dient, will hardly be denied. . . . The states of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States.

...

To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. . . . There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by a European Power of political control over an American state.

That Mr. Olney's dispatch gave a wide extension to the principles laid down by President Monroe will hardly be denied, nor that it was needlessly provocative in tone; but Lord Salisbury declined to be provoked. He did, indeed, refuse to accept 'unrestricted' arbitration, and politely questioned the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the matter in hand. It was, however, manifest from his reply that he had no intention of allowing Great Britain to be drawn into a serious

quarrel with the United States. Lord Salisbury's good humor tended rather to provoke than to appease the wrath of the United States, and on December 17, 1895, President Cleveland sent a special message to Congress, wherein he declared that

If a European Power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will, and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European Power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be dangerous to our peace and safety.

This message, notwithstanding its decorous moderation of language, accentuated a difficult situation, and

feeling began to run very high in America. Fortunately for us,' writes an American critic,' Lord Salisbury had a very good sense of humor, and declined to take the matter too seriously.'

Both Great Britain and Venezuela agreed to submit the evidence for their conflicting claims to a 'committee of investigation' appointed by the United States; and the investigation issued in a Treaty of Arbitration, concluded nominally between the immediate disputants, but in reality between Great Britain and the United States. The result of the arbitration was, on the whole, to substantiate the British claim. A still more important result ensued. In January, 1897, a General Arbitration Treaty between the two great English-speaking nations was signed by Sir Julian Pauncefote and Secretary Olney. The Senate, however, refused its assent, and the treaty was not actually concluded until the autumn of 1914.

In the interval a very significant change had taken place in the attitude

of the United States toward world

politics. The Venezuelan affair proved to be the starting point for a new departure in American diplomacy. From the position then asserted by Mr. Olney, his countrymen could not well recede. That position involved, moreover, important corollaries. If the United States is 'practically sovereign' on the American continent, if 'its fiat is law,' it could not avoid responsibility for the doings of its neighbors. Several of those neighbors have shown themselves both weak and turbulent, and in 1904 President Roosevelt frankly admitted that 'the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power.'

As a fact, the policy of isolation had already been abandoned. The war with Spain in 1898 was followed by the definite assumption of responsibilities in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. The annexation of the Hawaiian Islands (1898), the partition of Samoa (1899), and still more the conquest of the Philippines, unmistakably proclaimed the advent of a new world power. The Zeit-Geist had proved itself too strong even for the Americans. As President McKinley wrote in 1898:

The march of events rules and over-rules human action . . . the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation, on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

The United States afforded a further indication of its new position in world politics by taking part, in 1900, with the leading European Powers in the relief of Peking and the punishment of the Boxers.

But all these manifestations of the new spirit, with others too numerous to recall, pale into insignificance as compared with the great resolution taken in 1917. Few will question the accuracy of Lord Bryce's words ut

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tered in 1917: 'With the entrance of the United States into this war a new chapter opened in world history. It was an occasion of solemn significance for all the ages to come.' To this judgment one observation may, however, be added. The new chapter is one toward the opening of which events have been tending with some rapidity since 1898, if not since 1895. The resolution to which President Wilson brought his country in 1917, though far transcending in significance any previous resolution in regard to external affairs, was in harmony with the whole trend of American policy for the last twenty years. Still more important: it was in harmony with the development of Welt-politik. During the last generation the world has become one in a sense of which no one dreamed forty years ago. The expansion of Europe' is the formula in which a brilliant historian has recently crystallized the political developments of the last half-century. The formula expresses the truth, but not quite the whole truth. If Europe has expanded, the world has shrunk; and, in the process of contraction, the American, Australian, and African continents have been inevitably drawn into the maelstrom of European politics.

THE Covenant of the League of Nations, made public by President Wilson on the 14th of February, 1919, is evidence of a momentous period of transition in world relations and, like a head of Janus, it looks in two directions. A pessimist might regard it as an instrument for perpetuating the existing superiority of certain governments to our disadvantage, and as intended to oppress us permanently. An optimist will hope that the statute will gradually be amended and modified, so as eventually to guarantee the vital interests of every nation, and to assure a status of just peace. This double character of a covenant that, unfortunately, is not born of the pure spirit of pacifism, has the defect of being more political than juristic in its nature. Its provisions are to some extent elastic and susceptible of varied. interpretation. In regard to precision and definiteness of draft and consistency of form and arrangement, the Paris project is incomparably inferior to the draft proposed by the German Society of International Law. It is also decidedly inferior to the draft proposed by a Swiss federal commission of experts, which has also considered this topic.

