New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure: Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association in Ottawa, Canada
MIT Press, 1986 - 559 oldal
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.
The contributors are Joseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta.
Joseph E. Stiglitz is Professor of Economics at Princeton University. G. Frank Mathewson is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto.
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Address Models of Value Theory G C Archibald B C
Strategic Competition and the Persistence of Dominant
Preemptive Competition Richard J Gilbert
Elementary Theory of Slackridden Imperfect
Vertical Integration and Related Variations on
Vertical Integration and Assurance of Markets Jerry
The Economics of Vertical Restraints
On the Stability of Collusion C dAspremont and
Competition and Industrial Organisation in the Centrally
THE PERFECTLY CONTESTABLE
COMPETITION AND MARKET
Theory of Competition Incentives and Risk Joseph
Evolutionary Modelling of Economic Change Richard
Cost Reduction Competition and Industry
The Theory of Technological Competition Partha
Coordination Steven C Salop
Workers Management and the Market Branko Horvat
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advertising American Economic Review analysis appropriate assume assumption behaviour Bell Journal buyers capacity capital cartel characteristics collusive scheme competitors consumers contestability contestable markets contract cost reduction credible curve Dasgupta demand deter entry discounts discussion Dixit dynamic econ economies of scale effects efficient elasticity enterprises entry deterrence equation established firm example existing firms firm's fixed costs function given implies incentives increase incumbent firm innovation inputs investment Journal of Economics labour long-run managers marginal cost market structure maximise Monopolistic Competition monopoly moral hazard Nash equilibrium number of firms oligopolistic oligopoly optimal organisation outcome output patent pay-off possible post-entry potential entrants pre-emptive problem product differentiation profits rational reduce relative restrictions result retail returns to scale rivals Salop scale Schmalensee Section seller specific Spence spill-overs Stiglitz strategy subsidies suggested sunk costs symmetric equilibrium theory tion variables vertical integration welfare zero