in time and refrained. The driver would have been deeply offended had he been offered money, and tact made the man one of Lord Bryce's disciples from thence onward. Lord Reading described in my hearing how he was rather afraid of the American reporters on his first visit to America during the war. When they clustered round him on the steamer he was in a dilemma owing to the heavy responsibility of his mission. He took a chance. He told the newspaper men frankly that he had a lot of information he could give them which must not be published and some that could. He asked if they would respect his confidence if he put his cards on the table. They promised. He gave them a pretty complete explanation of how affairs stood. Not only did those newspaper men keep faith implicitly, but there was not one of them from that time onward who did not have a good word for the British Ambassador on all kinds of occasions. Lord Reading, like Lord Bryce, was a great success in America. His eminence in Britain helped him. But it would not have gone far if he had not been what the Americans call a 'mixer.' A British Ambassador must not only look after the interests of his country at the State Department, but must in his personality bring his country home to the American public. It is not really a hard task for the right man. Lord Grey will find that the people of the United States will receive him with open arms.

One of the great assets of Britain in America throughout the war was Lord Grey's struggle for peace before hostilities began. Americans are not a war-loving people. They hate the whole business of war-when they are in cold blood. German propaganda playing on ancient prejudices spread abroad the suggestion, widely accepted at first, that Britain had planned the

war, and by subtle means had driven Europe into conflict in order to secure her own ends. Not for months was the truth properly brought home. Subsequently, with the wide publicity given to Lord Grey's dispatches and his public announcements, it was realized that Britain's Foreign Minister had not only not fomented war, but had striven with might and main to eliminate it. As the circles of information became wider and wider they broke down much prejudice. His words and actions contributed more, perhaps, than those of any one man to start that great new volume of feeling for Britain which marked the progress of the war.

Popular sentiment in America has receded somewhat from Britain in recent months (though it is even now immeasurably in advance of what it was before the war). A score of influences have contributed to this, perhaps the principal one being the Sinn Fein agitation, which even on our hosts of friends in America has left the impression that we are muddling the government of Ireland. So far as other matters are concerned a dozen different persons will give you a dozen different reasons, some of them contradicting each other. The reaction after brotherhood-in-arms is perhaps one of the general causes. There is, moreover, the League of Nations project, which, while I believe a large majority of Americans would support it, has roused violent opposition among leading Republicans, who hate President Wilson, and produced some eddies of opinion with regard to Britain. The shipping of the world, the trade supply of the world, are matters which, in view of the fact that America must now become, at least for a time, the principal supply depot for all countries, have aroused controversies and questions in which the British Empire is inevitably involved. Lord Grey's prestige as the

recent head of the British Foreign Office will automatically produce a way out of many difficulties. Still more will be solved by the knowledge that he is a man of high scruple, seeking no unfair advantage for his own. country. I attach more importance to this than to the fact that he will bring an unsurpassed knowledge of Foreign

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Office administration to bear at Washington. It will strengthen him that he has always been a strong advocate of Anglo-American coöperation.

It is good news for the British Empire that Lord Grey is going to America. He has a giant's task before him. I believe he has a better chance than any living Englishman of accomplishing it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recently declared in the House of Commons that he soon intended to occupy himself with the Irish problem. Questioned by Sir Donald Maclean, leader of the liberal opposition, he replied, "The government will surely submit certain propositions to Parliament at the earliest possible occasion.' Mr. Lloyd George, it is true, added that this occasion would present itself only at the opening of the autumnal session; nevertheless the Irish question has been put before the world, publicly and officially, by the British Government itself. There is no indiscretion, therefore, in commenting upon it.

