entitled at the date of the Act to sue in their behalf. By sect. 5, such proceedings are not to abate or be affected by any change in the person holding the office of Her Majesty's Advocate.

For the procedure before the passing of the statute, see L. A. v. Lord Dunglas (1842), 9 Cl. & F. 173, and the judgment of Lord Medwyn in that case in the Court below (15 S. 314), a case which further decides that the Lord Advocate bringing an appeal to the House of Lords in such a case is not required to enter into recognisances to answer the costs of the appeal.

The Crown Private Estates Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 37), s. 11, further provides that all suits and actions respecting the private estates of the Crown in Scotland, which are not vested in a trustee or trustees, may be sued in Scotland on behalf of the Crown by any person or persons to be from time to time appointed by the King by writing under the sign manual, and all suits and actions respecting such private estates, at the instance of any other parties, may be sued and carried on by process against such person or persons. A person or persons so appointed by the King may make applications for declarations that the Crown is entitled to a conveyance to itself of Crown private estates vested in trustees and for the appointment of new trustees thereof.

Members of the Royal Family.

The Queen Consort.

It appears that the Queen Consort might have sued or been sued as a feme sole at common law, as in a case in 1410, Y. B. P. 11 Hen. IV. pl. 26, which was a scire facias to repeal certain letters patent granted by the King to the Queen Consort, and in which it was said: "Præcipe quod reddat gise vers le Roygne et auters maners des breves, car el est person exempt, nient obstant le coverture." See also the remarks of Brian, J., in Y. B. M. 3 Hen. VII. pl. 22. We find her suing in a quare impedit against the Abbess of Cirencester in Y. B. H. 18 Edw. III. pl. 6. The reason given in Co. Lit. 133 a, is that "the wisdom of the common law would not have the King disquieted for such private and petty causes" as the legal proceedings of his wife.

The statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 51 (numbered c. 12, private, in Ruffhead's edition), however, makes special provision on the matter. After enacting that the King may settle lands in jointure on the Queen for the time being, and that such Queen may accept the same and dispose of the profits thereof as a feme sole (see also the Crown Private Estate Act, 1800 (39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88), ss. 8, 9), the statute provides that the Queen "shalbe hable and enabled by auctoritie of this Acte to sue and pursue in her owne christen name and by the

addition of Quene of England and of Fraunce and Lady of Ireland, without the consent of the Kinges Highnes, and without nomination of the Kinges Highnes as her husband or Souveraine Lorde," in any legal processes or matters which may be sued or prosecuted by her, "and she to have theffect and profitt of the same to her owne propre use and behouf without contradiction or disturbaunce of the Kinges Highnes; and also to sue in her owne name onely as a woman soole all maner of actions sutes and executions as the cace shall requier . . . and also shall be hable and enhabled to pleade and be impleded in anny of the Kingis Courtis and in all other Courtis and places, in all maner of sutes and actions aswell reall and personall and myxte, in her owne christen name and with the said addition of Quene of England and of Fraunce and Lady of Ireland onely."

It would appear that, as this statute has never been directly amended, the subsequent alterations in the style of the Sovereign leave it untouched, and that the Queen Consort should, in strictness, still sue and be sued by the title mentioned in the statute. According to Chitty on Pleading, however (ed. 1831, vol. ii. p. 25), she should sue and be sued as "Her most sacred Majesty Queen, &c. [using the now current title], consort of our sovereign lord the now King."

It seems that she can sue by her Attorney-General or SolicitorGeneral by information, or sue and be sued in her own person by ordinary action. "Suit by peticion can be to no other but only to the King, for no such suit shalbe made to the Queene or to the Lord Prince, for these personages have no such prerogative" (Staundf. Praerog. 75 b). We find her Attorney-General proceeding by information of intrusion in 1607 (see A.-G. to the Prince of Wales v. St. Aubyn (1811), Wight. 167, 202), and it was said in Sir Robert Floyde's Case (1619), 2 Roll. Abr. 213: "La Royne Feme del Roy poet informer per sa Atturney General en le Chancery per English Bill d'aver un decree fait en le Court del Royne confirme, car coment que el soit un subject, uncore el ad tiel prerogative del Roy come que el est son feme."