The Paris Covenant creates three governing organs-a body of delegates, an executive council, and an international secretariat. The body of delegates, to which each government is permitted to send three representatives, follows the suggestion of The Hague Peace Conference in meeting only at intervals. Unfortunately —

for this is a very serious defect the Executive Council likewise is not a continuously functioning institution, but ordinarily will meet only once a year. This Executive Council will likewise perform the function of an international mediation office, in case of controversies of a non-political character. This adds to the importance of the manner in which it is constructed. Although the evolution of international law has been consistently in the direction of a nonpartisan authority to settle controversies between governments, and the reform most urgently advocated in this procedure has been the elimination of political influence, which, arising as it does from the governments themselves, gives such procedure the character of partisan intervention, the Paris Covenant commits this mediation to an executive council constituted entirely along old diplomatic lines, composed of the representatives of the Great Powers and of four other states elected by the body of delegates. Were we to assume that the present political alliances were likely to be permanent, the German Empire, upon entering such a League of Nations, would incur the peril of unjust and arbitrary treatment by this Executive Council. To be sure, commissions may be appointed to investigate special cases; but if the Executive Council is to decide by a majority vote when the latter course is to be taken, this does not constitute any ground of fair treatment.

Quite remarkably the question as

to where the League will have its headquarters is left unsettled, although The Hague, with its Peace Palace, has an undisputed moral claim to this distinction. The admission of new members, such as Germany, is to depend upon a ballot in which at least two thirds of the member governments shall vote. The proposition that dominions and colonies having an autonomous government shall become members, with equal rights, strengthens the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon element.

A more questionable proposition still is the one making admission to the League conditional upon the applicant giving special guaranties, and in particular obligating itself to a reduction of armament to a maximum fixed by the League itself. It goes without saying that a new government entering the League would obligate itself to conform to the general principles of the League in regard to limitation of armaments. The dangerous point is that one group of nations is given the final word as to the armament of the new member, without its having any voice whatever, while the governments already in the League do have a voice in regard to the general armament programme. The fact that, instead of fixing a general scale of disarmament to apply equally to every country, such as 25 per cent of the force maintained prior to the present war proposed in the German draft we have mentioned, the geographical situation of each country is to be taken into account - another proposition which may be so employed by a hostile majority as to endanger Germany. If such a provision were to be honestly enforced by an absolutely non-partisan authority, then there is no country in the world that would have a greater interest in this last provision than Germany itself.

So long as we remain out of this League of Nations, it is nothing else than an ambitious alliance of our opponents against us; for a military danger threatening any member is to be a matter for common action. All League members obligate themselves to submit their controversies either to arbitration or to mediation by the Executive Council. A really permanent international court is to be organized for arbitration. Naturally, the decree of that court is final, and if it is not complied with within three months the Executive Council will enforce it. If a political conflict is involved, which is not justiciable, and if the Executive Council does not succeed in bringing the parties to an agreement, the Executive Council publishes its decision. If all the members of the League who are not parties to the controversy are unanimous, the judgment of the League becomes obligatory, and the Executive Council in such a case is authorized to enforce the decision against the party which rejects it. If the Executive Council is not unanimous, the majority is obligated and the minority is authorized to publish reports, stating their opinion of the merits of the case and their proposals for its settlement. In this case, therefore, the reports have only moral sanction; and it looks as if the door were open for war between the contestants, qualified by the fact that they must not begin actual hostilities within three months.

It follows from what has just been said that if we were members of the League, for instance, and became involved in some new controversy with England, and the Executive Council issued a unanimous judgment against us, we would have to submit, for otherwise we could be compelled to do so under Article 16 of the Paris Covenant. In order to enforce the judg

ment, the League could employ an absolute economic boycott against us and our subjects, and, if necessary, military force. The Executive Council would determine what force each state should contribute for the latter purpose. The members of the League grant members the right to convey their military forces through their respective territories, and obligate themselves to distribute upon a fair basis the losses and expenses involved in the enforcement of an economic boycott.

We cannot say in respect of all these provisions that they do not agree with existing principles of international law. They seem intended rather to develop those principles, although the methods they use in some instances are open to criticism. But Article 17 is

a

monstrous provision. It defines what is to occur if a member of the League of Nations becomes involved. in war with an outside government, or if two outside governments become involved in war with each other. Without regard to the elements of justice in the controversy, the League of Nations assumes authority over the outside governments, and would force them to submit to the obligations of members of the League and to bring their case before its tribunals at the peril of having the League intervene directly. This means in practice that the League of Nations would impose its sovereignty upon outside governments whether they wish it or not.

The methods proposed by the Covenant to plunder us or our colonies under false pretenses, and to camouflage English and French annexations

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from the territories of the Turkish Empire, have already been generally ventilated. So far as international legislation for the welfare of the working people is concerned, the Covenant contents itself with a few meaningless phrases, and provides for an international labor bureau. A more practical provision places all the international bureaus under the supervision of the League of Nations; and another one provides that international treaties shall not become effective until they have been registered at the international office and have been published. All special agreements that violate the fundamental principles of the League are abrogated.

It would carry us too far afield to mention all the things that are, unfortunately, omitted in this project. We merely mention that the internationalization of the open seas, which Wilson advocated, has been entirely cast aside. In spite of all these defects, it would be a short-sighted policy to condemn the principle of a League of Nations on account of this imperfect and dubious statute. That principle has at last begun to take real root in Germany. The tragic experiences of the war will force the world into a League. No League of Nations can succeed permanently without the coöperation of a nation of Germany's rank. The League of Nations must have us and we must have a League of Nations. A recognition of this fact will lead us to hope that before peace is finally brought about we shall have discovered some basis of agreement for establishing this institution.