In dealing with this subject, which we make no pretense of exhausting in a day, and whose developments we must follow successively, our goal is the true well-being of all concerned. After the war, as well as during it, France remains absolutely loyal to England, her ally of tragic days. On the other hand, after the war as well as during it, an instinctive and ancient sympathy unites Frenchmen and Irishmen. This sympathy has been lately stirred to deeper life by the coming of American soldiers to fight

by our side, for many of these Americans were of Irish descent, and we know that the cause of Ireland has a large popular following in the United States. Simple spectators of Irish events, we wish in our hearts to see this long struggle which has lasted for seven centuries and a half, ended at last by the triumph of a new spirit, the spirit which should inspire the League of Nations.

From the legal point of view, the Irish problem to-day appears very clear. A law of 1914 arranged for autonomy, 'Home Rule,' in Ireland. This law is intended to go into effect, six months after the end of the war. It would seem at first that there was nothing to be done but to await the expiration of the legal period of delay, and then begin the test of the new régime. But because of financial reasons, this régime has lost its foundations, and because of political reasons no one will have anything to do with it. On the very eve of the war the Orangemen of Dublin were preparing an armed insurrection, so unwilling were they to accept the Home Rule government of Dublin. Since then, on Easter Monday, 1916, there has been a revolt at

Dublin; the chiefs of the revolutionists rejecting Home Rule altogether, and demanding complete independence. The revolt was suppressed, but the suppression had its martyrs. At the elections of December last, it was seen that the Sinn Feiners, that is to say the partisans of an independent Irish Republic, had on their side the immense majority of the Irish people out side the unionist districts of Ulster. Again, all the unionists are not Orangemen à l'outrance in the manner of Sir Edward Carson; this was clearly seen three months ago when the Carsonist candidate was beaten in the East Antrim contest by a more moderate unionist.

It may be recalled that the Sinn Fein members of Parliament have refused to sit in the British House of Commons. They have formed at Dublin an organization which they consider the foundation of a democratic and independent government. But they have no material power at their disposition, for the British authorities have proceeded to the military occupation of Ireland and have applied martial law. Few notes on the working of the system of occupation have been published. Sir Arthur SteelMailland, once under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, said recently in the House of Commons, 'The veil should be lifted. We should know what is taking place at our doors.' The British Government, however, has not yet responded to this appeal, and since 'the veil' has not been lifted, it is difficult to deliver an impartial judgment on the internal condition of Ireland. A lucid review of the history of Irish affairs during recent years may be found in M. Louis Tréguiz's book Ireland in the Universal Crisis. Let us allow him to explain the past, reserving for the instant our views on the present and the future.

For some time it has been customary to regard the Irish question as largely a religious one. It was said that the partisans of Irish autonomy or independence were, in general, Catholics, and that all the Protestants. wished to maintain the union. This very summary distinction should be set aside, for it by no means conforms to the reality. Among the most intransigeant champions of Irish independence are emphatic Protestants. The heart of the Irish question is that it is above all a question of nationality, of race, even the Celtic race. Professor Erin MacNeile, described as 'a true Ulster Scot,' writing in the League of Nations Journal for June last, prints these words 'We of Ireland have only the power of being faithful. Even were we to judge the present by the past, this, indeed, is the worst thing that can possibly happen to us, to be the only nation of the white race, governed against its will by the government of another people. This state of things cannot last.'

How, then, can such a state of things be brought to an end? In the absence of all sign from the government, our colleague of the Times has had the merit of seeking and proposing a solution. He expected it to be criticized on every hand, as it was. But he also hoped that his scheme might be a foundation, or a pretext even, for some move of the government's, and this expectation has not been realized. In his recent declarations, Mr. Lloyd George contented himself with saying that he had kept watch on the effect produced by the Times proposals. 'I have observed the result. This programme is one which all the Irish parties have been unanimous in condemning. Such is the experience of everyone who brings forward a programme.'

According to these words, it seems

as if the British Government had abandoned hope of finding an amiable equilibrium between the claims of the Irish republicans, the resistances of the Ulster Unionists, and the interests of England. That is why of all the schemes so far advanced barely two remain.

