, growing in their natural wildness, are infinitely more beautiful than when trimmed into pyramids and cones. The apartments of a house must be regular in their difpofition, for the conveniency of its inhabitants; but a garden, which is defigned merely for beauty, would be exceedingly difgufting, if it had as much uniformity and order in its parts as a dwelling-houfe.

"Mr. Hogarth, in his Analyfis of Beauty, has obferved, that figures bounded by curve lines are, in general, more beautiful than those bounded by straight lines and angles. He pitches upon two lines, on which, according to him, the beauty of figure principally depends; and he has illuftrated, and fupported his

doctrine,

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