and had only a discretion as to the amount; that Mr. Kerrison, by maintaining the children, became a purchaser of the trust fund provided for their maintenance, which in fact he had received. They relied upon Stocken v. Stocken, 4 Myl. & Cr. 95; s. c. 7 Law Rep. J. (N.S.) Chanc. 305; Ransome v. Burgess, 36 Law J. Rep. Thomson v. Griffin, 1 Cr. & Ph. 317; MALINS, V.C., after stating the facts, said:-If there had been a marriage settlement; that is, if there had been a contract, the settled fund being provided by the wife or the wife's family-a fund provided otherwise than by the husband himself the case would be settled by authority, because, from the case in 4th Brown's Chancery Cases, the decision of Lord Cottenham in Stocken v. Stocken (ubi supra) and the more recent authorities referred to-and I am bound to say, Lord Cottenham seems to have decided in opposition to his own individual judg ment, as also did Sir Richard Kindersley in the case of Ransome v. Burgess (ubi supra)-it has been decided that it is a matter of contract that the husband should have the income applied to the maintenance of the children, although he may have allowed years to elapse-although he may have died without demanding it, it is a trust for him. Those are decisions which appear to me most irrational, but which, nevertheless, I must have followed, although I should have done so reluctantly, if this had been the case of a marriage settlement. But this is not the case of a marriage settlement. This is a purely voluntary settlement made by Mr. Kerrison upon his wife -he cannot contract with himself; he may form certain intentions, but contract he cannot. And I asked Mr. Bristowe whether any case was to be found in which such a construction had been put upon such an instrument, where it was not a marriage settlement. He has stated frankly that there is no such case, and therefore it is open to me to put what appears to me to be a rational construction on this settlement. Now what is the object of this settlement? I must take it to be just the same as if the money had been invested upon mortgage to some stranger. What, therefore, is the meaning of this settlement? I think it is this-"I settle upon my children 15,000l., and all the accumulations which I do not want for their maintenance; if I want it I will say so; if I want my children to be maintained I will apply to the trustees, and they will give me such part as they think fit; not only that, but they may pay it to me for my maintenance.' Upon what principle am I bound to say there was a trust for himself? Did he intend in this voluntary settlement to make a trust for himself? If he had, he would never have made it to his wife for life, with remainder to his children. He has shewn his object was to provide for his wife and children; he never had any intention to be one of the beneficiaries himself, unless by reason of change of circumstances he should apply to the trustees to allow such part as they thought fit for the maintenance of his children. He has never altered the destination of the property; and the decisions which have been quoted, in Stocken v. Stocken (ubi supra), Ransome v. Burgess (ubi supra), and the case of Mundy v. Earl Howe (ubi supra), which is the foundation of all of them, have all proceeded solely on the ground of the instrument being marriage settlements where the husband contracted to have a benefit out of the wife's property, and have not the slightest application to this case. I therefore come to the conclusion, that over and above the 15,0007., the trust fund consists of all those accnmulations which never were applied by the trustees for the maintenance of the children, and which the father never requested should be applied for his benefit. The Vice Chancellor accordingly made an order in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Solicitors-Messrs. Clarke, Woodcock & Ryland, for petitioners; Messrs. Parkers, Pritchard & Sharpe, agents for Messrs. Coaks & Rackham, Norwich, for respondents. : A testator gave and devised his real and personal estate to his wife for the use and benefit of herself and all his children :Held, that the wife took an estate for her life with remainder to the testator's children as joint tenants. This was a suit for the administration of the estate of Henry Newill, deceased. The ordinary decree for administration had been made, and the case now came before the Court on further consideration to determine the construction of the following clause of the testator's will: "I give, devise, and bequeath unto my wife, Anna Elizabeth Newill, for the use and benefit of herself and of all my children, whether born of my former wife or such as may be born of her, all my property of every description, real and personal, whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy at the time of my decease." The widow of the testator was living, as well as children of the testator by her and a former wife. Mr. Pearson and Mr. C. A. Holmes, for the plaintiffs, the infant children of the testator, contended that the widow and children took joint estates: they cited De Witte v. De Witte, 11 Sim. 41; Bustard v. Saunders, 7 Beav. 92; Bibby v. Thompson, 32 Beav. 647. Mr. Marcy, for the defendant, R. D. Newill, the plaintiffs' guardian, supported the plaintiffs' contention. Mr. Glasse and Mr. B. B. Rogers, for the defendant, the widow, contended that she took a life interest in the whole, with remainder after her decease to the children as joint tenants. They cited Audsley v. Horn, 26 Beav. 195; on appeal, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 226; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 201; Ward v. Grey, 26 Beav. 485; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 74; Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Ph. 553; s. c. 