The first of these is the work of Major Erskine Childers, an Irish Protestant who distinguished himself during the war. This scheme would withdraw all the British troops from Ireland, would guarantee that troops should not be used in part of Ireland to sustain any faction of government, and would organize a referendum by which the Irish people should with full liberty of action pronounce on the form of government they preferred. Assuredly this referendum would not suppress all the difficulties. No matter what scheme carried the day, no matter what the nature of the majority behind it, dissidents would always remain, and it is the existence of these very dissidents which, up to our own days, in appearance at least, has constituted the principal obstacle to solutions of the Irish problem. Nevertheless, one may answer, by such a referendum a double progress may be accomplished. First of all, one could have under one's eyes, a regular and complete expression of the wishes of the Irish. Moreover, all intervention

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of the British army being counted out, votes for or against the union cannot be written down as due to considerations alien to the proper interest of Irish citizens.

In an article which the Nineteenth Century and After has recently published, Lord Dunraven comes out squarely against the project which we. have just examined. He advises the transformation of the United Kingdom into a federal union, and would make Ireland one of the federated states. As this solution nowhere comes up to the claims of the Sinn Feiners, it can be safely prophesied that the proposition will be rejected by a large majority of the Irish. Lord Dunraven is prepared for such a contingency and adds, 'In the event of rejection, what is to be done? In my opinion Ireland should be administered under the new constitutional statute and according to its conditions, substituting nomination for election until the people take it over as a representative system. The Crown can by its deputy summon whom it will to councils of the type existing in India and many of the Crown Colonies.'

Such are the two possibilities in the foreground. The other day Mr. Lloyd George seemed to favor the second, to prepare a scheme for Ireland, and if Ireland rejects it, to take the responsibility of its application.

GOOD relations between Great Britain and America are one of the hinges of peace, and like all hinges they must be well made and well oiled. The reasons for this state of affairs are so plain that they need no elaborate exposition. The war has eliminated three of the socalled Great Powers for all practical purposes; it has gravely impaired the strength of two others, leaving only three capable of playing a decisive part in the world's affairs during the next ten years. Two of these the United States and Japan - lie outside Europe; the third the British Commonwealth is the only European state which by reason of its intrinsic power and its vigorous Dominions overseas can take any immediate and effective share in high politics. Of the three, Great Britain is the hardest hit by the war, though much less seriously hurt than most of her continental neighbors; but (because of her wise economic policy, which some headstrong business politicians' hope to reverse) she is capable of a rapid industrial recovery if only all classes will coöperate to produce wealth as quickly and efficiently as possible. I recognize, as everyone must, that the immediate signs of the times are not very favorable to that coöperation; but I assume confidently that the innate 'horse sense' of the British people will rescue it from the perils that now beset it. Whatever the outcome of our present discontents may be, our responsibilities, liabilities, and relative influence in the world are greater than they ever

were before; and since they lie in large part in or around the Western hemisphere it is obvious that our interest in the great land-block which divides the Pacific from the Atlantic Ocean can never be slight and will probably grow as the years pass. We do not suggest thereby that British policy should be deflected from its appointed course by the magnet of our interest in America. Far from it; but I believe that we shall more and more find that our true interest and the American magnet draw us in the same direction.

The word 'interest' raises an important point. Anglo-American relations are suffering from the turgid generalities of sentimentalists who persist in proclaiming the amiable untruth that in politics blood is thicker than water. Blood is not thicker than water unless the blood relations cherish common ideals and serve a common purpose. It is, therefore, the duty of Anglo-American propagandists to stop paying one another the easy compliments that are born of the innocuous inebriation of the political banquet and to set to work to show that Britain and America draw their political inspiration from the same sources, act in practice on the same political assumptions, and pursue political paths in foreign policy which, though not identical, are closely parallel. I hope, then, that we have come to an end of the empty generalities of the AngloAmerican situation and are about to enter upon a sincere exploration of the new political world which lies open be