tions to that individual, in his private capacity, which his high rank, no less than the respectability of his personal character, so justly demanded. He had never concealed from prince Cimitelli the wish of the British government to know more of the circumstances of the revolution at Naples, before it fixed upon it the formal seal of its sanction. If the hon. and learned gentleman supposed that this declaration had been productive of umbrage between the English and Neapolitan governments, he laboured under considerable mistake. The Neapolitan government would have been very glad to have had its new minister received; but the refusal to receive him had not caused any interruption of friendship between the two states; on the contrary, count Ludolph, who had resigned his papers, was requested to re-assume them, and the diplomatic relations of the two countries remained on the same footing as before the revolution. Sir Robert Wilson, Mr. Brougham, and Mr. Wilberforce participated in the sequel of the debate. On a division, the numbers were, for the motion, 125; against it, 194.

On the 2nd of March, lord Lansdown moved the following address:" To thank his majesty for having been graciously pleased to lay before this House a copy of the despatch to his majesty's missions at foreign courts, on the circular communication addressed by the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to their several missions, relating to the recent transactions in the kingdom of Naples: to express the satis faction which we feel that his majesty has declined becoming a

party to the measure in question, considering them to be no less repugnant to the fundamental principles of the British constitution, than destructive of the established law of nations: and to express an earnest hope, that his majesty will exert all his influence with the allied powers, if not too late, to prevent or to repair the consequences of measures which may eventually disturb the general tranquillity of Europe; and which, especially when considered in combination with the doctrines that have been advanced in their justification, are of most dangerous example to the independence of sovereigns and the security of nations."-Lords Ellenborough, Calthorpe, Holland, and Darnley, supported the motion. Lord Liverpool, expressing his regret at the declaration of the three allied sovereigns, and his condemnation of the principles there laid down, maintained that we had observed a strict neutrality. We took no part against the revolution, because it endangered none of our interests: but had we any right to prescribe a rule of conduct to Austria? Would it be wise to deal in remonstrances, unless we were prepared, in case they were neglected, to enforce them by arms? The result of the debate was-Contents, 37; Notcontents, 84.

On the 20th of March, this subject was again brought into full discussion, on a motion by sir Robert Wilson, for the production of a letter from sir Wm. A'Court to the Neapolitan minister for foreign affairs, in which our ambassador, after declaring the purpose of England to remain neutral, proceeded thus;-" It

will interfere in no way in the affairs of this country, unless such a step should be rendered indispensable by any personal insults or danger to which the royal family may be exposed." Sir Wm. A'Court added, that "not foreseeing the possibility of such a case, he flattered himself that nothing would alter the peaceful attitude in which Great Britain was placed." On this passage, sir R. Wilson observed, that it appeared distinctly, that sir Wm. A'Court thought that we had a right to interfere, if the royal family of Naples were exposed to personal insult or danger; and that he might consider himself justified in ordering the British squadron to bombard Naples, while some commotion took place within the walls, in which insult or danger might be incurred by any branch of the royal family. The assertion of such a power was incompatible with the rights of independent nations, and most injurious and hazardous to our own; for it ought to be recollected, that we could apply no principle of public law to foreigners, which they, in turn, might not apply to ourselves.

Lord Castlereagh protested against the strained interpretation which had been put on sir Wm. A'Court's letter. That letter was a declaration, that we would not interfere in Neapolitan affairs; but that we should protect the royal family, if, under any circumstances, our protection should be needed. It had been so viewed at Naples, and had been received with universal sa

tisfaction.

