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admits affirm answer appear apprehended attention called carried cause character circumstance cognition common conceived conception conclusion condition consideration considered constitution contingent contradiction contradictory counter-proposition course definition demonstration denied distinction doctrine doubt effect element epistemology error essential existence explanation express extent factor fixed given gives ground hand Hence hold human idealism ignorance important impossible inconceivable Institutes intellect intelligence involves kind knowledge known laid least less material matter means mere merely metaphysics mind namely nature necessary truth necessity never º º object OBSERVATIONS opinion ordinary ourselves particular philosophy Plato position possible present primary principles PROP proposition proved psychology qualities question reason regard remarks require result sense separable speculation stand sufficient suppose taken theory things thought tion true turn unit universal usually whole
95. oldal - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' — a various wording of the general doctrine.
512. oldal - All absolute existences are contingent except "one; in other words, there is One, but only " one, Absolute Existence which is strictly " necessary ; and that existence is a supreme " and infinite and everlasting Mind in synthesis
93. oldal - Hegel, — but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen, — not any foreigner, — seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, bis intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.
4. oldal - Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent : it is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true ; because while truth may perhaps be attainable by man, to reason is certainly his province, and within his power.
28. oldal - Affirm, nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth — that is, as a truth the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction ; and deny nothing, unless its affirmation involves a contradiction — that is, contradicts some necessary truth or law of reason.
30. oldal - From this single proposition the whole system is deduced in a series of demonstrations, each of which professes to be as strict as any demonstration in Euclid, while the whole of them taken together constitute one great demonstration. If this rigorous necessity is not their character to the very letter, — if there is a single weak point in the system, — if there be any one...
512. oldal - Neither the existence nor the non-existence of things is "conceivable out of relation to our intelligence, and therefore " the highest and most binding law of all reason is, that under no " circumstances can a supreme mind be conceived as abstracted
82. oldal - I' is the object of intel" lect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man "can see and touch his body, but he cannot see and touch "himself. When the cognizance of self is laid down as the " condition of all knowledge, this of course does not mean that " certain objects of sense (external things, to wit) are apprehended " through certain other objects of sense (our own bodies, namely), " for such a statement would be altogether futile.