stability can we hope to find under any as that. They considered that in repubconstitution in which the principle of a lican, though in a less degree than in single legislature is established? Let us other governments, legislators are liable now turn to the history of the United to forget their obligations to their conStates. Throughout the whole of them stituents, and that therefore a second the powers of legislature are vested in branch of the legislature, dividing power two houses. In their national legisla- with the first, but distinct from it, would ture the same principle is carried out. interpose a salutary check, and render This great principle therefore pervades sinister combinations difficult, if not imthe Union. In practice it has been found possible. They knew the nature of pothe great safeguard of the country. On pular assemblies, and that the immediate many occasions of great national peril, dependence of their members upon their the Senate of the United States, in the constituents render them peculiarly open face of the wildest democracy in the to be influenced by every change of poworld, has proved itself to be the main- pular opinion, and that there is a prostay of the constitution-the one great pensity in all numerous assemblies to yield authority to which the friends of peace to sudden impulses, and be led by party and order must look in every storm. But feeling, and under the influence of factious I will take another and a nobler in- leaders into intemperate resolutions. stance the Senate of our own country In all such large assemblies it is easy -the House of Lords-a Senate which for mere agitators to obtain a paramount (the opinion of Mr. Mackay notwith-control. Consequently, they thought it standing) I will venture to call the advisable to establish a less numerous greatest and the wisest the world has and more dignified body; less liable than ever seen. Great in intelligence, great the other to dangerous influences, either in dignity, great in practical wisdom, from within or without. Again, in bodies great in patriotism and love of public composed of large numbers, and holding liberty to that Senate we owe a large office but for a short period, there is share of all the greatness of our nation. every probability that the majority will On this principle of a double legislature, be made up of men possessing a comtherefore, do I desire to base our consti- paratively small amount of legislative tution. That principle has received the talent, and hence arises a necessity for a sanction of the greatest authorities, and body of superior endowments, with a among them that of Burke, Montesquieu, farger tenure of power to review every Story, and many others entitled to equal act of legislation. These, and the various respect. On every ground, therefore, of other equally cogent reasons, which led experience, reason, and authority, we to the formation of the American Senate, cannot but arrive at the conclusion that will be found detailed at length in the a double legislature is the worst form of pages of Story, but it will not be found government that can be adopted. This anywhere among them that the Senate brings me to a consideration of the objects was deemed necessary as a mediator for which an Upper House of legislature between the President and the House of should be established, The self-elected Representatives. I come now to the committee to which I have had occasion formation of the Lower House, and the to refer so often, have put forth a state- first question which arises for determinament to the effect, that such a House is tion is, the number of members of which required merely to act as a mediator be- that House ought to consist. This point tween the Executive Government and the has not been touched upon by any of the representatives of the people. Now, in previous speakers, but as it may be made all the researches which I have been able a subject of comment during the reto make, I can find no authority for this mainder of the debate, I will take leave position. Those profound statesmen who to say a few words in reference to it framed the American constitution estab- now: The principle by which I think lished their Senate on no such principle we ought to be guided in this matter is

