Johnson's Petition of Right, which received the fiat and was compromised by the Crown, seems to have belonged to the same class. It was a claim by a War Department tenant for various injuries alleged to have been suffered by him at the hands of the War Office.

The claim in Windsor and Annapolis Rail. Co. v. R. (1886), 11 A. C. 607; 55 L. J. P. C. 41, already referred to on p 339, though laid in contract, also savoured of tort. It was based upon a sort of trespass by officials of the Government in ejecting the suppliants from a railway over which the Crown had contracted to give them entire control. Compare also the Canadian case, Robertson v. R. (1882),

6 S. C. R. 52.

The claim in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. R., [1905] 2 K. B. 391; 74 L. J. K. B. 753, partook at least as much of tort as of contract.

In Broadbent & Co. v. R. (1900), not reported, the claim being in respect of the seizure by the Admiralty of certain slates alleged to belong to the suppliants, the fiat was granted, but the Crown demurred on two grounds, one of which was that the seizure complained of was a tort. See the precedents below, pp. 403, 405.

Personal Estate of Deceased Intestates.

The fiat has been granted to numerous petitions of right lodged by claimants to personal estate in the hands of the Crown's nominee, or otherwise in the possession of the Crown, owing to the death of the possessor without known kin. Such petitions are generally assigned to the Chancery Division. We may instance the petitions of right of Kelly (1900), Sheridan (1893), Axford, Mullett, Tait, Colledge (1898), and Palmes, none of them reported; Monckton v. A.-G. (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 402; s. n. In re Robson (1846), 2 Ph. 84; and In re Brooke's Settlement, not reported, cited in 5 N. R. at p. 103.

An ordinary inquiry as to next of kin is ordered and judgment follows accordingly. Sometimes, as in Tait's case, the Crown has obtained an extension of the time for putting in an answer, and, after making inquiries, has admitted the claim.

By the Intestates' Estates Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 71), s. 3 (p. 735), "After the passing of this Act an information or other proceeding on the part of Her Majesty shall not be filed or instituted, and a petition of right shall not be presented in respect of the personal estate of any deceased person, or any part or share thereof, or any claim thereon, except within the same time and subject to the same rules of law and equity in and subject to which an action for the like purpose might be brought by or against a subject."

Duties Paid.

Probate, Legacy, and Succession Duty.

See Percival v. R. (1864), 3 H. & C. 217; 33 L: J. Ex. 289; Stern v. R., [1896] 1 Q. B. 211; 65 L. J. Q. B. 240; De Lancey v. R. (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 140; 41 L. J. Ex. 64; Perry's Executors v. R. (1868), L. R. 4 Ex. 27; 8. n. Bacon v. R., 38 L. J. Ex. 5; Crossman v. R. (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 256; 56 L. J. Q. B. 241. In In re Nathan (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 461 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 229, the Court expressed the opinion that a petition of right was the proper procedure to obtain the repayment of probate duty, and the Attorney-General went so far as to undertake, not merely that he would advise that the fiat should be granted, but that the fiat would be granted. These remarks will apply also to the duty on the property of bodies corporate and unincorporate.

Estate Duty.

The Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30), s. 10 (1) (p. 744), provides for an appeal to the High Court by any person aggrieved by the decision of the Inland Revenue Commissioners with respect to the repayment of any excess of duty paid, and on the decision of the Court that the duty ought to be less than that paid to the Commissioners, the excess is to be repaid. In cases which do not fall within this section, or to which this section is for any reason inapplicable, as, for instance, if the time therein limited has elapsed, a petition of right will lie for the return of estate duty. Sect. 8 of the Act, it is to be observed, provides that the existing law and practice relating to death duties is to apply, so far as they are applicable and subject to the provisions of the Act, to the collection, recovery, and repayment of estate duty. Miles' Petition of Right, not reported, and Winans v. R. (1907), 23 T. L. R. 705, are instances of petitions under this head.

Excise and Customs Duties.

Carron Co. Ltd.'s Petition of Right (1902) claimed the repayment of customs duty alleged to have been wrongly exacted.

Dickson v. R. (1865), 11 H. L. C. 175, was a petition of right to obtain the return of a sum alleged to have been overpaid in respect of a grocer's excise licence. Richard's Petition of Right (1901) concerned a similar subject-matter, but the fiat was refused on the facts as disclosed in the petition.

In Malkin v. R., [1906] 2 K. B. 886; 75 L. J. K. B. 884, the suppliant sought the return of a contribution to the compensation

fund under the Licensing Act, 1904 (4 Edw. VII. c. 23), s. 3, which the Commissioners of Inland Revenue had compelled him to pay in respect of a provisionally renewed on-licence.

Light Dues and other Sums paid under the Merchant Shipping Acts.

Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. R., [1901] 2 K. B. 686; 70 L. J. K. B. 845, was a petition of right claiming the return of light dues alleged to have been overpaid owing to the refusal of the officials to deduct the crew space occupied by lascars, on the ground that it ought to have been spacious enough to comply with the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, but did not do so. Judgment was given against the suppliants. The pleadings are printed below, p. 408.

