in damages on a grant of an interim injunction. The real effect of this case is explained in 4.-G. v. Albany Hotel Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 696; 65 L. J. Ch. 885 (see above, p. 607), to which the attention of the Irish Courts was not called; but, quite apart from this, it does not seem reasonable or proper that, in a case where the Crown has a legal option of proceeding in a particular way, the Court should endeavour to exercise a jurisdiction to restrain it from so proceeding, by imposing such terms as to costs as would make the method of procedure selected by the Crown equivalent to another method, which the Crown has deliberately refrained from adopting.

The House of Lords.

In the House of Lords, the general principle that, apart from statute, the Crown neither receives nor pays costs has been fully adopted. (L. A. v. Lord Dunglas (1842), 9 Cl. & F. 173, 212; Smith v. Earl of Stair (1849), 2 H. L. C. 807, 809; L. A. v. Hamilton (1852), 1 Macq. 46, 55, all cited more fully on p. 613, above.) The principle extends to all appeals whether from England, Scotland, or Ireland. In Mews v. R. (1882), 8 A. C. 339, 353; 52 L. J. M. C. 57 (mandamus proceedings), an order was made against the AttorneyGeneral on behalf of the Crown to pay the costs; but later a memorandum was made by Lord Blackburn, who had presided, to the effect that the point had not been raised, and that the case was not to be taken as a precedent. The principle that no costs were receivable or payable by the Crown in such proceedings was accepted by both sides in Middlesex JJ. v. R. (1884), 9 A. C. 757, 786; 53 L. J. Q. B. 505.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The whole question of Crown costs was elaborately discussed in Johnson v. R., [1904] A. C. 817; 73 L. J. P. C. 113; and the Board, considering that, though the Crown had often been treated by the tribunal like a private litigant in the matter of costs, the point had never been argued, pointed out that all such cases fell under three heads-(i) where the Crown was treated as an ordinary litigant under the provisions of local statutes; (ii) where the proceedings were by petition of right or something analogous thereto; (iii) exceptional cases, where justice seemed to require that the Crown should pay oosts, or where the Crown was not unwilling to be treated as an ordinary litigant. They therefore thought they ought to adhere to the practice of the House of Lords, and that in future the rule should be that the Crown neither receives nor pays costs, unless the case is governed by some local statute, or there are exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the ordinary rule.

The Revenue Side of the King's Bench Division.

The provisions of the Crown Suits Act, 1855, which apply to proceedings by the Attorney-General as therein mentioned, have already been stated and discussed above, p. 614.

The Queen's Remembrancer Act, 1859, s. 21 (p. 679), more specifically provides that the costs of all suits, informations and other proceedings, and of any interlocutory matter or proceeding, on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division, whether at law or in equity, may be awarded by the Court or a judge between the Crown and subject on the same principle as between subject and subject, but in accordance with any rules and orders in that behalf.

Ord. LXVIII. r. 2, applies Ord. LXV., which relates to costs, to proceedings on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division, but Ord. LXV. rr. 6, 6a, and 7, which govern security for costs, could not conceivably apply to suits by the Crown (see above, p. 614).

Suits upon obligations or specialties made to the King or to his use are dealt with by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 36 (p. 652), which provides that in such cases the King shall have and recover his just debts, costs and damages like other (sic) common persons.

Under the Succession Duty Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 1), s. 50, which provides for appeals (see above, p. 67) and gives the Court power to determine the matter of the appeal and the costs thereof, it was held in In re Micklethwait (1855), 11 Ex. 452; 25 L. J. Ex. 19, that a successful petitioner could be awarded costs against the Crown.

The Probate Duty Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 92), s. 1, which provides for the enforcing of payment of succession and legacy duties, and the payment of costs in such proceedings by or to the Crown, was repealed as to England by the Crown Suits, &c. Act, 1865, s. 53, and Sched. III. (below, pp. 702, 707).

The Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 13, gives the Court, on appeals from the assessment of the Commissioners, power to give the successful appellant costs if it thinks fit, and to order an unsuccessful appellant to pay the Commissioners' costs.

The Customs, Inland Revenue and Savings Bank Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 13), s. 5, provides that in all informations, prosecutions, suits or proceedings at the suit of the Crown under the Customs Acts the same rule as to costs shall be observed as in suits and proceedings between subject and subject, and by sect. 220 of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876 (printed below, p. 717), on the conviction of a person and his commitment in default of the payment of a penalty and costs under the Customs Acts, the costs awarded to be paid by

him as well as the penalty are to be stated in the conviction and commitment. See also A.-G. v. Mann (1748), Park. 91, where it was held that the Attorney-General and the Customs officer were both entitled to costs under a repealed Act of Anne.

For Scotland, the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 56), s. 24, provides for the award of costs to and against the Crown in any civil Court in any proceedings by or against the Crown. (See Alexander v. Officers of State (1868), 1 H. L. Sc. 276.)

In revenue cases the costs follow the event unless it is otherwise ordered. (A.-G. v. Countess Blucher de Wahlstatt (1864), 3 H. & C. 374; 34 L. J. Ex. 29.) As to costs on a new trial, see Exchequer Rule 109 (p. 770).

As to the allowance of costs where an information was successful in part only, see A.-G. v. Shillibeer (1849), 6 Ex. 606; 19 L. J. Ex. 115; and compare A.-G. v. Lord Carrington (1843), 6 Beav. 454; 12 L. J. Ch. 453.

Where a verdict was entered by consent against each of two defendants to an information for a specific sum, but judgment was entered generally on the postea against both defendants for the total amount, it was held that the costs were rightly taxed generally against both defendants. (A.-G. v. Roberts (1855), i Jur. (N. S.) 1024.)