its

this, namely, that the Lower House the period of three years was extended to should be sufficiently numerous to pre- seven. Since the passing of the Sepvent improper combinations being easily tennial Act, however, attempts have been formed, but not so numerous as to throw made from time to time to procure impediments in the way of calm and repeal, but hitherto without success. rational discussion. It is impossible to Either by accident or design, the exact fix upon any arbitrary number that can mean between these two periods of three I be positively said to suit these two and seven years, has been fixed upon for essential conditions. In America the the continuance of this Council, unless number first fixed upon was sixty-five. previously dissolved. This term of five But this is no guide for us, as the deter- years has been found to work well, and mination of such a question must in all there is, therefore, no good reason why cases depend upon local circumstances we should change it. The next and and conditions. Here the best guide is most important question of all, with reexperience. The present House of fifty- ference to the Lower House is, - by four members has been found, in the whom are the representatives to be respects to which I have alluded, to work elected? And this involves two questions, well, and the Committee I think have namely:-where are we to fix the limit acted wisely in retaining that number. of the suffrage, and how are we to group There are many persons I know who the voters? If we are to place any redoubt whether so large a number of liance upon the opinions of the Radicals competent persons can be found in this and Chartists, and admirers of the colony, willing to undertake the duties of American Constitution, we should adopt legislation; but I do not share in their the principle of equal electoral districts doubts. In the first instance, perhaps and universal suffrage. This view indeed there may be some difficulty of this de- is not confined to the Radicals and the scription, but the advance of the country Chartists. I find that it is adopted by in importance is so rapid, and so great the honourable and learned member for an increase of wealth, and its consequent Cumberland, who, in his speech last leisure and intelligence may reasonably night, laid down the doctrine, that be looked forward to, that those diffi- 'every man who breathes the air has a culties in my opinion must speedily right to share in legislation, either pervanish. The next question is, the dura- sonally or by representative." tion of the Lower House. It is proposed by the Committee to retain the present term of five years. No doubt if we are to follow American precedents, or yield to the advice of those who are such strong admirers of American institutions in all their integrity, we should feel ourselves bound to limit the duration of the Lower House to a single year; but, as has been well said by Mr. Justice Story, there can be no good reason why the annual return of the seasons, or any other arbitrary period, should determine the existence of the legislature. The guiding principle for us should be to fix the duration of our House of Assembly at a period sufficiently long to enable it to understand its functions, but not long enough to remove it from a due sense of responsibility. In former times English Parliaments were triennial. By statute

66

Mr. DARVALL: I beg leave to correct the honourable member, I never stated anything of the sort.

Mr. MARTIN: I do not think that I am in error; but if the honourable member says positively, that he made no such statement, then I must be mismistaken.

Mr. DARVALL: I will submit to the House, whether or not I used such language. If I did I will be very glad to be set right on the point.

Mr. MARTIN: I will submit to correction if I am wrong, but I certainly took a note of the words, and I quoted them now, because I was proceeding to call the attention of the House to a subsequent statement of the honourable and learned member, to the effect, that he did not desire universal suffrage- a statement which I considered rather re

It

The right to elect representatives is no
original right of man, because it is a
thing unknown to man, except in civil
society. It arose from the necessity of
imposing checks upon those entrusted
with the preservation of man's rights,
and it can be carried no further than
the exigency of the case requires.
There is no record in history to show us
how society was first organized. How
the fabric of government was first raised
is a matter of pure speculation.
It
cannot be supposed that any number of
persons met together, and formed them-
selves into a community at once.
is more reasonable to imagine that the
first regular government had its origin
in a usurpation-in a despotism wherein
a single individual, taking advantage of
some superiority displayed by him in
war or commotion of some kind, seized
upon the supreme authority. There can
be little reason to doubt that such was the
origin of government. Experience,
however, would soon teach the people
under such a rule, that although one
despot might be wise and beneficent,
his successor might be the reverse-that
the same government, which in the
hands of one man might be the best,
in the hands of another might become
the worst. Thus constitutional checks
of some kind would come to be sought
for, and obtained, one by one, not as

markable after the expression of such a doctrine as, that every man who breaths the air is entitled to a vote. The honourable and learned gentleman certainly did say this" Why should any man give rights in which he is not to share.” Now, if this is not advocating universal suffrage, I am at a loss to know what is Those who are in favour of universal suffrage have one great difficulty to get over before they can expect their ideas to be received with any favour by persons of real intelligence. They must establish the right to have a direct voice in the choice of representatives to be one of the original inherent rights of man. Unless they can make this out clearly and indisputably they must fail to establish their case, and the franchise must be regulated upon some principle of expediency by those in whose hands the chief power may happen to be placed. Now, what are the natural rights of man? He has a right to personal liberty-he has a right to personal security-he has a right to the enjoyment of his property he has a right to do as he likes, so long as by so doing he does not trespass on the rights, or inferfere with the liberty of others. Governments are established to protect and secure those rights, and for no other purpose. If human nature were perfect-if all men would spontaneously abstain from interfering with each other's rights-government would then be un-rights, but as necessities for the presernecessary. But the fallibility and perversity of human nature are such, that men will not respect each others rights unless they are coerced by some superior power. Government, therefore, is a matter of necessity. And it follows from this that all that has to be considered in the formation of a government is,-in what way the natural rights of man can be best protected. Whatever government is best calculated to protect those rights; that is unquestionably the best form of government no matter whether it be based on universal suffrage, or limited suffrage, or no suffrage at all. The rights of suffrage are a means, and not an end; and they have been so regarded by every eminent man who has entered upon the consideration of this question.

