Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing the Mind

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W. Blackwood and sons, 1854 - 530 oldal

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Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI
The polemical character of this system
Because Absolute Existence may be that which we are ignorant
Remarks obviating any objections to the system on the ground that
Further illustration
Short statement of what this proposition contends for
DeMossTRATION ib 02servations AND Explanations
Idealism and materialism have their roots here ib 2 Fourth Counterproposition ib 3 It expresses common opinion as to our knowledge of matter ...
Psychological opinion as to our knowledge of matter per se ib 6 Psychological materialism as founded on the four counterpropositions
Fallacy of materialism Possibility of idealism as founded on four pro positions
A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist
Cause of this precipitate judgment Its evil consequences
How Prop IV decides this preliminary question How Counter proposition IV decides it
Symbols illustrative of the position maintained by the Institutes ib 12 The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position
Different conclusions from the two positions
Difference farther explained ib 15 Another point of difference between this system and psychology
Matter per se reduced to the contradictory
This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter perse
But to matter per se itself
Advantage of this reduction New light on the problem of philosophy
Importance of finding the contradictory

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95. oldal - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' — a various wording of the general doctrine.
406. oldal - Therefore, we can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known ; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.
512. oldal - All absolute existences are contingent except "one; in other words, there is One, but only " one, Absolute Existence which is strictly " necessary ; and that existence is a supreme " and infinite and everlasting Mind in synthesis
93. oldal - Hegel, — but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen, — not any foreigner, — seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, bis intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.
4. oldal - Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent : it is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true ; because while truth may perhaps be attainable by man, to reason is certainly his province, and within his power.
28. oldal - Affirm, nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth — that is, as a truth the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction ; and deny nothing, unless its affirmation involves a contradiction — that is, contradicts some necessary truth or law of reason.
30. oldal - From this single proposition the whole system is deduced in a series of demonstrations, each of which professes to be as strict as any demonstration in Euclid, while the whole of them taken together constitute one great demonstration. If this rigorous necessity is not their character to the very letter, — if there is a single weak point in the system, — if there be any one...
512. oldal - Neither the existence nor the non-existence of things is "conceivable out of relation to our intelligence, and therefore " the highest and most binding law of all reason is, that under no " circumstances can a supreme mind be conceived as abstracted
82. oldal - I' is the object of intel" lect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man "can see and touch his body, but he cannot see and touch "himself. When the cognizance of self is laid down as the " condition of all knowledge, this of course does not mean that " certain objects of sense (external things, to wit) are apprehended " through certain other objects of sense (our own bodies, namely), " for such a statement would be altogether futile.
167. oldal - To this day, all philosophic truth is Plato rightly divined; all philosophic error is Plato misunderstood.

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