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 230; Lamb v. Eames, Law Rep. 10 Eq. 267; on appeal, 40 Law J. Rep. Jeffrey v. De Vitre, 24 Beav. 296; Re Owen, before V.C. Wickens, not Mr. Pearson, in reply, cited Mason v. Clarke, 17 Beav. 126; s. c. 22 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 956. MALINS, V.C., said that the question was what was the intention of the testator, and looking at that alone, if there had been no authority on the point, he should have thought it clear that the property ought to go to the wife for her life. He was, however, somewhat hampered by decisions which were numerous and conflicting. But the balance of recent authority was in favour of giving a life estate to the wife, and as that was in accordance with his view of the testator's intention, he should decide that the wife took an estate in the whole for her life, with remainder after her decease to the children as joint tenants. nican Convent at Carisbrook (payable to the superior for the time being), and The Sisters of the Charity of St. Paul, at Selley Oak, near Birmingham (payable to the superior thereof for the time being). The receipts of the priests and superiors were respectively made discharges for the same. The testa trix died seized of (inter alia) considerable realty, and pure and impure personalty, all subject to her appointment. The priests each claimed only one-fourth of the resi due of the pure personalty, which was not disputed:-Held, that the appointment in favour of the Dominican Convent was valid, in toto, but that in favour of the Sisters at Selley Oak was good as a charitable bequest only. The legal status of an English Convent discussed and defined. The plaintiff in this suit was one of the executors of the will of Frances Manners; the defendants were her husband, the other executor, and Geneviève Dupuis, the superior of the Sisters of the Charity of St. Paul at Selley Oak, near Birmingham. The testatrix by her will, dated the 1st day of June, 1867, and made in pursuance of a power, appointed, devised, and bequeathed as follows: "I, Frances Manners, wife of William Whichcote Manners, of Newport, in the Isle of Wight, Esq., declare this to be my last will and testament; and I do hereby, pursuant to every power me enabling, appoint and bequeath all the property belonging to my separate use at my death, or over which I have any power of disposition as follows:-All my jewellery, watches, and ornaments, I leave to my executors, to divide among my children in any way they think best and suitable; and the residue of my disposable property I leave equally between the following religious institutions, viz.:-The Newport Catholic Chapel, for the general purposes thereof, and payable to the officiating priest for the time being; the Brighton Catholic Chapel, in Upper St. James's Street, payable for the like purposes to the officiating priest; the Dominican Convent at Carisbrook (payable to the superior for the time being), and the Sisters of the Charity of St. Paul at NEW SERIES, 40.-CHANC. Selley Oak, near Birmingham, payable to the superior thereof for the time being; and I declare that the receipts of the officiating priests of the said chapels, and the receipts of the superiors of the other two institutions, for the time being respectively, shall be good discharges to my executors. And I appoint my husband and my brother-in-law, John Somers Cocks, Esq., to be my executors. And I leave to my husband, as a memorial of me, my small black marble clock, and to my said brother-in-law the miniatures of himself and his wife; and to my godchild, Frances Cocks, one diamond ring (single hoop)." The testatrix died on the 19th of February, 1870. Limited probate of the will was, on the 4th of July, 1870, granted to the executors, and administration, cœterorum bonorum, was subsequently granted to her husband. The testatrix was, at her death, seized of realty; and possessed of personalty, both pure and impure, all subject to her testamentary appointment or disposition. The bill in this suit prayed that it might be declared how far the trusts and dispositions of the will were legal and valid; and that the same, so far as they were legal and valid, might be performed and carried into execution; and that the estate and property comprised in or subject to the will might be administered by the Court, and for the usual accounts, enquiries, and directions. On the 5th of November, 1870, a decree was made. On the 9th of June, 1871, the Chief Clerk, by his certificate, found (inter alia) that the realty of the testatrix, over which she had a power of appointment by will, consisted of a moiety of two pieces of freehold land at Clapham, in the county of Surrey, valued at 6251.; and that her impure personalty consisted of a sum of 21,300l., invested on a mortgage of freeholds, and forming a part of a sum of 21,3771. 11s. 3d., subject to the trusts of her marriage settlement, executed in 1856. Under that deed, the testatrix had a power of appointing that fund by will, if her husband did not exercise a power of appointment over it, in favour of his children, reserved to him, and if no child of their marriage attained 4 N a vested interest in it. There were several children, and the husband had exercised his power: but no child had yet attained a vested interest. The impure personalty also consisted of a sum of 3221. 4s. 4d., for the interest due on the mortgage till the death of the testatrix; and of a further sum of 4,615l. 14s. 9d. Bank Annuities, the result of the investment of part of the moiety of the purchase money of certain real estate, bequeathed by an uncle of the testatrix to her, for her separate use, but not actually sold till after her death. The pure personalty consisted of a sum of 771. 11s. 3d., the balance of the 21,377l. 11s. 3d. in the hands of the settlement trustees; 2001. 14s. 3d. Bank Annuities, purchased with the residue of the money arising from the sale of the uncle's estate; and a sum of 219l. 12s. 10d. cash, the balance of the moiety of the uncle's residuary personal estate, also bequeathed to the testatrix for her separate use. The outstanding personal estate, not specifically appointed, therefore comprised the aforesaid mortgage debt and interest; the balance of the settlement moneys, namely, the 771. 11s. 3d.; the 2191. 12s. 10d.; and a sum of 4,8161. 