Mr. Canning discussed the question on general principles. He contended that the imme

diate effect of the course of proceeding, recommended by the opponents of ministers, would be to plunge the country into war. It was alleged, that there were means, by which this country might aid the Neapolitans without committing itself to the issue of their struggle; and it might at least give the sanction of its opinion to the cause of freedom. Not so, said Mr. Canning If it was right that, with a view to favour the progress of liberty, we should declare our alliances broken, and make war against those powers who were now called the oppressors of the earth, in God's name let that course be decidedly taken; and let the country be told, "although you are already heavily burthened, there is yet a great work to perform, and you must buckle to. True, England is saved; but that is not enough: Europe must be regenerated, and at your expense." This might be done, if it were done openly and avowedly; but to adopt such a policy, and to follow it secretly and by by-ways, would only prolong the struggle, aggravate the difficulty, and probably defeat the end. Of all modes of support, which England could extend to other countries, constructive support was the most unfair. Direct support was capable of definition: it might be stated in precise terms, and recorded in stipulations which could not be mistaken. But constructive support, by which the receiving party understood all that they could want, and the bestowing party all that they found it convenient to give, would only leave the miserable victim to finish with her single means, that which she had begun with the

assistance of another. Had England no warning of the effect of such conduct? Let the House look at the case of Parga, in which the accidental expression of a British officer had been construed into a promise on the part of Great Britain, which was to embroil her with a considerable portion of the globe. Suppose such a constructive promise to be given to Naples, and Naples, upon the faith of it, to embark in a contest, which perhaps otherwise she would not have undertaken, what eternal infamy would be cast upon England, should she fail to fight the cause, as though she contended for her own existence, with all the strength and means which exertion could command! Then away with the distinction between war and armed negociation! Unless it was proposed to go even to the last extremity and to involve the existence of England with that of her ally, all mention of support was but a fraud; and was it not romantic to talk of embark ing the country, not on account of duty, alliance, or obligation, but merely as matter of sentiment and feeling, in hostilities in which we had neither interest nor concern? Statesmen should not plunge the country into war, unless its interests coincided with their personal sympathies; and the House would act most unjustly, if they first encouraged the Neapolitans to undertake the war, and then abandoned them in the midst of their difficulties. What ever the House might think of the paper put forth by the allied powers-and no man abjured its principles more fully than he did; whatever the House might think of the condition of Naples, he

believed, that in taking either one side or the other, the country engaged in no short or trifling contest. He would call them visionary statesmen; he would say that they were an ungrateful parliament; if they suffered their feelings to run away with them, and to urge them to acts in contradiction to the interests of the nation. He felt that he should be carrying to a precipice, over which it must inevitably fall, the panting spirit of liberty, if he should undertake to fight its cause with means so scanty, as should compel him to furl his banner before the battle was ended.

Sir James Macintosh denied, that war was either the necessary or the probable result of the policy which he and his friends recommended. Did any man ever hear, that remonstrance from one nation to another must necessarily be followed by war? Did any statesman ever lay down such a principle? On the contrary, did not the history of Europe abound with instances of amicable remon strances against war, which had never been followed by hostilities? If France and England had expressed six months ago their opinion against the aggression on Italy, would that opinion have been despised? Were they sunk so low in the scale of national consequence, as not to be able to prevent their own allies from engaging in such a war? Was it for this, that we were called the protectors of Europe, and boasted of having set Europe free? The policy of early remonstrance would have been pacific, and by neglecting it, war had been ultimately rendered not only more probable, but almost inevitable. Sir J. Macintosh next adverted

to the observations made in de fence of the instructions given to sir Wm. A'Court. No man in that House blamed the government for placing a squadron in the bay of Naples for the protection of British subjects and British property. As to the other object of the squadron-the removal of the royal family in case of danger -it, no doubt, was consistent with neutrality, and therefore it was unnecessary to argue the point. But he would ask one question connected with this topic of protecting the royal family of Naples. They knew that the unfortunate king had been conveyed from Naples in a British ship, when he proceeded to appear before the self-constituted, usurping, tyrannical, and insolent tribunal at Laybach. Had not all Europe read with horror the account given by count de Gallo, first, of the interview between him and prince Metternich, and then of that between him and the poor infatuated monarch himself, in the presence of prince Metternich? From this account, the truth of which could not be doubted, it appeared that the unfortunate monarch had not been allowed to see his old friend and counsellor alone, but had merely been brought, as it were, from his prison, and permitted to hold a conversation with him in the presence of the minister of the allied sovereigns. It was not, therefore, against the violence of the people of Naples, but against that of the monarchs at Laybach, that the royal family required protection. Sir Robert Wilson withdrew his motion.