On an English information, the Attorney-General gave notice that he did not intend to proceed further, but refused to discontinue, and the Court held that it had no power to dismiss the information for want of prosecution, and that it therefore could not order the Crown to pay the defendant's costs. (4.-G. v. Williamson (1889), 60 L. T. 930.)

Some cases on costs on extents are cited in Manning, Exch. Pr. (ed. 2), pp. 69, 70, but are not of sufficient importance to be reproduced here. It was held in R. aux. Simpson v. Hopper (1816), 3 Price, 40, that the Crown Debtors Act, 1785 (see above, p. 199), did not give the Crown a right to costs in cases where it was not necessary to resort to a sale of the lands.

Petition of Right.

Costs on petition of right are dealt with in Book III. of this work, above, p. 397.

Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari.

It was settled by R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, [1902] 2 K. B. 503; 71 L. J. K. B. 932, that where the Crown is a party to the argument of a rule for a prerogative writ of mandamus, the Court

has no jurisdiction to give costs either to or against the Crown, but the Court (at p. 572) did not wish to express an opinion as to matters other than the prerogative writ of mandamus, or even as to that writ when it was applied for by or against the officers of executive departments of the public service in relation to their statutory or other duties. But, semble, the same principle would also apply to this latter case unless there was specific statutory provision for the payment or receipt of costs, and also to writs of prohibition and certiorari. As to certiorari, see R. v. Local Government Board for Ireland (1901), not reported, cited in In re Madden's Estate, [1902] 1 I. R. 63, 68.

The decision in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, ubi sup., must be taken to supersede in this respect such cases as R. v. Secretary of State for War, [1891] 2 Q. B. 326; 60 L. J. Q. B. 457; and R. v. Staines Union (1894), 10 R. 292, 307, where costs were awarded in mandamus proceedings against and on the prosecution of Government Departments respectively, but without argument. See also Mews v. R., and Middlesex JJ. v. R., cited above, p. 617, and R. (PostmasterGeneral) v. Great Northern Rail. Co., [1908] 2 I. R. 32.

Appeals from Inferior Courts.

In R. v. Beadle (1857), 7 E. & B. 492; 26 L. J. M. C. 111, an excise officer on behalf of the Crown laid an information before justices charging the use of a stage carriage without a licence. The defendant was acquitted, and the officer unsuccessfully appealed to Quarter Sessions, where he was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. It was held, in proceedings for a certiorari, that the award of costs was wrong, since sect. 5 of the Quarter Sessions Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45), did not bind the Crown (see also sect. 2 of the Act), and the Crown Suits Act, 1855, did not apply to such a case.

In Moore v. Smith (1859), 1 E. & E. 597; 28 L. J. M. C. 126, on the other hand, where costs had been awarded by the High Court to the respondent against a revenue officer on an appeal by way of special case from a conviction by justices on a similar information, the Court held that the costs were rightly awarded, on the ground. that the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 43), s. 6, under which the Court heard the appeal by way of special case, covered all cases of appeal, and, in particular, that sect. 4 of that Act, which provides that the justices shall not refuse to state a case, if application is made to them by or under the direction of the Attorney-General, showed that appeals by or on behalf of the Crown were intended to be included.

These two cases were recently discussed in Thomas v. Pritchard, [1903] 1 K. B. 209; 72 L. J. K. B. 23, where it was held that, by virtue

of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 18, and the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 53, a Court of summary jurisdiction can award costs to or against the Crown in summary proceedings under the Revenue or Customs Acts. The decision was based on sect. 53 of the Act of 1879, which provides that the Summary Jurisdiction Acts shall apply to such proceedings, and the principle of Moore v. Smith, ubi sup., was followed. The judgment no doubt rested upon stronger grounds than that in Moore v. Smith, ubi sup., but it seems to the author that both these decisions may deserve reconsideration. They seem to be somewhat of an infringement on the principles that the Crown is not bound by statutory provisions unless there is a clear intention that it should be bound, and that the Crown does not receive or pay costs apart from statutory provisions in that behalf.

Traverse of Escheat.

If the Crown is to be regarded as a plaintiff in such proceedings (see above, p. 439), it apparently pays and receives costs under the Crown Suits Act, 1855, ss. 1, 2 (p. 673); and this was so held, though the matter was scarcely argued, in R. v. Carlisle Corporation (1888), not reported. In the most recent case, R. v. Manning (1902), not reported, judgment was given for the Crown with costs, but the matter was not argued. Apart from the statute, there would be no costs for or against the Crown. (See Ward v. Templeton (1787), Vern. & S. 123.)

Chancery.

The Attorney-General.

The general rule that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs, apart from statutory provisions to the contrary, is not completely applicable to proceedings in Chancery. In A.-G. v. Earl of Ashburnham (1823), 1 Sim. & S. 394, 397, a charity information filed by the Attorney-General without a relator, under 59 Geo. III. c. 91, s. 1 (now repealed), Leach, V.-C., said: "It is said that although this result may not have been in the contemplation of the Legislature, it is the necessary consequence of a general principle that the Crown can neither pay nor receive costs. I find no such general principle in Courts of Equity. The Attorney-General constantly receives costs, where he is made a defendant in respect of legacies given to charities (see Moggridge v. Thackwell (1803), 7 Ves. 36, 88); and even where he is made a defendant in respect of the immediate rights of the Crown in cases of intestacy. And where charity informations have been filed by the Attorney-General, costs have frequently been awarded him in inter