98. Bank Annuities, representing the whole of the testatrix's share of the purchase money of her uncle's realty. The Chief Clerk had reserved, for the consideration of the Court, the questions-whether the Dominican convent at Carisbrook, and the Sisters of the Charity of St. Paul, at Selley Oak, or either and which of them, were or was charitable institutions or a charitable institution ? With respect to the Dominican Convent at Carisbrook, it appeared from the evidence of Agnes Barker, the superior of it, that that institution was the only one of that name at Carisbrook; that for several years before the death of the testatrix and ever since, it had been and now is an institution consisting of Roman Catholic females, living together by mutual agreement in a state of celibacy, and under a common superior, for the purpose of sanctifying their own souls by prayer and pious contemplation within their institution; and without performing external works or providing for public worship, or engaging in education, or receiving or visiting the sick, or poor, or indigent, or children; and without relieving the poor, except casually and accidentally, and not as one of the objects of the institution; and without engaging in any of the corporal works of mercy; that it had not been and is not any part of the duties or objects or ordinary functions of the institution to perform works of charity; that the institution was not, before or at the death of the testatrix, and is not now a charitable institution; and that a small portion of the chapel attached to the institution was registered and open to the use of the public. With respect to the Sisters of the Charity of St. Paul at Selley Oak, the defendant, Geneviève Dupuis, deposed that they had existed as an institution since 1704; that they were formerly at Banbury; that she had been connected with the institution in England since 1847, and nearly all the present members had been admitted since that time; that in 1864 they were established at Selley Oak; that the congregation of the sisters, which was the institution, so, for several years, established there, was composed of Roman Catholic women living together by mutual consent, partly at Selley Oak, and partly at various subordinate establishments in other parts of England to which members of the congregation were from time to time sent, they still continuing members of the institution at Selley Oak; that the primary object of the congregation was the personal sanctification of its members, who as a means thereto employed themselves in the exercise of works of piety and charity, and principally in teaching the children of the poor, and in nursing the sick. They were enjoined to apply themselves sedulously to acquire sufficient skill and knowledge to enable them to become teachers in schools and nurses of the sick; and when found to be fully competent they were chiefly employed in those capacities in localities where their services were required; and they received small stipends for their services from those at whose instance they rendered them. That in order to procure admission into the con gregation a portion was required from each member during the period of her probation and training, and until she was qualified to earn a livelihood by her own exertions; all moneys thus received, and all moneys earned by the members, were paid into the common fund of the congregation at Selley Oak, and were the property of the members of the congregation, and were applied for the maintenance and support of such members, and otherwise at their discretion; and it was their habit to give to works of religion and piety, and in almsgiving, at their discretion, any surplus thereof beyond what was required for the purposes of the congregation; that the members of it retained their vested rights in any property which might belong to them; but, while members of the congregation the receipt and application of its revenues was interdicted to them; and for that reason, before their admission they were required to make over to some person or persons of their own selection the administration of all their property, and to direct the application of its revenues according to instructions then given; but such disposal of property was provisional only, and ceased to have any effect in case they left the congregation; and a power of revocation, even while remaining in the congregation, might be inserted in the deed if desired. The same rule applied to any property which might come to the members after their admission by way of inheritance or by bequest; they might dispose of it by will or by deed of gift, if such disposition was made with the consent of the superior and council of the congregation; and with the like consent they might also execute any legal document and do any other legal act required of them, for any of the above named purposes. If the parents or near relations of any of the members became involved in difficulties so as to be in real want, such members might ask that the whole or a competent part of any property which they might have brought into the congregation might be applied to their relief; and the superior and council of the congregation might order accordingly. The deponent further stated that the present buildings of the institution were provided by their own earnings, which went into a common fund; and that the expenses of the institution were paid for out of the same source, the buildings being kept in repair out of the common fund; that their earnings were derived chiefly from teaching the poor, not in England, and from nursing the sick; that they were not remunerated for nursing the sick in England, because they had no hospitals; that she and three assistants, who were sisters, managed the affairs of the institution, and they had not to consult anyone outside the establishment on any question; that the management of their property was wholly controlled by herself and the three sisters; that "the rules and constitution of the congregation of Sisters of Charity of St. Paul in England" were the only ones regulating the affairs of their establishment; that she and the three sisters admitted new members from time to time, and they needed not to obtain the sanction of anyone else; that when a new member was admitted she reserved the capital of her property, but the revenue belonged to the community; that they still retained the ownership of their property, but some one administered it for them; that the "instructions," to which she referred (as above), were given by the new members, and in whatever they wished to do with their own, they were free; that as to whatever came to them after admission, they had the same right to dispose of it; and it was put into the hands of the administrator, if they wished it; but that the revenue of the property of each member went to the common fund, for the support of the members; that if they required the consent of the superior and council to dispose of their property, they asked for it; that they had a chapel attached to the institution in England, in which the public services of the community were provided out of the common fund; that the property in the buildings of the institution was vested in four or five members for the purposes of the institution, and belonged to the community; that if they should be dissolved, everyone would take her share, but that so long as they were not dissolved, the property would go on for the community, and that |