Claims may be entered at any time before process issued or order obtained for realising the property returned into Court; they are to be entered in the respective records and in the claim book. (Rule 107, p. 769.) If part only of the property is claimed, the remainder may be dealt with as if there had been no claim. (Rule 106, p. 769.) As to the appearance of third parties, see what is said below.

Pleas.

The solicitor of the Department, who is conducting the matter, on the claim being entered, may serve a notice requiring the defendant to plead in fourteen days from service of the notice, otherwise judgment, and such time may be extended by order of a judge. (Exchequer Rule 49, p. 761.) The pleadings are to be delivered as in other cases. (Rule 50, p. 761; see the practice below, pp. 227, 231.) A recent form of pleas and of a replication by the Attorney-General are printed below, pp. 276, 277. See also the more formal pleas in West, App., pp. 94 sqq. For an order to strike out part of a plea (which ought to have been made by a judge in Chambers), see below, p. 277.

The general principles governing the traverse of an inquisition taken under an extent are the same as those which govern a traverse of an inquisition of escheat, as to which see below, p. 438, and reference must be made to the general article on pleading below, p. 561.

The inquisition, of course, serves as the Crown's declaration, and the Crown only pleads in replication, and, if necessary, in surrejoinder. The plea may be either a denial or an allegation of discharge of the debt on the part of the extendee or those claiming under him, or it may be a claim by third parties who claim to be owners of, or to have some overriding interest in, the property which has been extended as being the property of the extendee.

A third party who so pleads must, on the general principle referred to on pp. 182, 564, not merely deny the property of the extendee; he must set up a title in himself, and not merely demur. (R. v. Soulby (1827), 1 Y. & J. 249.) A reported instance of such a claim by a third party (who claimed a lien on the extended property) will be found in A.-G. v. Trueman (1843), 11 M. & W. 694; 13 L. J. Ex. 70. As to compelling the Crown to reply, see p. 218.

No time for rejoinder is fixed in the rules. The time formerly was four days (West, 214), and this should probably be adhered to now. There is no reason why the defendant should not demur in a proper case, though there seems to be no instance in the case of an extent,

where this has been done.

But it will probably be more advisable to move to set aside the extent before pleading. (See above, p. 200.)

Trial and Judgment.

See the practice below, pp. 223, 232, Manning, Exch. Pr. (ed. 2), pp. 119 sqq., and the remarks on amoreas manus above, p. 201.

Costs.

See the general article on costs below, p. 618. Costs on an extent were formerly taxed in the King's Remembrancer's Department. (R. v. Collingridge (1816), 3 Price, 280.)

Extents in Chief in the First Degree, other than Immediate Extents.

These are extents which follow on a judgment obtained for, or other debt of record due to, the Crown (including bonds, under 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 36), or debts which have been made debts of record by a commission to find debts. The procedure is similar to that followed in the case of immediate extents, with the exception of the affidavit of debt and danger, and it seems that a fiat is required except in the case of extents on judgment debts. On a judgment the Crown has an extent as of right, without any other formality than the præcipe for the writ.

Extents in Chief in the Second and Subsequent Degrees.

Where the inquisition returns a debt owing to the extendee, that debt in its turn becomes the proper subject of an extent, and an extent in the second degree, either immediate or not, may issue to seize it, in a similar manner to an extent in chief in the first degree. The debt, by the inquisition, has become a Crown debt of record, and the debtor paravaile a Crown debtor. The Crown may proceed by extent in the second degree before it has actually endeavoured to realise its debt out of the property of the primary debtor. (R. v. Larking (1820), 8 Price, 683.) As to the time of issuing the writ, see R. v. Pearson (1816), West, 242, but Exchequer Rule 48 (p. 761) now provides that an immediate extent in the second degree may be issued without waiting the time therein mentioned. There seems to be no limit to the number of degrees in which extents in chief may be issued; it is otherwise in the case of extents in aid. (A.-G. v. Poultney (1665), Hard. 403.) The practice follows closely that described above in the case of extents in the first degree, except that the writ and inquisition on the original extent must be produced to

the judge in Chambers, with an affidavit declaring that the defendant was found indebted to the primary debtor under the inquisition, and (in the case of an immediate extent) that there is danger of the debt being lost. The writ will recite the inquisition. The defendant will be able to plead that no debt was due from the primary debtor to the Crown, and also may plead anything which would be a good defence as between himself and the primary debtor.

Extents in Aid.

In the case of an extent in chief in the second and subsequent degrees, it is the Crown which proceeds for its own benefit against the debtor of a Crown debtor or against that debtor's debtor and so on; in the case of an extent in aid the Crown debtor employed the prerogative process to recover debts due to him, ostensibly in order that he might be able to pay the Crown, but mainly for his own advantage. The commonest case was that of a surety, the procedure being based on 25 Edw. I. (9 Hen. III., Ruff.), c. 8, which provides that sureties, who have had to pay their principal's debt, may have the lands and rents of the debtor. But the superior efficacy of the prerogative process naturally made the subject more and more eager to employ it, on the same principle as that on which an imprisoned debtor was anxious to assert himself to be a Crown debtor, since he was thereby removed to a prison which was (by comparison) more salubrious. (See 1 Rich. II. c. 12, s. 4.) The practice, therefore, arose of procuring the issue of an extent pro formâ against the Crown debtor (which could easily be done, since most people are in debt to the Crown for current taxes, if for nothing else); or pro majori cautelȧ, an assignment of some debt could be made to the Crown, a mischief alluded to in 7 Jac. I. c. 15 (see above, p. 153), and thereupon the Crown debtor was enabled to obtain an extent in aid for his own purposes against his own debtor. This ingenious process was limited at first to the third degree (Ewin's Case (1678), Park. 259; R. v. Boon's Estate (1743), Park. 16; A.-G. v. Poultney (1665), Hard. 403), but later it was extended to the fourth degree, by excluding the Crown debtor himself from the reckoning. (R. aux. Austin & Co. v. Lushington (1814), 1 Price, 94.) It may have been this last case which drew attention to the scandal. At any rate the Extents in Aid Act, 1817 (57 Geo. III. c. 117), ss. 1-5, by limiting the procedure to its more legitimate application, had the effect of rendering extents in aid, in the end, practically obsolete. It enacts (i) that the amount of the debt due to the Crown is to be stated in the fiat, and that the amount to be stated in the writ is to be, if the debt due to the Crown