Her Attorney-General and Solicitor-General are entitled to a place within the Bar, together with the King's Counsel. (Selden, Tit. Hon. I. 6, 7; 1 Bla. Comm. 220.)

Queen Consort,
Thus, in Y. B.

Some of the early authorities seem to place the as a litigant, almost in the position of the King. 17 & 18 Edw. III. pp. 430–435 (Rolls Series), it is said that her writ will not abate for the same reasons as those for which a common person's writ would abate; and in Y. B. 18 Edw. III. pp. 29-31 (Rolls Series), that her writ will not abate for any reason for which it would not abate if brought by the King-" pur ceo quelle est persone excellent ele avera bref en toutz pointz come le

roy avera.' (Y. B. 17 & 18 Edw. III. p. 435 (Rolls Series).) In this case, too, it is said that she need not give security for costs, and it is doubted whether time runs against her. (See also Fitzh. N. B. 101 a; Co. Lit. 133 a.) Apparently she cannot be made to pay costs. (See 3 Bla. Comm. 400, where the reference to Fitzherbert should be as above.)

The Queen Dowager.

This lady is in the same position with regard to actions as any other subject. She is not entitled to an Attorney- and SolicitorGeneral as the Queen Consort is. Com. Dig. Action, C. 2, cites three instances from the Year Books in which a Queen Dowager was sued. Again, in Lilly's Entries, p. 151, we find, in 1694, an action of debt by Catherine of Braganza, then Queen Dowager, under the style of Catharina Regina Dotissa Angliæ, &c. v. Briggs. A similar action was Roigne Mother v. Challenor (1667), 1 Sid. 295; 2 Keb. 81. In A.-G. v. Tarrington (1661), Hard. 219, the same lady joined with the Attorney-General as plaintiff in a bill in equity. In Y. B. M. 9 Hen. VI. pl. 36, Joan, Queen of Henry IV., was sued on a writ of annuity.

If the Queen Dowager marries a person who is not royal, she still sues and is sued alone under her royal title, as in the cases of the Queen Dowager of Navarre and Catharine ap Tudor. (2 Inst. 50.) See also Fowler, Exch. Pr. (ed. 2) I. 17, and Savile v. Queen Mother (1669), Hard. 502. R. v. Lords Commrs. of the Treasury (1851), 16 Q. B. 357; 20 L. J. Q. B. 305, was an application for a mandamus by the surviving trustee of the Queen Dowager, then recently deceased, to obtain payment of an apportioned part of her annuity.

The Prince of Wales and Duke of Cornwall.

The Prince of Wales may sue or be sued by writ in the ordinary way. (Staundf. Praerog. 75 b.) See Prince de Gales v. Basset (1348), Y. B. M. 21 Edw. III. pl. 46, and the case in Y. B. T. 1 Hen. V. pl. 2, where the King brought a scire facias to get execution on a judgment obtained by him, when Prince of Wales, against the Bishop of St. Asaph.

With regard to the Duchy of Cornwall, the nature of the Prince's estate is discussed in The Prince's Case (1604), 8 Rep. 1 a, while the position with regard to legal proceedings of the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwall, and his Attorney-General is discussed in A.-G. to the Prince of Wales v. St. Aubyn (1811), Wight. 167. It was decided in the latter case that the Prince had the right to file an English information by his Attorney-General for lands parcel of the Duchy of Corn

wall. All the preceding instances of proceedings by information on behalf of the Prince were examined, and the information itself will be found in full at p. 268. See also the closely connected case of A.-G. v. Plymouth Corporation (1754), Wight. 134. A.-G. v. Lambe (1838), 3 Y. & C. 162; 8 L. J. Ex. 23; and A.-G. of the Prince of Wales v. Lambe (1848), 11 Beav. 213; 17 L. J. Ch. 154, were informations praying a declaration that the Crown and Duke respectively were entitled to certain waste and certain china clay thereunder.