vation of rights. Under the feudal system, which pervaded Europe after the downfall of the Roman Empire, each separate community was governed by a number of petty chieftains. One chieftain gradually managed to raise himself to authority over the rest, and under the title of King exercised irresponsible power over the people. This was the case in England as well as elsewhere. Arbitrary exactions of one kind or another led to the interpositon of checks, first by the chiefs and warriors-next by the common people. After centuries of oppression representative institutions arose, not because the people had any right to representation, but because without representation they felt they could enjoy no rights at all. So far,

that rule; they have a right to do justice, as between their fellows, whether their fellows are in have a right to the fruits of their industry, and politic function or in ordinary occupation. They to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of lation in death. Whatever each man can sepatheir offspring; to instruction in life, and to consorately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour. In this partnership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a joint stock; and as to the share of power, auright to an equal dividend in the product of the

ought to have in the management of the State, that I must deny to be amongst the direct original rights of man in civil society, for I have in my contemplation the civil, social man, and no other. It is a thing to be settled by convention.

then, as it is necessary to protect the rights of man, so far should the princi=ple of representation be extended, but no farther; for it should ever be recollected that the rights of man need to be protected more from the people than from the sovereign—and that by giving uncontrolled power to the masses, you give them the means, not of protecting their rights, but of violating all rights, including their own. It is our duty, therefore, in the formation of a government, to select that constitution which will be the most likely to secure the best administration-which will be most likely to place the powers of legislation in the hands of the wisest, the most up-thority, and direction which each individual right, and the most impartial men in the =community. We should examine into the history of the past—we should look to the experiences of the mother country, and the experiences of other lands, and by applying those experiences to our own condition, endeavour to ascertain what suffrage will be best calculated to place our government, at all times, in the hands of our best men. That it will be universal suffrage, or anything approaching to universal suffrage, we can have no warrant for believing. But whatever it may be, let us never forget that that suffrage is the best calculated to carry out the ends of government which will not only best protect the people from the injustice of their rulers, but also do that which is, perhaps, the most important function of government -protect the people from themselves. These, it should be borne in mind, are not my individual opinions-they are the deliberate opinions of men universally regarded as the highest authorities on the subject. These are the words of one-the most illustrious of them all:

Far am I from denying in theory, full as far is my heart from withholding in practice (if I were of power to give or to withhold), the real rights of men. In denying their false claims of right, I do not mean to injure those which are real, and are such as their pretended rights would totally destroy. If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence, and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by

If civil society be the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law-that convention must limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution which are formed under it. Every sort of legislature, judicial, or executory power, are its creatures. They can have no being in any claim, under the conventions of civil society, other state of things; and how can any man rights which do not so much as suppose its existence-rights which are absolutely repugnant to it? One of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is, that no man should be judge in his own cause. By this each person has at once divested himself of the first fundamental right of uncovenanted manthat is, to judge for himself, and to assert his own cause. He abdicates all right to be his own governor. He inclusively, in a great measure, abandons the right of self-defence, the first law of nature. Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together. That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may secure some liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it. Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it, and exist in much greater clearness, and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection; but their abstract perfection is their practical defect. By having a right to everything, they want everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient re-restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in