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" of abandoning his most perfect work, and letting it "perish eternally, for want of means to restore it; or, "in other words, it supposes the infinitely wise and perfect Being to propose a Design, in which He miscarries; and which He is not able to accomplish through the immense Space of Eternity." The Author suggests some other Considerations, such as these, viz. That Evil not being eternal in its Origin, will not be eternal in its Duration; and that Punishment being a violent State, a forced Situation, it consequently cannot endure for ever, which, however, supposing the Truth of them, fall short of his Design; since a Period may be put to these things, whether there be a Restoration, or not.

His first Proposition, that the Deity has but one Design in Creating things, is either no Truth at all, or however a Truth which cannot be admitted in terminis, without Explanation. The Happiness of the Creatures may be one End, but there is no Reason to make it the sole and only End, of the Creation. The Deity might have some Regard to himself;-to the Display and Manifestation of his own Attributes and Perfections. We at least are commanded to do every thing to the Glory of God, and are taught to pray for the Advancement of his Glory. And it is hard to conceive, how that should be made the first Thing in our Prayers, and the chief End of our Actions, which to the Deity himself is no End at all. It is no Reply to this, to say that the Happiness of his Creatures tends to the Glory of God; or that his Glory is display'd and promoted in their Happiness. For allowing this, still they are distinct Ideas; and one is not precisely a See p. 353. Conf. p. 395. 406.

b See p. 398. Conf. p. 284.

the other. The Glory of God is display'd in the Happiness of his Creatures, and it is also display'd by other ways;-display'd even by just and righteous Punishment. For this is a Manifestation of some, or other, of his glorious Perfections. In short, every wise and good End accomplish'd by the Creation of the World, was intended by the Creator; for there is no reason to exclude one more than another, from a Mind, which takes in every thing, at one comprehensive View.

He foresaw what would befall his Creatures; that is, He foresaw the Misery which some of them would bring upon themselves, notwithstanding all his Care, notwithstanding all the Dispositions of his good Providence, and all the Dispensations of his Grace, to prevent it. But still this was not a sufficient Reason, why he should forbear the Exercise of his Creating Power: Because, more good, infinitely more good, upon the whole, was produced by executing his Design, than by dropping it. If indeed he had foreseen that all his Creatures would become miserable, that he should be able to make none of them happy, or none in comparison of the rest; that is, if he had foreseen that more Evil would be produced than Good, that Evil finally, and upon the whole, would be prepollent; there may be some reason to say, that in such a Case, and upon such terms, He would not have exerted his Creating Power. Not that even Then any Creature could complain of being injured, if he was so far from being created necessarily miserable, that he had a fair Offer of everlasting Happiness. But whatever the Deity might, or might not, have done, in the Case supposed; we have no Concern with it at present; as we have all the reason in the

world to think, that the Good produced by the Creation will be vastly prepollent, and that no one Individual is created necessarily and unavoidably miserable. And upon this footing I have prov'd before, that it is consistent with the Divine Perfections to create intelligent and free Beings; tho' it had been better for some of them, through their own Perverseness, if they had never been born.

The Purpose of God is to render Men happy in a certain Order; that is, agreeable to their free Nature, and the Nature of things; and without forcing their Liberty. This Purpose cannot be defeated. But the Question is, whether the Resistance of Man inay not go so far, that no Method can be found out to bring him to Repentance and Holiness, consistently with this Order, and this Purpose? I don't see how the Affirmative of this, supposes in God a helpless Wisdom. No Power can perform Impossibilities, no Wisdom can reconcile Contradictions. His Wisdom may produce Good out of Evil; and make these Creatures of use or other in the Creation, in ways and methods which we are not aware of. But it may be impossible to restore them in the sense here meant, that is, to bring them to Glory and Virtue, by any means whatsoever. Force is intirely out of the Question, as being utterly incompetent, and incongruous to the End proposed; and moral Means may have lost all their Influence. If this be the Case, there is no room for Wisdom to exert itself in their favour; or to contrive any methods to bring them to Repentance and Holiness. For Wisdom, the more perfect it is, is the farther remov'd from doing, or attempting, any thing in vain. Nor does this argue any Defect in the Divine Wisdom, or lay any Imputation

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upon it; any more than it is a Reflection upon Omnipotence to say, that it cannot work Contradictions. "It is not a Limitation of the Divine Goodness" (says Bp. Burnet1) nor, I would add, of his Wisdom, "to 'say, that some Men and some States are beyond it ; no more than it is a Limitation of his Power, to say "that he cannot sin, or cannot do Impossibilities: "For a Goodness towards Persons not capable of

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becoming good, is a Goodness that does not agree "with the infinite Purity and Holiness of God." Nor does this imply that God propos'd a Design, in which he miscarries: For he never design'd to make them happy, by destroying Liberty, by inverting Order, and in contradiction to the Nature, the Reason and Truth of things.

The great Point therefore to be prov'd by the Advocates for a Restoration, is, that the Damned are capable of becoming good. Till this is done, the rest is all Amusement. It is idle and ridiculous to talk of Wisdom's contriving and finding out means of Virtue, with regard to States and Persons incapable of Virtue. And here Dr. Burnet steps in and tells us, that he cannot conceive what can hinder their Amendment, except a supernatural Obduration : nisi divinitus indurentur, unless they are harden'd by God.2 Where I observe, that it is here suppos'd possible that God may harden them; and therefore such an Obduration is not impossible in the nature of things. I would ask therefore why it may not as well be conceiv'd, that free Creatures can thus harden themselves? What the Doctor suggests, "that in the future State there " will be no room for Infidelity; that the Fomes mali 1 Exposition. Art. i. .

2 De Stat. Mort. & Resurg. p. 293.

"will be extinguish'd; that there will be no internal "Concupiscence, and no external Incentive, to feed "and encourage their Vices;" supposing it all true, appears to hurt his Cause as much one way, as it can serve it another. For what is this but excluding Virtue as well as Vice? What is it saying less, than that that State is not a State of Probation, will not admit of any moral Discipline, and is calculated for no moral Improvement at all? Which is indeed the Truth of the Case; and though it be destructive of their Scheme, and tears it up by the Roots, it is the Amount of all they have to offer, when they would persuade us that the wicked in Hell will some time or other become good and virtuous.

His Argument may be reduced to this Dilemma: If the Beings concern'd have Reason and Liberty, they will repent; and if they have not Reason and Liberty, they are no longer to be accounted Men. The Force of which Argument consists in the Idea you annex to the word Man. If by that Term is meant such a Creature as Man is now, while he is in his ProbationState, it implies indeed Reason and Freedom. But suppose such an Agent, for the continued Abuse of these Powers, should be punish'd at last with the loss of one, or both of them, would it mend the matter at all, to dispute whether he is any longer to be call'd a Man? Suppose he is not, (as by the Supposition he is not, in the Sense of free Agency) he is still a Creature, capable of suffering those Punishments which he has brought upon himself. But we know too little what Degrees of Reason the Damn'd will enjoy, or whether any Liberty, as that implies a Power to repent, and become really good, to determine any