In A.-G. to the Prince of Wales v. Crossman (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 381; 4 H. & C. 568; 35 L. J. Ex. 215, which was an information to recover certain dues payable to the Prince, the defendant applied to change the venue to Devon. The Court decided the matter against the defendant on the ground of convenience, coupled with the consideration that there was such an interest in the Crown that the Attorney-General might appear and claim a trial at bar, but the Court was inclined to the opinion that the Prince's Attorney-General was in the same position with regard to venue as the Attorney-General of the Crown.

A.-G. of the Prince of Wales v. Bristol Waterworks Co. (1855), 10 Ex. 884; 24 L. J. Ex. 205, was an information alleging the diversion of water to which the Prince was entitled in right of his Duchy of Cornwall.

As to the procedure when the Duchy of Cornwall is in the hands of the Crown, there being no Duke of Cornwall, or where there is a Duke of Cornwall, but he has not yet obtained livery of the Duchy, see above, p. 1.

It has been stated (see Chitty, Prerog. 404) that the disabilities and advantages of minority do not apply to the Duke of Cornwall. But the authorities cited do not seem to bear out this view, and it is shown. to be very doubtful by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 2, s. 6, which provides for the exercise by the Crown of the rights of the Prince as Duke of Cornwall during his minority.

The Heir Apparent's Establishment Act, 1795 (35 Geo. III. c. 125), contains special and peculiar provisions respecting the recovery of debts from the Heir Apparent. By sect. 7, creditors are to deliver particulars of their demands within ten days of the end of the quarter in which they accrue. By sect. 8, no action can be brought against the Heir Apparent in respect of such debts or the securities therefor, but, by sect. 9, the Treasurer or other principal officer or officers of the Heir Apparent to whom such particulars have been delivered, may be sued within three months of the delivery thereof in respect of such debt or demand. Judgment is not to be executed against the defendant or his effects, but is to be a charge on the funds of the Heir

Apparent in the defendant's hands. See the sections more fully set forth below, p. 571.

As to the rights of the Duke of Cornwall to the goods of intestates, see the article on the Solicitor of the Duchy of Cornwall below, p. 20.

The Consort of a Female Sovereign.

Such a personage has no rights other than those of a subject in respect of litigation. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652; on appeal, 1 Mac. & G. 25; 18 L. J. Ch. 120, was a bill filed by the Prince Consort in his own name against certain persons and the Attorney-General, to which was added an information laid by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown against the same persons and the Prince Consort, for the infringement of copyright in certain drawings and etchings belonging to the Prince Consort and the Queen respectively.

Other Members.

These, as such, have no special privileges whatever as litigants. The Princess of Wales, for instance, is to be found suing by her next friend under the old Chancery practice in Princess of Wales v. Earl of Liverpool (1819), 1 Swanst. 114; 3 Swanst. 567; 1 Wils. Ch. 113; 2 Wils. Ch. 29.

The Attorney-General.

General Observations.

His Majesty's Attorney-General is the proper legal representative of the Crown in the Courts. (See R. v. Austen (1821), 9 Price, 142, n.) He is primarily the officer of the Crown, and in that sense only the officer of the public. (A.-G. v. Brown (1818), 1 Swanst. 265, 294; compare R. v. Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. 2527, 2570.) The AttorneyGeneral appears on behalf of His Majesty; it is incorrect to say that His Majesty appears by his Attorney-General. The reason of this is attributed by Finch, Law 81-2, to the King's omnipresence, an attribute which he shares with the Deity (see below, p. 218), and this seems logical enough; but in R. v. Gregory (1672), 2 Lev. 82; 3 Keb. 127, Lord Hale, C.J., called the latter mode of description "well enough but unmannerly," and he is followed by Sir J. Wilmot, C.J., in Wilkes v. R. (1768), Wilm. 322, 327. The former mode of expression, however, is now universal.

The various cases in which the Attorney-General appears for the King are duly dealt with under their proper headings, but it will be proper here to mention a few points of practical importance, which