scription, on account of having least in place of less ; but were his general position correct, it would be strange if the same blunder did not occur in sentences containing terms of quantity in the other degrees of comparison as they are called-much and little, most and least-as well as more and less. It would be just as easy to commit mistakes in the one case as the other. Consider the following passage, for instance, from " All's Well”:

66

Rinaldo, you did never lack advice so much
As letting her pass so."

Act iii. sc. 4.

In this case it was as incumbent on Shakespeare in mere consistency to express the contrary of what he meant, as if he had written more instead of so much. Agreeably to the spirit if not to the letter of Malone's rule, he ought to have made his speaker say, "you did never lack advice so little." But in this instance, as well as the others, our poet chose to clothe, or rather could not help clothing, an exact meaning in correct language.

* There is here, I think, a corruption: the pronoun it is without antecedent, and to obtain one we are obliged to extract t in defiance of grammar out of the participle lov'd; and when ve have got it, we find we have got also the awkward exression lend you love. A slight alteration would remove both hese defects; we have only to read:

They that least tender you, shall lack you first.

that, even if they had been brought home to the poet, the generality of the accusation would still remain a logical fallacy on the part of the accuser, and also stand refuted, in point of fact, by contradictory instances.

To any one who has studied Shakespeare's genius, it must appear à piori most improbable that he should have systematically fallen into the confusion of ideas implied in the charge; while, on the other hand, nothing is more likely than the commission of errors of this kind by copyists and printers. They are such mistakes as we every day witness, and such as must have deformed any books published under disadvantages similar to those which ushered into the world the dramas before us.

A DIS

phras there which

approp the oth

apply. But tions text ar

genuine and thu of proba amongst No o

text of

his own

guesses

hardly b

are ofter

DISSERTATION IV.

ON CONJECTURAL EMENDATIONS.

A DISTINCTION is made without precision by the phrase conjectural applied to emendations, as if there was a strict line to be drawn on one side of which a class of emendations might be placed, appropriately designated by that epithet, and, on the other, a class to which the designation did not apply.

But no such line can be drawn. All emendations which can now be made in Shakespeare's text are inferential. They are inferred to be the genuine reading from grounds more or less strong, and thus they may severally possess more or less of probability, which is really the only distinction amongst them.

No one seriously proposes an amendment in the ext of an author without some kind of reason in his own mind. Here what may be called pure guesses (except such as are merely humorous) can ardly be said to be possible, although suggestions re often much too lightly hazarded.

འ་

required, it may be conveniently used to mark an inference from the lowest, or a very low, degree of evidence.*

The similar character of the proofs in what are thus called conjectural, and in all other emendations (however they may differ in their probative force), is not unworthy of elucidation.

Let us take an instance of a very happy emendation respecting which no doubt can be raised. In the drama of "Pericles" that prince makes a vow regarding his daughter, thus given in the old copy:

"Till she be married, madam,

By bright Diana, whom we honour all,
Unsister'd shall this heir of mine remain,
Though I show will in it."

Act iii. sc. 3.

*"When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act or state induced a conjecture; when they are strong, we term it an inference or conclusion. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture.

"The process which ends in a conclusion, and the process which ends in a conjecture, are thus essentially the same, and differ only in degree, or in the force of the evidence. A conjecture, therefore, if it has any grounds, is a species of conclusion; if it has none, it may be called a mere guess, a whim, or caprice, or sally of the imagination, or any thing else implying disconnexion with proofs and premises which the reader may choose to term it, but it has no claim to the appellation of inference.”—The Theory of Reasoning, by the author of the present volume, second edition, p. 31.

the signification of the line; but the grounds for rejecting the old reading and for adopting the new are perfectly conclusive.

1. The vow, according to the old reading, has no precedent or parallel, and is intrinsically absurd, implying that it was at the prince's option to give his daughter a sister at any time. Besides, no end could be answered by not giving her a sister, and the pledge does not tally with the subsequent termination of it. Hence the old reading is

corrupt.

2. In favour of the second reading there are some powerful considerations. It has happened on several occasions that such vows have been made, and in Act v. the vow in question is referred to expressly by Pericles, who, addressing his daughter, says:

"And now,

This ornament that makes me look so dismal,
Will I, my lov'd Marina, clip to form;
And what this fourteen years no razor touch'd,
To grace thy marriage-day I'll beautify."

Act v. sc. 3.

To these proofs it may be added that in two older versions of the same story the vow is recited; that it accords in both cases with the amended reading; and further, that this reading would be