General being vacant, was good. In R. v. Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. 2527, 2554, Lord Mansfield, C.J., says: "Suppose the AttorneyGeneral out of the realm, or under a disability from sickness, suppose the office of Attorney-General vacant-when it is, the business (which cannot stand still) must devolve upon another of the King's Counsel, and there is nothing so certain as that the whole business and authority of the Attorney devolves upon the Solicitor-General." It is quite plain from these passages that the Solicitor-General may take the place and perform the functions of the Attorney-General for all purposes, either when the Attorney-General is absent in any way, or incapacitated, or when his office is vacant. In the case of proceedings on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division this is specifically provided for by the Crown Suits, &c. Act, 1865, s. 5 (1), below, p. 692. We find the Solicitor-General for Ireland filing an information and bill with relators in S.-G. v. Dublin Corporation (1877), Ir. R. 10 Eq. 512; 1 L. R. Ir. 166. In S.-G. v. Bath Corporation (1849), 18 L. J. Ch. 275, we find an information filed by the Solicitor-General during the vacancy of the Attorney-General's office, and heard together with a supplemental information filed by the subsequently appointed Attorney-General. S.-G. v. Law Reversionary Interest Society (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 233; 42 L. J. Ex. 146, was an information filed by the Solicitor-General because the Attorney-General happened to be a director of the defendant society. So it was held by Lord Eldon, L.C., in E. p. Skinner (1817), 2 Mer. 453, that a certificate approving of a petition with regard to a charity should only be signed by the Solicitor-General when the office of Attorney-General was vacant.

Occasionally, where separate interests of the Crown require representation, or where the Crown requires representation independently of the formal appearance of the Attorney-General, as for instance in the case of an information with relators (see A.-G. v. Galway Corporation (1829), 1 Moll. 95, 101, n.), or in the case of proceedings relating to a charity, or where a friendly suit is necessary for the determination of some question of importance to the Crown, both the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General may be made parties, or may attend the hearing. A very good instance of such separate representation will be found in A.-G. v. Dean and Canons of Windsor (1860), 8 H. L. C. 369; 30 L. J. Ch. 529, where the Attorney-General appeared for himself as informant, the Solicitor-General for the Crown, and other counsel for the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. This was a case where the Attorney-General was making a claim on behalf of a charity which was inconsistent with alleged rights of the Crown. A similar case was A.-G. v. Bristol Corporation (1820), 2 Jac. & W. 294, see especially p. 312; see also A.-G. v. Ironmongers' Co. (1833), 2 My. & K. 576, 578, n.; A.-G. v. Vivian (1826), 1 Russ. 226, 238; and Ellis v.

Duke of Bedford, [1899] 1 Ch. 494, at pp. 504, 518; 68 L. J. Ch. 289, at pp. 295, 297. In A.-G. v. Duke of Richmond, Gordon and Lennox (No. 2), [1907] 2 K. B. 940; 76 L. J. K. B. 1049, the AttorneyGeneral appeared for the Inland Revenue Commissioners, claiming estate duty, while the Solicitor-General appeared for the Parliamentary trustees of the defendant's estates.

The Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The position of the Crown in respect of the Duchy of Lancaster is discussed above, p. 3. Under the Intestates Estates Act, 1884, sect. 8 (p. 736), the Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster takes the place of the Attorney-General for the purposes of the Duchy. The Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster cannot exhibit an information in the High Court. (A.-G. of the Duchy of Lancaster v. Duke of Devonshire (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 195; 54 L. J. Q. B. 271.) As to proceedings by him in the Palatine Court, see A.-G. of the Duchy of Lancaster v. London & North Western Railway Co., [1892] 3 Ch. 274; 62 L. J. Ch. 271; A.-G. of the Duchy of Lancaster v. Liverpool New Cattle Market Co. (1896), 12 T. L. R. 261; and A.-G. of the Duchy of Lancaster v. Blackpool Corporation (1907), 71 J. P. 478, the last two cases being proceedings by information with a relator.

Whatever precedence the Attorney-General of the Duchy has in the Courts of the Duchy, he has no precedence over any of his seniors at the Bar in other Courts. (See Case of A.-G. and L.A. (1834), 2 Cl. & F. 481, 487; Paddock v. Forrester (1842), 3 Man. & G. 903, 920, n.) In the case of an illegitimate and unmarried lunatic, who lived in Lancashire and had copyholds holden of the Duchy of Lancaster, it was held that the Crown was sufficiently represented in the lunacy proceedings by the Attorney-General, and the Court refused to give the Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster leave to attend in addition. (In re Kershaw (1882), 21 Ch. D. 613.)

The Attorneys-General of the Queen Consort and of the Prince of Wales and Duke of Cornwall.

The position and functions of these officers are dealt with above, at pp. 6 and 7 respectively.

The Treasury Solicitor and the Solicitors to other Government

Departments.

The Revenue Solicitors Act, 1828 (9 Geo. IV. c. 25), s. 1, provides that whenever any person has been or is or shall be appointed to be solicitor or attorney on behalf of His Majesty under the orders and

directions of the Commissioners of the Treasury, Customs, Excise, or Stamps, or of any Commissioners or other persons having the management of any other branch of the Revenue, such person may act and practise as such solicitor or attorney under such orders and directions in all Courts and places in any part of the United Kingdom, all laws or usages notwithstanding. (See West v. Taunton (1830), 6 Bing. 404; 8 L. J. (O. S.) C. P. 129.) Consequently the Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), s. 47, expressly exempts from its provisions any persons appointed to be solicitors of the Treasury, Customs, Excise, Post Office, Stamp Duties, or any other branch of the Revenue, and also the personages who are now represented by the Treasury Solicitor and his Assistants, acting for the affairs of the Admiralty and the War Office. A similar provision is to be found in sect. 50 of the Attorneys and Solicitors Act (Ireland), 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 84). They are also exempted by the general words of sect. 33 of the Solicitors Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 127).

The Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 68), s. 12, declares that a person shall be deemed to be duly qualified, for the purpose of avoiding the penalties imposed by the section, if he has been appointed to be solicitor of the Treasury, Customs, Inland Revenue, Post Office, or other branch of the Revenue, or of any Public Department, including the Department of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and of the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty, or if he be a clerk or officer appointed to act for the solicitor for any Public Department as therein before described.

It will be observed from these provisions that, though the clerks and officers acting for the above-mentioned solicitors are exempt from the penalties attaching to unqualified persons acting as solicitors, yet they are not definitely given power to act and practise in any Court, that power being only conferred on the solicitors themselves. It is, however, specially provided, in the case of the Customs, by the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 36), s. 273 (below, p. 728), that the solicitor and assistant solicitor of the Customs, or any clerk directed by them, may act as counsel, solicitor, &c. in a Customs case in any Court, and that they or any officer of Customs under the direction of the Commissioners may conduct any Customs proceeding before justices. So, in the case of the Inland Revenue, by the Inland Revenue Regulation Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 21), s. 27 (below, p. 742), any officer or person employed or authorised by the Inland Revenue Commissioners, or by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue in that behalf may, although not a solicitor, advocate, or writer to the signet, conduct any proceeding before any justice of the peace or sheriff relating to Inland Revenue, and the Finance Act, 1896

C.P.

C

(59 & 60 Vict. c. 28), s. 38, adds that any solicitor authorised by the Commissioners may appear in, conduct, or defend such proceedings in any County Court in England or Ireland.

The Treasury Solicitor stands in a very special position. By the Treasury Solicitor Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 18), s. 1: "The person for the time being holding the office of Solicitor for the affairs of Her Majesty's Treasury shall be a corporation sole by the name of the Solicitor for the affairs of Her Majesty's Treasury, and by that name shall have perpetual succession, with a capacity to acquire and hold in that name lands, Government securities, shares in any public company, securities for money, and real and personal property of every description, to sue and be sued, to execute deeds, using an official seal, to make leases, to enter into engagements binding on himself and his successors in office, and to do all other acts necessary or expedient to be done in the execution of his office. Any document purporting to be sealed with the said official seal shall be receivable in evidence of the particulars stated in such document."

By sect. 3, an Assistant Solicitor for the affairs of Her Majesty's Treasury may do anything which the Treasury Solicitor is required or authorised to do for the purpose of any Act, or otherwise in the execution of his duties.

The Treasury Solicitor is also Director of Public Prosecutions, and at present is also King's Proctor (see below, p. 19).

The statutes relating to the Treasury Solicitor were discussed at some length in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, [1903] 1 K. B. 289; 72 L. J. K. B. 188, where it was sought to be argued that the Treasury Solicitor could not, even by direction of the Crown, act as solicitor for a private individual (in that case the Archbishop), but could only act in his official capacity, and that if he so acted he was It was an unqualified person, and his client could not recover costs. held that if the Crown thought proper to order him to appear for a private person, he was a duly qualified solicitor when so appearing, and that his client could recover his costs. The head-note to the case in adding "in any matter in which the Crown has an interest" does not seem to be quite correct. If the Crown chose to order the Treasury Solicitor to appear for any person, the Court could not inquire whether, in fact, the Crown's interests were concerned or not.

It should be added that, by a new rule (Ord. XXXVII. r. 60), where a commission rogatoire, or letter of request, is transmitted to the Supreme Court by the Foreign Office, with an intimation that it is desirable that effect should be given to it without requiring an application to be made to the Court by the agents of any of the parties, the Senior Master is to transmit it to the Treasury Solicitor, who may

thereupon, with the consent of the Treasury, make such application and take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to it in accordance with Rules 54 to 58 of the Order.

On receiving the commis-ion rogatoire, or letter of request, from the Senior Master, the Treasury Solicitor applies parte, with an affidavit setting out such receipt and the person who, and the time and place which, have been discovered to be suitable for the examination of the witnesses in question, obtains an order for the examination of the witnesses before such person and at such time and place under Ord. XXXVII. r. 54, and serves the order on the witnesses. The examiner sends the examination to the Senior Master under Ord. XXXVII. r. 57, and the Treasury Solicitor sends to the Senior Master a statement showing the expenses incurred, if payment thereof by the foreign Government is sought. The Senior Master then transmits the papers and the examination to the Foreign Office under Ord. XXXVII. r. 57, with an intimation that the expenses incurred in giving effect to the commission rogatoire, or letter of request, are as stated in the Treasury Solicitor's notification to that effect. (In re Galavis and Hermann (1907), not reported.)

The position and duties of the Treasury Solicitor with respect to petitions of right and probate and administration on behalf of the Crown are dealt with below under their appropriate headings, pp. 384, 464, 495.

The King's Proctor.

The Treasury Solicitor at present doubles the part of King's Proctor with his own. His duties in the latter capacity in Divorce and Admiralty matters are dealt with below, pp. 501, 513.

The Director of Public Prosecutions.

The appointment and duties of this official are provided for by the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 22), and Regulations made thereunder. By the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 58), s. 2, it is enacted that the Treasury Solicitor for the time being shall be the Director of Public Prosecutions, and that the Assistant Solicitors to the Treasury may act for him.

There is no provision for suits by or against this official, but in Stubbs v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 577; 59 L. J. Q. B. 201, we find an action against him for the costs of criminal proceedings alleged to be payable by him. The action appears to have been brought by consent and was decided on a special case.