but those of contempt or ridicule. The gestures of almost all the gay and exhilarating passions are beautiful; and our sympathy with happiness is so great, that we never observe them without the disposition to believe that they are just. Inform us, however, that all these expressions of happiness arise from some childish, or some worthless motive; that the philosopher has only discovered a new butterfly; or that the warrior has only got a step in the army; that the joy of the youthful beauty is only occasioned by the present of a new dress, and that of the matron by a fifty pound prize in the lottery, &c. and the gestures we formerly admired become at once either ludicrous or disgusting. disgusting. Observations of this kind may be extended to every emotion or passion; and I think it will be found, in every case, that no gesture or attitude, expressive of such passions or emotions, is per manently and originally beautiful; that our opinion of this beauty varies according to circumstances; and that the circumstance, in every case, which determines our sentiment of beauty, is our opinion of the justness or propriety of the emotion which such attitude or such gesture signifies.

SECTION V.

Of Grace.

THE preceding illustrations are intended to shew, that the sublimity or beauty of attitude and gesture arises, not from any causes of a material kind, nor from any law by which certain material appearances are immediately productive of these sentiments, but from their being adapted to express, and being felt as expressive, of amiable or interesting, or respectable qualities of the human mind. In concluding those illustrations, I have com

pleted all that I had properly in view in that investigation.

There is, however, a quality of which the human form is susceptible, and which is occasionally found both in its positions and in its motions, which is not sufficiently accounted for by this theory. This quality is GRACE; a quality different from beauty, though nearly allied to it; which is never observed without affecting us with emotions of peculiar delight, and which it is, perhaps, the first object of the arts of sculpture and of painting to study and to present. Upon this subject, while I presume to offer a few additional observations, I am yet to request my readers to consider them rather as conjectures, than as the results of any formal inquiry.

That there is a difference between the qualities of beauty, and of grace, in the human form, must, I conceive, every where be admitted. The terms themselves are neither synonymous, nor are they used synonymously; the emotions we receive from them are easily distinguishable, and are every day distinguished in common language; and when we refer to experience, we may find a thousand instances in which the positions and movements of the form are beautiful without being graceful. Beauty, indeed, in some degree or other, is to be found in the most common appearances of man; but grace is rarely seen. We often lament its absence, while we are conscious of the presence of beauty; and it every where seems to us to demand some higher and more uncommon requisites than those which are necessary to mere beauty.

It seems to me, still farther, that the appearances of grace in the attitudes or gestures of the form, are never perceived without affecting us with some sentiment of respect, or admiration, for the person whose form expres-ses them. When we observe the attitudes of joy, or

hope, or innocent gaiety, we feel delight, but not respect for those who exhibit them. When we observe the attitudes of grief, or melancholy, or despondence, we feel sympathy, and the delight which nature has annexed to social interest, but we do not necessarily feel admiration.

The gestures of rage, in the same manner, of force, of anguish, of terror, may affect us with very sublime emotions of fear, of astonishment, of awful interest, but they may be unaccompanied with any emotion of admiration or respect for the individual who displays them. Whenever, on the contrary, we witness the graceful in gesture or attitude, we feel, I apprehend, an additional sentiment of respect; a conviction of something dignified or exalted in the mind of the person, and of which the gesture or attitude employed is felt as significant to us. How far this proposition is true, must be finally determined by the consciousness of my readers: I shall observe only, that it seems to me very strongly justified both by the language of philosophers, and by the common language of the world. When we hear any attitude or gesture described as graceful, we are conscious, I think, of immediately feeling some sentiment of respect or admiration for the individual who displays it. Whenever we use the same term ourselves, we mean always to convey to those who hear us, a similar sentiment. Every attitude or gesture of a well proportioned form, which is at once easy and expressive of some amiable or interesting feeling, is beautiful, and is accordingly spoken of as beautiful: but when we add the term graceful, we wish, I think, always to convey the idea of some additional quality, which is intitled to respect, and which is expressive of some conceived dignity or superiority in the mind of the person who exhibits it. Whenever, in the same manner, any attitude or gesture affects us, beside

the emotion of beauty, with the sense of respect or admiration for the individual in whose form it appears, I apprehend we use the term graceful in addition to that of beautiful, to express our sense of this superiority or dignity. The application of the same observation to the sublime, either in movement or position, is within the reach of every person's inquiry; and I apprehend that the experience of every one will teach him that the sublime of this kind may often exist without grace; and that when grace is perceived it is always felt as an additional quality, and as expressive of something in the character of the person which excites veneration, or aston ishment, or respect.

I.

From these preliminary remarks, I would observe, in the first place, "That there seems to be no one emotion or "class of emotions, to the expression of which the qual

ity of grace is exclusively limited; but that, on the <6 contrary, every emotion in which the spectator can be “interested, is susceptible of grace in the expression of "it, either in attitude or gesture." Of so general a proposition, the full illustration is impossible within the limits to which I must confine myself. I shall only request my readers to call to mind the different pleasing or interesting emotions of which the human form is expressive, and to examine for themselves, whether there are any of them which do not admit of grace in these expressions. If we consult experience, I am much deceived if we shall not find that every class of human feelings is susceptible of grace in the movements or positions of the form which is significant of such qualities. All the gay and exhilarating emotions, the emotions of hope, of joy, of love, of beneficence, of admiration, &c. admit very

obviously of grace, as well as of beauty, though it is much more rarely perhaps that we discover it. In the saddening or depressing class of emotions, on the other hand, in grief, or sorrow, or penitence, or melancholy, &c. the capacity of grace will, I apprehend, equally be found. If we consult the productions of the fine arts, (and more particularly of the fine arts of antiquity, whose predominant feature is grace), we shall arrive at the same conclusion. In the remains which we possess of their sculpture, there is scarcely any emotion or class of emotions of which man is susceptible which they have not imitated, In all of these, grace is intended, and is produced, and in all the minute or technical commentaries of connoisseurs, there is none which has limited this quality to any one expression, or class of expressions exclusively; or pointed out any appearance of the human form which is susceptible of beauty or sublimity, and which is not susceptible of grace. If the reader will take the trouble of following out these slight suggestions, I apprehend he will be satisfied that grace is not the result of any peculiar quality in human character, but of some general quality which may be common to all.

II.

I presume to observe, in the second place, "That, "wherever the attitude or gesture expressive of any "emotion or passion, is at the same time expressive of

SELF-COMMAND, (of that self-possession which in"cludes in our belief, both the presence of a lofty stan"dard of character and conduct, and of the habitual gov❝ernment of itself by this high principle), the attitude or "gesture is perceived and felt as graceful; and that, al"though every pleasing or virtuous quality of mind may "admit of beauty, and every great or exalted quality