On the 27th of March, lord Ellenborough moved an address to his majesty praying, that he

would be pleased to offer his me diation to the emperor of Austria, and the government of Naples and Sardinia, with a view to bring about an amicable adjustment of their differences. Lord Aberdeen opposed the motion, which was negatived without a division. No new topics of argument were urged in the debate.

A few days brought the intelligence of the military occupation of Naples by the Austrians; it was in vain to talk any longer of interfering to prevent the inva, sion of the Neapolitan territory, and the conduct of the Neapolitans themselves had been such as to make their warmest partisans ashamed of their cause. Under these circumstances, the subject was allowed for some time to slumber, till the declaration of the allied sovereigns, issued at the breaking up of the congress of Laybach, again roused our English jealousy. On the 20th of June, Mr. Hutchinson concluded a speech, in which he accused the allied sovereigns of conspiring against the liberties of Europe; and our own ministers of being too patient of the monstrous doctrines promulgated by the despots of the continent, by moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, stating to his majesty, that this House, the representatives of a free and enlightened people, has witnessed with the greatest concern and alarm the events which have lately taken place on the continent of Europe; and also the open and insulting avowal of pretensions as novel as they are dangerous, and which are in direct opposition to the principles of our own Revolution, and to

assistance of another. Had England no warning of the effect of such conduct? Let the House look at the case of Parga, in which the accidental expression of a British officer had been construed into a promise on the part of Great Britain, which was to embroil her with a considerable portion of the globe. Suppose such a constructive promise to be given to Naples, and Naples, upon the faith of it, to embark in a contest, which perhaps otherwise she would not have undertaken, what eternal infamy would be cast upon England, should she fail to fight the cause, as though she contended for her own existence, with all the strength and means which exertion could command! Then away with the distinction between war and armed negociation! Unless it was proposed to go even to the last extremity and to involve the existence of England with that of her ally, all mention of support was but a fraud; and was it not romantic to talk of embark ing the country, not on account of duty, alliance, or obligation, but merely as matter of sentiment and feeling, in hostilities in which we had neither interest nor concern? Statesmen should not plunge the country into war, unless its interests coincided with their personal sympathies; and the House would act most unjustly, if they first encouraged the Neapolitans to undertake the war, and then abandoned them in the midst of their difficulties. What ever the House might think of the paper put forth by the allied powers-and no man abjured its principles more fully than he did; whatever the House might think of the condition of Naples, he

believed, that in taking either one side or the other, the country engaged in no short or trifling contest. He would call them visionary statesmen; he would say that they were an ungrateful parliament; if they suffered their feelings to run away with them, and to urge them to acts in contradiction to the interests of the nation. He felt that he should be carrying to a precipice, over which it must inevitably fall, the panting spirit of liberty, if he should undertake to fight its cause with means so scanty, as should compel him to furl his banner before the battle was ended.

Sir James Macintosh denied, that war was either the necessary or the probable result of the po. licy which he and his friends recommended. Did any man ever hear, that remonstrance from one nation to another must necessarily be followed by war? Did any statesman ever lay down such a principle? On the contrary, did not the history of Europe abound with instances of amicable remonstrances against war, which had never been followed by hostilities? If France and England had expressed six months ago their opinion against the aggression on Italy, would that opinion have been despised? Were they sunk so low in the scale of national consequence, as not to be able to prevent their own allies from engaging in such a war? Was it for this, that we were called the protectors of Europe, and boasted of having set Europe free? The policy of early remonstrance would have been pacific, and by neglecting it, war had been ultimately rendered not only more probable, but almost inevitable. Sir J. Macintosh next adverted