incapacitated by law."-Vide Serious Considerations, p. 23. Or thus: "The House, somewhat inaccurately, used the word expelled; they should have called it a motion."-Vide Mungo's Case considered, p. 11. Or, in short, if these arguments should be thought insufficient, we may fairly deny the fact. For example: "I affirm, that he was not re-elected. The same Mr. Wollaston, who was expelled, was not again elected. The same individual, if you please, walked into the House, and took his seat there; but the same person, in law, was not admitted a member of that parliament, from which he had been discarded."-Vide Letter to Junius, p. 12.

SECOND FACT.

Mr. Walpole having been committed to the Tower, and expelled for a high breach of trust, and notorious corruption in a public office, was declared incapable, &c.

ARGUMENT.

From the terms of this vote, nothing can be more evident, than that the House of Commons meant to fix the incapacity upon the punishment, and not upon the crime; but, lest it should appear in a different light to weak, uninformed persons, it may be advisable to gut the resolution, and give it to the public, with all possible solemnity, in the following terms, viz. "Resolved, That Robert Walpole, Esq. having been that session of parliament expelled the House, was and is incapable of being elected member to serve in that present parliament."-Vide Mungo on the Use of Quotations, p. 11.

N. B. The author of the answer to Sir William Meredith, seems to have made use of Mungo's quotation; for in page 18, he assures us, "That the declaratory vote of the 17th of February 1769, was indeed a literal copy of the resolution of the House in Mr. Walpole's case.

THIRD FACT.

His opponent, Mr. Taylor, having the smallest number of votes at the next election, was declared not duly elected.

ARGUMENT.

This fact we consider as directly in point, to prove, that Mr. Luttrell ought to be the sitting member, for the following reasons: "The burgesses of Lynn could draw no other inference from this resolution, but this, that at a future election, and in case of a similar return, the House would receive the same candidate as duly elected, whom they had before rejected.”—Vide Postscript to Junius, p. 37. Or thus: "This their resolution leaves no room to doubt what part they would have taken, if, upon a subsequent re-election of Mr. Walpole, there had been any other candidate in competition with him: for, by their vote, they could have no other intention than to admit such other candidate."-Vide Mungo's Case considered, p. 39. Or take it in this light: The burgesses of Lynn having, in defiance of the House, retorted upon them a person, whom they had branded with the most ignominious marks of their displeasure, were thereby so well entitled to favour and indulgence, that the House could do no less than rob Mr. Taylor of a right legally vested in him, in order that the burgesses might be apprised of the law of parliament; which law the House took a very direct way of explaining to them, by resolving, that the candidate with the fewest votes was not duly elected: "And was not this much more equitable, more in the spirit of that equal and substantial justice, which is the end of all law, than if they had violently adhered to the strict maxims of law?" Vide Serious Considerations, p. 33, 34. "And if the present House of Commons had chosen to follow

the spirit of this resolution, they would have received and established the candidate with the fewest votes."Vide Answer to Sir W. M. p. 18.

Permit me now, sir, to shew you, that the worthy Dr. Blackstone sometimes contradicts the ministry as well as himself. The speech without doors asserts, page 9, "That the legal effect of an incapacity, founded on a judicial determination of a complete court, is precisely the same as that of an incapacity created by act of parliament." Now for the doctor. "The law and

the opinion of the judge are not always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen, that the judge may mistake the law."Commentaries, vol. i. p. 71.

The Answer to Sir W. M. asserts, page 23, "That the returning officer is not a judicial, but a purely ministerial officer. His return is no judicial act." At 'em again doctor. "The sheriff, in his judicial capacity, is to hear and determine causes of forty shillings value and under, in his county court. He has also a judicial power in divers other civil cases. wise to decide the elections of knights of the shire, (subject to the controul of the House of Commons,) to judge of the qualification of voters, and to return such as he shall determine to be duly elected.”—Vide Commentaries, vol. i. p. 332.

He is like

What conclusion shall we draw from such facts, and such arguments, such contradictions? I cannot express my opinion of the present ministry more exactly than in the words of Sir Richard Steele: "That we are governed by a set of drivellers, whose folly takes away all dignity from distress, and makes even calamity ridiculous." PHILO JUNIUS,

LETTER XXIII.

ΤΟ

HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF BEDFORD.

MY LORD,

September 19, 1769.

You are so little accustomed to receive any marks of respect or esteem from the public, that if, in the following lines, a compliment or expression of applause should escape me, I fear you would consider it as a mockery of your established character, and perhaps an insult to your understanding. You have nice feelings, my lord, if we may judge from your resentments. Cautious therefore of giving offence, where you have so little deserved it, I shall leave the illustration of your virtues to other hands. Your friends have a privilege to play upon the easiness of your temper, or possibly they are better acquainted with your good qualities than I am. You have done good by stealth. The rest is upon record. You have still left ample 'room for speculation, when panegyric is exhausted.

You are indeed a very considerable man. The highest rank; a splendid fortune; and a name, glorious till it was yours, were sufficient to have supported you with meaner abilities than I think you possess. From the first, you derive a constitutional claim to respect; from the second, a natural extensive authority; the last created a partial expectation of hereditary virtues. The use you have made of these uncommon advantages might have been more honourable to yourself, but could not