debtor equals or exceeds the debt due to the Crown, the amount of the former, but if it is less than the debt due to the Crown, the amount of the latter. (ii) If the amount levied exceeds the amount endorsed on the writ, the balance is to be paid into Court, and paid out, on application, as the Court thinks fit. (iii) The Act is not to affect the ordinary remedies of the Crown debtor against his debtor. (iv) The following persons are not entitled to extents in aid-(a) simple contract debtors to the Crown; (b) persons indebted to the Crown by bond for paying any duties or sums of money in respect of their trades, professions or businesses; (c) sub-distributors of stamps who have given bonds to the Crown; (d) sureties by bond to the Crown, until they prove that the Crown has demanded payment from them in default of their principal, and then only to the amount of such demand; (e) sureties by bond to the Crown for the payment of duties by insurance companies.

This prohibition, however, does not extend to persons who are simple contract debtors to the Crown by reason of the collection or receipt of money arising from the Revenue for the Crown's use, if such persons are bound by bond to pay over such money.

It is important to notice that a Crown debtor cannot continue to utilise prerogative process, either by extent in aid or otherwise, against his own debtor after his own debt to the Crown has been paid. (R. aux. Hollis v. Bingham (1833), 2 Cr. & J. 130; 1 Cr. & M. 862; 2 L. J. Ex. 266.) This case must be taken to overrule the resolution in R. v. Clarke (1726), Bunb. 221.

For the practice in the case of the use of prerogative process by sureties who have paid the Crown's debt, see R. v. Robinson (1855), 1 H. & N. 275, n.; R. v. Salter (1856), 1 H. & N. 274. Similarly, persons in this position have a right to the remedy by scire facias. (R. v. Fay (1878), 4 L. R. Ir. 606.)

The Extents in Aid Act, 1817, and other causes having rendered extents in aid practically obsolete, for further information regarding them the reader is referred to West on Extents, pp. 251 sqq. (though West, it must be remembered, wrote before the passing of the statute), and Manning, Exch. Pr. (ed. 2), pp. 71 sqq.

The practice resembles that described above in the case of an immediate extent in chief in the first degree. The affidavit, however, must state (see forms in West, App., pp. 33 sqq.), (i.) the debt due from the prosecutor to the Crown; (ii.) the debt due to the prosecutor from his debtor or from his debtor's debtor, and so on; (iii.) the danger arising from the insolvency of such debtor, his debtor, and so on; (iv.) that such debt is due to the prosecutor originally and bonâ fide, without any trust; (v.) that it has not been put in suit in any other

Court; (vi) that the prosecutor is consequently unable to satisfy the Crown, and that the Crown is in danger of losing its debt.

The extent pro formâ is then granted, on which the prosecutor must prove his indebtedness to the Crown. It was said in R. aux. Hill v. Hornblower (1822), 11 Price, 29, that he must do so by virå voce evidence, and not merely by the affidavit on which the extent was granted, but this case was disapproved of in R. v. Ryle (1841), 9 M. & W. 227; 11 L. J. Ex. 234, where it was said that it gave satisfaction to no one except the author of West on Extents. On the return of the inquisition, the affidavit, the bond, if any, the extent and the inquisition are taken before the judge in Chambers, and a fiat is given for the extent in aid, which is then proceeded with in the regular way.

Diem Clausit Extremum.

This writ is based on 25 Edw. I. (9 Hen. VIII., Ruff.), c. 18, which provides: "If any one holding of us lay fee do die, and our sheriff or bailiff do shew our letters patent of our summons for the debt which the dead man did owe to us, it shall be lawful for our sheriff and bailiff to attach and inventory all the goods and chattels of the dead being found in the lay fee to the value of the same debt, by the view of lawful men, yet so that nothing thereof shall be taken away until there be paid unto us the debt clearly made to appear; and the residue shall be left to the executors to perform the testament of the dead; and if nothing be owing unto us by him, all the chattels shall go to the use of the dead, saving to his wife and his children their reasonable parts."

It has already been noted that the death of a Crown debtor does not affect an extent tested before his death (p. 192), but the writ of diem clausit extremum is the equivalent of an extent tested after his death. Formerly a commission to find the debt and the death was necessary before the issue of the writ, but now, by the Crown Suits, &c. Act, 1865, s. 47 (p. 699), it is provided, as in the case of an extent, that such a commission is no longer required, and the writ is issued on an affidavit of debt and death. This section, therefore, also disposes in the negative of the query (see R. v. Hassell's Estate (1824), 13 Price, 279), whether it was necessary to allege danger as well as death in the affidavit. It also appears to abolish the effect of the cases which rested on the distinction between debts of the deceased to the Crown which were of record in his lifetime and those which were not, such as R. v. Boon's Estate (1743), Park. 16; R. v. Curtis (1750), Park. 95; and A.-G. v. Perry (1734), 2 Com. 481; and apparently also