In this case the Crown was willing to grant its fiat to the petition, but it is not altogether clear that the General Lighthouse Fund is such a Crown fund, or " King's treasure," as to make moneys paid into it the subject of petition of right. The Merchant Shipping (Mercantile Marine Fund) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 44), s. 1, separated the General Lighthouse Fund from the Mercantile Marine Fund, and directed that such moneys as were not thereby made payable to the General Lighthouse Fund, and which had until then been payable to the Mercantile Marine Fund, should in future be paid into the Exchequer. No definite conclusion can be drawn from this provision as to whether the Mercantile Marine Fund, or the General Lighthouse Fund, was or is to be regarded as a Crown fund. The following sections, however, of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), seem to bear upon the matter:-By sect. 648 (3), light dues are to be paid by the general lighthouse authorities to His Majesty's Paymaster-General; the same is the case with colonial light dues (sect. 672). By sect. 678 (now repealed) Parliament subsidised the Mercantile Marine Fund. By sect. 679 (1), as amended by the Act of 1898, s. 1 (c), accounts of the General Lighthouse Fund are to be deemed to be public accounts within the meaning of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 39), s. 33, and by sect. 679 (2), they are to be laid before Parliament every year by the Board of Trade. The sums paid into the fund are those mentioned in sect. 676 (1) (i), and the expenses paid thereout are specified in sects. 531 (2), 677 (i). The expenses are to be fixed and approved by the Crown by Order in Council and by the Board of Trade, under sect. 659 and sect. 660 respectively.

It is not altogether easy to determine from these provisions, whether moneys in the General Lighthouse Fund can be the subject of petition of right or not; the author inclines to the view that they

are not. It seems clear, however, that the other sums paid under the Merchant Shipping Acts, and now paid into the Exchequer by virtue of sect. I of the Act of 1898, are the proper subject of petition of right.

Stamp Duty.

Brown's Petition of Right (1903) was a petition of right for the return of stamp duty, presented by a stockbroker.

Land Tax.

The author is not acquainted with any instance of a petition of right for the return of land tax, but it would seem, on general principles, that such a petition would lie; and he is unaware of any provision in the numerous Acts relating to land tax which would prevent it.

Tolls.

Northam Bridge Co. v. R. (1887), 55 L. T. 759, was a petition of right claiming a declaration that persons in the service of the Post Office were liable to pay tolls in like manner as other persons, an account and payment. The petition was dismissed on demurrer.

Tomline v. R. (1879), 4 Ex. D. 252; 48 L. J. Ex. 453, was a petition of right claiming certain tolls on goods carried over the suppliant's jetty under an agreement between the suppliant and the Crown.

Rent and Mesne Profits.

Ryan's Petition of Right was for arrears of rent of a house vested in and occupied by the War Department. The Crown paid the amount claimed and costs. In the action of Ryan v. Earl de Grey and Ripon (1865), 11 Ir. Jur. (N. S.) 236, an attempt had been made to sue the Secretary of State for War for the rent, and the action had been dismissed on the ground that a petition of right was the proper remedy. See also, as to mesne profits, below, p. 443.

Compensation for Land taken.

Blundell v. R., [1905] 1 K. B. 516; 74 L. J. K. B. 91, was a petition of right lodged by a person, whose lands had been compulsorily taken under the Defence Acts. An award had been made in two parts, one of compensation for the value of the land, the other of compensation for injurious affection. The Crown argued that no sum was payable under the latter head, where land was taken under the Defence Acts. Judgment was given for the suppliant.

Incorporated Society for Promoting Protestant Schools in Ireland v. R., [1900] 1 I. R. 464, was a petition of right in respect of lands

taken under still more ancient Defence Acts of 1803 and 1804, claiming that the Crown should continue to pay rent, or remove the buildings erected by it on the lands, or pay compensation for the damage done; or, in the alternative, that the War Department were bound, as an ordinary tenant would be, to restore the lands to their original condition on the termination of the tenancy. Reluctant judgment for the Crown.

Baring's Petition of Right may be mentioned here. It claimed damages for breach of covenant in the erection of works under the Defence Act, 1860, and was compromised by the Crown by the purchase of the property in respect of which the covenant was given.

Pensions.

The question of petitions of right by military and civil servants of the Crown after dismissal, are dealt with in the next chapter (p. 354), where it is pointed out that they hold office at the Crown's pleasure only, and have in general no claim to compensation for dismissal, or to the payment of pensions. But apart from such exceptions, a petition of right would no doubt lie for the recovery of a pension or arrears of a pension, and even in the case of a civil servant, where the servant was entitled by statute or otherwise. The remedy is suggested in Oldham v. Lords of the Treasury, cited 6 Sim. 220. In Murray's Petition of Right, arrears of pension were claimed. The petition received the fiat, and was settled by the Crown on payment of six years' arrears and future payment of the pension.

Owens v. R., [1900] 2 I. R. 513, was a petition of right lodged by a teacher claiming a pension of a certain amount under the National School Teachers (Ireland) Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 74), on the ground that there was a contract between the Treasury and himself, that subsequent rules made by the Lord Lieutenant with the approval of the Treasury could not vary such contract, and that such rules were ultra vires. Whether the form of this petition was such that it ought to have received the fiat seems to be dubious. The suppliant, it appears, was not at the time in receipt of a pension, and merely sought a declaration that he would become entitled to a pension of a certain amount by the deduction of certain premiums from his salary, whereas the Treasury claimed to make a larger deduction.

Money taken in Execution by the Crown.

For an instance of a petition of right by bankers claiming money and other property extended by the Crown to answer a debt to the